The New Europe/ The European Union : © R. James Ferguson 2003

INTR12-204 & INTR71/72-204, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

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Modern Germany not only has the dimensions of a virtual economic 'superpower', it is also one of the key drivers of European integration. Over the last decade it has increased its international engagement in regional and foreign affairs, and has also begun to deepen its security cooperation with the new NATO and proposed European Defence Initiative and the European Rapid Region Force. Germany has not been extremely active in the wider European setting, and has begun to play a stronger role in global affairs through the late 1990s: -

This progress, however, has been highly controversial due the legacy of history, which still influences attitudes today in a Europe which is keen to seek a 'new' future in which errors of the past are not repeated. In this context, a brief exposition of some features of European and German experience is needed before proceeding to current factors that are shaping Germany's role in wider Europe.

Germany as found on the map today had not existed prior to the mid-19th century as a unified nation-state (the early Middle Age states based on Frankish and Saxon kingdoms had rather different dimensions). The region covered by Germany had been a group of small principalities, including Prussia, Saxony and Bavaria. These small states were only loosely associated by cultural and religious concerns, e.g. under the 'Holy Roman Empire', but this cultural unity was fractured by the conflict between Protestants and Catholics from the 16th century onwards. However, the growth of Prussian power helped establish a unified Germany between 1866 and 1871, using wars against neighbouring states, especially Austria and France, to complete unification. From this time the country emerged as a modern, industrialised, central European power. During the late 19th century and early 20th Germany came into conflict with Russian, French and English interests over the balance of power in Europe and over imperial domains world-wide. In spite of the complexities of the causes of World War I, as the defeated side Germany was held to have had the major responsibilities for the war. This 'war guilt' was the moral justification for the loss of German territory and a heavy reparations dictated by the Versailles treaty. This in turned sowed the seeds of future conflict.

At the same time, a more democratic constitution was put in place, the Weimar Republic, with general elections first occurring in 1918. Partly under the impact of the local depression of 1923-1925 and the World Depression of the late 1929-1932, political life in the Republic began to polarise into a number of smaller extreme parties (Peacock 1974, pp174-177), with extreme violence occurring between the far left (the Communists) and the right (the National Socialists). Part of this polarisation from the Centre to extreme parties on the fringe was aided by the proportional representation (PR) system which gave many small parties a voice (Roskin 1992, p164). In contrast, current polarisation trends are comparatively mild, though some would argue that a somewhat greater gap between the rich and poor emerged within Germany during the 1990s, with up to 13% of household being defined as poor in European terms (see Vincur 1998; Roskin 1992, p182).

The manoeuvring between parties is indicated by the fact that there were twenty-six different Cabinets in 14 years (Roskin 1992, p149). Unemployment reached some 6 million in the early 1930s. This political polarisation (see Roskin 1992, p150), however, was only part of the story.

The Weimar Republic had several flaws in its structure. Firstly, the old Republic had a directly elected President who stood apart from the Chancellor and his cabinet - in times of emergency this President was empowered to rule by decree, could dissolve the Reichstag, and controlled the armed forces (Peacock 1974, p173). This compares with the very symbolic role played by the president in the current Germany (the current president is Joannes Rau). In 1932, for example, President Hindenburg passed some 62 decrees, while the German parliament only passed 5 laws (Hancock 1993, p216). Likewise, the Weimar constitution contained a loosely phrased article (Article 48) which allowed most of the constitution to be suspended in periods of crisis. It was partly these trends which allowed the quite popular NAZI party to form a coalition of the right, and although not securing an outright majority, to engage in acts of violence which forced Hindenburg in January 1933 to give the Chancellorship to Hitler, heading a government of Nazis and conservatives (Peacock 1974, p178). In 1933 Hitler as Chancellor passed the Enabling Decrees which destroyed the democratic system itself. The Weimar Republic had been perceived as imposed on Germany by the victors, and did not have widespread support in the population. Michael Roskin suggests that only 25% supported democracy strongly, and that in effect Weimar was 'a republic without republicans and a democracy without democrats' (Roskin 1992, p149). Such disparities meant that this early democracy was not robust.

Sometimes parallels are incorrectly drawn between the Weimar Republic and Germany today. These parallels are very limited. There is a certain fragmentation into smaller parties, with parties of the extreme right still active, especially in parts of southern Germany and the former East Germany. At the same time, German security authorities have been actively suppressing efforts to directly revive a NAZI party, e.g. in March 1995 police searched some 80 homes of Neo-Nazi's, confiscating a large haul of weapons and propaganda. Skinhead groups, though demonstrating strong discontent, often only borrow neo-NAZI slogans rather than having a strongly developed ideology (Haas 2002, p162). Through 2001, the sale of Hitler's Mein Kampf remained illegal within Germany (a factor leading to some debate concerning Internet sales from Amazon and Barnes & Noble), as well as officially banned in countries such as Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland (Pascal 2001). Likewise, Germany has taken effects to ban such material on German websites. Taken as a whole, however, these groups still represent a small fringe of protest and discontent which is easily outvoted: the issue, however, is whether they can destabilise the political process and force mainstream politicians to change some of their policies. Moreover, through 2000, some 15,951 'cases of right-wing, racist, or antisemitic acts were reported to police', with some 1,000 of these involved 'violent acts' (Haas 2002, p161).

Likewise, there has been a shift in contemporary Germany's willingness to take a stronger role in world affairs. Legal reforms in the 1992-1995 period made it easier for German forces to be used within the U.N. context as peace keepers (European 1994), though Germany is still sensitive about any overt rise of militarism, e.g. even when it makes and sells military equipment, it attempts to legally limit their use to defensive purposes and not as tools in human rights abuses. At the same time, Germany's reinterpretation of its defence role allowed German combat aircraft to be engaged in NATO operations in Bosnia to enforce UN mandates during 1995-1996, and has been active in peacekeeping operations in Kosovo through 2001. In June 2000, a ruling of the European court also forced a change on policy whereby women can undertake combat roles in the German army. Through the 1990s Germany still sought to present itself as a civilian power in its foreign policy, as part of a special path (Sonderweg) that set it apart from other Western democracies (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p102; Haas 2002, p152). However, after the Constitutional Court ruled in 1994 to allow 'out of area' multilateral operations directed towards 'international peace and security' (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p103), Germany has cautiously allowed itself a stronger role in peacekeeping and intervention operations of NATO, perhaps as part of its effort towards a stronger role in the UN. Through 2000-2003, Germany has also signalled that it is willing to cooperate in the creation of an independent European security and defence identity, and recent reviews have suggested that Germany might need to shift to a fully professional (rather than conscript) army. It has recently moved to create an independent military command centre as part of cooperation with the European defence initiative. Likewise, with support from the Greens leaders and foreign affairs minister Joschka Fischer (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p104), the German government in recent years it has had up to 10,000 troops active overseas (mostly in the Balkans), and has sent teams into East Timor, and soldiers into Afghanistan, with recent deaths of German peace-keepers (4 dead, 29 injured) in a suicide bombing occurring in June 2003 (Economist 2003). However, it wishes these activities to be strictly multilateral, in support of NATO, OSCE, and UNSC agenda. Hence, Gerhard Schroeder has been highly critical of the war in Iraq, a move supported by German voters through 2002-2003 (see below).

Nonetheless, the memory of the past still has a strong influence on Germany foreign policy, which has in the post-World War II period been strongly supportive of the fledgling state of Israel (as well as trying to aid a peaceful development path in the Middle East through 2000-2003), and has now moved to strong policy of 'atonement', 'reconciliation' and engagement with the East-Central-Europe area (see Phillips 2001; Thompson 2001). On this basis too, issues of German nationalism, of the content of German culture, and the proper place for multiculturalism and different religious values remains highly sensitive, with German parties split over how far Germany should move towards a multicultural system in Germany, with the Green most in factor of accepting that Germany is now in part a country of immigrants (Haas 2002). This flows into the debates of integrations, assimilation, or a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Germany (Haas 2002, p168).

German politics today is very different from the 1930s. The German state now has a very resilient political system. Firstly, the FDR (West Germany) had a complex voting system, half 'winner take all' and half 'proportional representation', which means that parties representing less than 5% of the voter population found it difficult to find parliamentary representation (Steiner 1986, p103). In this system, the citizen voted twice, once for single-member districts (328 electorates whose members should reflect local concerns), and an equal number of representatives drawn from a Party selection list (Roskin 1992, p164-5). This mixed system allowed a closer reflection of national interests in the selection of Bundestag members, but avoids excessive fragmentation.

Secondly, the Federal President, elected now by the federal parliament and an equal number of state representatives, has a largely ceremonial function as the head of state (not head of the government), and therefore unable to interfere too directly in parliamentary politics (Hancock 1993, p215; Roskin 1992, pp155-156). Thirdly, the Federal Constitutional Court has much more power than the Weimar courts to challenge legislation passed in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat (upper Federal Council of states), so that laws undermining democracy are likely to be challenged (Hancock 1993, p215; Steiner 1986, p155). Likewise, the position of Chancellor has been made more stable by a principle called 'constructive no-confidence', because the head of the government cannot be ousted by a no-confidence vote unless a new Chancellor is also appointed (Roskin 1992, p158). Since the Chancellor appoints the Cabinet, this is a powerful position which strong leaders like Adenauer (Chancellor in 1949) and Helmut Kohl have used to set their stamp on government-style. There is also a very strong emphasis on state powers, and the German states (Länder) have extensive authority over police functions, education, and medical care (Roskin 1992, p155).

The Bundestag (lower house of parliament) gains much of its power through the use of standing committees which work on and modify proposed legislation, often working with multi-party support on particular reforms, and liaising directly with cabinet ministries to influence the running of government. Although the Bundestag is not as powerful as the British parliament, it does include a wide range of types of members, including civil servants given leave from their duties, as well as leaders from the union movement and business men who have decided to run for office (Roskin 1992, p162). The Bundesrat, the upper house consists of delegates appointed by the states (between 3-6), who have an equal vote with the Bundestag on laws effecting states - on other issues they can veto a piece of legislation, but in the end the Bundestag can 'override' the objection (Roskin 1992, p162). The local states, the Länder, however, retain strong responsibilities for local legislation, control of the police, 'administration of justice, primary, secondary and higher education, and cultural matters' (Rémond 2001).

These assurances remain in place, of course, only so long as extremist parties remain minorities, and do not dominate lower level state regions. However, efforts have been made to keep Germany integrated into larger European structures that favour multilateral rather than unilateral policies. Occasionally some citizens of Britain, Switzerland, the Czech Republic (see Phillips 2001) or France express concern about possible German economic dominance of the European Union. This has also expressed itself in concerns over how far Germany influences the financial policies of the European Central Bank. Likewise, the way that Germany uses its international influence is watched carefully by world opinion and by European neighbours. A more serious issue is how large and small states relate within the EU, and whether a shared Franco-German understanding of the future of Europe can be sustained (see below).

The division of Germany at the end of World War II was one of the great pivotal events in world history. The 'two Germanies' became front lines in the Cold War military and economic contest. In turn, the ending of this division in the 1989-1990 period would set into motion the conditions for a new, united Germany in a new Europe. During 1944-1945 much of German infrastructure and social organisation was destroyed, dislocated (for the desperate conditions of this period, see Bedurftig 1995). At the end of World War II the remains of the German state and Berlin were controlled by an allied Four-Power commission, with a slide into possible East-West confrontation in 1947-1949, especially over the blockade of West Berlin. By the early 1950s the virtual control of the Western sector by the US, France and Britain was recognized, as was Soviet control of the smaller section which came to be known as East Germany. Both sectors became de facto states, and then had limited sovereignty recognized respectively by the East and West in 1955 so that they could become front lines in the Cold War. Effective entry into NATO and the Warsaw Pact meant that both regions had to be treated as partly autonomous states. The GDR (The German Democratic Republic = East Germany) was at first one of the better economic performers of the Eastern Bloc, with special emphasis on heavy industry.

In summary, East Germany (GDR), though one of the most advanced industrial producers after Russia in the Warsaw pact, was a strictly controlled society which was rapidly declining in terms of real wealth. This industrial output was controlled by large combines with dated plant equipment - by the 1980's its productivity was low, with the ratio of capital investment per head of the work force less than half of the West German figure (Padgett in Smith et al. 1992, pp194-5). William Paterson and Gordon Smith have aptly described life in East Germany as a grey but relatively secure subsistence (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p10). In spite comparatively strong economic performance, began to suffer major difficulties from 1980 onwards (Brezinski 1992, p235).

Furthermore, East Germany suffered from close contact with the West, and many citizens had access to Western media, and from 1980's onwards, and regular travel to the West (Brezinski 1992, p239; Gepert 2002). This appeasement, however, was not effective. It merely highlighted the political and economic inequalities between East and West. Ironically, a Stasi (East German secret police) report shows a clear understanding of the real problems, though expressed in diplomatic language. Speaking of refugee problems, this report is summarised by Konrad Jarausch: -

Of course, it turned out to be too late for the GDR government to correct any of these 'misunderstandings'. The GDR government would be destabilised and overthrown, in part by its own failings and in part by people power. It would then be absorbed into West Germany, a move that signalled the end of 44 years of a divided European heartland.

The unification of Germany might seem to be a sudden reversal of history following naturally on the fall of Communism in East Germany. This in fact is not the case. Preparation for this eventuality had begun in the early 1970s. By the 1970s Willy Brandt (Chancellor in 1969) began a series of policy initiatives towards the East under the notion of Ostpolitik. In 1970 and 1971 a series of treaties guarantied the western borders of Russia and Poland (further verified in 1991), and culminated in the broader Helsinki agreements of 1975, whereby the West recognized the borders of the Soviet Union and its European allies, in return pledging respect for a wide range of human rights (Zeman 1991, pp287-288; Jarausch 1994, p9; Stokes 1991, pp160-62). This was part of long term policy whereby the two Germanies could move closer together. As Brandt noted, 'what belongs together will grow together' (Rothwell 1990a, p11) Furthermore, concepts developed under the West German Basic Law (the nearest Germany had to a Constitution, since it was not felt appropriate to formulate a Constitutional document as such until unification had occurred, see Roskin 1992, p156) included the principles of sovereignty and unification. The preamble to the Basic Law, stated that 'the entire German people are called upon to achieve free self-determination and the unity and freedom of Germany' (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p10).

In essence, this gave West Germany an edge in opening a diplomatic and political dialogue with Eastern Europe (see Plock 1986), a position they could rapidly exploit once Gorbachev's reforms took place after 1987-1988. From the late 1980's, it was recognized by a number of German politicians that a stronger role for Germany could be found within the more unified Europe, and that the prospects of a unified Germany were tied to the success of Gorbachev's reforms. As noted by Zeman, in the late 1980's: -

East Germany, in spite of its hard-line leadership, soon faced massive problems in the new international environment around them. In September 1989 it requested Hungary to close its borders to East German refugees, while by 'the end of the month, some 2,000 East Germans were packed in the garden of the West German Embassy in Prague' (Zeman 1991, p324). In fact, sensing the changes in Europe due to perestroika, many East Germans on holidays in the Eastern block began to congregate in Hungary, with its softer border into Austria a tempting option (Jarausch 1994, p20). In spite of potential Warsaw Pact pressure, Hungary chose in the end to put human rights above Eastern solidarity - such a policy also helped support its own fledgling reforms, and earned it the later gratitude (and economic support) of West Germany and the West (Jarausch 1994, p16; Thompson 2001). In January-October 1989 some 167,000 persons left the GDR, followed by another 177,000 from November-December 1989 (Brezinski 1992, p236). It was clear that by this stage that East Germany was in severe social and economic crisis, a fact not lost on the West Germans.

Former Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, after initial suspicion of Gorbachev, used the new international environment to pursue a proactive policy. He claimed that he would use his 1988 visit to Moscow to raise the long-term prospect of the ending of the Berlin Wall and beginning German reunification, a claim dismissed by Soviet spokesmen at the time (Macleod et al. 1988, p28). These overtures, aimed at improving security and economic relations, indirectly hastened peoples' expectations in Eastern Germany (see Thompson 2001). Furthermore, Gorbachev allowed the West Germans the opportunity to pursue unification without active Soviet opposition (Rothwell 1990a, p11). Gorbachev thought these events would take place much more slowly than they did.

Furthermore, once large numbers of East German refugees crossed the border, even West German resources to cope with these people began to be strained. The only long terms alternatives were to ask East Germans to stay at home, as Kohl did in November 1989 (Jarausch 1994, p23), and push for quick reform in the GDR, or to proceed to some form of unification. Certainly Kohl quickly grasped the extent of the collapse of Eastern German economy, and his 10 point plan for unification of Germany, published shortly after, was a stroke of initiative that surprised all of NATO (Rothwell 1990c, p28; see Jarausch 1994, pp67-8). Within the package were a number of 'time-bombs'. East Germans who reached West Germany were treated as citizens, and helped to resettle (Jarausch 1994, p15). As a starting point Bonn defined German citizenship to include any "refugee . . . of German stock" who came from what were the 1937 borders of Germany (Jarausch 1994, p17). Here the West German policy of granting any ethnic German full citizenship began to pay off - during 1988 some 200,000 Germans had arrived from Poland, the Soviet Union and Romania and elsewhere (Zeman 1991, p324). Since that time, many ethnic Germans living in Russia and Kazakhstan, closer to 2 million, have left (see Brubaker 1998).

Of course, this policy was complemented by the most liberal asylum laws in Europe, allowing West Germany to give refuge to a range of Eastern Europeans, as well as asylum seekers from the Balkans and other minorities. These laws were made less liberal after 1993, but Germany has been left with a complex legacy by its asylum laws and past utilisation of guest-workers. These guest workers and their families, drawn from Turkey, the Balkans, and earlier on Italy and Spain, numbered some 5 million, representing 6.5% of the population in 1992 (Roskin 1992, p200). Today, Germany has the highest number of resident foreigners of any European country, some 7 million (Cohen 2001), a fact which has become a major political issue in 2000-2003 with efforts to more effectively co-ordinate migration across the EU as a whole. This issue has also contributed towards a xenophobic reaction, especially among youth in parts of former East Germany (in fact, part of a wider adjustment problem in a society undergoing rapid change, see Boehnke 1998). It must be noted that being married to a German, or being born within Germany by non-German parents, does not automatically lead to German citizenship.

Although important for their economy, these different ethnic groups, especially the Turks (some 3 million) and some Eastern Europeans, have been the target for neo-Nazi attacks (see Krell 1996; Thompson 2001). Germany has the problem of whether to cater for these groups as permanent residents, or by limiting social services, hope to discourage permanent enclaves. In the past decade Germany has been able to use its massive economic resources to pursue its foreign policy - with the huge demands on government spending in absorbing East Germany and in investing in Eastern Europe, it found this a little more difficult in the mid-1990s. Indeed, by June 1996 Germany was assessing what level of recession it would have to face, largely due to a slump in output in the eastern part of Germany of some 2.5% in late 1995 (Norman 1996a). At the same time, some level of investment in Eastern Europe and Russia has been viewed as essential in stabilizing its eastern borders (see Thompson 2001). Although economic conditions have since improved, there still remains an economic and cultural gap between Germans from the west and east. Likewise, projections for slow growth in 2003, and some erosion of traditional welfare provisions within Germany, also suggest that these tensions may well increase in the short term.

During his visit to East Berlin in October 1989, Gorbachev had made it clear that Moscow would not directly determine the future of the GDR, and the elderly communist leader Erich Honecker confirmed that he had no interest in reform (Zeman 1991, pp324-5). Gorbachev in fact made a telling aside at one stage in his visit, noting that history punishes those 'who come too late' (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p13), a clear indication of the outdated nature of the GDR government. Events, however, soon overtook the issue of reform. Major protests followed in Leipzig: -

Gorbachev had in fact hoped for reform from Honecker. When this was rebuffed, and the news came through that Honecker was considering using lethal force rather than riot-police methods against the crowds, Moscow made it clear that a change of leadership was acceptable. Egon Krenz sounded out other potential leaders, and at a meeting of the central committee deposed Honecker. Krenz, in particular, was not willing to use lethal force to repress the popular movement which was now sweeping East Germany. Krenz, however, was indeed not acceptable, and a more popularist leader, Hans Modrow, was brought into power, along with a fresh group in the politburo (Zeman 1991, p325). More importantly, these events indicated that even the police and the security forces were not willing to support the elitist regime of Honecker to the extent of mass shootings on the streets. Once this became clear, several unthought of events occurred. The East German government, in order to release pent up pressure, allowed applications for private travel, with application to be approved immediately. The result was a mass rush through border posts which surprised the government and in fact led to its eventual downfall (Jarausch 1994, p3).

In Berlin on November 9, 1989, people went to border posts and the guards there, perhaps confused by the lack of clear-cut commands, did not stop them crossing over into the West. At first the guards tried to stamp visas, but soon gave up as a mass of people and cars crossed the border (Jarausch 1994, p4). By the 9 November the 1989 the Berlin Wall was breached, and later dismantled (Zeman 1991, p325). The next day, the West German government allocated 100 DM of 'welcome money' for each such visitor (Jarausch 1994, p11), a move which seems to have been designed to avoid social problems during the visit, but also ensuring that the high level of crossing-over would be sustained.

There were East German plans to try to close the border two days later, with the East German defence minister ordering a rifle division to seal off the zone, using force if necessary. Yet, the general staff refused to participate in what would have caused a massacre - here the negative example of Tiananmen Square in China may have had some influence (Australian 1990; Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p11). The Wall, which had been build in 1961 at the express order of Honecker, had been designed to keep people within the Eastern Block, especially Germans (during 1945-1961 3.4 million registered refugees had fled from East Germany, Jarausch 1994, p8). Of course, it could not stop all movements: officially permitted emigration, direct escapes, flight through third countries, and ransoming of prisoners, resulted in 203,619 people leaving East Germany in the 1980-1988 period (Jarausch 1994, p17). Now, however, the Wall was unable to stop either refugees or visitors.

Various grass-roots movements had helped bring about the situation whereby the East German government was forced to begin reform. Reform groups first formed as civic movements with the aid the Protestant Church, which remained socially still fairly strong in East Germany (Jarausch 1994, p10). These groups included environmental, human rights, and later on democratic reform groups. In spite of close monitoring and harassment by the Stasi, these groups would help catalyse mass popular unrest in the major cities of East Germany (for revival of 'civil society' in Eastern Europe generally, and its later limitations, see Tismaneanu 2001).

Meanwhile, the East German government was under enormous economic pressure (Brezinski 1992, p236). On 17 November 1989, Hans Modrow made initial proposals concerning a contractual union, an initiative immediately followed up by Kohl's 28 November 1989 speech in which the ten point plan for unification was proposed, a move which caught the US and other European powers by surprise (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p24). In early 1990 Modrow and 17 of his ministers visited Bonn to seek emergency aid ($12 billion) from West Germany, and to discuss the prospects of monetary union (Rothwell, 1990b, p8). The hard cash was refused, with only limited aid offered (Rothwell 1990, p8), a move underlying the East German delegation's status as suppliants, and the lack of viability of their government.

For maps of Germany, go to the PCL Map Library at

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/germany.html

The interim East German government quickly decided to consider unification with the West, a policy actively aided and manoeuvred for by Chancellor Kohl. The March 18, 1990 elections confirmed the policies of the East German centrist parties, the 'Alliance for Germany' (including the CDU, Christian Democratic Union and the SCU, the Christian Social Union), and their path towards unification (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p25). This trend was emphasised in the slogans of street marchers, which changed from 'we are the people' to 'we are one people' (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p14). Here Kohl's personal canvassing of support in the East German elections was essential (Hancock 1993, p226). It was decided that general elections on both sides would only occur after unification.

International acceptance was also required for this transition. Although alliance arrangements made with the US, France and Germany in 1954/1955 had provisions for moves towards a peaceful reunification of Germany, Britain, under Thatcher's leadership, was in early 1990 opposed to the idea of a rapid reunification. As soon as early 1990 top German officials were visiting France and Britain to allay suspicions, while in February an Ottawa (Canada) meeting between the 4 main World War II allies and German representative attempted to iron out various concerns, especially those concerning borders (Rothwell 1990a, p11). These negotiations resulted in the Two Plus Four Talks, in which the USSR, the US, France and Britain (the four powers of WWII) and the two Germanies ironed out many aspects of the path to unification.

On 3 October, 1990 the parts of Germany torn apart at the end of World War II were united. This was done not through negotiating a new constitution, but by an adoption of existing constitutional arrangements implicit in the Federal nature of West Germany. Under Article 23 of the Basic Law of the West German state, 5 new Lander or regional states were incorporated into the Federal Republic (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p9). This was a faster path than the use of Article 146, which states that 'Basic Law shall cease to be in force on the day when a constitution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into force', i.e. the creation of a brand new constitution (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p25), perhaps through the use of referendums. West Germany simply expanded its federal structure to include what had once been East Germany.

Great public displays accompanied these changes, but the realisation of the economic disparity between East and West soon emerged. However, as their industries were dismantled or 'restructured', many soon found themselves taking the brunt of unemployment. For example, by mid 1990 plans were established to fire 15,800 of the 20,000 East German border guards (Australian 1990). Unemployment rates in the older towns of eastern German are often double those of western areas, with unemployment as high as 24%, e.g. in Templin (Cohen 2001). Estimated unemployment rates of 10.5% for 2003 (DFAT 2003) can thus still translated into local areas of higher unemployment.

Past securities to which East Germans were accustomed, such as housing and a range of socialist measures ranging from free child care to liberal abortion laws, were soon under reform. The extent of infrastructure investment required in East Germany can be see in one simple fact: even the thousands of cheap housing tenements thrown up during the last 30 years in fact needed major restructuring and modernisation to meet basic West German levels. We can glimpse the difficulty of absorbing East Germany through some of the difficulties the European Community and its Commission had on this issue: in early 1990 it had to create exemptions for 80% of its food laws in order to avoid wiping out the East German food processing industry (Paterson & Smith, in Smith 1992, p21). East German companies were given a 5 year period (until 1995) to come into line with wider European safety and quality standards. Likewise, large numbers of East German industries now found their products too expensive for export. This applied even to apparently successful foreign cash earners such as the camera company Pentacon, which was in fact supported by a wide range of government subsidies (Roskin 1992, p197). By the late 1990s, large segments of the older industrial and consumer production industries in the eastern areas had been effectively wiped out, and only partially replaced by new firms.

A more serious legacy was in the minds of East Germans - for more than 40 years they had been subject to a Stalinist regime in which the state security organs, the Stasi, relied on informers and the enforcement of censorship to try to limit and control their aspirations. Certain test cases have highlighted the difficulties of social unification: the issue of abortion-on-demand (which is not compatible with West German constitutional guarantees for the right to life), the desire for the prosecution of Honecker and of border guards who shot those escaping to the West. Likewise, attitudes towards World War II and the Nazi past have also been reviewed as East Germany opens its archives to world scrutiny. The East German State Security Police, the Stasi, had deeply penetrated ordinary society through the widespread use of informers, and some western political leaders were found to have some connection with this hated organisation, e.g. Lothar de Maiziere, a noted non-Communist East German, was forced to resign from Kohl's cabinet due to such allegations (Roskin 1992, p202). The whole issue of reviewing who had a 'dirty past' became a major problem both ethically and legally for Germans. Furthermore, the Stasi also built up major profiles on West German citizens. We can see this in a recent estimate of Stasi activity: -

This data would turn out to be very embarrassing for Helmut Kohl when files created in the 1970s and 1980s revealed that he may have known more about an illegal slush fund created by his party, the Christian Democrats, than he had admitted. Although many of these files have been destroyed, those that remain have been used in 'vetting civil servants, for criminal proceedings', and individuals have been able to look at their own records (Economist 2000). Such factors would help lead to the eventual resignation of Kohl as chairman of the Christian Democrats in January 2000 (Hooper 2000) when he refused to name persons who had made secret donations to the party.

The unification of the two Germanies had several immediate effects on the landscape of relations within Europe and the broader international arena. In summary, these include: -

The September 1998 the Social Democrats, led by Gerhard Schroeder ( = Schröder) defeated the government of Helmut Kohl. The Social Democrats received 40.9% of the votes, supported by the Greens with 6.7%. The Christian Democratic Union-Christian Social Union coalition only received 35.1%, and its junior partner the Free Democratic Party (FDP) garnered 6.2%, and was therefore unable to continue to hold government (Walker 1998). Schroeder, a lawyer and former political activist, left behind much of the radicalism of his early Marxism (Wosnitza 1998) and even moderated some of the strong environment demands of the Greens in order to present the image of a winning party that would not rock the boat too much. A politician who had been the premier of Lower Saxony, leading a 'red-green' coalition there, and later a member of the board of Volkswagen, he was able to present an image of himself as 'business friendly' and pragmatic (Walker 1998; Wosnitza 1998). He is also a tough politician who managed to survive a public and potential damaging divorce to his third wife (Wosnitza 1998).

The election of Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder brought a raft of new issues to the forefront both within Germany and within Europe as a whole. One of these has been the issue of the role of the Germany army in the new European setting. Thus a special commission, set up under Richard von Weizsacker (a former President), came to the conclusion that the current army is a relic of the Cold War and needed serious restructuring: -

In part the review was driven by NATO and U.S. criticism of the army's effectiveness, but there is no guarantee that German citizens would be happy with a more professional army (United Press International 2000b), even if this is compatible with the demands of any evolving European Defense Initiative. Germany has re-iterated its peace-keeping commitment in the Balkans, and has been a main provider of aid for the Balkan stabilisation plan that seeks to rebuilt the region and make it ready for deeper association with the European Union.

Another main issue of concern to nearby states was whether Chancellor Schroeder would continue strong support for EU expansion. Poland, in particular, had benefited from the strong backing of former Chancellor Kohl. In fact, the current government, in spite of some nervousness of declining electoral enthusiasm for enlargement before the 2002 elections (Oxford Analytica 2001), has also come to support carefully managed expansion (see further Wood 2002). In a June 2000 visit to the Baltic states, Schroeder promised aid to close down an old-style nuclear reactor in Lithuania, and also promised full support for the efforts of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to become member of the European Union.

However, it would be true to say the current government is more 'Europeanist' in orientation than the former leadership, with some lessening of support for NATO-led policies (Stratfor Update 1998), even though in the end Chancellor Schroeder supported the NATO intervention in Kosovo. This was largely done on the basis of explicit humanitarian grounds, and with the agreement of key opposition parties. However, this 'fragile consensus' has had to be carefully maintained (Stratfor Update 2000). Germany is also concerned about the 180,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees it has allowed to stay in Germany with initial refugee visas down to March 2000. Likewise, guest workers from the Balkans regions peaking at a total of 400,000 in the 1990s (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p106). Through June 2002, German interior ministers have suggested that Kosovo refugees should be repatriated by the end of the year, though this has resulted in strong protests from Gypsy (Roma) refugees who say they still would be in great danger if returned (Deutsche Welle 2002a). In this context, Germany strongly supports stabilizations plans that would help rebuild the states of former Yugoslavia.

Likewise, the Social Democrats have had to carefully managed their coalition with the ecologist Green party, both at the federal and local level. One of the problems which confronts the Greens is a sense that they may have left their oppositional and radical roles behind them. Likewise, the Greens have had to moderate some of their demands, but has since gained support from the government for the closure of all of Germany's nineteen nuclear power stations (that provide one-third of the country's electricity) by the year 2018 while new laws may place a ban on reprocessing nuclear waste by 2005 (Energy Europe 2001).

In fact the Green-SPD coalition can be disturbed by various controversies within their own ranks, including charges of corruption within the Social Democrats, potential splits within the Greens, by a decline of social service resources, the restructuring of the state pension scheme, and by simple things like the increase of fuel taxes. As a result, in voter surveys during 2000, the SPD dropped to a 38% approval rating, while their opposition the Christian Democrats (CDU) rose to 37%. With the Greens at 6%, and the Free Democrats (FDP) at 9%, this means that the current government alliance slipped somewhat behind its opposition in popularity (Deutsche Welle 2000), though this may include a certain protest effect which will not necessarily be carried through in major elections.

At the same time, through 2001, the chairwoman of the Christian Democrats (CDU), Angela Merkel, had begun to run a strong campaign designed to mobilise support among a range of voters in Germany: she has been critical of the current immigration policy, has argued for the return of a strong state able to support law and order, and has criticised any emerging multiculturalism within the German context, and argued for a return to an active German 'national pride' (Cohen 2001; for problems with this unless set within the context of European sensibilities, see Haas 2002). In May 2002 she called for serious reform in the German labour market, arguing that a reduction in bureaucratic blockages would cause a boost in employment as early as 2003 (Deutsche Welle 2002c).

One of the issues that has emerged in the last two years has been the status of foreign policy. In general, Germany under Schroeder has followed the path towards integration within Europe, but with a slight left of centre approach that tries to give extra protection to the environment and vulnerable groups within German society. However, it has been difficult to fund all levels of government spending at pre-1998 levels, especially while undertaking areas of reform. This has meant that both defence and social services spending have not been immune from cuts. Likewise, the only moderate level of wage increases that have been permitted for German workers over the last three years has to some degree eroded the long-term consensus that linked government, management and unions into a 'productivity consensus' that seemed quite effective through the late 1980s down to about 1996 (Economist 2000b).

Likewise, Germany has tried to maintain its strong links with the US, but does not always agree with Washington initiatives, e.g. the US decision not to ratify the ongoing Kyoto process to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Furthermore, the financial pressures on the Schroeder government has meant that he also does not support the US approach on seriously reducing the foreign debt that Russia has inherited from the former Soviet Union. Germany is one of the main members of the 'Paris Club', a group of nations owed some $100 billion. Germany is reluctant to ease this debt by $30-35 million, as former President Clinton had suggested (United Press International 2000). In this context, however, Germany remained critical of U.S. moves to create some kind of National Missile Defense (NMD) system, and did not think that such a system should be extended to European defense. Through early 2001, NATO foreign ministers, including those of France and Germany, decided not to back such a defense system, though agreed to continue negotiations with Washington. This fed into a early gap between the EU and the new US Bush administration on a number of issues including defense and the environment (see Daalder 2001). This relationship was somewhat improved with German-US cooperation over the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and with visits by President Bush which sought to emphasise trans-Atlantic cooperation.

However, the last round of tensions over Iraq seems part of a wider tensions on Atlantic cooperation that may take some years to fully resolve. In the wider setting, the EU has moved to rebuild the relationship with the US through a special EU-US Summit held in late June 2003. The political nuances of this stage of the process are worth noting: -

In the 2002 elections, Gerhard Schroeder had argued strongly against involvement in the war against Iraq, and he had recently performed quite well in dealing with the floods that during August had ravaged much of central Europe and parts of Germany (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p99). Schroeder argued that war in Iraq could lead to mass civilian casualties, increase tensions with the Arab and Muslim worlds, and possibly lead to new rounds of terrorism (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p100). Likewise, he made other economic stimulus plans, including tax cuts that will come into play through 2004, a reduction of income tax of around 10% (Deutsche Welle 2003). The election had been very close, with the retention of government by the Social Democrats based on the strong performance of their Green alliance partners, winning over conservative parties led by Edmund Stoiber: -

This led to later charges of opportunism and 'peace-mongering' in relation to Iraq and the UN Security Council, but there is no doubt that Chancellor Schroeder's policies struck a strong accord with a large segment of the electorate (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2003, p101). However, his government will now have to perform strongly in the areas of stimulating the economy, reducing unemployment, and retaining a strong role for Germany within the EU in order to retain office in future.

Germany is now a strong player on the European and world stage. Germany has been willing to take on a wider international role, e.g. financial negotiations with China, visits by leading Germany officials to Israel and Singapore, a strong presence in the Asia-Europe meeting of March 1996, a high level visits to Australia in May 1997, and a leadership role in attempting to bring Eastern Europe into the fold of Europe through 1997-2003. Germany remains committed to the Kyoto protocol in reducing green-house gases, as well as to supporting the peace process in the Middle East. Germany's international interests support this expansion of roles: -

However, other problems now face the new Germany. Economic and social problems will remain paramount for some years. The main challenges to Germany are still in the East, not the West. Germany has a strong vested interest in stabilising her nearer eastern neighbours. If unification within the EU can help reduce the threat of a too-strong Germany, this is only half the problem. Germany can only remain happy with an enlarging EU so long as Eastern and Central Europe remain stable - and this means a major rise in economic and living standards throughout that region. Here Germany cannot provide solutions alone - active European and American involvement is required. To date, processes within the EU, NATO, the Partnership for Peace programme, and the OSCE have begun to address these issues. These problems are the main reason why former Chancellor Kohl had so strongly supported the aim of expanding the EU eastwards, though recent German policy has allowed Germany to control movement of peoples out of new European member states in the east for up to seven years (European Report 2001).

Certain signs of internal political turmoil remain. The rise of an extreme right, the violence between unemployed youth and guest workers in Berlin, the intense debate (2001-2003) over whether German culture verses multiculturalism should be supported, all suggest that the German political system is beset by numerous complex demands. While joined to a relatively stable economic system, it is likely to meet the basic needs of many Germans. However, it has been suggested that in large measure this liking is due to the output effect, that is, Germans like the jobs, relative security and material success of Germany, and it is less certain that they are deeply attached to the political system as such - this 'output effect' seems particularly strong for ex-East Germans (Roskin 1992, p173). The future of an open and progressive Germany depends very much on this linkage between expectations and reality, and on the prospect of a developing European culture as distinct from a more narrow definition of national identity. The Christian Democrats, in particular, have been willing to play the nationalism card, arguing that the question of what it means to be a German in today's Europe needs to be openly discussed (see Cohen 2001 & Vandenberg 2000). Through 2002, efforts have been made to deepen the grass-roots democratic culture of Germany by trying to persuade young voters to be more active, and to find ways for the political system to be more responsive, e.g. through the possible use of referendums (Deutsche Welle 2002d & 2002e). Recent debate in the German parliament has suggested a stronger role for direct democracy via referendums (Deutsche Welle 2002e)

Two other factors will influence Germany in the immediate future. The first of these is how Germany moderates is relative economic dominance within Europe. Germany, in particular, has reduced some of these tensions through the use of two key processes. First, by the process of 'semi-sovereignty' Germany has reduced the centralisation of its state structure, opting for a federal structure with a strong central court and division powers within its political system (Katzenstein 1997). This has been combined internationally with the strategy of associated sovereignty whereby Germany has developed its national policies alongside an integrating European Union, with a strong emphasis on running foreign policy approaches through multilateral organisations (Sverdrup 1998). On this basis, until the late 1990s Germany has opted for the use of soft and civil power, using a series of overlapping competencies and abilities rather than using the dominant power of a great state, thereby reducing tensions between large and small states within the European system (Sverdrup 1998). On this basis, Germany has been one of the main financial sources for the budget of EU institutions, also supporting the development of weaker economies during the 1980s and early 1990s, e.g. Greece, Ireland and Spain. At the same time, Germany has tried to project a cooperative image, one which has been sustained in the 1997-2003 period, especially in relation to cooperation with Eastern Europe. In this area, it has now moved to some greater use of military and defence capabilities, but only within a multilateral context. German power is linked deeply into the emerging power of the EU.

The third major component of this German moderation has been its strong cooperation with France, providing in many ways the engine for the emergence of a singe Europe (Calleo & Staal 1998). This is linked to other themes in German foreign policy. 'Atonement' and 'reconciliation' remain key themes of Germany foreign policy, especially in relation to France, Eastern Europe and Israel (see Phillips 2001; Feldman 1999). This atonement, however, constrains German policy from being too assertive or unilateralist, and often tightly binds Germany in certain sensitive areas, e.g. in criticism of Israel, in areas such as asylum laws, the use of armed forces, and assertive economic diplomacy.

In the long term, the stability of Europe will rest on whether Germany remains a strong society and nation able to take part in future EU leadership. Here active British support (tested through 2002-2003), alongside French cooperation, will be required to counter-balance the strategic and economic weight of Germany. The future of Germany will go hand in hand with the continued stability of European cooperation and integration via a number of agencies, including the EU, NATO, OSCE, the new European Defence Initiative and the regular Conferences on European Stability. This complex set of arrangements are bound to undergo evolution, but for the time being, the German role in the 'wider European equation' remains crucial, but not problem-free.