

European Counter-Traditions and the Western Unconscious

by Dr R. James Ferguson

European history and world history, for all the work of critical scholars and deconstructive revisionism, still tends to be viewed in terms of epochs and periods.¹ Combined with a core event or central theme and a sense of 'narrative closure', these factors are sufficient to shape the key historical narratives or storylines that are repeated about the past.² Simply by knowing the time, the general social context and place, we seem assured of having some genuine understanding of the issue at hand.³ Popular histories, often but not always written by experts in the field, remain best sellers, especially when stripped of the references and technical apparatus that supports a strong storyline.⁴ The History Channel suggests to its viewers, with narrative glibness and engrossing visual detail, that we can easily explore not only the main galleries but also the side chambers of history with just a little extra effort. These video documentaries imply that more detail will always be discovered about the past, but for now, this twenty-five or fifty-minute slice of reality is all you need to know (before the series becomes available). The 'past is honored and forgotten',⁵ even as it is positioned within the realm of commercial infotainment. The technical expertise of such products, both written and filmed, conceals their highly constructed, editorialised and inferential nature.

Scholarship is aware of the dangers of such narrative approaches, but instead provides its own layers of theory and methodology to each and every historical event or issue, multiplying the versions of historical events that we can envisage while robbing each one of certainty. In the meantime, the needs of politics, the legitimization of power, and the social imagination that sustain communities⁶ come together to create a series of vital myths and grand narratives that are imbued with conviction as to their meaning and a depth of human creativity that is itself deeply engaging. In spite of the fervent renunciation of such 'foundationalism' by post-modern scholars,⁷ these narratives remain powerful mental and political touchstones. Nations, through leaders and popular memory, mobilise their founding myths just as power needs to warm itself on the touchstone of civilisational values. Power must be justified by moral claims, leadership based on grand vision, the current cycles of destruction and poverty, whether in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq or Sudan are largely the fault of victims (but may be ameliorated through the correct form of intervention). Such stories multiply and dominate media discourses even as critical analysis seeks to undermine, deconstruct and deny them. Big stories, like religious visions, however, are hard to refute. The very scale of a grand vision, whether the 'clash of civilisations', the moral hegemony of the West, the 'axis of evil', or 'globalisation and its discontent' have a dramatic glow that gain them a niche in the human imagination, no matter how far they are from the complex realities of the 20th and 21st centuries. A plausible certainty is often better politically than a complex, uncertain probability supported by examinable facts.

Grand narratives and great traditions imply key phases of historical development, running from the first human use of tools through the various ages that are in effect posited as stages of development. Complex and dangerous theories about human and

cultural evolution lurk behind commonly used terms: the bronze, archaic, classical, antique and medieval ages, the Renaissance, Reformation, Revolutionary, Industrial modern and post-modern periods. More recently, we have been told of the 'end of history' (a very brief period as it turned out), a 'short' twentieth century, and a chorus of voices assured us that September 11, 2001 ushered in a terrorist age with a new global order, noting the down-side of globalization and the supposedly 'border-less' world.⁸

Although historians have recanted the ideas of strict evolutionary development and progress, this is still implied both in popular histories and the way 'surprising' examples of early sophistication are treated. When evolution is insufficient, notions of discontinuity, chaos, or revolutionary change are utilised as similes of that which is not evolutionary. Although intense debate continues to delineate the beginnings and ending of these epochs, they are still used as the main approach in teaching history, in positioning text books and documentaries, and in the setting for fictive books and film. This sense of history, no matter how crude, is structured into the mental life of 'modern' educated people, even when dealing with diverse Asian, American or African cultures. The utility of placing an idea, a person, an invention, or an issue in its historical context is not disputed. However, all of these constructions involve powerful acts of imagination that may hide or exclude as much as they reveal.⁹

In the case of European history and European values, the dominant historical narrative has been repeatedly revised in ongoing cycles of reinterpretation of the past. Some would assure us that the Greeks did not invent the 'West' and that indeed we have to look further to Middle Eastern and Egyptian civilisations for many of the sources of European vitality.¹⁰ Alexander the Great was a butcher and destroyer of civilisations as much as he was hero and founder of the Hellenistic Age (while in 2004 Greek lawyers assured us that he was certainly not bisexual).¹¹ Witches were a phenomena largely created by the social pressures and the projective imagination of the late Middle Ages.¹² The actions of the Spanish Inquisition, though often regrettable, have been greatly exaggerated in a black myth fostered by Protestant propaganda.¹³ Britain is the invention of 19th century English universal education and does not represent a strongly unified culture or identity.¹⁴ The Scandinavian contribution to early Russian and Ukrainian history has been greatly underestimated, or alternatively exaggerated, for political reasons.¹⁵ Each thesis, no doubt, has its own merit and represents an exciting opportunity to re-assess our knowledge and assumptions. To a limited degree this would allow us to retest our real understanding of facts and own our knowledge within a progressive, open and critical society, a process superficially compatible with a trend in political thought running from J.S. Mill to Karl Popper, Noam Chomsky and John Ralston Saul. However, sustained effort is needed to challenge dominant traditions if they are embedded in the popular imagination. The deep architecture remains the same, but the rooms are viewed under different lights, from different perspectives, or in more detail with new intellectual tools.

Revolutionary thought may be possible, but requires a genuinely critical approach which goes beyond mere revision, or the repeated working up of supposedly new theories (a trend supported by both popular and academic publishers). In the worst case scenario, this indeed becomes 'the thriving activity of publishing and forgetting'.¹⁶ The fascinating detail of history is so overwhelming that budding

historians might sympathise with James Joyce's hero in *Ulysses* when he says that 'history is the nightmare one tries to waken from.'¹⁷ In this sense, it only a partial exaggeration to argue that in Europe: "Those who come later chose their ancestors for themselves. The European heritage is the object of a vast usurpation of a legacy. The European are the heirs of antiquity in nothing."¹⁸ Europe is a shifting zone of geography and influence in the present, a contested cultural zone in the future, and a shifting horizon of the past as diverse Russian, Celtic, Turkish and North African histories claim a vital place in the 'House of Europe.'

In the case of the European tradition, the true diversity of the social and intellectual life of the past has begun to emerge as every aspect of life, society, art, and architecture comes under closer scrutiny. This is achieved not just through the mere revision of the historical record or the history of ideas,¹⁹ but the recovery of lost areas of social memory and the discovery of that which has been obscured. At best this involves a serious engagement with and sustained critical analysis of precisely that which lies outside current assumptions. What emerges, however, is a sense that dominant traditions and triumphant institutions hide secondary and marginalised ways of viewing the world, ways that were hidden rather than destroyed by dominant cultural systems.²⁰ These ways of thinking about the world were often embedded in popular traditions, sublimated in daily practices, buried as stories or myths, or fused into complex works of art which now seem mysterious or displaced within their historical setting. They may also form the bedrock of irrational and emotive dispositions that carry through to the current period in a subterranean system of beliefs and prejudices. These receive limited public scrutiny for the very reason that, when expressed overtly, they are readily dismissed as ludicrous, archaic, or superstitious. This is much more than everyday prejudice, or a tendency to steer away from anything that speaks seriously of the supernatural, daemonic or sinister. Rather, it is one of the bases of Enlightenment rationalism and the later dominance of instrumental logic.²¹ Moreover, this aversion removes none of these averted elements from having a certain guiding power on unreflected action.

This appropriation of the past in the name of diversion, however, disguises something rather more insidious. Over the last two and a half thousand years, dominant intellectual and political traditions have generated counter-cultures that carry the seeds for later revolutions of thought,²² that constitute alternative visions of the future, and give people the intellectual space to diverge from the dominant ideologies of their own time. In some cases these repressed elements form active bodies of literature and thought that coalesce as virtual counter-cans or anti-canonical doctrines, challenging the intellectual dominance of mainstream religion or literature.²³ Some of these ideas now seem ludicrous (at the emotional level) and their basis disputed (logically or empirically), but this has not robbed them of their social and structural function in the 'knowledge game'. They have not lost the symbolic associations that imply new human possibilities. Furthermore, at the most extreme, what is repressed is a sense of the potential for revolution, or at least revolutionary change in the way human relations are organised,²⁴ a possibility that is only occasionally grasped and carried through to a successful transition. This sense of divergent possibility is sometimes projected onto the past, a distant future, or as an immanent and radical change that is about to transform the world, either through revolution or apocalypse.

These European counter-traditions are certainly not continuous, nor a fully integrated intellectual system. However, dialogue among these 'counter-cultures',²⁵ and their interaction with the dominant ideologies of European civilisation, have been strong enough to generate a particular world of imagination, a hidden grand narrative that could be accessed by heretical scholars and visionaries. Ironically, it was this 'counter-vision' that provided the enriching soil needed to give birth to a Christianity enriched by Graeco-Roman scholarship, to reintroduce Greek logic and Aristotelian philosophy to the Middle Ages, and to lay the groundwork for the Renaissance and the Reformation. As early as the 13th century, some five percent of the population of Latin Christendom 'had separated themselves from the Latin Church and set up their own religious ("heretical") communities'.²⁶ The counter-tradition also enriched the stream that led from Alchemy to what we would today call early experimental science.²⁷ It contained seeds that would aid the move towards political equality and the liberation of women from the precise and limited roles of Christian paternalism. It also generated some of the intellectual furniture for orientalism, channelling, New Age mysticism, and the ongoing shift of meaning associated with magic and vampires.²⁸ Whether it can provide one impetus towards of new global 'community of communities' based on a more harmonious environmental and social participation remains to be seen.

In their preconscious, uncritical aspects, counter-traditions also carry potent myths concerning power, evil, and social hierarchy. These negative myths, rather than the cold rationalism of decision-making, regularly guide the images that the media still use when making 'moral' judgements on the calamities of today's world. This counter-tradition is often uncritically invoked in editorials, in the public speeches of politicians, and in the casting of global affairs as a great melodrama in which there must be heroes and villains, but in which evil protagonists seem to have a greater reality as protagonists. If not Hitler or Saddam Hussein, then terrorist extremists strapped with dynamite will suffice. Villains in corporate boardrooms, crime lords in penthouses, under-class rogues dealing drugs on the streets and turning children in zombies, and foreign narco-terrorists are also part of this projective mechanism. Critical judgement is replaced with collective psychodrama. Hence the great appeal of 'reality' television, where projections and prejudices are blessed with real-time miracles of spy-cam verification. In such times, no one asks if Bush or Blair knew that it is much easier to believe in evil than good, and that man might well make the Devil in 'his own image and likeness'.²⁹ A simple dualism, a heroic battle between light and dark, a vision less sophisticated than that found in ancient Sumeria, will do instead.³⁰ Furthermore, those who seem to support, promote, or believe in those things held to be wrong or evil become castigated as 'people of the lie', a term indicating a moral and spiritual lapse as much as a rational failing.³¹ In the 'age of terror', such people are painted in strategic thinking and the media as persons whose freedom, and lives, may be destroyed at will in the search for a greater freedom, usually for other people deemed in some sense to be more worthwhile. The public face of the military operations through 2001-2010 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, and Somalia, though supported by rational reasons of *real politik* and the real threat posed by terrorists groups, also contained elements of demonisation, stereotyping, the use of pre-judicial lethal force, and in some cases the suspension of normal legal guarantees usually granted to criminals, combatants and prisoners of war. These methods involve a psychological and moral narrative that appeals to both rational interests and irrational patterns of identification.

Dominant and counter-traditional elements today are creatively linked in a floating sea of signs and symbols that have become consumerised and technologically disseminated.³² The power of these clusters of meaning, whether presented in fictional or non-fictional forms, should not be underestimated. Babylon has more than a historical or Biblical resonance for the young Rastafari who use it to symbolise the entire world of conformity and money that destroys values, a concept that has become transnational as reggae carries its message to small Rasta communities around the world.³³ A world champion wrestler and superstar, the 'Rock' presented a 'respectable' history documentary by National Geographic about early Egyptian history, because, yes, indeed, there was once a Scorpion King. Here the movie seemed to precede, indeed legitimise the documentary account, *The Real Scorpion King*. The idea that in the second millennium there was a great matriarchal society based on the worship of the Great Goddess, though at best an overstatement of limited historical materials from early European and Middle Eastern archaeology, has nonetheless been used to help launch a creative re-appraisal of the nature of human sexuality.³⁴ This is the kind of false 'knowledge' that indeed articulates change, mobilises resources, motivates societies, aids social transformation,³⁵ and provides the conceptual glue for innovative communities. Such 'knowledge' can provide these roles without presenting a fully developed ideology, without being in any positivist, empirical sense 'factual', and may not be based on valid reasoning. However, there is then little control over the moral and political directions in which such 'false' inspirations lead, whether towards some positive liberation or towards prejudice, racism, or new forms of chauvinism. This interaction of tradition and counter-tradition may still in the long-term ratify dominant terms that marginalise alternative or excluded ones.³⁶

On that other hand, that which was once 'beyond the bounds' and excluded can later on be accepted, and in time re-located within the regulated social sphere as a new norm. This occurred, for example, in the early history of Christianity, where an excluded religion over several centuries was transformed into the cultural basis for governance and social values within the Roman Empire.³⁷ Likewise, protests against corruption and turpitude within the Catholic Church were the seeds from which both the Reformation and Counter-Reformation would grow. Small republican communities that survived as the exception in parts of Italy and Switzerland, along with social movements such as the Quakers, Ranters and Levellers, would be threads in the larger European swing toward more egalitarian, democratic societies.³⁸ Diverse religious codes and their interpretation became one way of interrogating both a 'hegemonic theology' and its power structures.³⁹ Movements of protest and popular religion can in turn become institutionalised and normalised, providing major sources for historical change, in effect overturning or modifying the old order. In large measure, this overturning of the hierarchy of the past generated the European emphasis on democracy and humanism, traditions that were not just based on the cold facts of political calculation, but rather a vision of humans as not only equal to each other, but equal to the task of understanding the universe.⁴⁰ Not just equality before the law (at first for citizens), but access to knowledge and 'processes of truth' (one of the key aspects of court and educational systems), was gradually subject to the idea of being 'equal available' for all.

One over-interpretation is to assume a single, partially organic counter-tradition reconstructed post-factum within the European imagination. Direct interaction can

sometimes be glimpsed among suppressed or distaff traditions, e.g. between Alchemy and Kabbalah, the possible influence of Kabbalistic thought on the pessimistic apocalyptic views of Joachimism (a strand Christian thought following the 12th century Joachim of Flora),⁴¹ or threads that indirectly link Gnosticism and Hermetic writings with later forms of Christianity.⁴² For a short time in the 11-12th centuries there was a nexus between Christian, Islamic and Jewish societies as they interacted across a multi-cultural Mediterranean.⁴³ Modern critical analysis sought for a time to integrate myth and dream in the realm of the meaningful alongside logic and analytical reasoning.⁴⁴ Post-modernism gave symbols and signs a crucial role in a view of the world which could only be semiotic, but always denied such symbols a role in revelation. However, the interaction among dominant and secondary traditions, though sometimes approaching a genuine dialogue or exploration, tended to conceal 'dominator hierarchies'⁴⁵ in which one code always set the ground and rules of interaction, establishing its own priorities of legitimacy and guidelines that limited tolerance. The doyens of dominant or new, emerging traditions became authority figures, made money, and rubbed shoulders (and who knows what else) with the famous. The champions of subaltern traditions at times would become spectacular champions of new ideas, but would often be forced to recant, be enjoined to silence, executed, or ended up in poverty as unrecognised voices within their own generation. Spinoza, Da Vinci, Galileo and Giordano Bruno, each experienced some of this oppression, though in the end their brilliance would be recovered by the reverence given to them in later reconstructions of European intellectual history.

Some of these suppressed or overturned traditions operated as the virtual 'unconscious' of Christianity. The ideas that Christian dogma, institutions, and law sought to repress from the fourth century onwards did not entirely disappear. As such, the values and world views that could not be accommodated in the public Christian world had to be redirected either into a private space or a counter-veiling tradition with its own resources of memory, preservation, and articulation. Christianity, and the different Christianities, are key elements in the wider history of the West. Christianity, moreover, has been crucial in developing not just a body of religious custom and associated cultural artefacts, as any religion may be said to do, but also engaged in the systematic development of an exclusive dogma, the formation of educational and propagation for a set canon of texts and values, and created robust institutional structures directly tied to the ideological content of this system. As such, it indeed made spirit flesh, and denied, or tried to deny, other messages such embodiment. The monopoly of the Church on belief and education was never complete, and was soon subject to strong challenges. It remained, however, for some fifteen hundreds years at least, the major force against which reform was launched, whether in the areas of alternative churches, the schism between Latin and Orthodox belief, apocalyptic movements, the divergent proofs of an emerging science,⁴⁶ or demands for freedom of conscience.

Ironically, modernism and post-modernism would soon find themselves haunted by the ghosts of the alternative belief systems that Christianity had also helped breed. Over the last three centuries, when educated men 'lost faith' in a unified and authoritative Christianity, they often turned not to what we would recognise as science, but to spiritualism, political theism, scientism, free masonry, theosophy, a humanism moulded on ahistorical views of the glory of Athens, or later on to New Age religious eclecticism. From this point of view, the European Enlightenment was a

failed project that made the world safe for diverse forms of the irrational. Just as the ancient Greeks, for all their vaunted invention of a self-critical and rational philosophy, had a public life deeply saturated with the emotive, irrational, and religious,⁴⁷ so in the contemporary world, science is publicly acclaimed not for its critical 'method' but as a source of technology that allows utopian dreams of personal pleasure, public empowerment and the provision of solutions to all possible human problems. In the public domain, science *is* science fiction, always pointing out towards a universe of infinite possibilities that dwarf human problems in the here and now. If the area of rational thought has greatly expanded, it is surrounded by a much wider and wilder domain of the irrational.

These processes in part revolve around the construction of history, the sense of the past as creating the conditions of the present, and the building of a conscious tradition that is the touchstone of everyday life and the basis of normative judgements about power and truth.⁴⁸ The process whereby the historical records begin to be systematically preserved as evidence of the past and are subject to academic discipline (in the modern period during the 17-19th centuries) is in fact one way of understanding the world.⁴⁹ Less systematically studied have been the mechanisms of forgetting, whereby experiences and ideas are lost, displaced, and divorced from the active tradition of social memory. Hence the well-worn adage of T.W. Adorno, the 'history of philosophy is the history of forgetting'.⁵⁰ This forgetting, however, is not just a random act, but a socially constructed amnesia.⁵¹ It involves not simply the loss, but the displacement and transformation of the information and understanding of past events and ideas. These displacements, in Freudian terms, may indicate processes of 'repression, distortion, negation and the like',⁵² but also have central roles in identity formation and social adaptation to disturbing events over which individuals and societies have limited control.

Social 'forgetting' is not a simple process. It may be a non-systematic loss of material that was never committed to an enduring record, or was not passed via oral history from one generation to the next. In other, cases, however, forgetting is a willed and intentional structuring of what is transmitted forward from the past, and what is allowed to shape our future imagining of how the historical record should look, e.g. the careful displacement, grafting and partial repression of the history of Kiev onto Russian history, conflation over the role of international versus American troops in Somalia, or confusion over naval exclusion zones in the Falklands (Malvinas Islands) during later television documentaries.⁵³ Several key mechanisms come into play, either in pivotal individuals (public figures, historians, journalists), via institutions, or through the collective memory of what is tolerated within a given society.

On this basis, certain parallels can be drawn from the psychology of individuals, though this is only a useful metaphor for wider social processes.⁵⁴ Memories can fail to be created and are lost in the historical record because adequate and sustained attention are not given to them. For many ordinary events and the details of private lives there is almost a complete loss after three or four generations. In other cases, a tradition may be poorly recorded, sidelined or marginalised. Even if some record is retained, it becomes a rare item that is not referred to regularly, and drops out of public awareness, making no impression on the educational arena. Framing narratives, sometimes falsified or erroneous, are then constructed as if these factors had never before come into play. Museums, family history societies, community projects,

popular history, films and novels perform these functions of appropriation and partial memory on a routine basis. Even libraries, in spite of archival and research roles that provide a wider repository of knowledge, are still subject to acquisition trends, public demands, and indirect forms of censorship.⁵⁵ Likewise, social projects of the 19th and 20th centuries such as the extension of public education to all children and literacy to most citizens has had a major impact on conformity and moral values, imposing forms of social control at the same time as it has enhanced opportunities for individuals and the generation of social capital.⁵⁶

At various times early Gnostic thought, the cultural legacy of the gypsies, the cosmopolitan cultures of early Medieval Spain and southern France, and the role of female troubadours (Trobairitz)⁵⁷ fit this notion of marginalised elements that were for centuries trivialised or stereotyped, but later revived as 'stories' worthy of merit. However, other influences are less well received. Profound schools of Rabbinical learning emerged in Eastern Europe from the 16th century onwards, while until World War II an extensive Yiddish literature flourished in a zone stretching from Poland down to Odessa.⁵⁸ Though well-chronicled in academic works, these influences have barely impinged on popular Western awareness. Nor is their contribution to Eastern European thought and culture likely to be widely revived in the expanding European Union. The popular image of the pogrom, ironically, may perpetuate a partially true image of outsider groups as victims, but does not highlight the crucial role of such groups in the formation of modern Western thought. The dramatic, negative content has been perpetuated as horror and the cathartic witness of mass crime (portrayed by Spielberg and a line of historical films since Otto Preminger's *Exodus*),⁵⁹ but the positive cultural legacy may still be ignored or trivialised. 'Everyman' knows of the Holocaust, few Christians have opened a Talmud, even in translation. The 'outsiders', whether the displaced picturesque images of the European south that was once the focus of 'northern' prejudice and construction,⁶⁰ a Roma group that has been resident in Europe for hundreds of years, or recent Kurdish and Afghan refugees, are still decoupled from their indigenous roles within a wider Europe and from civilisation legacies in order to facilitate the prejudicial formation of Europe's national identities.⁶¹ These rich cultures have since been re-discovered by specialised scholars, artists, film-makers and musicians, but have not entered the wider Western awareness. This collective consciousness, in so far as it has any unity, remains both arrogant and fearful, a compromise formation based on the selective 'dreaming' of the past. The Kurds were useful in the war against 'Satan' Hussein (and their treatment one measure of Turkish democratisation in terms of the Copenhagen criteria mandated by European Union officials), but this did not equate with a broader understanding of their past and future role in the Middle East.⁶² The people of Afghanistan may be forgotten once the hot war against Al Qaeda is over and national elections have met international standards, but reconstruction remains slow in a war-ravaged country that fades into another backwater of global concern even as conflict in the troubled south of the country continues through 2006-2010.⁶³ This selective dreaming of the past projects itself onto the present and thereby imagines a fragmented, often exclusive, future.

In other cases a more intentional form of forgetting or removal from the public record occurs. These forms of activity range from selective transformation of the historical record by historians for more than two centuries, e.g. the underestimated role of often unnamed women in the historical record of the Roman world and early Europe, which has been the focus of recent 'recovery' historiography over the last three decades,⁶⁴

through to the suppression and destruction of alternative traditions, as in the banning of the use of hieroglyphics in early Christian Egypt (along with the defacement of many monuments, or their transformation into Churches). This is a much wider tradition than simply banning and burning books, a common Christian preoccupation from the fourth century to the twentieth centuries, making later Soviet events jejune in comparison.⁶⁵ It also involved making some areas of public discussion and research improper, and a refusal in daily life to entertain easily observed facts that cannot be accommodated in the dominant world-view.

The power of such viewpoints can be demonstrated in the issue of female sexuality. The simple realities of female pleasure, eroticism, and orgasm as a human parallel to male sexuality were soon displaced in the Christian tradition. This involved both a suppression of female sexuality and its displacement and polarisation into two different images, female virtue versus female depravity.⁶⁶ In between, there was little scope for a normal female sexuality, nor for a positive sexual relationship between the sexes. These processes were indeed backed up by an ideological hegemony (as in Gramsci's theory), but also by the selective usage of 'ideological state apparatuses' (as in Althusser's thought)⁶⁷ via the nunnery, the insane asylum, the system of prostitution, the advice of the medical profession, and through differential school education and the legal systems which selectively discriminated against women who acted outside authorised roles.

Metaphorically, this more 'intentional amnesia' parallels the psychological processes of suppression and repression. In psychoanalytical thought these two concepts are related but theoretically distinguished. Suppression is the conscious effort to ignore, forget, or push away from consciousness awareness a thought, memory, emotion or experience.⁶⁸ In such a situation, the person is still aware of and can retrieve such information, but chooses as far as possible not to do so. Ironically, efforts at suppression can often fail, especially under conditions of anxiety or distraction, and in effect brings to mind the very thing to be forgotten.⁶⁹ Repression, however, is more unconscious process, with the effort of the psyche to prevent threatening memories or ideas from even entering awareness. This involves a much deeper effort at eradication of the memory and associations leading to it, and has a much stronger impact on the subconscious, dream-work, and is more dangerous for future mental health.⁷⁰ In the long term, however, there may be a relationship between suppression and repression. Ideas repeatedly suppressed may eventually become part of a repressed complex, while in turn, new thoughts that uncomfortably suggest repressed material may themselves be suppressed, often through mechanisms of anxiety and marginalisation from awareness. It is necessary to distinguish this process from non-intentional or unmotivated forms of failing to remember,⁷¹ whether due to a lack of initial attention or due to information not being processed past short-term memory.

Suppression and repression of unwanted knowledge, combined with the social amnesia directed towards particular interests, form two sides of a process that prunes and shapes individual interaction with the historical record and our wider intellectual horizon. It is possible that learning the art of speech (and what not to say aloud) itself forms one of the bases of selective suppression, and eventually of a more complete form of repression.⁷² It thus includes social and cultural components, in which social interactions shape patterns of disclosure and repression. In an important analogy, we may even speak of an 'unconscious civilisation', one directed away from its core

values by a hijacking of the language, tools, and legitimising processes of rationality in the name of 'efficiency' and the needs of special interest groups, i.e. the 'corporatisation' of knowledge and truth directed to extrinsic gains.⁷³

In terms of historical and intellectual traditions, the acts and art of suppression can be effectively charted. Banned books, suppressed doctrines, punitive court cases, debates over what might be taught in school, and censorship policies give a clear map of conscious efforts to either silence, or remove from the main public arena, those ideas which are held immoral, subversive or 'unthinkable'. In the case of Christianity, this process had begun at the same time as the Canon that was to become the accepted Bible was being shaped, with some works accepted as authoritative, others disputed but not completely rejected (*antilegomena*). Some works were placed outside the Canon as 'apocrypha', and others more completely condemned.⁷⁴ This also occurred in doctrinal areas, with major theories about human nature debated by Church leaders and then suppressed after intellectual battles and court cases, e.g. St. Augustine's successful suppression of the heresy of the perfectibility of human beings without the necessary intervention of God's grace, the 'heresy' known as Pelagianism.⁷⁵ The charting of the orthodox and heretic within differing Christian traditions, e.g. over the nature of Christ, whether God was triune or monophysite in nature, the status of icons, methods of crossing oneself (especially disputed among different Orthodox Churches), formed a virtual intellectual battlefield that shook the foundations of wider Europe and the Levant for almost two thousand years. In these cases, the tradition was deeply contested until one interpretation became dominant. Nor was this just a battle of ideas and list of texts: it was a battle over political power, institutional wealth, and the ruling ideology that would shape the future of Europe. Thus, as noted in the fourth century Egyptian debate over canonical biblical books: 'Athanasius's disputes with other Egyptian Christians over the biblical canon were not struggles over lists of books alone, but reflected more fundamental conflicts between competing modes of Christian authority, spirituality, and social organization.'⁷⁶

Repression, however, was not often complete. One tradition could be dominant, but it could not erase the historical record completely, while small groups continued their affiliation to alternative traditions, e.g. in Russia those who follow unreformed Orthodox traditions, e.g. the 'Old Believers'.⁷⁷ If these events seem confined to a doctrinaire and authoritarian past, then several current debates remind us that these events have led to much unfinished business. The religious revival around mystical apparitions of Mary, both in Spain and parts of Latin America, had indicated a strong piety that cannot be satiated in a largely patriarchal Catholic Church. The issue of a female priesthood, in such a setting, becomes a symptom of a wider dominant and subordinate tradition, and much more than a debate about traditional Christian doctrine versus feminism. Likewise, the tools of legal and informal suppression are still regularly used against cultural products that challenge social order, e.g. the past effort in France to suppress certain forms of rap music as deeply anti-social, and some self-censorship in U.S. media industries through 2001-2003.⁷⁸

Ironically, one of the places where a code of silence has developed on certain topics, viewed as politically incorrect, are university campuses. In the name of justice and equality certain topics can be hardly raised outside of very specialised classes. Professors may summarise existing views but find it dangerous to profess their own critical analyses if these challenge mainstream views or dominant social interests,

especially in areas relating to gender, race, religious politics,⁷⁹ and more recently the blanket condemnation of the social roots of terrorism which makes the analysis of long term causes risky (unpatriotic) for many academics. In the developed world lecturers are now more often gagged by the fear of student law suites, lack of employment prospects, risks in not gaining tenure, or a record that may lose them research grants rather than by direct threat of government or religious censorship. Even the label 'political correctness' has now become a term of abuse and used in attempt to marginalise crucial debates"⁸⁰

Repression is a concept central to both psychology and politics. Freud viewed this mechanism as one of the key elements in the formation of the subconscious, a major defence mechanism protecting the ego, the root of much psychological displacement, dream-work and neurosis.⁸¹ For thinkers such as Marcuse, Norman O. Brown and Russell Jacoby repression is the key that unlocks both the treasures of psychoanalysis and an understanding of social psychology.⁸² At the broader level, however, repression is a political tool used in silencing and restricting counter-cultures and counter-traditions that challenge dominant historical and national narratives. If civilization itself can be viewed as a mechanism designed to suppress the free expression of human drives and to modify them to communal needs, then incomplete repression leads not only to a complex life in the human subconscious, but also a virtual 'unconscious' structuring of suppressed material within counter-traditions. In this sense, suppressed traditions and cultures are a counter-memory or alternative choice that has been pruned away to reinforce the preferred ideas of a given culture in a given time period. If the heresy of a female God within early Gnosticism had been allowed to thrive, this would have undermined the essentially patriarchal authority of Catholic Church.⁸³ If female prophets and seers had been allowed to extend their authority in early Christian communities, this too might have challenged the exclusive role of male priests and their hierarchy of abbots, bishops and cardinals.⁸⁴ Such choices, Christian priestess and the feminine God, were to be removed by making them unthinkable. Some accommodation might occur: the cult of Mary was allowed if at times de-emphasised, while nuns were allowed to forsake the world, though a certain suspicion of this as an escape route for women from their proper family duties was harboured through the Middle Ages. In particular, though the spiritual role of nuns was admitted, they were largely excluded from a larger 'leadership and sacerdotal' role in the Church, as well as from much formal higher education.⁸⁵ Even leading female figures such as Hildegard of Bingen and Heloise in Paris were indeed exceptions, while only in separated religious communities such as the 14th century Lollards of England were women given key preaching roles in what were in effect counter-churches that persisted in some areas down to 1530.⁸⁶ In any case, the road to the nunnery was only in some cases a road to spiritual freedom: a sizeable number of unmarried or widowed gentry women may have been relegated to relatively poor and under-funded nunneries, especially if their dowries were too small or if they posed a financial burden to inherited estates.⁸⁷ As George Eliot would note in passing in *Daniel Deronda*, to later generations poor nunneries would seem little more than female asylums for women who had been caste off by society.

Other mechanisms play a major role in silencing traditions and in forced forgetting. These include the normal arts of trivialisation, superficial irony,⁸⁸ patterns of humour and sarcasm, and marginalisation. In part, this derives from the very way societies set up bodies of knowledge, and the issues to which we give attention in the generation of

public knowledge. These 'discursive practices' profoundly shape our knowledge, theories and social systems:

This context discloses a systematic organization that cannot be reduced to the demands of logic or linguistics. Discursive practices are characterized by the delimitation of a field of objects, the definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices.⁸⁹

In effect, the way we structure, use and discuss knowledge is part of wider set of relations deeply concerned with power and obedience. Ironically, this emerges most clearly in studies of truth, justice, madness and punishment. Zones of exclusion, of control, as well as loci where status can be charged, all form patterns of exclusion and inclusion. In post-Renaissance European society, as noted by Michel Foucault, asylums, early hospitals (whose functions were often non-therapeutic), factories, prisons, barracks and schools controlled both discourses and social power.⁹⁰ In post-17th century Europe it was the hospital, the asylum, and the workhouses which acted as places where the mad 'as well as others unable or unwilling to work' were confined and excluded from society.⁹¹ Madness, like other 'variants' of the human condition, was structured as part of a 'broken dialogue' concerned with the language of authority, power, transgression and exclusion, and eventually confinement.⁹² Likewise, the social production of knowledge creates certain procedures and institutions which involve 'rules of exclusion: prohibitions, rejections, and divisions; restrictive limitations on the exercise of discourse: rituals, fellowships of discourse, and doctrines'.⁹³ Repression, suppression, and marginalisation are parts of the process of 'world-making' that is given the shorthand name: 'culture'. Furthermore, this is not just an external social or cultural process. In so far as it robs people of any chance of genuine self-knowledge, a central theme for thinkers as diverse as Socrates, John of Salisbury (12th century) and Freud, it also robs people of the consciousness and social knowledge needed to build genuine civil societies.⁹⁴

The great irony, of course, is that in order to set up the conditions for the censorship, suppression, destruction of alternative views, and selective punishment of its carriers,⁹⁵ it is enough merely to *claim* to believe that you have a monopoly on truth. There are enormous secondary gains in power and authority for those who determine the truth as their prerogative, regardless of whether they personally entertain the beliefs in question. 'True believers' come in many forms: -

The Jacobins of the French Revolution, the Bolsheviks, the Fascists, and now the free marketeers, are all the direct descendants of predestination and the Jesuits. They are the chosen few - the minority who have the truth and therefore have the right to impose it by whatever means.⁹⁶

The litany goes back much further than the Jacobins. A close reading of the *Apology* suggests that the jurists knew well enough that they were punishing Socrates for his pride before the *demos* (the Athenian public within in the context of revolutionary democracy) and before the court, just as much as for any guilt on the specific charges laid against him. Alexander the Great benefited from claims of his divinity and divine parentage, even as he remained ambiguous on the issue to avoid outraging his more egalitarian relations with the old Macedonian soldiers. Hegemonies of knowledge were sealed within the authoritative dispositions of the Universal Catholic Church and

reinforced by an impressive educational and archival system. Scientific, economic, psychological, legal and managerial knowledge is now concealed within complex dialects and jargons designed to retain professional groups as gate-keepers in these areas of 'truth', thereby regulating public spending, public health, the judicial system, and the way people are controlled within their work environments.⁹⁷ Such trends can lead to 'self-delusion and romanticism', aspects of an ideology utilising unconsciousness to remove power from the public and democratic domains.⁹⁸ Nor does the new emphasis on the 'individual', personal satisfaction, 'life style', and personal therapy⁹⁹ necessarily lead to a 'conscious civilisation': on the contrary, a false dichotomy between the public and private spheres distorts both.

Many areas of the repressed knowledge, in all probability, will remain hidden from contemporary view. However, suppressed traditions often provide a central role in the formation of 'new' knowledge. Distaff and subaltern cultures, in their interaction with dominant traditions, have constituted a 'forbidden knowledge' that has been highly useful in enlightening those who have sought it as freedom from dogma. This process was driven in part by a change in the transformation of curiosity from a virtue into a vice, in part by the desire for intellectual empowerment.¹⁰⁰ This tension was evident in Christian scholastic traditions. Monks, even within orders that set aside several hours each day for study, were enjoined not to become obsessively engaged in the question for knowledge, though the Benedictines were an exception in promoting knowledge over submission to the hourly routine of the day.¹⁰¹ Likewise, the Dominican order soon emerged as a major intellectual force at the University of Paris, especially in theology and philosophy.¹⁰² This could be tolerated under the presumption that secular knowledge and human logic were secondary handmaidens that would support the higher knowledge of revelation and the other divine gifts such as charity, a powerful synthesis that Aquinas promoted with elegance. In this area, the thought of Thomas Aquinas for a time seemed to dominate the alternative approach of the 'Oxford Franciscans' such as Roger Bacon, Duns Scotus and William of Occam, whereby rational thought was clearly secondary to faith and belief, but thereby freed from a false synthesis that would shackle any possible progress in experimental science.¹⁰³ However, when the knowledge sought overturned this relationship, or led to a confusing reversal of orders, it was deemed either daemonic or deluded, leading to condemnation, heresy or the madhouse. In the long run, however, this limited role for rational investigation could not be contained. The dyke of Christian faith would soon be punctured in too many places for even Thomist theory to repair.¹⁰⁴

At the wider level, these mechanisms often invoke methods to reduce or contain dangerous contradictions.¹⁰⁵ Ironically, this suppression and masking of counter-traditions has sometimes led to their ultimate preservation. First, the condemned works or ideas are publicly berated in the literature of the major tradition, thereby providing distorted reflections of the suppressed works, i.e. the numerous works written by Christians against heresies.¹⁰⁶ These argumentative, polemical and evangelical works have been extremely useful in reconstructing entire 'Schools' of thought and social practises that were otherwise condemned and exterminated. Here, we see a parallel to the personal principle that conscious partial suppression is often unsuccessful, since it marks and reiterates the very things that are to be suppressed.¹⁰⁷ The censors themselves often preserve the name and content of the work they suppress, even if in distorted form, and at times keep copies in archives proscribed for use by a select few. Second, works viewed as heretical were often hidden by those

who wrote them or sought to read them, either in remote communities, in hidden caches, or as part of an intellectual subculture that rejoiced in such forbidden fruit (as in the Gnostic texts that were buried in a clay pot near *Nag Hamadi*, to be discovered in 1945 by an Arab camel driver).¹⁰⁸ More recently, banned books have generated their own avid audiences, and in the broader tradition of European antiquities have been major items for the collectors of rare books whose value is based on their very obscurity. Works as diverse as the early Gnostic hymns, Gallileo's astronomical theses, Joyce's *Ulysses*, and Lawrence's *Sons and Lovers* gained notoriety by being banned or suppressed. For a time the Vatican even sought to prevent new reprints and translations of Graham Greene's novel *The Power and the Glory*, with the Church's Index of Forbidden Books being maintained down till 1966.¹⁰⁹ Such interdictions were, in the long term, unsuccessful to varying degrees.

Likewise, efforts at repression of dissent and uncomfortable past legacies in the Soviet Union were in the long run unsuccessful and laid the basis for an underground cultural resistance that would be mobilised under Gorbachev's reforms. Indeed, for over two centuries an enduring Russian pastime was the reading and reproduction of *samizdat*, banned publications. For example, Boris Pasternak's novel, *Doctor Zhivago*, was at first read within the Soviet Union in this way, while from 1970's the underground *Chronicle of Current Events* appeared in Moscow dealing with infringements of human rights by the government.¹¹⁰ A sense of what the political opening of the late 1980s meant to the Russian people has been captured by an essay of the dissident poet Yevtushenko, who wrote that 'the best monument to the early poems of our generation is the liberation from the tyranny of censorship, from the tyranny of the observing eye of Orwell's Big Brother. And this liberation is what we call glasnost.'¹¹¹ It must be remembered that since 1917 some 6,000 works of fiction and politics had been banned in the USSR, with censorship based on ideological grounds being totally lifted only in 1989. However, the opening of the KGB files, revelations concerning disastrous legacies of the Stalinist past, the disasters of the dirty Soviet war in Afghanistan, and a widespread knowledge of corruption among the communist elite meant that in turn even reformers such as Gorbachev would be swept away in revulsion at a past that had only been partly suppressed. Efforts by former Presidents Yeltsin and Putin to mobilise a reborn vision of Russia as a great power with cautious contiguities to its past have also involved cooption and control of mainstream media within the country.¹¹²

Such suppressed concepts can become part of ongoing verbal traditions, key themes for fiction and humour, or are embedded in different patterns of everyday life, including popular music. These patterns range from innocuous children's songs, through to a range of aversive codes that owe their origins to a type of peasant knowledge rooted in the everyday magic of past traditions.¹¹³ The dangers of such failed efforts at censorship, conscious or habitual, are that they not only make the authority involved look ludicrous, but that the banned knowledge becomes more rather than less attractive to active sub-communities. Even a dominant, hegemonic discourse implies a second voice, and 'remains locked into a dialogue with the discourse it has suppressed'.¹¹⁴

If some of these counter-traditions become explicit, and even integrated into later periods of public culture, there is much that can still be learned by addressing those that have remained secondary or suppressed. Furthermore, the sidelining and

oppression of divergent viewpoints in the name of 'realism', 'pragmatism' (in reality the crudest sort of 'common sense' mobilised in support of self interest,) ¹¹⁵ and 'right' (narrowly based to exclude the rights of others) remains a vital issue in the 21st century (just as it was for Sparta and Athens during the disasters of the Peloponnesian War). Some two thousand, four hundred years ago Thucydides explored the dangerous way that right, might, self-interest and delusion subverted public judgment during periods of conflict. ¹¹⁶ Today the danger is not so much that we are stultified by a dominant tradition, nor that we have lost options, but that we no longer understand nor feel a need for a critical approach to the diverse traditions that we feel free to appropriate at will. In this sense, we unconsciously accept the current stage of historical conditioning without engaging in deep exploration of the traditions that meet within us. This conditioning implies that information is all we need to have, and suggests that all information and information channels are equal. This ready access to rich data sources parades itself as open engagement and general tolerance. This shallow eclecticism is one of the basic moves of an elective post-modernism.

However, a false cosmopolitanism generates risks almost as great as that of a rabid nationalism or shallow globalism. ¹¹⁷ In so far as such choices are pre-consciously conditioned, such values become removed from rational critique and thereby open to external manipulation. Far from being untouched by tradition, we have become its objects in an uncontrolled experiment in knowledge that has little in the way of conscious human guidance. In part an unconsciously directed wish-fulfilment, the outcome is sometimes read as 'destiny'. ¹¹⁸ A semiotic reading of the signs cast on the shore of global turbulence suggests a future that is both utopian and daemonic: conflict, violence, narrow assertion, destruction and death all lead, ironically, to a technological heaven in which the privileged few survive in a self-satisfied haven. The division between those excluded or included in heaven or hell depends on whether or not they adopt an unreconstructed set of assumed values that assure economic, political and technological dominance. Those in the Western technological haven, the 'zone of peace', ¹¹⁹ watch (via television and cable) those subject to war, starvation, and disease, including the poor and dislocated at the bottom of their own societies. An emerging mythology insists that democratic, middle-class consumers who are somehow 'good' will inherit the earth. Such misreadings of Western and Christian traditions, combined with mis-predictions of the emerging global system, are dangerous in the extreme in that they colonise both decision-making processes directed towards the future, ¹²⁰ as well as form the basis for simplistic political decisions in the use of force against those who carry messages deemed worthy of suppression. As such, it is no surprise that the outcome in the twenty-first century has been a flawed modernisation and turbulent globalisation now challenged by those once excluded.

- ¹ For the dangers of approaches which 'give the impression of a facile totalization, a seamless web of phenomena' that appear to express some deeper truth, see JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, pp27-28. These periods are generated by particular historical narratives, *Ibid.*, p28, though in turn accepted periods are used to shape some narrative structures, see MAIER, Charles S. "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era", *American Historical Review*, Vol. 105 Issue 3, June 2000, pp807-831.
- ² HULL, David L. "Central Subjects and Historical Narratives", *History & Theory*, Vol. 14, 1975, pp144-152; STRUEVER, Nancy S. "Topics in History", *History & Theory*, Beiheft, 19, 1980, pp66-79; McCULLAGH, C. Behan "The Truth of Historical Narratives", *History & Theory*, Vol 26 Issue 4, December 1987, pp30-46; JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, p29. The very notions of Western civilisation and European history are such central subjects, conceptually unified in spite of the 'deep disunity' revealed by closer analysis, see SOUTHERN, R. W. *The Making of the Middle Ages*, London, Pimlico, 1993, p17.
- ³ For a critique of this view, see JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, pp1-4.
- ⁴ For successful examples of this genre, with limited appendices and bibliographies, see HIBBERT, Christopher *Agincourt*, London, Phoenix, 1995.
- ⁵ JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, p46.
- ⁶ A strong theme in international relations and identity politics is the idea of the imagined community as shaping the aspirations, and failures, of national development. See especially ANDERSON, Benedict *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London, Verso, 1991. For the practical strategic implications of some alternative imagined communities, see DAVIS, Diane E. "Non-State Armed Actors, New Imagined Communities, and Shifting Patterns of Sovereignty and Insecurity in the Modern World", *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 30 Issue 2, August 2009, pp221-245.
- ⁷ See WOOD, Ellen Meiksins "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda", in WOOD, Ellen Meiksins et al. (ed.) *In Defense of History: Marxism and the Postmodern Agenda*, N.Y., Monthly Review Press, 1997, pp1-16.
- ⁸ FUKUYAMA, Francis *The End of history and the Last Man*, New York, Free Press, 1992 & HOBBSBAWM, E. J. *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991*, London, Michael Joseph, 1994. For an example of the post-September 11 debate, see BOOTH, Ken & DUNNE, Tim (eds) *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of the Global Order*, N.Y., Palgrave Macmillan, 2002 & CHOMSKY, Noam 9-11, New York, Seven Stories Press, 2001. See further AGUILAR-Millan, Stephen et al. "The Globalization of Crime", *The Futurist*, November-December 2008, pp41-50; HAAS, Peter M. et al. (eds) *Controversies in Globalization: Contending Approaches to International Relations*, Washington, CQ Press, 2010; HEROD, Andrew, TUATHAIL, Gearóid & ROBERTS, Susan M. (eds.) *An Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography*, London, Routledge, 1998; JACKSON, Patrick Thaddeus & NEXON, Daniel H. "Paradigmatic Faults in International Relations Theory", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 53 no. 4, December 2009, pp907-930; KALOUDIS, George "Why Global Transformation and Not Globalization", *World and I*, Vol. 19 no.12, December 2004.
- ⁹ For the origin of this historical imagination in pivotal European intellectual developments in the 18th and 19th centuries, see WHITE, Hayden *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1973. This imagination not only influenced the formation and identity of modern nation-states, but also the way the international orders was viewed and constructed, see WILLIAMS, Michael *Culture and Security: Symbolic Power and the Politics of International Security*, N.Y., Routledge, 2007; IRIYE, Akira *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, N.Y., John Hopkins University Press, 1997; IRIYE, Akira *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2002; WATSON, Adam *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis*, London, Routledge, 1992.
- ¹⁰ See various controversies in PAGDEN, Anthony (ed.) *The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union*, Cambridge, CUP, 2002; RENFREW, Colin *Before Civilization: The Radiocarbon Revolution and Prehistoric Europe*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1978; BERNAL, Martin *Black Athena: The Afroasiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1987.
- ¹¹ Balanced assessments are found in BOSWORTH, A.B. *Alexander and the East: The Tragedy of Triumph*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1996; BOSWORTH, A.B. *Conquest and Empire: The Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge, CUP, 1988. In December 2004 a group of Greek lawyers sought an injunction against an American film on this basis, claiming that it was not possible to scientifically prove that Alexander was bisexual. What was wrong with bisexuality was not explained, nor were the implication for the rights of bisexuals and gays explored by these legalists.
- ¹² For a sophisticated placing of this debate in a wider context, see THOMAS, Keith *Religion and the Decline of Magic*, London, Penguin, 1971.
- ¹³ For a 'balancing' view, see LEMIEUX, Simon "The Spanish Inquisition", *History Review*, December 2002 pp44-50 [Access via Infotrac Database].
- ¹⁴ For some of the implications, see MARR, Andrew "Stuff the Hope and Glory", *New Statesman*, 27 November, 1998 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]. For the early historical context, see WARD-PERKINS, Bryan "Why did the Anglo-Saxons not become more British?", *English Historical Review*, June 2000 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com].

¹⁵ As noted in BRAGUE, Rémi *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*, trans. by Samuel Lester, South Bend Indiana, St. Augustine's Press, 2002, p18. For the emerging, integrated approach, see HAARMANN, Harald "The soul of Mother Russia: Russian Symbols and Pre-Russian Cultural Identity", *ReVision, Vol 23 no. 1*, Summer 2000.

¹⁶ JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, p10.

¹⁷ See Chapter One of JOYCE, James *Ulysses*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993. For somewhat similar takes on the burden of history, see Saul Bellow, *Humboldt's Gift*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p7; JAMESON, Fredric "Foreword", in LYOTARD, Jean François *The Postmodern Condition: A Report On Knowledge*, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1984, pxii; BRAGUE, Rémi *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*, trans. by Samuel Lester, South Bend Indiana, St. Augustine's Press, 2002, p170.

¹⁸ BRAGUE, Rémi *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*, trans. by Samuel Lester, South Bend Indiana, St. Augustine's Press, 2002, p131.

¹⁹ An effective critique of mechanical revisionism in psychology and political philosophy will be found in JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, pp12-14, pp19-45.

²⁰ This line of thought is powerfully developed by Foucault in a number of works including FOUCAULT, Michel *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, London, Tavistock Publications, 1974; FOUCAULT, Michel *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979; FOUCAULT, Michel, "History of Systems of Thought", in FOUCAULT, Michel *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. D.F. Bouchard & S. Simon, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977, pp199-205 & FOUCAULT, Michel *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard, London, Tavistock Publications, 1967. For the blinding effect of 'success' in projecting dominant traditions backwards on the historical record, see BUTTERFIELD, Herbert *The Whig Interpretation of History*, N.Y., Norton, 1965. For a similar problem, when dominant traditions are projected forward as destiny or manifest history, see POPPER, Karl *The Poverty of Historicism*, London, Routledge, 1991.

²¹ See GIBBONS, B.J. *Spirituality and the Occult: From the Renaissance to the Modern Age*, London, Routledge, 2001, pp2-3; STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, pp230-231.

²² See the complex debate of how this process may be structured in the evolution of science, see KUHN, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1996 & FEYERABEND, Paul *Against Method*, London, New York, Verso, 1993. Any choice for the 'first' rebels would be entirely arbitrary. From the point of view of dominant traditions, however, it is possible to suggest that the future dominance of the trinity of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle has tended to overshadow the real contributions of relativists such as Protagoras (for a totally unrepentant relativist view, see ATKINS, Anselm "Protagoras visits the Darwinian Planet", *Humanist*, March-April 1998 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]), as well as the deep insights of the Cynics and Sceptics. These patterns of thought would persist down into the Roman period, but were largely disesteemed by the political establishment, who preferred Stoic models that support current notions of governance.

²³ BAUMLIN, James S. "Reading Bloom (Or: Lessons Concerning the "Reformation" of the Western Literary Canon)", *College Literature, Vol. 27 no. 3*, Fall 2000, pp35-36. See further in Chapter III below.

²⁴ See DOWLING, William C. *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious*, London, Methuen, 1984, p117, in relation to the ideas of Jameson.

²⁵ The term counter-culture has been extended from its current usage in modern counter-cultures and alternative visions of community, especially driven by youth movements in the 1960s but extending forward for at least one entire generation, for which see VEYSEY, Laurence R. *The Communal Experience: Anarchist and Mystical Counter-Cultures in America*, New York, Harper & Row, 1973; BERKE, Joseph (ed.) *Counter Culture*, London, Owen, 1969; MUSGROVE, Frank *Ecstasy and Holiness: Counter Culture and the Open Society*, London, Methuen, 1974.

²⁶ CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p194.

²⁷ This trajectory, however, was not a direct one, and needed to draw on many other sources aside from Alchemy. Indeed, the emergence of robust theories of matter and a more rigorous experimental method would sharply diverge from philosophical alchemy, though perhaps not till as late as the second half of the 18th century. See further DEBUS, Allen G. *Chemistry, Alchemy and the New Philosophy, 1550-1700: Studies in the History of Science and Medicine*, London, Variorum Reprints, 1987 and LEVERE, Trevor H. *Transforming Matter: a History of Chemistry from Alchemy to the Buckyball*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001.

²⁸ See for example VRBANCIC, Mario "Globalisation, Empire, and the Vampire", *Comparative Literature & Culture: A WWWeb Journal, Vol. 9 Issue 2*, June 2007, pp1-9 and OWEN, Susan A. "Buffy the Vampire Slayer: Vampires, Postmodernity, and Postfeminism", *Journal of Popular Film & Television, 27 no. 2*, Summer 1999, pp24-31.

²⁹ A central them in DOSTOYEVSKY, Fyodor *The Brothers Karamazov*, translated with an introduction by David Magarshack, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1958. See also STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, pp261-262, p278.

³⁰ For the strong forms of dualism found in parts of ancient Mesopotamia and in Zoroastrianism, see STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, p7.

- ³¹ For this term within Zoroastrianism, see STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, pp31-32.
- ³² For this terminology, see HANSING, Katrin "Rasta, Race and Revolution: Transnational Connections in Socialist Cuba", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27 no. 4, October 2001, pp733-747; SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, pp175-176. For our purposes, it is important to note that symbols both reveal and hide meaning, depending on their use and context.
- ³³ HANSING, Katrin "Rasta, Race and Revolution: Transnational Connections in Socialist Cuba", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27 no. 4, October 2001, pp733-747.
- ³⁴ See for example EISLER, Riane *Sacred Pleasure*, London, Doubleday, 1995, pp16-18. For the rather romantic but inventive Anglo-Celtic spin on this, see GRAVES, Robert *The White Goddess: A Historical Grammar of Poetic Myth*, London, Faber, 1952. In part, Graves seems to be following an existing line of 'anthropological' inquiry that was pushed forward in 1921 by Margaret Murray's *Witch Cult in Western Europe*, though this trend would be academically deconstructed by works such as Norman Cohan's *Europe's Inner Demons*, see STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, pp242-242. For the distinctly modern aspects of these traditions, see HUTTON, Ronald "The Neolithic Great Goddess: A Study in Modern Tradition", *Antiquity*, Vol. 71 no. 271, March 1997, pp91-100.
- ³⁵ See EISLER, Riane *Sacred Pleasure*, London, Doubleday, 1995, p2.
- ³⁶ JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, p114.
- ³⁷ For Rome as symbolising an attitude and process of adapting external cultures and ideas, a process at the heart of the European process and modernisation itself, see BRAGUE, Rémi *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization*, trans. by Samuel Lester, South Bend Indiana, St. Augustine's Press, 2002, pp26-34.
- ³⁸ MERRETT, Alexandra *Religious Liberty as a Paradigm For the Development of Human Rights*, Research Paper no. 5, The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, December 1997 [Internet Access at <http://www.international-relations.com/rp/rp5weba.html>].
- ³⁹ JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, p84. See further HILL, Christopher *The World Turned Upside Down*, London, Temple Smith, 1972.
- ⁴⁰ See MERRETT, Alexandra *Religious Liberty as a Paradigm For the Development of Human Rights*, Research Paper no. 5, The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, Bond University, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, December 1997 [Internet Access at <http://www.international-relations.com/rp/rp5weba.html>].
- ⁴¹ CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p197.
- ⁴² GIBBONS, B.J. *Spirituality and the Occult: From the Renaissance to the Modern Age*, London, Routledge, 2001, p3; STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, p132.
- ⁴³ See SOUTHERN, R. W. *The Making of the Middle Ages*, London, Pimlico, 1993, p30-42, pp64-67.
- ⁴⁴ Noted, for example, in FRYE, Northrop *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature*, London, Arc, 1981; FRYE, Northrop *Myth, Metaphor and Identity*, Lectures presented at the Australian National University, 27 June 1986, 28 June 1986, and at Sydney University, 8 July 1986.
- ⁴⁵ To borrow a phrase from EISLER, Riane *Sacred Pleasure*, London, Doubleday, 1995, pp4-11.
- ⁴⁶ It must be stressed, however, that the imagination of science was not born by an anti-religious or anti-Christian imagination as such, but rather in the demand to read the universe as a source of authority that could not be denied by the strictures of Church authorities. See further HARRISON, Peter "The 'Book of Nature' and Early Modern Science" in Van Berkel, K. & Vanderjagt, A. (eds) *The Book of Nature in Early Modern and Modern History*, Leuven, Peeters Publishers, 2006, pp1-26.
- ⁴⁷ See for example DODDS, E.R. *The Greeks and the Irrational*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1951; DODDS, E.R. *Pagan and Christian In an Age of Anxiety*, Cambridge, CUP, 1965; FOX, Robin Lane *Pagans and Christians*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1986.
- ⁴⁸ See FOUCAULT, Michel "History of Systems of Thought", in BOUCHARD, Donald F. (ed.) *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1977, p204; MAJOR-POETZL, Pamela *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History*, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1983, p41.
- ⁴⁹ See WHITE, Hayden *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe*, Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1973.
- ⁵⁰ In JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, p1.
- ⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p4, p42.
- ⁵² JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, p130.
- ⁵³ On 2nd May a British submarine sank the Argentine cruiser *General Belgrano*, even though it was apparently outside the exclusion zone and sailing away from the British task force (and therefore not a threat) at the time of being sunk, leading to a loss of 368 lives, though of course she was in any sense a 'neutral' vessel, see ADAMS, Valerie *The Falklands Conflict*, Avon, Wayland, 1988, p33; ARQILLA, John "The origins of the South Atlantic War", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 33 no. 4, November 2001, pp739-775 and alternative formulations in GILL, William "Was Mrs Thatcher right?", *New Statesman*, April 1, 2002, pp32-33.

- ⁵⁴ There is no claim here to pursue a rigorous 'organic' metaphor, whereby the functions of society can be viewed as the same as those of a human individual, as in the Plato's *Republic*. A more direct linkage might be found in the way social conditioning shapes the mentality and thinking of individuals, thereby influencing institutions, processes, and patterns of explanation. As suggested by one historian: "Scholars of childhood and of individual identity formation inform us that by the age of five our ways of organizing emotions, knowledge, and aspirations are formatted but hidden in the *sub-conscious*", HOERDER, Dirk "How the Intimate Lives of Subaltern Men, Women, and Children Confound the Nation's Master Narratives", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 88 no. 3, December 2001, p875.
- ⁵⁵ See for example BYRNE, Alex "The End of History: Censorship and Libraries", *The Australian Library Journal*, 53 no. 2, May 2004, pp133-152.
- ⁵⁶ See GILLIS, A.R. "Institutional Dynamics and Dangerous Classes: Reading, Writing, and Arrest in Nineteenth-Century France", *Social Forces*, 82 no. 4, June 2004, pp1303-1331.
- ⁵⁷ Which produced a brief plethora of corrective publishing, including works such as BOGIN, Meg *The Women Troubadours*, New York, Paddington, 1976; EARNSHAW, Doris *The Female Voice in Medieval Romance Lyric*, New York, Peter Lang, 1988; RIEGER, Angelica *Trobairitz: Der Beitrag der Frau in der altokzitanischen hofischen Lyrik*, Edition des Gesamtkorpus. Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1991, and more recently BRUCKNER, Matilda Tomaryn, SHEPARD, Laurie & WHITE, Sarah (ed. & trans.) *Songs of the Women Troubadours*, New York, Garland Publishing, 1995, reviewed in POE, Elizabeth W. "Songs of the Women Troubadours", *Romance Philology*, 49 no. 4, May 1996, pp483-489 and PATERSON, Linda M. "Songs of the Women Troubadours", *Medium Aevum*, 69 no. 1, Spring 2000, pp144-147.
- ⁵⁸ See CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, pp164-166.
- ⁵⁹ Preminger's film was based on the book by Leon Uris, with the film emphasising 'heroic elements', see WEISSBROD, Rachel "Exodus as a Zionist Melodrama", *Israel Studies*, 4 no. 1, Spring 1999.
- ⁶⁰ See DAINOTTO, Roberto M. "A South with a View: Europe and Its Other", *Nepantla: Views from South*, Vol. 1 no. 2, 2000, pp375-390.
- ⁶¹ See further DAINOTTO, Roberto M. "A South with a View: Europe and Its Other", *Nepantla: Views from South*, Vol. 1 no. 2, 2000, pp375-390.
- ⁶² For the danger of stereotyping in this topic, see ASATRIAN, Garnik "Prolegomena to the Study of the Kurds", *Iran & The Caucasus*, 13 no. 1, 2009, p1-5.
- ⁶³ For these issues, see CHRISTIA, Fotini & SEMPLE, Michael "Flipping the Taliban: How to Win in Afghanistan", *Foreign Affairs*, 88 no. 4, July/ August 2009, pp34-45; SIMON, Steven & STEVENSON, Jonathan "Afghanistan: How Much Is Enough?", *Survival*, 51 no. 5, October-November 2009, pp47-67; CHESTERMAN, Simon "Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building", *Survival*, 44 no. 3, Autumn 2002, pp37-46; JALALI, Ali A. "Afghanistan in 2002: The Struggle to Win the Peace", *Asian Survey*, 43 no. 1, January/February 2003, pp175-185; SAIKAL, Amin "Afghanistan After the Loya Jirga", *Survival*, 44 no. 3, Autumn 2002, pp47-56; SEDRA, Mark "The 'Day After' in Iraq: Lessons from Afghanistan", *Foreign Policy-In-Focus Policy Report*, March 2003 [Internet Access at <http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.org/papers/iraqrebuild2003.html>].
- ⁶⁴ See for example MOLINARI, Andrea Lorenzo "Women Martyrs in the Early Church: Hearing Another Side to the Story", *Priscilla Papers*, Vol. 22 Issue 1, Winter2008, pp5-10; JACOBS, Andrew S. Writing "Demetrius: Ascetic Logic in Ancient Christianity", *Church History*, Vol. 69 Issue 4, December 2000, pp719-748; STARK, Rodney "Reconstructing the Rise of Christianity: The Role of Women", *Sociology or Religion*, Vol/ 56 no. 3, Fall 1995, pp229-245; SEREMETAKIS, C. Nadia (ed.) *Ritual, Power and the Body: Historical Perspectives on the Representation of Greek Women*, N.Y., Pella Publishing, 1993; ROBINS, Gay *Women in Ancient Egypt*, London, British Museum Press, 1993; JUST, Roger *Women in Athenian Law and Life*, London, Routledge, 1989; POMERORY, S.B. *Women in Hellenistic Egypt: From Alexander to Cleopatra*, N.Y., Schocken Books, 1984; CAMERON, Avril & KUHRT, Amélie (eds.) *Images of Women in Antiquity*, London, Croom Helm, 1983; RUETHER, Rosemary & MCLAUGHLIN, Eleanor (eds.) *Women of Spirit: Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions*, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1979. See further SALISBURY, Joyce E. *The Encyclopedia of Women in the Ancient World*, Santa Barbara, ABC-CLIO, 2001.
- ⁶⁵ See for example HAIGHT, Anne Lyon *Banned Books: Informal Notes on Some Books Banned for Various Reasons at Various Times and in Various Places*, New York, R.R. Bowker, 1955.
- ⁶⁶ For example BROWN, Peter *The Body and Society: Men, Women and Sexual Renunciation in Early Christianity*, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1988.
- ⁶⁷ Noted in DOWLING, William C. *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious*, London, Methuen, 1984, p129; JAMESON, Fredric *The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act*, London, Methuen, 1981, p39.
- ⁶⁸ For an overview of past psychological research, see WENZLAFF, Richard M. & WEGNER, Daniel M. "Thought Suppression", *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 51 Issue 1, 2000, pp51-59.
- ⁶⁹ WENZLAFF, Richard M. & WEGNER, Daniel M. "Thought Suppression", *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 51 Issue 1, 2000, pp51-59. For strategies that can avoid these effects, e.g. focused distraction, see VINCENTE LUCIANO, Juan & ALGARABEL GONZALES, Salvador "Analysis of the Efficacy of Different Thought Suppression Strategies", *International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy*, Vol. 7 Issue 3, 2007, pp335-345.

- ⁷⁰ For the association of suppression and repression with a range of disorders including depression, trauma, and obsessive-compulsive disorder, see WENZLAFF, Richard M. & WEGNER, Daniel M. "Thought Suppression", *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 51 Issue 1, 2000, pp51-59.
- ⁷¹ BILLIG, Michael *Freudian Repression: Conversation Creating the Unconscious*, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, p141. Artistic, scientific and intellectual work may also be viewed as driven in part as mechanisms of sublimation, whereby socially dangerous drives are displaced re-directed into creative activities, FREUD, Sigmund *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. David McLintock, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2002, p17. On this basis, civilization is build up on patterns of renunciation, see FREUD, Sigmund *Civilization and Its Discontents*, trans. David McLintock, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 2002, p34.
- ⁷² See BILLIG, Michael *Freudian Repression: Conversation Creating the Unconscious*, Cambridge, CUP, 1999, pp1-13.
- ⁷³ This has been effectively charted in SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997. John Ralston Saul, however, directed most of his account toward current social and political issues that distorted the discourse and use of rationality, a somewhat different theme to those pursued in this article. For this discourse of knowledge in modern capitalism over the last decade, see THRIFT, Nigel "The Rise of Soft Capitalism", in HEROD, Andrew et al. (ed.) *An Unruly World?: Globalization, Governance and Geography*, London, Routledge, 1998, pp25-71.
- ⁷⁴ BAUMLIN, James S. "Reading Bloom (Or: Lessons Concerning the "Reformation" of the Western Literary Canon)", *College Literature*, Vol. 27 no. 3, Fall 2000, p34. Diverse Christian canons were already being shaped as early as Eusebius, and in the 4th century by Athanasius, bishop of Alexandria, BRAKKE, David "Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-century Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria's Thirty-ninth Festal Letter", *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 87 no. 4, October 1994, pp395-419; STANFORD, Peter *The Devil: A Biography*, London, Mandarin, 1996, p83.
- ⁷⁵ See Augustine, (Saint) *Four Anti-Pelagian Writings*, translated by John A. Mourant & William J. Collinge, Washington, Catholic University of America Press, 1992.
- ⁷⁶ BRAKKE, David "Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-century Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria's Thirty-ninth Festal Letter", *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 87 no. 4, October 1994, pp395-419 [Access via Infotrac Database].
- ⁷⁷ See VORONTSOVA, Lyudmila & FILATOV, Sergei "Paradoxes of the Old Believer Movement", *Religion, State & Society*, Vol. 28 no. 1, March 2000, pp53-68. For the context, see FIGES, Orlando *Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia*, London, Allen Lane, 2002.
- ⁷⁸ PREVOS, Andre J.M. "Hip-Hop, Rap, and Repression in France and in the United States", *Popular Music and Society*, Vol. 22 Issue 2, 1998, pp67-84; D'ENTREMONT, Jim "Clear and Present Danger", *Index on Censorship*, Vol. 32 Issue 3, July 2003, pp124-128.
- ⁷⁹ KORS, Alan C. & SILVERGLATE, Harvey A. "Codes of Silence", *Reason*, Vol. 30 Issue 6, November 1998, pp22-30; SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, p177.
- ⁸⁰ SPARROW, Robert "Talking Sense About Political Correctness", *Journal of Australian Studies*, Vol. 26 Issue 73, March 2002, pp130-131.
- ⁸¹ See FREUD, Sigmund "Revision of the Theory of Dreams", in FREUD, Sigmund *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. James Strachey, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, pp35-59.
- ⁸² JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975; BROWN, Norman O. *Love's Body*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990.
- ⁸³ PAGELS, Elaine "What Became of God the Mother?: Conflicting Images of God in Early Christianity", *Signs*, Vol. 2 no. 2, 1976, pp. 293-303.
- ⁸⁴ See RUETHER, Rosemary & MCLAUGHLIN, Eleanor (eds.) *Women of Spirit: Female Leadership in the Jewish and Christian Traditions*, N.Y., Simon & Schuster, 1979.
- ⁸⁵ CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p144.
- ⁸⁶ CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p144, pp207-208. For a somewhat negative interpretation of Lollardy, see ASTON, Margaret "Lollardy and Sedition 1381-1431", in HILTON, R. H. (ed.) *Peasants, Knights, and Heretics: Studies in Medieval English Social History*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976, pp273-318.
- ⁸⁷ See CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, pp145-146.
- ⁸⁸ As distinct from deeper forms of irony that may have an awareness-heightening function, fully comprehending its object while showing up its limits, faults, or critically undermining its context.
- ⁸⁹ FOUCAULT, Michel, "History of Systems of Thought", in FOUCAULT, Michel *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. D.F. Bouchard & S. Simon, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1977, p199. See also FOUCAULT, Michel & CHOMSKY, Noam "Human Nature: Justice versus Power", in DAVIDSON, Arnold I. (ed.) *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, p140.
- ⁹⁰ FOUCAULT, Michel "Madness, the Absence of Work", in DAVIDSON, Arnold I. (ed.) *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp97-104; MAJOR-POETZL, Pamela *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History*, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1983, pp27-8, p121, p124. For the relationship between 'power-knowledge' and discourse, see LEMERT, Charles C. & GILLAN, Garth *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression*, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1982, pp57-92.

- ⁹¹ MAJOR-POETZL, Pamela Michel *Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History*, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1983, p113.
- ⁹² FOUCAULT, Michel *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, trans. Richard Howard, London, Tavistock Publications, 1967, pxii, pxiv, pp8-10, pp38-64; FOUCAULT, Michel "Madness, the Absence of Work", in DAVIDSON, Arnold I. (ed.) *Foucault and His Interlocutors*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp97-104, pp100-101. For power relations that seek 'to tame, diminish, control and organize discourse', see FINK-EITEL, Hinrich *Foucault: An Introduction*, Philadelphia, Pennbridge Books, 1992, p42.
- ⁹³ LEMERT, Charles C. & GILLAN, Garth *Michel Foucault: Social Theory and Transgression*, N.Y., Columbia University Press, 1982, pp62-63.
- ⁹⁴ See SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, pp1-4, pp15-16, pp57-59.
- ⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p183.
- ⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p24.
- ⁹⁷ SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, pp40-42. For the role of language in shaping social power, see REID, Scott A. & NG, Sik Hung "Language, Power, Land Intergroup Relations (Social Influence and Social Power: Using Theory for Understanding Social Issues)", *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 55 no. 1, Spring 1999, pp119ff.
- ⁹⁸ SAUL, John Ralston *The Unconscious Civilization*, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1997, p50.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p56.
- ¹⁰⁰ For the transformation of the view of curiosity during the 17th century, see HARRISON, Peter "Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, and the Reformation of Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England", *Isis*, 92 no. 2, June 2001, pp265-292.
- ¹⁰¹ See for example GREATREX, Joan "The English Cathedral Priors and the Pursuit of Learning in the later Middle Ages", *The Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, Vol. 45 no. 3, July 1994, pp396-412. [Access via Infotrac Database].
- ¹⁰² CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p114.
- ¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, pp115-121.
- ¹⁰⁴ For the evolution of curiosity from a vice to a virtue was only possible through the moderation of positive goals, good outcomes and then by method in natural philosophy, HARRISON, Peter "Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, and the Reformation of Natural Philosophy in Early Modern England", *Isis*, 92 no. 2, June 2001, pp279-292.
- ¹⁰⁵ DOWLING, William C. *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious*, London, Methuen, 1984, p54.
- ¹⁰⁶ FILORAMO, Giovanni *A History of Gnosticism*, trans. by Anthony Alcock, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp4-7. See works such as Origen *Contra Celsum*, Ireneaus *Against the Heretics*; Epiphanius *Treatise Against the Heresies*; Hippolytus *Refutation of All Heresies*; Augustine *De haeresibus*.
- ¹⁰⁷ WENZLAFF, Richard M. & WEGNER, Daniel M. "Thought Suppression", *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 51 Issue 1, 2000, pp51-59.
- ¹⁰⁸ The politico-religious environment may have been a reason for the location of these texts, a speculative but possible idea, as noted in BRAKKE, David "Canon Formation and Social Conflict in Fourth-century Egypt: Athanasius of Alexandria's Thirty-ninth Festal Letter", *Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. 87 no. 4, October 1994, pp395-419.
- ¹⁰⁹ GODMAN, Peter "Graham Greene's Vatican Dossier", *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. 288 no. 1, July-August 2001, p84. Ironically, as once secret archives become opened up they can become crucial historical sources. However, this is not always problem-free, e.g. concerns by Jewish and Catholic Scholars over the degree of disclosure of documents concerning Pope Pius XII's and the Holocaust, "Scholars Say Vatican's Published Material on Holocaust Inadequate", *America*, Vol. 183 no. 15, 11/11/2000, p4. In some ways the banning of books was less distorting than the effects of the *Index Expurgatorius*, i.e. those books which had been 'purified' by removal or modification of offending sections, see BAYLEY, Howard *A New Light on the Renaissance Displayed in Contemporary Emblems*. N.Y., Benjamin Blom, 1967, pp206-207. For the ongoing effort to control the divergent writings of Catholic priests in some areas, see ALLEN, John L. (jr) "Vatican levels new censorship against Haight", *National Catholic Reporter*, Vol. 45 Issue 7, 1/23/2009, p8-9.
- ¹¹⁰ ZEMAN, Z.A.B. *The Making and Brealing of Communist Europe*, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1991, p288.
- ¹¹¹ YEVTUSHENKO, Yevgeny *Fatal Half Measures: The Culture of Democracy in the Soviet Union*, trans. Antonina Bouis, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1991, p35.
- ¹¹² On these and related issues see LEMAITRE, Roemer "The rollback of democracy in Russia after Beslan", *Review of Central and East European Law*, 31 no. 4, October 2006, pp369-412.
- ¹¹³ See CANTOR, Norman F. *In the Wake of the Plague: The Black Death and the World It Made*, N.Y., Free Press, 2001, p5.
- ¹¹⁴ DOWLING, William C. *Jameson, Althusser, Marx: An Introduction to the Political Unconscious*, London, Methuen, 1984, p131. This is not a genuine dialogue, nor a genuine evaluation (based on systematic principles) of distaff ideas, but has the saving grace of leaving a limited social and cultural space in which memory might be preserved and coded in long term forms.
- ¹¹⁵ For a critique of so-called common sense, see JACOBY, Russell *Social Amnesia: A Critique of Conformist Psychology from Adler to Laing*, Hassocks, Harvester Press, 1975, p25.

¹¹⁶ See THUCYDIDES *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972; FARRAR, Cynthia *The Origins of Democratic Thinking*, Cambridge, CUP, 1988.

¹¹⁷ For globalism as a set of expectations, as distinct from globalization processes, see NAIM, Moises "Globalization", *Foreign Policy*, March April 2009, pp28-34; SAUL, John Ralston *The Collapse of Globalism: And the Reinvention of the World*, London, Atlantic Books, 2005; COKER, Christopher *Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-First Century: NATO and the Management of Risk*, Adelphi Paper 345, London, IISS, 2002.

¹¹⁸ This occurs both in the reading of the past as having meaning for national destiny, see POPPER, Karl *The Poverty of Historicism*, London, Routledge, 1991.

¹¹⁹ For the 'zones of peace' versus 'zones of turmoil' model as a limited global description, HARKAVY, Robert E. "Images of the Coming International System", *Orbis*, 41 no. 4, Fall 1997, pp569-591; SINGER, Max & WILDAVSKY, Aaron *The Real World Order: Zones of Peace / Zones of Turmoil*, Chatham N.J., Chatham House Pub., 1993. For related policy implications of notions such as 'arcs of instability', see BROMLEY, Simon "Connecting Central Eurasia to the Middle East in American Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan and Pakistan: 1979-Present", *Perspectives on Global Development & Technology*, Vol. 6 Issue 1-3, 2007, p87-108.

¹²⁰ See GIDDENS, Anthony *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Oxford, Polity Press, 1991.