Are the Demons Sleeping or Have They Been Banished?  
Europe 1913 verses Europe 2013

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Introduction

The European Union (EU) evolved from the realisation that ultranationalism, which ran rampant in early twentieth century Europe, had been one of the central factors that led to the wanton destruction of the continent twice in a thirty year period. The ideal of European integration, as a means to stave off future disaster in Europe, was begun with the creation of the European Steel and Coal Community in 1952. In 1957, the signing of the Treaty of Rome resulted in the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), at first composed of six member nations; Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the lifting of the Iron Curtain in 1989 and 1990 respectively, resulted in further expansion. The European Union was established, under its current title, by the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.

The European Union was struck by a widespread financial crisis, the Eurozone Crisis, in late 2009. This ongoing crisis has led many critics of the EU to believe that the abandonment of European integration and the EU governance model is warranted. The then Luxembourg Prime-Minister Jean-Claude Juncker stated, in an interview with Der Spiegel, 2013, “I am chilled by the realisation of how similar circumstances in Europe in 2013 are to those of 100 years ago. The demons have not been banished; they are merely sleeping. . .”

This was much more than a ‘throw-away’ media line. Such sentiments pointed to the long tradition of Euroscepticism, which though initially most intense in the United Kingdom, has swept through several countries in recent years, including France, Greece, Spain and Italy. Historically, Eurosceptics in Britain managed to sustain a debate aimed at reducing the extent of their integration within Europe and maintaining the pound as an independent currency. Levels of Euroscepticism have fluctuated, first based on a disinterest in European Parliamentary elections in the 1990s and reluctance by Danes and Swedes to fully engage in all treaty areas

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1 The views in The Culture Mandala are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views, position or policies of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies. Bearing in mind the controversial debates now occurring in International Relations and East-West studies, the editors publish diverse, critical and dissenting views so long as these meet academic criteria.
during that period.\textsuperscript{5} The Eurozone crisis from 2009 intensified these debates, leading to major concerns about a two-track, two-speed Europe. Depending on future elections, the UK government of David Cameron has indicated that it may run a referendum on staying within the European Union in 2017, depending on its ability to negotiation its terms of engagement with the EU. Such concerns have led to the President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, to accuse Eurosceptics of wanting to take Europe back to ‘the trenches’ of World War I.\textsuperscript{6} In general, the Eurozone crisis seems likely to lead to increased criticism of EU institutions and possible gains for Eurosceptic parties in future elections.

However, this article will dispute Juncker’s claim that the Europe of today is similar to that of one hundred years ago. The alliances of 1913, which were the basis of World War I, will first be described to illustrate the precarious situation of early 20\textsuperscript{th} century Europe. This situation will be then be compared with the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century, detailing the vastly divergent priorities of the European Union in 2013. Subsequently, the Balkan setting of 1913 will be detailed and compared with the Balkan situation in 2013 to demonstrate that the Balkans are no longer the ‘powder keg of Europe’, largely due to EU efforts. Ultimately, it will be demonstrated that Juncker’s claim that Europe of 2013 finds itself in similar circumstances to Europe of 1913, is incorrect; in reality, the Europe of 2013 is vastly different from the Europe of one hundred years ago.

Alliances in 1913

Otto von Bismarck was the hegemon of his time in central Europe and the architect of the unified modern German State. As Prussian Prime-Minister and then German Republic Chancellor, Bismarck constructed the German State through several conflicts, especially with Austria, France and first of all with Denmark in 1864 over the status of Schleswig-Holstein, which became a province of Prussia by 1866.

In 1866, Bismarck engaged in conflict with Austria over disputed administration of the region of Holstein, but in fact this was a pretext for war aimed at reducing the influence of Austria in the German Confederation. The resulting “Seven Weeks War” ended with the utter defeat of the Austrian military. The victory for Germany assured the creation of a North-German Federation. Moreover, to assure similar results to those achieved by the Austrian campaign, Bismarck went to war with France, wherein French forces were destroyed by the well-trained Prussian military.\textsuperscript{7} Resultantly, large sections of Alsace-Lorraine were ceded to Prussia from France. France was also forced to pay equivalent to approximately one billion dollars in modern day

\textsuperscript{5} Field, Heather & Dellios, Rosita (December 2002) \textit{Strategic Powers in a Post-September 11, Post-American World: The European Union and China (1)}, Research Paper No. 9, The Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, School of Humanities and Social Science, Bond University Queensland, Australia.


terms, in reparations.\textsuperscript{8} Importantly, the southern German states agreed to an alliance with the Northern states, resulting in the creation of the German Republic.

Bismarck realised the potential threat that France’s desire for revenge posed to the new German Republic. Accordingly, Bismarck began to cultivate balancing relationships. In 1873, he was the main leader responsible for the formation of the Three Emperors League, which tied Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany together.\textsuperscript{9} While Russia withdrew in 1878, Austria-Hungary and Germany maintained the Dual Alliance, which assured mutual assistance in case of Russian attack or if Russia provided aid to another power at war with Germany or Austria-Hungary.

In 1881, Italy joined Austria-Hungary and Germany, forming the Triple Alliance.\textsuperscript{10} Specifically, the pact guaranteed that if France attacked one of the signatories, then the other two would join in the fight against the French. Ultimately, the Triple Alliance was meaningless since Italy entered into a secret treaty with France, which stated that Italy would remain neutral if Germany attacked France.

Russia saw the potential threat posed by the Triple Alliance. Correspondingly, in 1892, it forged an alliance with France.\textsuperscript{11} Also, Britain realised that its policy of “splendid isolation” would not ensure its security or preclusion from a European war. Thus, in the early twentieth century, Britain agreed to military alliances with Japan to limit German colonial expansion in the East; with France, which resolved certain colonial conflicts and ensured greater cooperation; and with Russia, facing Germany with the prospects of a two-front war. Again, in the event of attack the pacts forged between Britain, France, and Russia guaranteed a mutual military response.

Ultimately, self-interest was at the root of every European nation that engaged in the forging of these alliances. Bismarck’s interests were expansionist in nature and thus he aligned himself with the Austro-Hungarian empire. Britain, while exercising isolationist tendencies, had to limit these trends and act in their self-interest, now played out on the global stage, by forming alliances with Japan, Russia, and France. Russia and France also acted in self-interest, aligning with each other; France, to have the capacity to exact revenge upon Germany for stealing Alsace-Lorraine and Russia, to protect itself from the Triple Alliance.

\textbf{Alliances in 2013}

The system of alliances in 2013 Europe is very different to the tense web of alliances and mutual suspicions of a century before. The European Union, which defines modern-day politics in wider Europe, diverges from earlier alliances in that member nations are now guided by

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\item \textsuperscript{8} Levinson, 2005.
\item \textsuperscript{9} Goriainov, Serge (1918) “The End of the Alliance of the Emperors,” \textit{The American Historical Review}, Vol. 23,(2), 324-349.
\item \textsuperscript{11} Levinson, 2005.
\end{itemize}
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common interests, rather than by narrow self-interests, which were at the heart of the aforementioned relations among nations. Alliances are no longer forged just in the areas of security and defence (as in the NATO alliance), but are shaped as supranational agreements and treaties that have created the new Europe. The Treaty of Lisbon attempts to further such ‘alliances’ (as patterns of democratization, consultation and participation) by improving relationships among the EU citizenry, the national Parliaments and the European Parliament. Thus, the situation of in the Europe of 2013 is centred on furthered integration, interconnectedness and transparency, whereas the Alliance system of 1913 was concerned primarily with security, expansion and secrecy.

The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by EU member states on 13 December 2007 and entered into effect 1 December 2009. It is decisive in shaping modern-day Europe because it sets the standards by which the member states are governed within the context of the European Union.

Essentially, the treaty provides the Union with the legal framework and tools, which are necessary to meet future challenges and to respond to citizens’ demands. Accordingly, the treaty outlines four main goals which guide the governance of Europe, dually attempting to further build the alliance between Europe’s citizenry and the European Union, as well as between national Parliaments and the European Parliament. A more democratic and transparent Europe is among the goals of the Treaty of Lisbon, which endeavours to strengthen the democratic process by further empowering EU citizens. The Treaty of Lisbon puts the European Parliament on equal footing with the European Commission, largely eliminating and replacing the ‘pillars’ system. For example, in accordance with the Treaty, the European Parliament possesses the same degree of power as the Council. Additionally, concerning the EU budget, Parliament and the Council have the same degree of power due to Lisbon’s abolition of the former distinctions between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure. Resultantly, Parliament and Council determine all expenditure together.

Further evidence of Lisbon as an attempt to forge closer alliances with the EU citizenry is apparent in its focus on the transparency of proceedings. This is in direct contradiction to the alliance system of early 20th century Europe, where secret alliances occurred and democracy was feeble, again distinguishing it from the Europe of 2013. For example, according to the Lisbon Treaty, all legislative deliberations of the Council of Ministers must be made public. Accordingly, citizens have full access to top-level decisions. That is, every EU citizen is able to access which national minister took which decision, regarding any matter.

In addition, another component of the Treaty aimed at increasing transparency, strengthening the alliance between the EU and its inhabitants, as well as deepening democracy, is the ‘Citizens’ Initiative’. Under the Treaty, the Citizens’ Initiative is intended to maintain an open, transparent, regular dialogue with civil society and give citizens the opportunity to make their positions known and participate in all areas of Union action. Accordingly, it allows one million individuals, who belong to any number of member states and support a particular policy, to directly participate in EU policy making by proposing legislation. That is, on matters where the EU Commission has competency to propose legislation, such as environment, agriculture, transport, or public health, citizens can propose an initiative. Additionally, the process requires seven individuals from seven different member countries. Thus, any proposal made to the EU ombudsman of the Council represents the initial interests of at least seven individuals from seven different member states, backed by one million supporters.

As a result of the Treaty of Lisbon’s endeavour to build a more democratic and transparent Europe, the European Parliament, which is directly elected by EU citizens, gains ever greater authority. As such, the European Union is attempting to forge closer engagement with its citizenry through further legitimising the EU Parliament’s role in European affairs, offsetting the power of the European Council, and strengthening democracy through the Citizens’ Initiative. As Jose Socrates, the Portuguese Prime-minister notes, Lisbon makes the EU more effective, more democratically accountable, and friendlier to citizens.

Accordingly, the endeavour to forge a stronger alliance with the EU citizenry by the European Union in the 21st century is in stark contrast with the Europe of one hundred years ago. Ultimately, one of the most prominent distinctions between the Europe of 1913 and the Europe of 2013 is that the Europe of 1913 still had subjects, while the Europe of 2013 has citizens.

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Strengthening the alliances between national Parliaments and the European Parliament

Along with strengthening the relationship between the citizenry and the EU, the Treaty of Lisbon also attempts to strengthen decision-making alliances between national Parliaments and the European Parliament. It does so through the encouragement of a greater involvement of national parliaments in EU processes. For example, a new mechanism allows national Parliaments to monitor Union only acts, so that results can be better attained. Thus, with Lisbon, national Parliaments become a pivotal component to decision making regarding Acts, even where authority rests with the Union. As such, national Parliaments have the opportunity to better reflect the interests of their populations.

Additionally, Article 9 of the Treaty states: “The European Parliament and national Parliaments shall together determine the organisation and promotion of effective and regular inter-parliamentary cooperation within the Union”. This furthers the increasing degree of cooperation among national Parliaments and the European Parliament. Thus, national interests are acknowledged and furthered by the Lisbon Treaty, while the common values of the European Union are still adhered to.

While the articles regarding greater involvement of national Parliaments have been criticised as threatening the success of European integration thus far, there is little evidence to support the notion that it will hinder the future process of integration in the EU. Rather, it is quite apparent that the new Articles of the Treaty, detailed above, further European integration. Accordingly, these articles strengthen the relationship between national Parliaments and the European Parliament, furthering genuine integration. Again, this pattern of cooperation and consultation contradicts the claim that European circumstances today are similar to those of the Europe of 1913.

The Balkans

The Balkans will be used as yet another comparison, showing just how different the Europe of 2013 is from Europe of 1913. The Balkan situation in 1913, when the region represented the most tumultuous area in Europe, will be detailed. Following, the situation of the Balkans in 2013 will be explained, detailing the European Union’s stabilising effect in the region. Once the ‘powder keg of Europe’, the Balkan states are becoming increasing stabilised through the prospect of deeper integration into the European Union itself.

The Balkans in 1913

The Balkans, once termed the ‘powder keg of Europe’, represented the most conflicted area of Europe during the early 20th century. For example, between 1912 and 1913 there were two Balkan wars over disputed territorial claims. The first, between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan League (comprising Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria) ended in May 1913.

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23 Europa, 2013.
Only a month after the ending of this conflict with the signing of the Treaty of London, a second war plagued the region when Bulgarian forces attacked their former allies, Serbia and Greece. Bulgaria was defeated but the effects of the second Balkan conflict resonated throughout Europe. Russia, for instance, was left with only Serbia as an ally in this critical area, but at this stage there were limits to how far Russia would support Serbia’s national interests or general Pan-Slavic policies.

Moreover, notions of national distinctiveness and self-determination in the Balkans, coupled with a declining Austro-Hungarian empire, which ruled over various factions of individuals with little in common, resulted in a precarious situation. For instance, the subsequent formation of extremist groups such as the ‘Unification or Death’ organization, publicly known as the ‘Black Hand’ in Serbia, intensified violent tactics in support of nationalist causes that the great powers could no longer control. Consequently, the powder keg of central Europe exploded, when on 28 June, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was assassinated by a member of the Black Hand organisation in Sarajevo (the plan itself may have been masterminded by Serbian military intelligence).

Almost immediately following the assassination, the Austro-Hungarian emperor, Franz Josef, issued an ultimatum to Serbia. However, complying with this ultimatum (which included demands for suppression of ‘various societies and associations’, plus dismissal of Serbian officers and officials engaged in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy), would have infringed Serbian national sovereignty. Serbia did not respond and one month later Austria-Hungary declared war against the country. In response to Austria-Hungary’s declaration against Serbia, Russia mobilised its armed forces. Germany, perceiving the mobilisation of Russian forces as a threat to Austria-Hungary, honoured its alliance and declared war on Russia. France’s alliance with Russia resulted in France’s declaration of war on Germany and, by extension, Austria-Hungary on the 3rd of August. Germany quickly invaded Belgium. Correspondingly, Britain, bound to both France and Belgium, honoured its allegiances and declared war on Germany on the 4th August. Japan honoured its commitment to Britain and, at the end of August, joined the war effort on the Allied side.

The Balkans in 2013

The reality of the Balkans today is vastly different from the desperate situation which the region found itself in one hundred years ago as the ‘the powder keg of Europe’. The modern day

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Balkan region is far more stable and prosperous than in 1913, when it was the most chaotic region in Europe.

Today, the Balkans form part of Europe’s super-periphery, the eastern ‘outposts’ of the EU (since the accession timetable for Turkey’s membership remains problematic through 2013). These countries constitute the Union’s newest prospective members, as well as EU’s recent full member, Croatia. Specifically, candidate countries for EU membership include Montenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; while potential candidate countries in the region include Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

As previously noted, Croatia constitutes the European Union’s newest member, officially joining on 1 July, 2013. The economic prosperity of the region has increased in all countries in the region, excluding FYR Macedonia, by over 5% annually during the past ten years, largely due to recovery from conflict situations, though there has been some slowing of growth in 2013. Two-thirds of Croatians supported joining the EU, hoping to boost foreign investment and reduce unemployment.

While still a possibly volatile region, the European Union has had a significant stabilising effect on this area. The EU has played a central role in post-conflict harmonisation and economic development in Bosnia, as well as supported regional reconstruction and human rights from 1999 via the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (succeeded from 2008 by the Regional Co-operation Council). More recently, the EU’s top diplomat, Catherine Ashton, was crucial in establishing a lasting peace between Serbia and Kosovo, who were historic enemies. The solution, which Ashton devised, enabled both countries to economically move forward and pursue their bids for EU membership. This has led to a more normalized dialogue across the two communities:

As recently as a year ago, meetings between Serbian and Kosovar leaders made headlines, but since the signing of the agreement such meetings have become so routine that they are no longer considered newsworthy. Bureaucrats and experts from both countries also meet regularly to hammer out the finer details of the agreements emanating from the Brussels deal. Kosovo

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36 The New York Times, (24 April 2013) “Moving Past the Last Balkan War”.
and Serbia now participate in many of the same regional meetings. Photographs of Nikolic [Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic] taking tea with Atifete Jahjaga [President of Kosovo], his opposite number, portray the two leaderships as putting the past behind them, making it ever harder for nationalist opponents of the deal to maintain their resistance. In this sense, the ‘European values’ championed by EU diplomats appear to have real meaning.\textsuperscript{38}

In recognition of the European Union’s peace-making and peace-building efforts in the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as six decades of reconciliatory efforts among European nations, the Nobel Committee awarded the European Union the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.\textsuperscript{39} The EU played a prominent role in the peace-making and peace-building processes which finally stabilised the Balkan Region, even if reconciliation processes need to continue.

The stability of the Balkans illustrates that the desire to belong to the EU, held by Balkan nations, as well as the EU’s peace-building efforts, was instrumental in contributing to a peaceful and relatively prosperous outcomes. Even if pockets of nationalism and some ethnic tensions remain, for 2013 the hope of a better future has shifted the emphasis to economic development rather than past security issues.\textsuperscript{40} Conversely, the Balkans of 1913 was a tumultuous area, rife with nationalistic fervour, which had severe follow-on consequences for Europe as a whole.

**Conclusion**

Ultimately, the Europe of 2013 is vastly divergent from the Europe of 1913. Clearly, the alliance priorities that defined the 1913 political situation in Europe are at odds with the goals of the European Union in the twenty-first century. Additionally, the Balkan region, whose unresolved conflicts by 1913 had triggered the First World War, is now a peaceful and stable region in 2013, largely due to the efforts by the European Union. Juncker’s claim that the Europe of today finds itself in similar circumstances to those of one hundred years ago is incorrect; the demons are not merely sleeping, they have been laid to rest.

\textsuperscript{38} Strategic Comments (26 September 2013) “Balkans’ Steady Integration into Europe”, Vol 19, Comment 26.

\textsuperscript{39} The New York Times (12 October 2012) “Nobel Committee Gives Peace Prize to European Union”.

\textsuperscript{40} Strategic Comments “Balkans’ Steady Integration into Europe”, Volume 19, Comment 26, September 2013.
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