The New Europe/ The European Union : © R. James Ferguson 2003

INTR12-204 & INTR71/72-204, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

11: The EU Search for Foreign Policy: Cooperative or Competitive Diplomacy on the Global Stage

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Topics: -

1. Uneven Convergence in Foreign Policy

2. Clash of Interests or Power-Balance?

3. From Commissioners and High Representatives to a European Foreign Minister?

4. Venus and Mars: Emerging Trends in Post-Atlanticism

5. United in Diversity?

6. Resources and Bibliography

 

1. Uneven Convergence in Foreign Policy

As we have seen in earlier lectures, the benefits of the European Community and the European Union were at first pragmatically targeted towards economic cooperation, the creation of a Common Market, and then the functional spill-over in reducing war and conflict. As such, emerging prosperity and reconstruction in Western Europe had a 'spill-over' effect in reducing conflict, even among traditional competitors such as France and Germany (see lectures 1 & 2). Although the European Community retained strong Inter-Governmental features, there was indeed some functional integration effects as cooperation in one area tended to generate norms of cooperation (for background, see Arter 1993; Miall 1993; Miall 1994; Molle 2001). As outline by Philip Gordon: -

The process has hardly been rapid or complete, but it does appear, as functionalists expected, that the formation of a customs union led to pressures for a completed single market, that the creation of a single market resulted in increased pressure for monetary union; that monetary union and other forms of integration have led to calls for further democractization of the Union; and that the common interests and perspectives resulting from all this integration increases pressure for a common foreign and security policy to represent and pursue the interests of the Union. (Gordon 1997)

From the 1960s there was an effort to coordinate foreign policy through a process of consultation known as European Political Cooperation (Bainbridge 1998), but this was deepened as Europe expanded and integrated more deeply. These early efforts included: -

* The unsuccessful European Defence Community (EDC, or Pleven Plan) through the early 1950s, which though it was technically was signed in 1952, was subsequently rejected by the French National Assembly in 1954 (Gordon 1997; Guyomarch et al. 1998, p18, p23). The EDC went too far too early, and did not deal adequately with sensitive issues such as the re-armament of West Germany (Guyomarch et al. 1998, p23).

* The Fouchet Plans, through which from 1962 France had hoped for extensions of the Treaty to Rome to include foreign policy, an effort explored in a commission led by Christian Fouchet. However, it became clear that de Gaulle was interested in using the project to enhance France's role and to permanently exclude the UK from membership, leading to the collapse of the effort (Guyomarch et al 1998, p24).

* The informal European Political Cooperation (EPC), conceived in 1969 and operation from 1970. The EPC 'was a network of European foreign ministers, political directors, and other diplomats who sought to meet regularly to exchange information and to coordinate their foreign policies as much as possible. It had no formal status in the EC treaties and was entirely inter-governmental. EPC was a recognition by European leaders that in the absence of a more integrated approach, regular meetings and discussion about foreign policy were better than nothing.' (Gordon 1997) It thus was 'an intergovernmental framework for pooling information across foreign ministries at both the diplomatic and political levels and represented a modest form of foreign policy coordination' (Guyomarch et al. 1998, p115). There was some formalisation of this intent in the 1987 Single European Act, which urged governments not to bloc consensus in this area, but outcomes 'were mostly declaratory, always based on consensus, and usually focused on relatively peripheral or uncontroversial issues' (Gordon 1997).

* Prior to the European Defense Initiative (see lecture 9), there was some military cooperation at the European level. Among the most successful was the formation of the Franco-German brigade (1988), which 'provided the model' for the larger Eurocorps of 35,000, which would from 1993 be integrated into NATO and utilised in the Balkans conflict and peacekeeping activities (Guyomarch et al. 1998, p124). Likewise, WEU (Western European Union) agreement was signed on 17 March 1948 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom for limited military coordination. A Consultative Council was created composed of Foreign Ministers. France remained interested in the WEU as a pathway to peacekeeping roles, but through 1998-2003, the WEU role was effective overtaken by the EDI.

By the early 1990s, this emerged through the Maastrich Treaty a deeper agenda of political cooperation whereby coordination of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) could begin and was viewed as one of the main pillars of inter-governmental cooperation within the European Union (Bainbridge 1998, p63). The aim here was to link German and French interests into a stronger integration that would also set the stage for future expansion of areas of cooperation.

However, through the mid-1990s, the CFSP seemed a mirage with very limited effectiveness in coordinating European foreign affairs agenda, and seemed unable to project a shared European foreign policy into adjacent regions. Even after effort to push this forward via the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, there were still real limits in this area of European policy (Gordon 1997). This can be seen in a number of areas: -

* In the early 1990s, as the state of Yugoslavia began to disintegrate, the EU as a whole was slow to developed a shared approach on the problem or even on when to recognise the new emerging states. Thus, for example, Germany, supported by Austria and Italy, strongly supported the recognition of the new states of Croatia and Slovenia well before a shared European approach had been framed, and managed to pressure the EU into recognising these two countries by December 1991. Thus, earlier hopes of preserving a unified Yugoslavia moderated by European concerns was soon shattered (Guyomarch 1998, p120). The problem here was that German policy, in this period, emphasized the notion of 'civilian power', i.e. non-military forms of persuasion (Maull 1995-6, p100), but had no effective way of restraining military aggression or the civil wars that followed in Bosnia.

* The EU as a whole, though sending in observers and seeking a peaceful transition in the Balkans, was unable the restrain the wars in Yugoslavia and the attendance ethnic cleansing and civilian deaths down to 1999. In the end, it was only in conjunction with NATO and U.S. initiative that France and the U.K. could support a stronger European involvement in the Balkans (see lecture 10).

* Through the mid-1990s, tensions continued between Greece and Turkey over small Aegean Islands. In large measure, it was rapid U.S. diplomacy under former President Clinton that helped diffuse these issues rather than European foreign policy, leading to a sense that the Europeans 'were literally sleeping through the night' (Gordon 1997).

* At a national level, most European states have rather strong, experienced and powerful foreign affairs ministries, which have for centuries engaged in patterns of sustained diplomacy. These are high prestige tools of government that feed back into national interests and national identity politics. In the post-war period this has been particularly true of France and the U.K. at a global level. As such, these institutions tend to precede, pre-empt, or seek to form European policy.

* On this basis, for several decades EU foreign policy has often been secondary to U.S. or national foreign policy in several key areas, e.g. in relation to Cyprus, Turkey, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East process, even when countries such as Germany and France have sought deeper involvement in these areas.

* Part of the problem with the CFSP was that it contained an inherent ambiguity, since it seemed to cover 'a wide range of different things, from long-term economic aid to crisis reaction and potential military intervention' (Gordon 1997). On this basis, different countries within the EU would assess the policy, its outcomes and success in different ways. There was often a different view taken of a policy verses its implementation.

* Another problem for the CFSP is that by definition it is not the foreign policy of a single nation, which traditionally is tied to the national interests of a single state in the international arena. On the contrary, the CFSP is an international orientation for a supranational organization, the EU, which is also itself a region interacting with other regions. As such, the CFSP must also contain wide regional orientations, e.g. towards the Middle East, Southeast Europe, East Asia. Some bilateral issues, for example, may be better handled at the national level, e.g. the need for better relations between Morocco and Spain, alongside a stronger engagement of the EU with Mediterranean contries (see Barbé 2000).

* Different orientations to the Gulf War and Iraq also made it clear that there were strong differences to the projection and use of force within European countries, a problem that has continued throughout the last decade.

* On this basis, there often seemed to be trade off in what the CFSP could achieve: "At times in the recent history of the CFSP, we have to choose between the 'C' and the 'P': if consensus enabled us to reach a Common decision, the result could hardly be considered a real and effective Policy, but if we wanted a real Policy, it could not be Common. External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten has even said that the CFSP could be compared to a misconstructed sentence, with too many adjectives but no verb. It is true that too often our policy has been judgemental and opinionated, but not executive' (Palacio 2003, p76).

 

2. Clash of Interests or Power-Balance?

One of the major reasons for a shift from the loose consultative approach on foreign policy of the 1980s to the formal CFSP of the 1990s was the unification of Germany. France, in particular, felt that the new, strong Germany would need to be deeply integrated in European political institutions, and than this would need to include a 'tie in' on foreign policy. On this basis, the Maastricht treaty through 1990-1992 developed a second pillar of cooperation based on an inter-government vision of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, the CFSP (Gordon 1997). Thus, the CFSP could be accepted in so far as it promoted national interests and national foreign policy.

We can see this in the case of France, whose traditional foreign policy has been outlined as: -

* 'a policy of reconciliation with West Germany

* a refusal to be subordinated to the United States

* a desire to influence 'bloc politics'

* a preoccupation with national grandeur, and

* an active Third World policy.' (see Guyomarch et al. 1998, p106)

The CFSP was useful in supporting the first three of these aims, strengthening the Franco-German understanding and promoting a stronger Europe. However, the fourth and fifth policies can not be easily accommodated with the EU unless the organisation is willing to play a strong and more independent role in world affairs. Thus, France has gained some benefit from the EU's Euro-Mediterranean policy, but somewhat less from EU's more tentative approach towards crises Sub-Saharan Africa (Guyomarch et al. 1998, p127). Likewise, a country such as Spain through the mid-1990s gained much from the CFSP: it was viewed as a way of enhancing the prestige of a middle-sized country, and of enhancing stabilisation in the Mediterranean, through it was somewhat less successful in supporting a progress engagement of Latin America, one of the key areas of Spanish trade, investment and cultural linkage (see Barbé 2000).

Moreover, as noted above, through the early and mid-1990s the CFSP seemed unsuccessful. On this basis, there was an effort to enhance the policy at the June 1997 Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (Guyomarch et al. 1998, p126). Real but limited progress at the institutional level was the made at that time, including 'the setting up of a foreign policy planning and analysis unit at the EU Council of Ministers; the appointment as High Representative for foreign policy of an EU bureaucrat (the Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers) . . . ; and closer cooperation - but no merger - between the EU and its defense arm' (Gordon 1997), then the WEU, Western European Union.

On this basis, the EU did managed to develop some common positions on some international issues: -

The EU has, it is true, established more than twenty-five so-called common positions, including those on economic relations with Libya, Sudan, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia; on general policy objectives or a common approach toward Ukraine, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, and East Timor; and on functional subjects such as blinding lasers, the biological and chemical weapons convention, and the collocation of diplomatic missions. It has made an unprecedented number of joint declarations on foreign policy (roughly two per week), and taken more than three dozen "joint actions," including supervising elections in South Africa and Russia; delivering aid to the Palestinian authority; organizing humanitarian aid in Bosnia and administering the Bosnian city of Mostar; supporting the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and negotiating and implementing the Stability Pact (or Balladur Plan) to ensure stability in Central Europe. (Gordon 1997)

This is a useful start, but has not always led to detailed action plans or rapid crisis management. Critically, this can be viewed as a kind of 'Declarative Diplomacy', useful for setting the basis for dialogue (Palacio 2003, p77) but not for completing agenda or actual programs on the ground. Here, the general principle has been applied that while the basic strategy or policy has to be shaped with unanimity among EU members, that the pattern of implements can be done by qualified majority (Papandreou 2003, p50). If unity is not possible, the Treaty of Nice does allow for a minimum of eight EU members to act together on some issues (Papandreou 2003, p51).

3. From Commissioners and High Representatives to a European Foreign Minister?

The key point about a common foreign policy is that it needs to converge on orientations and outlooks in international affairs. To do this it needs to promote convergence of viewpoint through regular cycles of consultation, shared policy analysis, shared expectations of gain, and shared institutions (Gordon 1997). To do this, agencies and officials need to carry on this process in a continuous cycle alongside European Council and inter-governmental meetings.

There has been some progress in aiding foreign policy representation at the EU level. These include the appointment of the Commissioner for External Affairs (Chris Patten), and the separate post of the High Representative for the CFSP (Javier Solana). Diplomacy is also conducted via the state which hold the rotating Presidency (every six months) of the European Council, as well as by key leaders and to some degree the President of the European Commission, and the European Parliament as a whole, leading to some confusion as a number of different actors at different levels operate on particular issues (Cameron 2003, p117). There has been some concern in future whether small states such as Latvia and Estonia will be able to successfully host and use this role of the rotating presidency. Likewise, the EU sometimes appoints Special Envoys to particular areas or issues, e.g. Special Envoy Miguel Moratinos (Palacio 2003, p77). Likewise, Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy has been a prominent and effective representative for the EU on these issues abroad (Cameron 2003, p119), hosting a range of issues in relations from Russia through to India. 'External Action' for EU, of course, embraces not just the CFSP, but also 'international trade policy, developmental cooperation, and asylum/immigration policy' (Papandreou 2003, p60). In terms of the CFSP, at present it is the European Council and the inter-governmental agreements that control the main agenda (Papandreou 2003, p60), with other units having a secondary and support role, e.g. the European Commission.

Javier Solana, now High Representative for the CFSP

(Photo courtesy of the OSCE Photo Archive, access via

http://www.osce.org/photos/index.php3)

These figures have been quite effective in representing the EU, but in part because of their earlier history and personal characters and networks. Thus, as the former Secretary-General of NATO, who helped lead it through its transition in the late 1990s, Javier Solana has had a prominent career with strong connections with key players in Europe and the U.S. As High Representative for the CFSP he has 'already hammered out important agreements to resolve problems between Serbia and Montenegro and between the Slav and Albanian communities in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)' (Papandreou 2003, p51). Likewise, Chris Patten has been a prominent administrator (as a former controversial governor of Hong Kong) who has been effective both in the media in coordination with Solana's activities.

It is possible to argue that there has been some confusion between the roles of the Commissioner and the High Representative (Steinberg 2003, p138). One approach might be to fuse the two positions into an enhanced EU Minister for foreign affairs, operating in a more cohesive and powerful fashion than earlier appointments (Cameron 2003, pp119-120). On this basis, the world (and the United States) would have 'Europe's telephone number' (Cameron 2003, p120). Joschka Fischer, the current German foreign minister, has been active in some of these debates for a proactive EU foreign agenda (for his background, see Sa'adah 2001). It would also be important to decide whether this position was linked to the European Commission, or the European Council (Cameron 2003, p120). Likewise, the proposal for a future elected President of the European Council would provide another powerful and actor for the EU, who would also be able to act on some issues for the EU as a whole (Cameron 2003, p119). Here, however, the nationality and character of the persons involved could be highly controversial, and spark severe internal debate about who/how and when prominent identities fill these posts. Highly politicised choices could be disastrous for the unity of Europe as a whole. Thus, there has been an effort to create a more institutionalised foreign policy with stronger common positions (Papandreou 2003, p60).

4. Venus and Mars: Emerging Trends in Post-Atlanticism

The other key reality shaping the emerging EU foreign policy is the changing relationship between Europe and the United States. In part, this is driven by the end of the Cold War with the U.S. emerging as a strategic superpower with clear military preponderance. Some would even describe the U.S. as a 'hyperpower', ('hyperpuissance', a term used by Hubert Vedrine, see Walker 2001). Europe, on the other hand, has emerged as a more integrated economic power, with strong interest in multilateral global governance but much more modest military capabilities. Here, several metaphors have been used for both powers. The United States at the strategic level is sometimes compared to ancient Rome, with a web of alliances and military force that cover the globe and now is without peer. On this basis, some commentators have though that the U.S. has to choose between being a modern Athens or Sparta: Sparta here being viewed as a hegemonic military power, Athens as a centre of culture and trade but with strong ability to defend itself (see Walker 2001). Likewise, the metaphor of Mars and Venus has recently been invoked to help explore the different approaches of the EU and US (Kennedy 2003; Steinberg 2003).

At the same time, we should not under-estimate the cultural, economic and political links that forged the Atlantic relationship, termed trans-Atlanticism or Atlanticism for short, and in the case of the US and UK, the 'special relationship'. It based in part on shared cultures, political systems, and earlier histories of migration. As noted by Justin Vaisse: -

Under the old system of "transatlanticism", before the fall of the Berlin Wall and for most of the decade that followed, a set of norms, rules and habits of intense consultations went hand in hand with an American leadership that oscillated between sharing decisions on matters of common interest and cleverly pretending to do so while acting largely on its own. A dense network of first- and second-track diplomacy ensured that even when they disagreed, allies should understand each other's position and make adjustments to avoid conflict and keep the fiction of an alliance of equals alive. (Vaisse 2003)

From World War II it was part of a broad engagement of North America in European affairs, having been allies in World War II and the Cold War, and having helped much of Europe through the Marshall Plan. Beyond this, major trade flows developed across the Atlantic, with Europe becoming the major investor into the U.S. and vice versa: in 1999 this was worth around $1.4 trillion, representing 45% of US foreign direct investment, and 60.5% of EU investment (Steinberg 2003). The relationship was affective and emotional, strategic, and driven by pragmatic economic benefits. Likewise, specific mechanisms were set up to aid political and international dialogue: the US-EU dialogues (following the Transatlantic Declaration of 1990 to strengthen the trading system), and military channels of dialogue (the 'Berlin-plus' process) for coordinating NATO and EU military abilities, with strong agreement in principle in December 2002 (Steinberg 2003, p122; Palacio 2003, p79). There is an ongoing Transatlantic Business Dialogue, which in 1998 helped set up the 1998 US-EU Mutual Recognition Agreements (aimed at 'eliminating duplicate testing and certification procedures'), and the 1998 Transatlantic Economic Partnership covering a range of trade and investment issues (Steinberg 2003, p133).

Nonetheless, nagging and recurring tensions occured in areas such as agricultural subsidies, steel tariffs, biotechnology, and genetically modified foods and crops, with disputes sometimes intensified through submission to the WTO dispute resolution process (Steinberg 2003, p134). Likewise, divisions on biodiversity conventions, and greenhouse gas policies (US unwillingness to ratify the Kyoto protocol) also raised tensions with the EU from 2001, as did the strong EU support for the International Criminal Court, a process the US will support only if its military personnel are exempted from prosecution (Cameron 2003, p116; Steinberg 2003, p134). The EU has also been concerned over the use of the death penalty in some US courts (Cameron 2003, p123), an issue which has risen again with the debate over the handing over of possible terrorism suspects to the US, and the issue of the use of military tribunals to suspects captured in Afghanistan (Daalder 2003). Though the UK has negotiated an open trial and no death penalty for those of its citizens about to be tried, this demonstrates rather different approach in the EU and United States.

Since 2001, gradual divergences have appeared between the two sides of the Atlantic. By 2003, real differences over how to intervene in Iraq surfaced between the US (supported by the UK, Spain and Poland) and some European states, especially with France, Germany and Belgium. This led to a major rift within NATO, proclaimed as the most serious division in alliance ranks since 1956 (Steinberg 2003). Part of the problem here is that the US has begun to filter much of its foreign affairs and security relations through the 'organising principle' of counter-terrorism (Steinberg 2003, p117), leading to a much more assertive approach even in relations to allies. It has been suggested that 'Europeans' mistrust of power and excessive faith in the rule of law and consensus has opened an unbridgeable gap with the United States, and rendered Europe incapable of effectively addressing the Hobbesian challenges of terror and rogue states' (Steinberg 2003, p120, following Robert Kagan). On the other hand, a EDI developed without due regard for cooperation with NATO could lead to a further reduced role for NATO, and perhaps eventual 'US disengagement from Europe' (Steinberg 2003, p126). This has led some states to argue that EDI missions must be carried out in close cooperation and coordination with NATO, a view supported by Spain (Palacio 2003, p74) and the UK, but viewed with some caution in France and Germany.

On this basis, intellectuals in Europe such as Jacques Derrida and Juergen Habermas have argued that the EU must further unify its foreign policy in order to counterbalance 'US hegemonic pretensions' (Kennedy 2003). However, despite Iraq and clashing leadership-styles, there are reasons to suggest that a more 'elective' and cooperative form of trans-Atlantic cooperation should emerge in future years (Steinberg 2003; Daalder 2003). Both sides face 'new global threats', opportunities and challenges (Steinberg 2003) that will need the use of both hard and soft power to create a more stable, just, and balanced global order. Furthermore, we should not exaggeration the differences of opinion between the wider American and European publics: polls conducted by the German Marshall Fund-Chicago Council suggest majorities of both (circa 54-55%) would prefer strong multilateral approaches to global problems, even after the Iraq tensions, with higher levels of agreement on the need to strengthen the UN and the importance of economic strength (Steinberg 2003, p127). This shows that 'Europeans and Americans are from both Venus and Mars' (Steinberg 2003, p127).

5. United in Diversity?

As the European Union enlarges to at least 25 member and more in the 2004-2008 period, this will lead to greater geographical, economic, linguistic and cultural diversity. The EU will expand to a population of 480 million, though new members have on average a per capita GDP that is only 39% of Western Europe (Palacio 2003, p75). This will make unity and consensus harder to achieve, but may also cause a more institutionalised mechanisms to emerge to allow the shaping of common positions and effective compromises (Gordon 1997).

However, we can sense how far the EU has to go in recent controversies on the future of Europe. After much debate, the 2002-2003 convention on the future of Europe also decided on a motto for the EU: United in Diversity, and an anthem, Beethoven's Ode to Joy (Black 2003). There are some ironies in the motto. It is rather close to a formula used in Suharto's Indonesia in support of its ideal of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic Indonesia, 'Unity in Diversity', a policy which could not be sustained with the relative dominance of Java within the politics of Indonesia. Likewise, the convention proceeded with some childish abuse across the sensitivities of the European past: German leaders withdrawing from holidays in Italy in protest over 'Italian minister who referred to German tourists as "hyper-nationalistic blondes" who "loudly invaded" Italian beaches' and described Germany as a country "intoxicated by arrogant certainties" (comments by Stefano Stefani), while perhaps more seriously a Danish member of the convention 'denounced the convention for creating a "superstate'' (Black 2003). Euro-sceptics (some from Denmark in particular) felt that the convention had been hijacked by Franco-German interests (Black 2003), perhaps referring the skilful diplomacy at the convention by former French president Valery Giscard d'Estaing and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer.

However, we should note that there have been some modest successes in the CFSP over the last decade. In areas of convergence, crisis management, and institution building, these include: -

1) The willingness to move to enlargement and stabilisation of East Europe. For some, this is a key statement of 'the outward projection of the EU as a community of democracy, solidarity, freedom, and prosperity' (Palacio 2003, p75). These factors may be compatible with self-interest, but the order of their delivery may matter to new members. Expectations in Eastern Europe, especially for increased prosperity, may receive something of shock if relative wealth does not improve quite rapidly.

2) The willingness to become more involved in crises in the Balkans: Bosnia, Kosovo, and most especially pre-emptive EU policy helping stabilise Macedonia through 1999-2003 (Papandreou 2003).

3) The development of the European Defence Initiative (EDI), leading the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), partially functional in 2003 and operating at small levels in peace keeping in eastern Congo (some 1400 to be deployed), Bosnia (including a special police missions, the EUPM) and Macedonia, where they are taking over from NATO forces (Palacio 2003, p78; Washington Post 2003).

4) Strong, shared positions in relation to environmental management, and the Kyoto Protocol.

5) A formal place as the EU in the Quartet of powers (the EU, US, UN, and Russia) to help mediate the Middle East peace process (Steinberg 2003, p120; Palacio 2003, p77), with the EU helping ensure strong U.S. engagement on this issues (Papandreou 2003, p51). On this basis, there is strong support in Europe for a 'road map' that would lead to recognition of a viable Palestinian state by 2005 (Palacio 2003, p77), but through a process that recognises the security needs of Israel. Therefore, the EU will need to contribute 'to the reconstruction and ongoing reforms of the Palestinian Authority', a policy also strongly supported by Canada (Papandreou 2003, p61; Xinhua 2003).

6) The willingness to plan ahead to collectively for a more stable Mediterranean through the Barcelona Process and the EMP, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), involving regular liaison between the EU with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, and future members Cyprus and Malta, using a 'comprehensive and cooperative approach' to reduce instability and security threats from the region (Biscop 2003, pp184-186). This remains an ambitious project that may need more funding in future (Biscop 2003).

7) The creation of the High Representative for the CFSP to be able to speak with one voice on many CFSP issues.

8) The creation of a new Political and Security Committee (PSC), located at Brussels, staffed by senior officials and active on a daily basis, and a new Military Committee to coordinate these areas at the EU level (Cameron 2003, p117; Steinberg 2003, p137). This is supported by Policy Unit that has 'monitoring, analyzing, and early-warning functions' (Papandreou 2003, p51). Taken collectively, this begin to approximate the resources of a small foreign affairs planning unit.

9) After serious delays, there is now a common policy towards the Balkans, based on Stabilisation and Association Agreements (Cameron 2003, p116; see lecture 10).

10) The EU as a whole is the largest provider to the UN budget, and the largest provider of developmental assistance globally (Cameron 2003, p116). The Union and member states 'provide more than half the funds for international development and global humanitarian aid. Together, they finance one third of the world aid to the Middle east, 60 percent to Russia and the other former Soviet republics, and 40 percent of the reconstruction effort in Bosnia' (Papandreou 2003, p51).

11) The EU has recently created the notion of 'headline goals' whereby failed states or societies in crisis can be provided with 'police and civil administration capability to assist in the reconstruction' of their communities after periods of violence (Cameron 2003, p116). This includes the provision of police, judges, administrators and training. On this basis, the EU can deploy up to 5,000 officers (1,000 within a month), plus up to 300 judicial officials (Cameron 2003, p116). This is extremely important since conflicts in the wider European setting over the last two decades have included civil wars and communal conflicts (as in the Balkans) that 'penetrate the entire social structure and engage civil society' (Papandreou 2003, p54), requiring a broad approach to rebuilding harmony and dealing with non-traditional threats ranging from refugees to related organised criminal activities.

12) The EU has some 2,000 diplomatic mission globally, and over 20,000 diplomats, approximately three times the staff of that of the United States in this area (Cameron 2003, p120). This is an enormous resource that can come into play as the CFSP begin to develop more effective policies.

13) The EU has hammered out a shared common position in relation to cooperation with Russia, based on renewal of Common Strategy for Russia (Papandreou 2003, p61; see lecture 3).

This progress suggests a serious effort to increase problem solving and comprehensive capacity in relation to adjacent regions in the wider Europe. However, serious challenges remain for a viable shared outward orientation for the European Union: -

* The need to engage civil society and European publics more deeply in new EU security policies and the CFSP in particular. Fraser Cameron has made the following rather ambitious suggestion: -

It will be important to enlist the support of the European public - through the involvement of the European Parliament (EP) and national parliaments as well as the media and NGOs - for the goals of the CFSP. This should involve not only a greater role for the European Parliament, but perhaps a semi-annual debate held simultaneously in all national parliaments on the CFSP's goals and achievements. This should be based on a short report by Solana/Patten and would ensure that each Member State's foreign minister was actively involved in explaining and defending the CFSP (Cameron 2003, p122).

It would be disastrous, for example, if European publics viewed the CFSP simply as an excuse for larger defence budgets at the expense of other areas, e.g. welfare benefits, a sensitive issue in Nordic states for example (Papandreou 2003, p54; Economist 2003).

* There may be a need to engage more deeply with parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia as the EU expands, and especially if Turkey becomes a member in the future. Thus, 'wider Europe' is expanding, and the EU 'cannot allow countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to become a black hole on our doorstep' (Papandreou 2003, p61). There is also an obvious danger of over-extension of ambitious regional goals.

* The need to able to be able to cope with new transnational threats including organised crime, uncontrolled migration flows, money laundering, and transnational terrorism. As noted by George Papandreou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Greece: -

Globalization means that the Union and its Members States are confronted not only with problems arising from traditional regional or bilateral conflicts but also with transnational threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and international organised crime. This means adopting coercive measures when necessary while still tackling the root causes of the problems, and at the same time, promoting regional and international cooperation, democracy, and respect for human rights. (Papandreou 2003, p50)

Though the EU might be viewed as a 'secondary' target for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, there have been attacks that threatened the lives of European nationals abroad (e.g. in Pakistan and Bali), as well as an attempted attack on a French tanker in the Persian gulf (Steinberg 2003, p122). In any case, the new generation of terrorists are part of a transnational web of contacts that 'puts their activities at <the> heart of Western societies, and utilises the tools of modern Western society - financial institutions, the Internet, global transportation networks - to carry out their work.' (Steinberg 2003, p123; see also Palacio 2003). This means that new patterns of governance, intelligence and policing are needed, not just brute military capability. The EU is well suited to be a partner in this area if it can deepen cooperation in selected areas of information sharing and justice. This process has begun with US-EU cooperation on emerging global standards to track and close down the funding of terrorist and organised crime organisations (Steinberg 2003, p136). From December 2001 there has also been some extended cooperation between EUROPOL and US agencies including the FBI and the Justice Department (Steinberg 2003, p136). In turn, the EU has also begun to realise that 'a judicious mix of carrots and sticks is needed to ensure the spread of its norms' (Cameron 2003, p116). Since these threats do not have a specific, single territorial source, and are 'dispersed, horizontal, and asymmetric' (Papandreou 2003, p54), international cooperation is crucial in containing them. Here, the CFSP may need to be adapted and activated much more effectively if the EU is to remain a key global player, and on the horizon of U.S. interests (Akgul 2002).

* The budget provided to the CFSP is in national and global terms very small: only 30 million euro for 2002, and perhaps needs to be tripled by 2005 (Cameron 2003, p117, p121).

* Aside from existing Committees (above), there may be a need for a formal, regular meetings (several a year) of EU defence and foreign affairs ministers to monitor progress in the CFSP and related European Security and Defence Policies (Cameron 2003, p121). Here, of course, countries such as Denmark with an 'opt out' option in relation to EU defence cooperation would need to seriously consider the relationship between military affairs and foreign policy agenda at the EU level (Economist 2003).

* A deeper pattern of shared training for EU diplomats is required, suggesting the need for a European diplomatic academy (Cameron 2003, p120).

* It may be necessary to recognise that a new phase of Atlantic relations has been confirmed during the 2001-2003 period. This does not end the relationship with the United States, but may change in into a more elective, post-Atlanticism. In one view: -

The . . . reaction to Washington's downgrading of transatlantic relations is to foster European unity and independence in order to regain some leverage and follow a foreign policy more adapted to Europe's collective ideals and interests. After all, in this view, if Europe is not at the center of America's strategic equation any more, the reverse is true also - Europe doesn't depend on America for its daily security any more. Those who hold this view feeling that Europe's real interests are not necessarily advanced or taken into account by America anymore, are ready to cooperate with Washington on a case-by-case basis. That position leave room for many joint projects, but doesn't ensure automatic cooperation. Jacques Chirac's policy during the Iraq crisis is a symptom of this pragmatic adaptation to the new rules. (Vaisse 2003)

* There is a need to further consider the linkage between an EU foreign policy and the supranational nature of the organisation. To function as a traditional foreign policy, such shared positions would need to be seen to be a meeting of national interests, projecting shared values, and to a shared European culture, and at the very least not to clash to the national identity of the EU's diverse membership (see Papandreou 2003). This factors set a real limit on how proactive and detailed the EU's CFSP can be.

The EU certainly has developed some strong orientations in an inter-regional sense, with a strong on dialogue with East Europe, Southeastern Europe and Russia, and a strong though ambitious plan for stabilisation of the Mediterranean region. Likewise, it has entered into serious engagement with East Asia through the regular ASEM (Asia-Europe meetings) running since 1996. It relations with the U.S. are of great but unequal depth and has entered a new phase of elective relations, sometimes called 'post-Atlanticism' (Vaisse 2003). Ironically, the assertive strategic policy of President Bush may help push the EU into a more independent and integrated role on the global stage (Vaisse 2003). Relations with Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, however, are less well coordinated at the EU level.

However, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has noted that the EU must be able as a whole to be 'capable of global action', a task which the EU only currently achieves in the area of trade (in Steinberg 2003, p137). In sum, we can see that there has been slow progress in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Palacio 2003, p76), but that key challenges remain if the EU is to be able to play a major role in shaping the global future. Nor is it certain that the European Union really wishes to be a superpower with all that implies, including major strategic and military responsibilities at the global level. It remains to seen, however, whether the EU can be a 'soft superpower', using soft power via its economy, peace-keeping forces, developmental aid, and views on democracy and governance to enhance its global role.

6. Resources and Bibliography

Resources

The European Commission webpage contains a wide range of related official documents at http://europa.eu.int/comm/index.htm

The European Convention draft constitution proposals will be found at http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf

The Brookings Institution has a range of documents on the EU and the US, and the Atlantic relationship at http://www.brook.edu/

Further Reading

BARBÉ, Esther "Spain and CFSP: The Emergence of a 'Major Player'?", Mediterranean Politics, 5 no. 2, Summer 2000, pp44-63 [Access via Ebsco Database]

CAMERON, Fraser "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", Brown Journal of World Affairs, , 9 no. 2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp115-124 [Access via Ebsco Database]

DAALDER, Ivo H. "The End of Atlanticism", Survival, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp147-166 [Access via BU Library Catalogue]

GUYOMARCH, Alain et al. "Common Foreign and Security Policy", Chapter IV in France in the European Union, N.Y., St Martin's Press, 1998, pp104-128

PAPANDREOU, George A. "Greek Views on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9 no. 2, Winter-Spring 2003, pp49-62 [Access via Ebsco Database]

STEINBERG, James B. "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations", Survival, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp113-146 [Access via BU Library Catalogue]

References

AKGUK, Deniz Altinbas "The European Union Response to September 11: Relations with the US and the Failure to Maintain a CFSP", Review of International Affairs, 1 no. 4, Summer 2002, pp1-24 [Access via Ebsco Database]

ARSENEAULT, Michel "The 'Strange Ways' of Joschka Fischer: The protestor-turned-politician is a driving force behind Germany's contentious foreign policy", Maclean's, March 10, 2003, p34 [Access via Infotrac Database]

ARTER, David The Politics of European Integration in the Twentieth Century, Darmouth Publishing Co., 1993

BAINBRIDGE, Timothy The Penguin Companion to European Union, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1998

BARBÉ, Esther "Spain and CFSP: The Emergence of a 'Major Player'?", Mediterranean Politics, 5 no. 2, Summer 2000, pp44-63 [Access via Ebsco Database]

BLACK, Ian "Europeans Unite in Joyful Disunity", The Age, 12 June 2003 [Internet Access]

BISCOP, Sven "The ESDP and Euro-Mediterranean Security", Security Dialogue, 34 no. 2, June 2003, pp183-198

CAMERON, Fraser "The Future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy", Brown Journal of World Affairs, , 9 no. 2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp115-124 [Access via Ebsco Database]

DAALDER, Ivo H. "The End of Atlanticism", Survival, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp147-166 [Access via BU Library Catalogue]

DALE, Reginald "The Search for a Common Foreign Policy", Europe no. 388, July-August 1999, pp25-29 [Access via Infotrac Database]

Economist "Identity Changes", 14 June 2003, pp15-17 [Access via Ebsco Database]

GORDON, Philip H. "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", International Security, 22 no. 3, Winter 1997, pp74-90 [Access via Infotrac Database]

GUYOMARCH, Alain et al. France in the European Union, N.Y., St Martin's Press, 1998

KENNEDY, Paul "How Old Europe Can Join the US in a New World", The Australian, 23 June 2003, p11

MARTIN, Terry "Joschka Fischer - Germany's man of the hour", Europe, November, 2002 pp8-10 [Access via Infotrac Database]

MAULL, Hanns W. "Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis", Survival, 37 no. 4, Winter 1995-6, pp9-130

Miall, Hugh Shaping the New Europe, London Royal Institute International Affairs, Pinter Publishers, 1993

MIALL, Hugh Redefining Europe: New Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation, Pinter, 1994

MOLLE, Willem The Economics of European Integration, Abingdon, Ashgate, 2001

PALACIO, Ana "The European Common Foreign and Security Policy: Projecting Our Shared Values", Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9 no. 2, Winter/Spring 2003, pp73-81 [Access via Ebsco Database]

PAPANDREOU, George A. "Greek Views on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy", Brown Journal of World Affairs, 9 no. 2, Winter-Spring 2003, pp49-62 [Access via Ebsco Database]

SA'ADAH, M. Anne "'Ein Staatsmann mit Geschichte': Joschka Fischer's German Past", German Politics and Society, 19 no. 3, Fall 2001, pp56-80 [Access via Infotrac Database]

STEINBERG, James B. "An Elective Partnership: Salvaging Transatlantic Relations", Survival, 45 no. 2, Summer 2003, pp113-147 [Access via BU Library Catalogue]

VAISSE, Justin "From Transatlanticism to Post-Atlanticism", National Interest, 9 July 2003 [Access via http://www.brook.edu/]

WALKER, Martin "Bush's Choice: Athens or Sparta", World Policy Journal, 18 no. 2, pp1-10 [Access via Ebsco Database]

Washington Post "EU to Send Peacekeepers to Congo", 6th April 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]

Xinhua "EU, Canada Urge Full Implementation of Mideast Roadmap", Xinhua News Agency, 28th May 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]

Copyright R. James Ferguson 2003
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