The New Europe/ The European Union : © R. James Ferguson 2003

INTR12-204 & INTR71/72-204, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

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Soviet and Russian policies have been crucial for the wider international environment of Europe since the late 19^th century. Since 1987, changes in Russia have had a crucial impact on the European Union in several areas: -

• Since 1987, Soviet Reforms under Gorbachev ended the Cold War and reduced the tensions experienced by the division of Europe into two armed camps. This subsequently allowed the expansion of NATO to include key Eastern European States, especially Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.
• Changes in the Soviet system and in Eastern Europe allowed the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the subsequent unification of Germany. This also acted as a spur for the deeper integration of Germany within the European Union from 1991.
• Economic reform in Eastern Europe has meant the expansion of European Union, to include much of Central and Eastern Europe. This has forced serious reform within the EU itself as new members join to form a Europe of 25 states through 2004.
• Russia remains a great power in nuclear terms, but a state troubled by problems in economic and political reform. On this basis, relations with Russia are crucial for the future of 'wider Europe'. Whether Russia become a 'strategic partner' or 'strategic competitor' is crucial for the future of the EU, as well as for relations with the U.S. Changes through 2002-2003 suggest that Russia has been trying to deepen its importance to the EU. Whether this can be sustained will be one of the most important issues for the next decade.
• Through 2003, Russia has moved to extend its foreign policy aims, some of which clashed with the U.S. on the management of Iraq, and the status of sanctions and weapons inspectors. These policies signal some different perspectives on the Middle East, but also a central view in Russian foreign policy that the UN Security Council must not be sidelined.

To understand these points, we will need to look at the main reforms of three key leaders: Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin.

It won't be possible to study the history of Marxism Communism and Russia in detail in this course, though these legacies remain important in many ways. See general readings such as MacKenzie & Curran (1997) Daniels (1984), Hosking (1990), Dukes (1990), Zeman (1991), Berlin (1979), Halperin (1985) or Szamuely (1974) on Bond University Library Shelves. This selective table of dates will set a past time-frame for 1914-1993. In this session we will look mainly at the period 1991-2003.

Part of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West had been about political systems, specifically, distrust of Communism and its willingness after the revolution in 1917 to promote revolutions world wide through the use of the Comintern (the Communist International). However, the Comintern organisation had been dissolved in 1943. Long before this the Soviets had come to accept the reformulation of socialism within one state. However, the Bolsheviks had not forgotten that between 1918 and 1921 a variety of Western and capitalistic governments, including Britain, France, America, Japan, and even Czechoslovakia and Poland had supported a civil war designed to overturn communism. Likewise, the Soviets deeply distrusted both capitalism and the form of democracy run by Western states. Thus the USSR still felt the need to struggle to protect communism and socialism. This theme remained a part of Soviet text books, and was recalled publicly by Khrushchev in the 1957 anniversary of the revolution (Zeman 1991, p73).

At the end of World War II, the fears of two great power blocks now facing each other in Europe was immediately apparent to international leaders. Post-war fear of the Soviet stance on Eastern Europe, and the possibility of a direct conflict in the European heartland remained very real through 1947 and 1948, with intense conflict of interests over Berlin (the Berlin blockade and the Allied Airlift to relieve the city occurred in 1948-9) and in Yugoslavia. Western opinion soon hardened against the Soviets, signified by Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of 5^th of March 1946 and President Truman's address to Congress on the 12^th of March 1947 (Zeman 1991, p232). Once the fortified frontier was established throughout Europe, the Cold War began, with the added joy of bipolar nuclear capability in 1949 (when the Russians tested their first nuclear device).

Stalin led the Soviets and their allies into the Cold War. During this period two organisations were created. The military alliance called the Warsaw Pact was created on 14 May 1955, at least partly in reaction to West Germany entering NATO (see Zeman 1991, pp255-6). Another international organisation for these countries was the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, the CMEA or Comecon (see Zeman 1991, p277). The arms race between the Soviets and NATO were sustained on the world-wide scale throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Russia felt it was enclosed by land and sea by American, British and European interests. Likewise, it viewed the Marshall Plan, aimed to revitalise Europe economically, as a cloaked means to ensure the dependence and friendship of Europe towards America, and aimed to rebuild German capitalism (Stokes 1991, p41). Here we see the beginning of the conflict of diplomacy and grand strategy which dominated European affairs down till 1987. It maintained a divided Europe which was one frontline in the Cold War until 1989.

Human rights and censorship had become major issues, covertly, within the Soviet Union. An enduring Russian pastime was the reading and reproduction of samizdat, banned publications. For example, Boris Pasternak's novel, Doctor Shivago, was at first read within the Soviet Union in this way, while from 1970's the underground Chronicle of Current Events appeared in Moscow dealing with infringements of human rights by the government (Zeman 1991, p288). The writer Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn had served 8 years in a Siberian camp for a joke about Stalin, and had to leave Russia in 1969. Even though he won the Nobel Prize for literature in 1970, he would not return to Russia until May 1994. He would return as a critic not just of the past, but of the new political leadership.

Likewise, the agreements contained in the Helsinki Accords (negotiated through 1973-1975 as part of improving relations between Soviets and the West, and concluded in Finland) were used to monitor abuses of authority, e.g. in Czechoslovakia during the 1980's the Charter 77 group were active, protesting human rights abuses and opposing censorship. Charter 77 itself shows how international agreements (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, agreed to by Czechoslovakia in 1976) were used to justify internal criticism (Stokes 1991, p163).

Reform in the Soviet Union and Russia was driven in part by necessity, but also by a 'revolution-from-above', i.e. a reforming leadership, focusing on Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Mikhail Gorbachev came from a younger generation of technocrats (with degrees in law and agriculture) who experienced neither the intensity of the revolution nor World War II conditions as an adult. He was born on March 2, 1931, in the province of Stavropol between the Caspian and Black Seas (Smith 1990, p7). He came from peasant stock, was an excellent student, and studied law at Moscow University and then entered straight into Party work, rising quickly through the ranks (Smith 1990, pp7-8). Gorbachev first worked as the secretary for agriculture in Moscow, then became a close aid and protege to Andropov, head of the KGB, and rose in influence once Andropov assumed party leadership (Smith 1990, p8; according to one view agricultural harvests suggest that Gorbachev's role as secretary in charge of agriculture was 'disastrous', Crawshaw 1992, p11). After the brief leadership of Chernenko it was time for a new generation to take the helm - this time in the person of Gorbachev. Gorbachev inherited a powerful but ailing political system which was entering a period of economic decline.

The Soviet state had already moved towards a massive and rapid industrialisation of the Western part of the USSR. and key sections of the Urals and Siberia (Desai 1989, pp10-11, pp14-15). In conjunction with the shift to an economy preparing for its part in World War II, and the continued development of a huge military-industrial complex during the Cold War, it at first seemed that central planned economies (command economies), would be able to create a truly modern and powerful state. Likewise, in the arms race with the U.S., the Soviets built up a range of specialised research centres and production plants with privileged access to resources and human talent (Pettman 1991, p189). This arms race and industrial competition was one of the factors which compounded later Soviet economic problems (Desai 1989, pp82-3). Likewise, aid to allies and the third world nations was also a major drain on Soviet resources - in 1985, for example, 'economic commitments' to Cuba and Vietnam amounted to some US$5.7 billion (Desai 1989, p95). Angola, Yemen, North Korea and India were also countries of special attention in Soviet foreign policy, receiving either direct aid or subsidised trade goods.

There were, furthermore, nagging problems in agriculture. After some initial gains, the huge collectives created by Stalin and developed in a non-sustainable way by Khrushchev in Central Asia began to show decreased productivity. Fantastically large schemes, e.g. diverting entire river systems in Central Asia, resulted in low productivity and massive environmental damage, e.g. increases in soil salinity and the destruction of the Aral Sea. Compared to Tsarist times, though, basic food supplies were available most of the time at subsidised rates to most urban citizens. These subsidies, maintaining inexpensive food for poorly paid urban workers, formed an important aspect of the budget, and increasingly of imports to make up harvest short-falls.

Indeed, both the USSR and Eastern Europe generally seemed to have been locked into the phase of 'dirty-tech', resulting in high levels of pollution and non-recyclable wastes. Likewise, Russian nuclear waste has been dumped into the Sea of Japan on a scale which has alarmed regional states and makes the future retiring of their nuclear submarines an international issue (Zyla 1993, p21). These crude industrial methods were already being reformed in the West during the 1960's (Aage 1992, p178). Likewise, in Russia large areas around Murmansk and along the border with Norway have been ruinously polluted by huge military industrial complexes (see Hønneland & Jørgensen 1999), including nickel works and a large concentration of nuclear power plants (up to 153,000 square kilometres have been affected). Problems in widespread environmental and air pollution thus became of direct concern to neighbouring Scandinavian states.

By the sixties and seventies, slogans of Soviet progress were beginning to wear extremely thin. Evidence of an economic and social crisis could be seen in the Soviet Union, indicated by the continuing 'shortage of mass-produced consumer goods, the notable absence of entrepreneurial activity, the productive surges that go into meeting monthly, quarterly or annual planning targets, the extent of the black market, and tangential signs of low worker morale such as alcoholism.' (Pettman 1991, p187-8). There was a comparative decline in the average annual growth of GNP in the period 1961-1990 (figures for communist countries are based on Net Material Product figures). The following table gives some idea of the economic and productive crisis which was most intense in the periods following 1981 (Aage 1992, p172; Desai 1989, pp3-4, p27).

Table: Average Annual growth rate of GNP 1961-1990 (from Aage 1992, p172).

1961-5 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90

---------------------------------------------------------

USA 4.8 2.9 2.2 3.2 2.9 3.4

USSR 5.1 5.0 3.0 2.3 1.8 0.6

Poland 4.1 3.8 6.6 0.9 1.2 0.7

Gorbachev directly expressed the reasons for reform book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World: -

However, slowing economic performance alone is not enough to explain the transformation of Eastern Europe. As noted by Bruno Dallago: -

The difficulties of the old system, in part, lay in the attempt to close off these countries from the world economic system, which was essentially capitalist, but at the same time to attempt to compete militarily and ideological. The Iron Curtain had largely removed these countries from trends in the world economy and in technology - such technology as was bought by the USSR was a very expensive overhead to their system. By the 1970's the USSR was in a half-way house - it recognized that the Stalinist aim of complete autarky (self-reliance) had to be abandoned, but at the same time it was not readily able to complete in world consumer markets, even in terms of heavy industry. Soviet oil fields and reserves remained huge, but much of its equipment was highly antiquated and it had to subsidise cheap oil and fuel to Eastern Europe (in 1981-85, 'half of the exportable 800 million tonnes of crude oil was committed to socialist countries', see Zeman 1991, p289). An ongoing energy demand was a major concern for Russia and Ukraine (Aage 1992, p182), especially since Russia seeks to export as much oil and gas as possible, and is the main reason for keeping antiquated nuclear reactors online. Oil and gas remain two of the main cash earners for the economically troubled Russian state (European Report 2001), but it may not be possible for Russia to continue boosting oil production indefinitely, especially if energy prices fluctuate (see Bakhtiari 2002; see below).

Likewise, the Soviets at first seemed able to compete in the arms race against the West; in 1949 they developed their first atomic bomb, admittedly with the aid of intelligence their spies derived from the US and Britain, and shortly thereafter developed thermonuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. In the end, however, the high-tech competition with the US became a crushing burden on Soviet resources (Dallago 1992, p139) - both the Cruise Missile, and more importantly, the 'Star Wars' (SDI) initiative sorely strained Russian hopes that they could retain parity in this game without even more burdens on their economy. Today, some would argue that a new round of technological competition may be set off by the US development of a National Missile Defence (NMD) system and its withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (see Gaffney et al. 2001). Russia seems keen to revitalise its research and military capabilities in its space program, especially in order to maintain its military intelligence capability (see Covault 2002).

Another area of difficulty for the Soviets was the attempt to strictly regulate the information available to their citizens. This was at least partially successful, but was doomed to failure in countries such as East Germany and Poland, which had ready access to Western broadcasts and had large related populations in the West. It is clear that the Soviet System did go some of the way in meeting basic needs, i.e. employment, some sort of housing, basic foods, basic medical and educational services, with Russia advancing far beyond the standard of living of most Third World countries and well beyond that found in Tsarist Russia (Aage 1992, p173). However, it soon stalled in going past these levels, and came under enormous pressure.

Gorbachev himself commented on this collapse of socialist values: -

A wide range of negative social indicators seemed to emerge in the Soviet Union and the Eastern block countries during the 1980s. Not only alcoholism but hard drug use have been reported since the early 1980's as serious problems, not only in Russia, but also in Poland (Wojciechowicz 1985, pp4-5, pp8-9; Tarschys 1993, p7). As of 1990-1991 the main issues for Soviet and Eastern European citizens remained the difficulty of living well on poor incomes and the lack of basic consumer and material goods (Aage 1992, p173). Furthermore, the lack of economic choice in the system was not adequately compensated by genuine egalitarianism - the emergence of new elites, the nomenklatura involved the virtual creation of a new privileged class (for the transformation of this class into modern capitalists during the 1990s, see Hosking 2001, pp569-613). Ironically, however, even elements within the communist party came to see that such contradictions could not continue forever. Two men who would emerge as leaders within the Soviet system, but they also recognised the need for change: Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin.

Gorbachev's reforms were both economic and social. Glasnost is a word with a long history in Russian thought - in the 19th century it indicated 'the need for the government's actions to be open to public scrutiny, so as to preclude the manifold abuses and crimes of the bureaucracy' (Raeff 1990, p105). In Soviet thought, it came to represent the opposite of partiynost which 'proclaims the primacy of the interests and needs of the party and gives priority to the demands of ideology over accurate factual information' (Raeff 1990, p105). Glasnost, referring to political and social openness, and Perestroika, economic reform, are related, as emphasized by Gorbachev: -

It must be remembered that since 1917 some 6,000 works of fiction and politics had been banned in the USSR, with censorship based on ideological grounds being totally lifted only in 1989, though even today it is not possible to regard the vigorous Russian media as uninfluenced by political and economic pressures (Australian 1989; Hosking 2001).

It must be stressed that Gorbachev did not aim at a totally market-controlled economy devoid of state control and ownership. On the contrary, he hoped for a mixed economy with strong socialist elements and the state still running 15% of the defence and infrastructure industries (Desai 1989, p48, p81; Gorbachev 1987, pp36-37; Economist 1989, p48). However, such reforms could not be effectively run as an 'add-on'. The first result of such attempts were escalating prices and the need to increase wages - a move which resulted in monetary inflation, as well as increased 'speculation, corruption, deficit, and price growth' (Yevstigneyeva & Yevstigneyev 1992, p217). Indeed, during period of hyperinflation (in the early 1990s) the mints were running out of the high quality paper needed to print fresh issues of money, with a further partial collapse during 1998.

In part these reforms were also aimed at reforming a huge and inert bureaucracy whose aim was often really to protect the privilege of the elite groups within the Communist Party (which had grown to 18 million members in the USSR in 1983, Zeman 1991, p292) and government organizations. These elite groups (within the Communist Party) have been identified as a virtual new class within the Soviet system, the nomenklatura, 'named' cadre and leadership personnel, perhaps totalling some 2 million individuals (Zeman 1991, p293. See Nove 1975; Voslensky 1984; Matthews 1978; Desai 1989, p78).

Gorbachev's reforms at first did not aim at a multi-party democracy of a Western sort (Desai 1989, p69). Initially, he introduced a level of democratic voting procedure within the Party itself, but in 1988 was still avoiding legalising any opposition parties (Desai 1989, p67). It must be remembered that Boris Yeltsin was sacked as chief of the Moscow party branch for apparently being too advanced in his desire for reforms (1987), while in 1989 he was investigated for seeming to advocate multi-party politics. Elections to the Soviet parliament in March 1989 were still conducted in a one party system, and Gorbachev urged the press not to make sweeping inferences from the fact that many older Communist Party candidates lost out to reforming elements (Weekend Australian 1989). Boris Yeltsin and Vyacheslav Shostakovsky would challenge this one-party system in 1990 by creating the Democratic Platform, a virtual party within the broader Communist Party itself (Dejevsky 1990, p9).

Glasnost allowed an enormous relaxation of censorship and thought control in the Soviet Union. It also allowed the whole-scale airing of many taboo subjects, and a rewriting of past history, especially of the Stalinist regime. This can be seen, for example, is a best sellers such as Anatoli Rybakov's Children of the Arbat, 1987, an anti-Stalinist novel. However, this trend is in turn not without its immediate dangers. The lifting of censorship allowed the revival of 'un-persons' of earlier periods, ranging from the poet and novelist Pasternak and the poet Nikolai Gumilev (shot dead in 1921 for anti-Soviet activity) through to a request for a rehabilitation of the radical Bolshevik leader and theoretician, Nikolai Bukharin, who was destroyed by Stalin (see Yevtushenko 1991, pp99-100). Likewise, a range of contentious issues began to be broadcast and debated for the first time on Soviet television, including the issue of returning soldiers from Afghanistan and, very slowly, the true extent of the Chernobyl nuclear power-plant disaster. Even during the 1991 coupe against Gorbachev, one independent radio station, Echo of Moscow, managed to run intermittently, with its reporters covering events at the Russian 'White House', while the Vremya (Time) news programme on Channel 1 ran an accurate report on what was happening (Yeltsin 1994, p69, p74). Glasnost, of course, also lifted restrictions on officially recognized religions and particularly the Russian Orthodox Church, which again flourishes in Russia but now has to face the possibility of the splitting off of different Orthodox organizations in other Republics as well as competition from other Churches (see Marty 2001). Today, Russia seeks to ensure that religious organisations are carefully registered and places limits on new cults and their activities.

Another major area of difficulty in the reform movements are the issues of privatisation and dispersal of state resources. State-owned businesses remained of some importance in these economies (Aage 1992, p178), while the sale of businesses and the creation of lands registers are in themselves major headaches. The Shatalin plan, for example, called for the privatisation of '46,000 industrial enterprises and 76,000 trading firms in 500 days' (Boyers 1990, p11). Throughout Eastern Europe and Russia, in spite of initial optimism, the implementation of privatisation will be 'a long-lasting process which will in some cases require restructuring of companies prior to privatisation' (Simoneti 1993, p99; see also Clarke et al. 1994). Restructuring, as usual, involve job-shedding and a major change in management positions. Although large numbers of state-owned enterprises were privatised, many share coupons have found their way not to the public at large, but to workers within the firm itself, and more significantly into the hands of the original management groups. Likewise, through 1993 up to 22% of the Russian gross national product was still needed to subsidise major industries (McFaul 1995, p92). Nonetheless, by 'the beginning of 1996 77.2% of medium-size and large enterprises had been privatised, accounting for 88.3% of total industrial output' (Debardeleben 1999), with the Russian government still helping to balance its budget through the sale of corporations through 1999. In effect, however, many old managers came to dominate large segments of the privatised economy, leading to a new group of millionaires with strong political connections, e.g. the 'oligarchs' who seemed to cluster around former President Yeltsin and who may still have some influence on the government of Russia.

Overall, the reforms were seen as too slow by progressives such as Boris Yeltsin and Yuri Afanasyev. In the end, Gorbachev wanted reform from above and cooperation from below - what he got was opposition from other leaders and a range of demands for reform 'from below'. He could no longer control the revolution he had started. The result was an attempted coupe (August 1991), which failed, but which also demonstrated the weakness of Gorbachev's proposals for a new Union Treaty. With Gorbachev's prestige fatally wounded, Yeltsin moved to the fore as leader of the Russian Federation. By the end of the 1991 this had led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the dominance of political life by the Communist Party.

In the first two weeks of December 1991 Belorussia, Russia and Ukraine refused to sign a revamped USSR treaty, and Kazakhstan, which at first wanted to continue in the USSR, had to follow suit. At first a much looser organization was created, the CIS, Commonwealth of Independent States. In this Alma-Ata agreement, the republics also pledged to respect current borders (Shevtsova 1992, p11). One of this organisation's tasks would have been regulating economic agreements and assuring some high level command of nuclear weapons. The compromise agreement was a looser confederation, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The CIS remains today, but it is now a loose grouping based on but regular meetings of heads of state, with some increased military cooperation through the last several years.

The following timeline will give some indication of the massive change in Soviet/Russian thinking and the change from the bipolar world system of the Cold War. It is these changes in foreign policy which would make Gorbachev more popular overseas that he would be within Russia.

From the 1970s, at enormous cost economically and socially, the Soviet Union sought, and largely achieved a role as a global power (Aspaturian 1992, p148). To achieve this balancing of political and military forces in its favour, the Soviet Union had to run a two-track foreign policy (Aspaturian 1992, p151). On the one hand it followed a normal foreign policy approach, treating the nation as the primary unit and normalising relations and entering into diplomatic dialogue even with competitors. At the same time, the Soviet Communist party still sought to support socialist and communist parties world-wide, and saw itself involved in a protracted ideological battle against capitalism and imperialism. This can be clearly seen in the Brezhnev policy which expressed itself in the new USSR Constitution of 1977. Article 28 included and defined foreign policy agenda: -

Gorbachev almost completely reversed this policy by 1987. What was 'extraordinarily new in the Gorbachev view, for a Soviet position, is the idea that the world constitutes material and civilizational unity, integrity, and interdependence, in spite of its contradictory, diverse, and tension-laden character, whose survival has a higher priority than the expansion of either of the two ideologies or social systems' (Aspaturian 1992, 154). This view immediately goes beyond notions of coexistence to a view of positive cooperation. Of course, Gorbachev needed a secure and positive international environment to allow him to carry through the major economic and political reforms he envisaged for the USSR (Aspaturian 1992, p160). By 1992 there had been large areas of agreement with the West especially in arms control and arms reduction treaties, 'limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), conventional forces in Europe (CFE) and strategic nuclear weapons (START)' (Daalder 1992, p51). The level of nuclear warheads suggested by START was a reduction to approx. 6,000 per side, (Daalder 1992, pp53-4; MacFarlane 1993, p9) with the later START II process to reduce these force levels even further (Strategic Comments 1997). More importantly, these reductions could be monitored through the 'Open Skies' agreements, which allows close inspection of the Atlantic Ocean-Ural Mountains zone (Daalder 1992, p54). As such, it seems that Gorbachev deserved the Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded in 1990 (though it is also true that by 1991 Gorbachev was more popular overseas than at home in Russia).

Aside from the far-ranging arms control and arms reduction agreements listed above, Gorbachev also engaged in several other key shifts in foreign policy: -

With the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact, and NATO redefining its role, one of the recent quests has been to find a security regime which would include all of 'wider Europe'. Russia eventually accepted an expanding NATO, but did not wish this agency to act without consultation with the UN Security Council. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic were invited to join NATO, with protocols for their accession completed in December 1997, and full membership established through 1999 (See these accession protocols at the NATO Website, at http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm). Such expansion was softened by promises of Russia joining the G-7, and that NATO would formulate a charter with Russia. In May 1997, Russia signed a cooperative agreement, the Founding Act, with NATO, as well as a treaty with the Ukraine (The "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", see http://www.nato.int/docu/basics.htm). These trends have made initial NATO expansion tolerable, but not desirable, from the point of view of most Russians. Indeed, as we shall see, through 1999-2001 cooperation between NATO and Russia remained a complex and difficult issue. Only by May 2002 had Russia begun to established a new dialogue with NATO (the Reykjavik agreement) that would result in a NATO-Russia Summit, and a new dialogue process that would give Russia much more influence on the organisation through a special new NATO-Russia Council, the NRC (Pfaff 2002). This new Council was seen in part as a 'reward' for Russian cooperation in the war on terror, though it was probably needed as well to allow Russia to accept further expansions of NATO. THE NATO-Russia Council has taken up a range of issues including 'counter-terrorism and threat assessments; crisis management; non-proliferation; arms control and confidence building; theatre missile defense; search and rescue; and civil emergencies' (Langton 2002, p88).

Future rounds of expansion for both NATO and EU will bring them more closely to abut Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, leading to the danger of new borders and 'new outsiders' (see White et al. 2002). Through November 2002 the '19 leaders of NATO members invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to begin accession talks immediately with the goal of becoming full-fledged members by May 2004', with prospective members benefiting from the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to prepare them for full participation and their initial military defence requirements (Boese 2002; Kovanda 2003). In effect, such expansion could not occur without strong dialogue between NATO and Russia.

Another approach to reduce tensions has been to institutionalise the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), a trend which began with the provision of a secretariat, staff, and headquarters in 1992. This new OSCE had been involved in conflict monitoring and in early negotiations in the Russian-Chechnya dispute, monitored elections in the Balkans from 1996, in recent years monitored the border between Russia and Georgia, as well as fostering cooperation in tackling organised crime, terrorism, racism, and anti-Semitism. In spite of Russian backing for the OSCE to become a joint security organisation for all of a wider Europe, this has not eventuated, even thought NATO has indicated that it would be willing to mandate itself to OSCE operations on a case by case basis. Yet there are still insiders and outsiders in Europe, with NATO simply shifting its lines eastward closer to Russia. Ukraine to date has indicated that it might like to join the EU, but only through 2002 indicated that it would like to join NATO, though Ukraine has already made treaties with Russia, NATO and military cooperation agreements with Poland. This provides some form of indirect security, and through 2002-2003 there have been a number of areas of loose cooperation between Ukraine and NATO (through the Partnership for Peace program and cooperation with operations in Afghanistan). Full membership will be a long term project for the Ukraine, and may involve serious political and military reform in the country (see UPI 2002). Through 2000-2001, Ukraine tilted back towards somewhat deeper cooperation with Russia (Bukkvoll 2001). In May 2003, President Leonid Kuchma of the Ukraine aimed at closer cooperation with Russia in economy and trade, in coordinating energy exports into Europe, and in coordinating bids to join the World Trade Organisation (Xinhua 2003; see below).

For Maps of Russia and Ukraine (and region), go to the PCL Map Library at

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth.html

It would be unwise to discount Russia as a major player in wider European affairs. Not only has it recently reasserted itself as a regional power, but 'the historic tendency in Russia has been for periods of disintegration and contraction to be followed by reconsolidation and reassertion' (MacFarlane 1993, p3). Russia remains a nuclear-armed great power with a relatively advanced defence industry. Her policy in the 'near abroad', e.g. in relation to Chechnya, the Caucasus region, Central Asia, Tajikistan and Afghanistan remains quite assertive (see Lepingwell 1994). From the European perspective, the key questions remains whether some kind of cooperative, multilateral security approach can be developed, or whether a looser 'Concert of Europe' will try to modify potential threats through older notions such as 'balance of power'. Multipolar international systems (with several powers interacting) are not necessarily stable (Miall 1994) unless counterbalanced by other institutions. It remains to be seen whether Russia will emerge as a competitor or ally to the European Union as it slowly expands to include much of Eastern and Central Europe. Through 2002-2003, President Putin has attempted to project the image of Russia as a fit partner for the EU, but whether this can be developed beyond immediate areas of strategic and economic cooperation remains to be seen.

With the USSR dissolved and Gorbachev out of a job, power devolved to Boris Yeltsin. Yeltsin's control of Russian politics after 1992 was far from complete. Yeltsin had strengthened his position by augmenting his presidential powers with the right to issue decrees and veto parliamentary legislation (Ignatius 1993, pA12; Chazan 1993, p18). Major problems remained for the Russian state - the most significant one was whether its fledgling political democracy would survive the period of transition to a working market economy and an open democratic political system. The nature of these tensions can be seen in the crisis of September and October 1993, when a direct confrontation occurred between Yeltsin and large numbers of delegates in the Russian parliament. Yeltsin had twice vetoed budgets which would have driven the country into hyperinflation (Economist 1993a), but parliamentary groups hoped to strip him of these powers through laws from its Committee for Constitutional Legislation (Economist 1993b). At the same time, Yeltsin ensured that the Security Council and Viktor Yerin, the interior ministry, and their police and troops would be behind the president, and not the parliament (Economist 1993b). In the end, as neither side would back down, Yeltsin ordered the army in to remove those holding control of the parliament house. This involved a massed attack on the Parliament building which shocked the world. The question here, however, is which level of government legitimately represents the Russian people - the elected president, or a majority in the parliament. In terms of real power, through 1993-2002, Russia has moved towards recognising the primacy of presidential and executive power.

Through 1993-2002, a range of strong alternative parties have developed - a sizeable group of Communists, who seek a return to 'Soviet' power, and who with their allies (the Agrarians, see Whitmore 1995a), are a large group in the Parliament, various Russian nationalists including a small group of royalists, the small, antisemitic Pamyat group, and more significantly, an extreme nationalist 'Liberal Democratic' party under Vladimir Zhirinovsky which has made gains in 1993 parliamentary elections (Chazan 1993, p18), and a strong showing in the 1996 Presidential elections. His policies, even though at times bizarre, include a pledge to increase the standard of living of Russians, and the strengthening of the state sector (Rubinfien 1993, pA10). Through 1998 he remained a wild card irritant within Russian politics, promising a strong army and an increased sale of weapons overseas to support the Russian economy. However, he should not be dismissed too quickly: "much of the appeal of Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party lies in the combination of hard-headed geopolitics with the prejudices and dreams of Russian men raised in the Soviet Union." (Ingram 1999). With the collapse of Marxist-Leninism, Russian nationalism remained a tempting appeal as a source of legitimacy for prospective government which might need to use coercive force to ensure stability (Maley 1990, p25).

The 'West' invested heavily in aiding reform, first in recognizing and respond to Gorbachev's initiatives, and then in pumping in money to try to cushion economic change under Yeltsin and Putin. For example, the German banks in October 1988 announced large credits to help renew the outdated Soviet food and consumer producing industries (Desai 1989, p106). Clinton aimed at making $900 million available to Russia in 1994 (Boian 1994, p1). Not all loan investments have been so straightforward - the IMF and World Bank terms have numerous strings, and when the USSR joined the IMF in October 1991, it was linking itself, and by default Russia, more closely into the world credit (i.e. debt) system. IMF loans, in particular, have been conditional on reform within the Russian system, an issue which re-emerged within full force in 1998-1999. Likewise, investment from the US has not been as strong as Russia hoped, and real trade levels were at first extremely low between the US and Russia (initially less than the trade between Denmark and the U.S., for example, see Hunt 1994, p13). Although superinflation and basic supply crises have eased, the Russian economy and financial system remained dependent on export of primary resources such as oil and gas (1993-2002).

President Yeltsin's rule also became rather unstable. He fired all his Ministers and Prime Ministers in early 1998, apparently on the basis of their inefficiency in guiding economic reform. Major problems included the inability to secure due tax revenues, problems in funding all areas of government including the armed forces, entrenched corruption and the influence of the new mafia groups, and the problem of developing a sound banking system. Yeltsin surprisingly also sacked his longtime prime minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin. In his place, Yeltsin then installed Sergei Kiriyenko, a much younger man, perhaps hoping to bring in a new generation of supporters (Goble 1998). Kiriyenko was in turn fired, and the next Prime Minister Primakov was also soon sidelined. The next Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin, was fired in favour of the elevation of Vladimir Putin, who soon emerged as Yeltsin's designated successor (Quinn-Judge 2000). These factors led to a sense of deep instability within the Russian government through 1998-1999, in part based on Yeltsin's ill-health and unstable behaviour, and in part on a mass of special interests pushing government actions. Indeed, some argue that key oligarchic groups, and in particular a group of new millionaires, had by the late 1990s coopted many areas of government policy, especially in the areas of privatisation and control of the oil and gas industries (see Wolosky 2000). This lead to key players such as Vladimir Potanin, Boris Berezovsky and Mickhail Khodorkovsky to gain control of key energy resources at heavily discounted rates through control of lending banks and through 'sweet-heart' deals with the government and key officials (Woloksy 2000; Hosking 2001). Likewise, shares in privatised government holdings and resources were sometimes sold off to such groups in 'sweat-heart' deals designed to help budget incomes (see Hosking 2001).

In terms of foreign policy Russia became very active from the late 1990s. Although no longer backing the military strength of countries such as Cuba, Vietnam or North Korea, she had provided positive diplomatic liaison to former friends such as India and China in efforts to sustain a multipolar global system (see Putin 2000). Furthermore, has made it clear that Russia still needs to be treated as a power within the UN, even if the days of superpower rivalry are over. In 1996, Russian forces cooperated with the NATO implementation force in Bosnia. Russia has also been active in rebuilding diplomatic and economic ties with India (1996-2002). Russia has also been deeply critical of the bombing campaign against Kosovo and Yugoslavia in 1999 (Antonenko 1999; Levitin 2000). Through May-June 2001 President Putin and Foreign Minister Ivanov moved to deepened ties with Vietnam. From late 2001, Russian cooperation in the intervention against Afghanistan was crucial, and through 2002 Russia has emerged as a major partner in security cooperation with the US, enshrined in new agreements signed by President Bush and President Putin in May 2002. The Treaty of Moscow was herald as launching 'a new era of cooperation focused on counterterrorism, nonproliferation, trade and Russia's new relationship with NATO', as well as a commitment to reduce nuclear arsenals to below 2,200 by the year 2012. Russia became very critical of US intervention in Iraq through 2003, based largely on the sidelining of the UN Security Council. On through early June 2003 was this breached healed, in part by bilateral diplomacy that seemed to heighten Russian influence in global affairs.

During 1994-2003 the Russian army (and other security services) demonstrated that they are willing to intervene in republics within the Russian federal state, i.e. the war in Chechnya. Their forceful intervention in Chechnya, in particular, indicated their resistance to claims of sovereignty within Russian borders, as well as a sensitivity to Islamic claims on her southern frontier. Yet the Russian army performed extremely poorly in 1994-1996 (see Gall & De Waal 1998), indicating that it is an army in crisis, with difficulties in funding, lack of procurement of new equipment, reduction in the training of ground forces, and low morale (Strategic Comments 1996). The eventual capture of Grozny and defeat of the main Chechen forces, largely completed only in April 2000, was only completed with the massive use of air power, tanks and artillery, resulting in the almost complete destruction of the city and numerous civilian deaths (see Knezys & Sedlickas 1999), a fact protested by the EU, OSCE and the US. It also probably involved the torture of captives and other human rights abuses (through 1999-2001) that have also continued to complicate relations with the European Union. Through 2002 President Putin has tried to place the strong security clamp-down on Chechnya in the context of terrorist activities conducted by some of these Chechen groups, but in reality the region will need to be economically rebuilt if it is not to be an ongoing problem spot for Russian policy. Russia has tried to develop a more forward-looking approach on Chechnya through 2002-2003, with a referendum claiming local support for Russian sovereignty over the territory within the context of high local autonomy (for one critical view, see Economist 2003).

Russia remains an active, though diminished, player in the international arena. To date Yeltsin and Putin have strongly resisted any further breakup of the Russian Federation. In this they have been backed by the Russian army. The more uncertain question is whether a functioning, deeply democratic system will remain in place over the years of economic and social transition. (DeLay 1998; Russia Today 2000). A second major debate which has been emerged in Russian foreign policy and security debates has been the question of how Russia should position itself in the new world scene. From the 1993 period on, a debate emerged between those who favoured a strongly European approach, and a centralist group who sought a new formulation of Russia as the Eurasian power (see MacFarlane 1993). The first group sought alignment with Western institutions, and perhaps even eventual Russian membership in NATO and the EU. The second group felt that a more independent line could be taken by positioning Russia as having a constructive role in Europe, Asia, and a special role as the main land power of Central Asia (see MacFarlane 1993). As such, Russia could take a unique role as a land-based transcontinental power (just as the U.S. was a naval transcontinental power in the Pacific Rim and its trans-Atlantic involvements). It will be interesting to see if Russia can capitalize on this new role while retaining a certain privileged position within European affairs. Today, one of the major issues is whether Russia can become truly 'Europe-user-friendly'. Russia has intimated that it would like closer relations with the EU but still seeks a privileged place within the CIS and within Eurasia as a whole (see Hosking 2001).

Russia has made considerable progress in economic stabilisation over the last four years but is not yet a fully stable democratic, capitalistic country. It has been formally recognised as a market economy by the US and the EU in 2002, but in part this may have been based on the political need for cooperation in the war in terrorism. Likewise, the fast-track to the WTO has yet to be completed. Russia remains a great power on the borders of Europe, the regional Eurasian power, a major nuclear and military power. But at the same time, Russia's international role is still being redefined.

The elevation of Vladimir Putin to become President of Russia was something of a surprise, since prior to 1998, the man was little known to the West. A former KGB official who had served in Moscow and East Germany, and then head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), Putin is familiar with the West, has a reputation for toughness, technical ability, and a willingness to use his contacts to centralise power in Moscow. He is also a comparatively young man (born in 1952), and therefore in stark contrast to aging leaders like Yeltsin. Mr Putin was for a time deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, then appointed to run the FSB, and thereafter appointed by Yeltsin to the post of Prime Minister in 1999. In a surprise move, he was then chosen as interrum President due to the sudden resignation of Boris Yeltsin at the end of December 1999. Several rumours have developed about this career path. One of these was the logical idea that Yeltsin wished Putin to have time in power in order to secure his position as Yeltsin's protege and protector. As the man directly in charge of the 'successful' war again the Chechens, Putin was presented as the new 'iron man' who might effectively lead the Russian state.

However, other key factors were involved. First, there were overseas journalistic investigations which suggested that Yeltsin and his followers (a clique known as the 'Family') were involved in shady financial dealings involving the misdirection of Kremlin funds. Criminal investigations launched by former Prime Minister Primakov, who soon emerged as a front running presidential candidate, may have forced the Yeltsin clique to quickly find a new front runner (Quinn-Judge 2000). One of the first acts of President Putin would to pass a decree that would protect Yeltsin from subsequent public prosecution, giving him complete immunity as well as the usual bodyguards and pension (Quinn-Judge 2000). Another line of speculation suggested that in the end Yeltsin had to be pushed by supporters before he would resign, a real possibility considering his lingering grasp on power and the fact that in his resignation speech Yeltsin said he would have preferred to continue holding office until June 2000 (Quinn-Judge 2000).

At the very least, this method of transferring power did boost the election popularity of Vladimir Putin, giving him the victory he needed in the 26 March 2000 election to begin to establish a very strong line on internal and foreign policies. One of his nicknames within Russia is 'Ras-Putin' (after the 'mad holy man' Rasputin from the early 20^th century), suggesting that he has a ruthless, pragmatic character (Quinn-Judge 2000), adept at using behind-the-scenes power. Internally, Putin opened up his bid for leadership with a line of apparently tough policies designed to rejuvenate Russian power. Internally, these are: -

• A formal declaration of the 'tyranny of law' , indicating both an attack on mafia, oligarchic and bureaucratic corruption. Putin has repeatedly iterated the need for a strong state in Russia. However, to do this he will need to trim the power of rich plutocrats (millionaires) who virtually coopted the Yeltsin government in the past. It remains to be seen whether Putin will face this challenge directly (see Wolosky 2000).
• A claim that defence spending will be boosted by as much as 50%, creating a new, professional and effective Russian army. This includes a revised military doctrine, once again stating that Russia retains the right of 'first use' of nuclear weapons if its sovereignty is threatened. Likewise, Putin seems willing to use military exports, including a new emphasis on the Russian aerospace industry, as part of his economic program (Covault 2000). After the Kursk submarine disaster, there have also been plans to upgrade and modernise Russia's navy. The military reform agenda in Russia has aimed at a smaller, 'leaner and meaner' force, but this reform has been a slow process. Russia has also hoped to move towards a more professional (rather than conscript) army by 2012, but is still assessing the enormous cost of such a change over (Langton 2002, p85). Total military manpower stood at around 988,000 in 2002, but an affordable professional army might be only around 400,000. Through 2002 the 76^th Airborne Division was being professionalized as part of this assessment (Langton 2002, p85).
• The continued tough prosecution of the war in Chechnya, which has now become a guerrilla war in rough terrain in which the Russian army has continued to take serious numbers of casualties. Although security forces have taken over from the army in Chechnya, there are still real problems with maintaining law and order in the region, with small numbers of Chechen fighters still engaged in hostilities through 2001-2003. Although Russia claims that it now has the support of the majority of Chechens for the reconstruction of the region, much remains to be done to heal the damage to the Chechen population.
• Maintain balanced and sustainable economic growth which is not narrowly based. This is required in order to sustain current IMF funding and other debt repayments, and to improve the stability of the Russian financial system, which is needed by all other elements of Putin's reform program. The recovery of the Russian economy since 1998 has been largely due to effective devaluation of the ruble and an emphasis on energy exports (see Gaddy 2001). This allowed President Putin to pass a balanced budget, without a planned deficit, in 2000 (see Sokolowowski 2000). However, there is no guarantee that serious structural reform has yet been carried through, and relative poverty for many ordinary Russians remains a reality. Likewise, any drop in the value of exports would seriously damage the Russian economy. Thus, in 1999, Russian GDP reached 5.5%, approx. 9% in 2000, and maintained 5% in 2001, but also had an inflation rate of 18.6%, higher than that hoped for (Chinyaeva 2002). In 2002, GDP growth was 4%, and it is estimated that growth will remain at 4% in 2003 (DFAT 2003). Concerns remain that the Russian economy is still too reliant on the export of primary resources, especially oil and gas, and that much more needs to be done to develop a balanced economy that sustain high levels of globally oriented trade. Tax reform has been largely successful but still has some problems: -

Key foreign policy challenges also face President Putin. Though successful in many ways, one issue is whether these strong foreign policies can be sustained by the domestic economy. Through 2000-2003 these issues include: -

• Efforts to ward off intense criticism of Russia's conduct of the war against Chechnya, which seemed to target civilians and was conducted in such as way as to virtually wipe out the capital of Grozny. This has led to official condemnation from the EU, the Council of Europe, from the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, and from the OSCE. For a time, this even resulted in the temporary exclusion of Russia as a voting member of the Council of Europe (a wide diplomatic grouping including all of wider Europe), though the body's moves were at first very cautious. This is a serious issue, since human rights issues are deeply embedded legally in most European institutions (including the EU and NATO). This issue has also included ongoing tensions with controlling the border with Georgia, now partly monitored by the OSCE. More generally, this issue presents the face of Russia to the world as a re-militarised power willing to use overwhelming force to settle its disputes. In terms of stabilising the Caucasus as a whole, a political as well as a military solution is needed (see Torbakov 2002).
• The need to carefully manage relations with NATO and nearby states such as the Ukraine, Georgia, and Turkey. Issues such as theatre missile and national missile defense systems will need careful debate to avoid mutual suspicions developing. Likewise, if the Russian economy and military continue to undergo strong reform and modernization, Russia might emerge as a very strong military institution active in the wider European and Eurasian setting. Its role in peace-making, peace-keeping, and security monitoring would then be even more important than today.
• The need to foster warmer relations with the US. At first, the US administration only cautiously welcomed the Putin government, perhaps because he was one of the few credible leaders that might be responsive to Western needs. A range of issues need to be resolved in Russia-US relations, including Russian concern over the new anti-missile defence system that the US. is keen to deploy, including a partial missile shield as early as 2005 in Alaska. The missile shield is problematic in that it in part undermines the traditional nuclear deterrence between Russia and the US (Russia Today 2000c). These issues have remained at the forefront of US-Russia relations under the Bush administration through early 2001, though Russia made a counter offer of land-based defence system that be located in Russia and/or Europe (see Daalder & Lindsay 2001). These issues were only overshadowed by the 'war' on terrorism through late 2001, while other confidence building measures including serious cuts in nuclear weapons have been agreed through May 2002. Certainly, the US has had to reach out to deep to engage potential 'allies' in the 'war on terror', leading to new alignments of power politics (see Skidelsky 2002). However, bearing in mind nuclear and missile technologies in China, India, Pakistan and North Korea, the extension of missile defence systems (high altitude) and theatre defence systems (as proposed for Japan) will remain highly controversial. Tensions also rose over the sidelining of the UNSC in the intervention and management of the Iraq crisis through late 2002-2003, leading to a temporary rift between the two countries. Only through May-June 2003 did this rift begin to heal, partly on the basis of minor concessions concerning the role of the UN and UN inspectors, but also perhaps on the basis of the coordinating agenda for the G8 meeting in June 2003. On 2 June 2003, Bush and Putin make a joint announcement calling on North Korea to 'abandon its nuclear ambitions' and for Iran to fully comply with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty' (Australian 2003). Russia's support on this is crucial, since Russia has retain a degree of economic and political links with North Korea, and Russia has exported peaceful nuclear know-how to Iran. Whether the emerging Russia-US understanding will lead to a 'new world order' in which Russia has a key role, as hoped by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (Ivanov 2002), remains to be seen.

These factors suggest that President Putin has opportunities to continue to empower Russia internationally. However, there may be down-sides to his use of centralised power. He has so far produced no 'magic formula' of policies that would tackle many of Russia's internal problems and foreign policy challenges. Although he has managed relations with the US quite effectively through the ups and downs of 2001-2003, this does not automatically translate into a successful path towards better relations with the European Union. Although many Russians and Europeans remain critical of Putin's domestic policies (Chinyaeva 2002), they may be willing to accept the current government so long as stability is maintained along Europe's new frontiers.

Russia has much to gain from deepening engagement with an expanding Europe: -

The Russian 'bear' seems willing to embrace Europe, but the EU has set down stringent conditions before it will let them get any closer. Surveys suggest that most Russians feel 'friendly' towards the EU, though knowledge about the operations of the EU was limited and many were not sure whether they should view Russia as a European country (White et al. 2002). President has spoken of Russia as part of a 'greater Europe' (White et al. 2002, p140), but this term may not please all Europeans. Russia will also need to balance its EU, US, and China relations if it wishes to emerge as a stable and respected partner in the wider European political and cultural space.

To extend your knowledge, you might like to look at one of the following: -