The New Europe/ The European Union : © R. James Ferguson 2003

INTR12-204 & INTR71/72-204, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

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The quest for peace and security, is also bound up with economic, social and political issues, as well as with the traditional notion of military defence. Europe was the main home of the modern nation-state. Europe was also the home of warfare conducted with a modern, industrialised armaments-base (though the American Civil War was one of the first experiences of such large-scale, modernised war). Europe was one of the originators of wars fought on a world scale, and one of the main theatres for two World Wars. As World War II intensified, the concept of total war also emerged: wars in which the total manpower, economic base and resources of countries would be mobilised to achieve war aims. The demands of World War II also laid the basis for development of atomic weapons and the doctrine of nuclear warfare. In part, of course, these wars were bound up the nature of the armed nation state, patterns of narrow nationalism, and imperfect power balances within the European setting.

With this background in view, it is not surprising that one of the central quests in the new Europe is the quest for a new basis for genuine security and lasting peace within an enlarging Europe (see Spiezio 1995), whether militarily, politically or economically. Today, we look at the institutions involved in this process, and the way these institutions interact with each other. Several agendas concerning security are in progress today. This includes the deepening and expansion of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) eastwards to include several Eastern European states through 1997-2003 (Antoneno 1999; Voigt 1996; Sloan 1996; Grant 1996). The key benefit of NATO membership is the collective security agreement of Article 5 whereby the alliance as a whole must respond to a threat to any of its full memberships (for new debates over how automatic this response should be, see World Affairs 2002b). Historically, NATO was viewed as a means of keeping 'the Russians out, Americans in, and Germany divided' (World Affairs 2002b), a role which would radically change through the 1990s. However, NATO has taken on a wider role in cooperative security, functionally seeking to stabilise the wider European and Mediterranean landscape, a challenging task in the 21^st century.

This has forced a serious adjustment of relations with Russia through 1999-2003. Relations in the late 1990s had become extremely tense in spite of treaty arrangements made between the two powers (the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security), but through 2001, under the leadership of President Putin, Russia emerged as a major strategic player in partial support of U.S. and European interests. We will also briefly address the role of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the new proposal for a new, purely European defence, commonly known as the European Defence Initiative (EDI, but also indicated by the terms ESDP, European Security and Defence Policy, while the term ESDI, European Security and Defence Identity, refers to the idea of a European identity working within, or at least with, NATO). However, the entire concept of security needs to be broadened and improved to benefit Europe in the current global situation.

NATO Timeline 1949 - March 2003 (BBC 2003) will be found at

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1543000.stm

Several security systems have been tried in Europe in the past: the Concert of Europe system between 1815 and 1848, based on the Vienna Conference stabilising the interests of great European powers (for some modern implications, see Chase & Rizopoulos 1999), the alliance systems of the early 20^th century, and the League of Nations in the 1920s. Through the 1930s through the early 1940s alliance system once again failed to deliver peace to Europe. Between 1949 and 1989 Europe and Germany divided between the spheres of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union, both forming opposed allied camps: this was essentially the bipolar system of the Cold War period. With rapid reform in the Eastern bloc from 1989, and the collapse the USSR by 1992, there is now a search for a security system now that the bipolar world of bipolar nuclear superpowers seems to be over. The search for this new, inclusive security system is still underway.

Most of the existing European institutions - the EU, the former WEU (Western European Union, an earlier framework for defence cooperation among European nations), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were created in the context of the Cold War. The oldest forms of diplomacy within the European states system were hegemony (one state dominating the rest), alliance systems, and balance of power. All three systems are prone to competition, instability and the use of force, e.g. the continental wars of the 19^th century, and the two world wars that ripped Europe apart in the first half of the twentieth century. The most recent attempt to avoid alliance systems is the consensus and/or veto system whereby all states have an equal say. The UN Security Council, in which permanent members have the veto, the OSCE, which relies on systems of consensus, and the inter-governmental aspect of the EU, at least until qualified majority voting takes on a bigger role, probably after 2004 (see European Report 2000), are examples. The problem with such organisations is that they are better equipped for negotiation than for rapid decision-making. Strong or quick action will often be vetoed if it interferes with the interests of one of the member states. The UN Security Council has not been able to overcome this in recent years, even with a partial thawing of Russian-US relations. The problem, then, is how to get a high consensus in the wider European setting, combined with relatively quick and effective decision-making.

One of the seminal turning points for East-West security relations was the Helsinki Agreement of 1975 (see Mastny 1986). Under conditions whereby a strategic nuclear balance had been achieved between the Soviets and the United States, the Soviets no longer had a need to regard Europe as a hostage to an American all out nuclear strike, for they now possessed sufficient weapons systems to immediately retaliate. This state of MAD (mutual assured destruction, also known as 'balance of terror', part of classic deterrence theory) was affirmed by the SALT II Treaty of 1979 and by the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 (the U.S. has moved to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 2002 in order to legitimate the development of missile defence systems). At Helsinki therefore a policy of detente was adopted, and a move away from Cold War politics continued for some years. The Soviets were able to secure Western recognition of the 'existing territorial-political realities' in Eastern Europe, and in return the West secured a formal acceptance by the Soviet Union of a pledge not to impede democratic developments in Eastern Europe should they occur, and a recognition by the Soviet regime of certain basic human rights (Stokes 1991). These formal recognitions, though at first not very effective in safeguarding human rights, did have some impact on reform groups in Poland and Czechoslovakia, legitimating their demands for more freedom. For a time there was a cooling of international tension, the period of detente.

Yet by 1979 the superpower confrontation continued with renewed intensity. Why did the Cold War restart? One reason was that the Russian military, following the so-called doctrine of achieving parity or even strategic advance over the US, continued key strategic developments. In the 1980s the Soviet began to deploy medium range intermediate nuclear forces (INF's) in the form of SS20 missiles into Europe. This resurrected the definite possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe. This move itself was possibly a delayed reaction to the NATO doctrine of graduated response, which also entailed the possibility of a limited nuclear war in Europe, a policy developed by US Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara in 1962 (see Knorr 1973, pp11-12).

Increasing tensions from 1979-1985 meant a phase of planning to modernise and update NATO forces. The U.S. was more than willing to deploy Pershing 11's and cruise missiles to counterbalance NATO's relatively weak ground forces. President Reagan also shelved the SALT II treaty which tried unsuccessfully to balance Soviet and Western strategic nuclear weapons, and began a massive re-start across the board of the arms race. Money was poured into high tech developments - e.g. the European fighter, the Tornado, while the U.S. itself opened up new areas such as the prospect of war in space with the SDI project, i.e. popularly known as Star Wars (see Cowen 1987; a new version of this is being developed now by the U.S. as a form of Missile Defence, see below). Probably by 1985 Gorbachev had come to the conclusion that such competition could not be sustained. The new arms race had already led to greater and greater percentages of Soviet GDP being devoted to defence - in 1984 Soviet expenditure was running at around 17%, and possibly much higher if all military research was included. Some have proposed that Gorbachev's motives were less peaceful by arguing that competition with the US was still the aim of perestroika but that such competition over the long term could not be achieved without structural economic reform.

The Russian leader Gorbachev initiated a series of sweeping arms reduction agreements. The result was a mutual agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States to liquidate all INF (Intermediate missiles of more than 500 kilometres range, particularly significant in Europe), which began to be implemented after 1987. An agreement was also reached to cut down and balance conventional armaments between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the ATTU area. i.e. from the Atlantic to the Urals. Despite the resignation of President Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin pledged that Russia would abide by the START I Agreement (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, which resulted in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), the process of which was begun by Gorbachev in 1991. Indeed Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have all agreed to the terms of START I. START II was signed at the end of 1992 in order to reduce strategic delivery systems to less than one third pre-START levels and to eliminate all ICBM's (Intercontinental ballistic missiles) with multiple warheads. The Moscow Agreement of January 1994 saw an agreement to take off line those missiles still targeted at each other. However, even as late as March 1997 there were some delays in full implementation of the START II treaty, e.g. the Russian Duma (parliament) had not fully ratified START II, in part because most of their missiles are multi-warhead systems, and destruction of these would result in something like a 500 warhead gap between it and the U.S. START II would hold nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500 for each side. However, it is hoped that earlier agreements between made Clinton and Yeltsin would push ahead to a START III treaty, dropping force levels to 2,000-2,500 (or possibly even to 1,000-1,500 as dictated by Russian economic sustainability, and reducing some of the Duma's fears about lack of parity between the two sides (for critical views see Clark 2001). In fact, it was not until April 2000 that President Putin of Russia was able to oversee the ratification of START-II, and the beginning of serious talks in preparing for the START III treaty (ITAR/TASS 2000). Ratification of START III, however, was compromised by the US move towards a missile defence system that Russian and China argued would breach the 1971 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and ends the secure period of nuclear deterrence (for one Russian view, see Safranchuk 2000). However, through 2001-2002, rapid rapprochement between Russia and the U.S., in part due to the new focus on the war on terror, led to further agreements by these two powers to further reduce their current nuclear stockpiles by to two thirds (Purdum 2002).

From 1989 through to 1991 discussion also led to the CFE, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and this was eventually signed in Paris in November 1990 between the then 16 member states of NATO and the 7 members of the then Warsaw Pact. Here the Soviet Union agreed to make more extensive cuts in tanks, APC's (armoured personnel carriers) and artillery, though conventional missile technology had not been fully covered (see MacFarlane 1993). The Soviets agreed to make a 10% cut in troop numbers down to 500,000, to remove the equivalent of 6 tank divisions from East Germany and Hungary, i.e. around 5,000 tanks, to remove another 5,000 from the Soviet Union proper, and a total of 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft. By 1991 Soviet forces had withdrawn from Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Russia had completed their withdrawals from the former East Germany and Poland by the end of 1994. As part of that ongoing process Berlin had all foreign military forces completely removed. By the late 1990s, the prospects for a major armed clash with Russia had been reduced to an unlikely option, both in the conventional or nuclear terms. This, however, did not mean an end to conflict in the wider European setting, with political and diplomatic tensions rising over the war in Chechnya, the ABM Treaty, and the war in Iraq.

Underlying the events of 1989-2003 were certain fundamental questions which followed in the wake of German reunification, Soviet/Russian agreement to withdraw all their military forces to within their own national borders, and then the dissolution of the USSR itself. These include: -

An enhancement of the political component of the alliance was set in motion by the adoption in November 1991 of a new strategic concept. NATO's mission was no longer merely to defend its members but included dialogue and co-operation with its traditional adversaries - Eastern Europe and the CIS (The Commonwealth of Independent States). Furthermore, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991 and all former members of the NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Albania were invited to join. Some 38 nations including the United States and Russia were engaged in this process of dialogue. In June 1992 at Oslo the decision was made to consider participation on a case by case basis in peacekeeping operations within the OSCE. The NACC has also instituted a Military Cooperation Programme. Joint peacekeeping training now takes place under the auspices of the Ad Hoc Group for Cooperation in Peacekeeping. In 1994-1995, for example, small numbers of Ukrainian and US troops joined in peace keeping training exercises. Since that time, combined Nordic, Baltic, US and Russian units have served as peacekeepers in Bosnia. Later on, wider groups under the Partnership for Peace program trained together for peace-keeping operations, especially in the Balkans.

NATO also began a fundamental restructuring of its forces. The key catalyst here was the outbreak of ethnic and national violence in former Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Caucasus. Such events demonstrated that none of the existing international organizations was properly equipped to prevent the outbreak of ethnic and national disturbances, to bring them under control, and to engage in peace-making activities which separated combatants. There were limitations in the effectiveness of the OSCE and the EU, as well as the UN and CIS. This culminated in a 60,000 NATO controlled force enforcing the Dayton accords for Bosnia during early 1996 (these themes will be look at in more detail later in the course), and the more recent intervention by NATO and European forces in Kosovo and Macedonia (1999-2003).

So there were two key elements, political structures (like the EU) and military forces (like NATO). There have been elements of cooperation and divergence in both these areas. Here there was a general consensus that NATO, the EU, WEU, OSCE, the UNSC, and the new European Defence Initiative should become components of a framework of cooperating institutions (for an interesting analysis of the benefits and risks in linking different levels of international organisations, see the case study for the Arab states in Barnett 1993). However this was resisted to some extent by the particular preferences by particular governments. Debate raged over whether NATO, the Western European Union (the WEU) the Organisation on Security and Cooperation (the OSCE) or the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) should be the dominant vehicle. One of the key problems was how to extend NATO's operations now the Cold War was over. Likewise, Russia was deeply concerned from 1996-2001 that NATO remained a strongly interventionist organisation which remained largely anti-Russian, and issue only moderated by new agreements in mid-2002 which allowed Russia a special place in a joint Russia-NATO Council, known as NATO-at-20 and then the NATO-Russia Council, the NRC (Pfaff 2002; Walker 2002). At the very least, the air-war against rump Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo) suggested that in spite of the treaty between NATO and Russia, that Russian protests were not being taking seriously at the end of the 1990s (Antonenko 1999; Levitin 2000).

Through the 1990s there was serious debate concerning not only the future of NATO but also the development of a uniquely European security program (see Yost 2000; Palmer 1988). The French at first favoured the development of a genuine European intervention force which would be independent of NATO under the WEU, but one which would operate in accordance with the directives of the European Union. It seemed to the French that European security was basically a European matter, yet they recognised consultation with the U.S. was necessary. A second problem was that France was not at that time an integrated member of NATO command structures though and ally (Posner 1991; Yost 1994). The WEU and the OSCE were different institutions that could help provide a wider view of European security.

The WEU agreement was signed on 17 March 1948 by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom. A Consultative Council was created composed of Foreign Ministers. France recognised as a result of the Yugoslav crisis that continued cooperation with US was crucial. French officials therefore acknowledged that the WEU would never and should not displace NATO and the US contribution. But France remained interested in the WEU as a pathway to peacekeeping roles. The French President, Jacques Chirac, had emphasised French and European independence in security affairs. In early 1996 these issues began to change as the US suggested that NATO could take on a more European focus, a move which allowed France to accept the idea of taking an active part in an integrated NATO command structure. In the period 1996-2001, several options have been developed for try to develop a more independent European security system. The first of these is the idea of European nations being able to develop their own combined joint task forces for particular operations, but being able to use NATO infrastructure, intelligence and communication systems (though this would involve the tacit support of the U.S., see Gordon 1997). This would have lead to an independency European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. However, such a grouping would still have had to rely on NATO (and in effect U.S.) intelligence and heavy lift aircraft for rapid deployment operations.

From November 1993 the Eurocorps was developed as a show-case of European cooperation. This had been set up as a Franco-German Agreement in 1989. Belgium and Spain also pledged forces. France, Germany and Belgium provided the bulk of a force of 35,000 and 40,000 men headquartered in Strasbourg which will augment the already existing 4,200 man Franco-German brigade which was also established in 1989. Although a relatively small unit, the Eurocorps also represented a physical example of strong Franco-German cooperation. The WEU was also active in April-May 1995 in planning a southern coordination of Spanish, Portuguese and Italian forces which could take on join roles in peace-keeping and in responding to emergencies. However, the WEU was a very much 'on paper' organisation, and only took on limited operational roles (it has been effectively replaced by the European Defence Initiative from 1999).

From 1999, there was a strengthened move towards Europe being able to create a more 'flexible and mobile' European armed force that could respond to nearby crises, in part based on a core of Anglo-French defence cooperation (Taylor 2000). This plan aimed to create a rapid reaction force of about 60,000 men to be operational by 2003, though there are concerns that dropping defence budgets in Europe might undermine this aspiration (Taylor 2000). It was hoped that such a force could be fully mobilised within one month and be able to operate in a remote site for up to a year (Heisbourg 2000). At the same time, due to needs of rotation and support, a total of three times the deployed number needs to be available for such deployment, indicating a need for a total allocation of 150,000-200,000 into such a force structure, out of a total of 1.7 million in European armies, including conscripts, through 2000 (Chipman 2001). By 2000-2003, this had developed into a firm outline for a European coordinated military capability, known as the European Defence Initiative, backed strongly by Britain and France, with more reluctant support from Germany. This would replace the WEU, but would still usually coordinate with NATO. This initiative developed into the European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) which was confirmed in December 2001 as the policy for 'conflict prevention and crisis management' (Biscop 2003, p183) , setting the basis for a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI), though this last term is sometimes taken to imply a grouping within NATO, or at least closely coordinated with it. As of 2003, the led to formation of the European Rapid Reaction Force, designed to taken on crisis management and peace-keeping operations for up to one year, with relatively rapid mobilisation of forces. The aim 'was to be able to deploy, within 60 days, 15 brigades (up to 60,000 troops) for the purpose of performing the so-called Petersburg tasks (crisis management, humanitarian and hostage rescue, and peacekeeping).' (Wilkie 2002). In 2003, these forces formally took up small operations in Macedonia Bosnia, and units based on French troops were involved in peacekeeping in Congo (the town of Bunia) from June 2003. 'A total of 1400 troops drawn from the EU's rapid reaction force' relieved '700 Uruguayan peacekeepers who were outnumbered' during earlier phases of the conflict (Australian 2003).

In part, this new policy was evolved in reaction to the European difficulties in taking offensive action against the Yugoslav state during the NATO operation in Kosovo in 1999 - European views on the type of intervention, and problems in mounting sufficient all-weather aircraft with smart munitions showed a strong reliance on the U.S. (Thomas 2000, pp45-46). Likewise, the initiative in part was driven forward by a change of thinking in the UK government under Prime Minister Blair, who found the European initiative a way of both maintaining military budgets (slightly declining for the 1998-2001 period, and 2.4% of GDP for 2000, slightly above the NATO-country average of 2.2%, Chipman 2001) and showing a strong engagement within Europe while not strongly supporting a short-term move to adopt the euro. The French, too, were also strongly aware of their limited air-power role in Kosovo, and became more determined to be able to carry out large scale military operations on the basis of EU rather than U.S. leadership (Thomas 2000, p46). However, there already exists a some gap between U.S. and European military capabilities, suggesting that there needs to be a serious upgrade of European forces even within NATO (see Yost 2000). On this basis, any independent European military force would need to have improved access to European intelligence satellites, better C⁴ISR abilities (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance; Yost 2000, p98) more heavy lift aircraft and sea transport, as well as new munitions and improved attack aircraft. Through 2000, this prospect began to make progress with the approval for the development of a NATO-Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps, a European Air Group, and further development of the Eurocorps (Taverna 2000). Through 2002-2003 this led to the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force..

The U.S. has also been concerned that this initiative could either distract from NATO efforts, or at the very least cause some unnecessary duplication of effort between NATO and the EDI. To date, though the European initiative seems to be designed to be able to sustain heavy peace-making operations and humanitarian interventions, it is not certain when or how it would be coordinated with NATO operations. Likewise, the degree of the gap between U.S. and EU capabilities has been challenged, especially by the French (Sparaco 2000), while some planners suggest that a refocusing of European defence spending, leading to a leaner, more heavily armed force with greater power project, can be done without a large increase in the overall budget. On this basis, the EU would be able to engage in more robust burden sharing with the U.S., especially in regional security issues (see Kupchan 2000) for the wider European setting. From 1999, Washington engaged NATO in a wider dialogue of areas of concern: -

One new proposal is the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) could be extended into the ongoing dialogue with the Mediterranean via the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which currently involves regular liaison between the EU with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the Palestinian Authority, plus future members Cyprus and Malta, using a 'comprehensive and cooperative approach' to reduce instability and security threats from the region (Biscop 2003, pp184-186). The aim would be to move from current trade and development issues onto arms control, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and anti-terrorism policies (Biscop 2003, p187). No such 'security community' (Biscop 2003, p187) is likely to emerge in the short to medium term, but the agenda indicates a serious effort to extend the influence of shared security policies.

Distinct from the above arms control agreements, the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) has addressed a wide range of diplomatic and political issues that will lead to a more stable, democratic wider Europe. The Helsinki process from 1973-1975 included of a number of provisions concerning 'human, social and political rights'. The acceptance by 35 nations of these principles was important for the future of Europe. Various principles from the Helsinki dialogue became embedded in law in Eastern Europe, and influenced political groups such as Solidarity (in Poland) and Charter 77 (in the former state of Czechoslovakia) in their demands for political reform.

From 1990 the CSCE (based on regular conferences) began its path to becoming a more permanent institution, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the OSCE (see further Flynn & Farrell 1999). Provision was made for regular meetings, and there was general acknowledgment that the previous problems and the east-west divide had been caused by a failure to communicate. The OSCE has established its current operations on the following principles: 'the need to strengthen its ties with the United Nations (the OSCE is already recognised as a regional arrangement under Chapter VI of its Charter), to create a common European security space, to improve the organisation's operational capabilities, and to establish a comprehensive and democratic European security model' (Strategic Comments 1996). It has yet to fully achieve these goals, though it has been involved in preventive diplomacy, monitoring elections, and peace-dialogue in the Balkans and Caucasus (for efforts to improve its effectiveness, see Aliriza 1999). Part of its agenda is based on the idea of shared European democratic norms and confidence building measures that would help form the part a wider basis for regional cooperation (Flynn & Farrell 1999)

The OSCE's 55 nation grouping is a diplomatic community not equipped for making rapid decisions. As a result, from May 1992 NATO committed itself to supporting peacekeeping operations, and has agreed to support either UN Security Council mandates or OSCE agendas. However, NATO does not now always rely on UN Security Council Mandates or OSCE agenda before taking action, leading to some further divisions between the diplomatic processes of the OSCE and the intervention processes of NATO (Antonenko 1999, p124).

Currently, the agenda for NATO is not focused just on Western Europe, but on the use of NATO beyond merely territorial defence, i.e. out of area operations and building cooperation into a wider European zone. These include programs that allow other nations to cooperate with NATO forces in peace-keeping operations. Washington's initiatives included the Partnership for Peace proposal (PfP) from January 1994. Designed to avoid Russian hostility to full membership of NATO by the East European states, the PFP offered military cooperation in areas such as peacekeeping, transparency and dispute resolution. The partners trained and exercised together, and with others, and subsequently even undertook joint missions as in PFP involvement in the Bosnia IFOR force during 1995-1996. The PFP is not a true alliance system: membership does not provide a security guarantee, as does membership in NATO. However, Russia had correctly feared that active involvement in the PFP might be a stepping stone towards full entry into NATO. In fact this has proven to be the case, with major PFP players like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic lining up for prospective NATO membership, a process begun in 1997 and resulting in full membership in NATO in 1999.

Russia still remains cautious about security relations with the European system. Their views have not been given full weight across a whole wide range of issues from Bosnia and Kosovo to arms control. In part, of course, this was due to some extent to confusions within Russian foreign policy, which in particular did not develop a consistent approach to the Kosovo until much too late to enforce serious dialogue (see Levitin 2000). Russia has also been disturbed that NATO has refused to acknowledge its need to station more troops and equipment in the troubled regions of the Chechnya on its southern flank. To do this would have meant breaching the 1990 treaty on conventional forces in Europe (CFE). This problem was dealt with by a compromise reached in the CFE Review Conference in May 1996, allowing Russia higher levels of forces in these areas, with compliance being reached by 1999 (Strategic Comments 1997). There are also continuing tensions over the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, and about prospective U.S. deployment of some kind if missile shield, first for the U.S., and initially proposed for Western Europe (Pierre 2001). European nations such as France and Germany have also been cautious about such a missile shield, and at the very least expect full consultation on the development of such a system (see further below).

Through the late 1990s it was felt in Russia that if former Warsaw Pact countries (like Poland) were admitted to full membership of NATO, given the security guarantee that implies, this would entail the creation of a hostile western grouping abutting on the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) borders. In effect, the buffer zone of a controlled and allied Warsaw Pact would be replaced with borders onto a hostile and militarily advanced NATO grouping. This would simply shift the border between two potentially hostile blocks from Germany to the Polish-Belarus border. When the Baltic states (expected through 2004) and if Ukraine (not yet accepted) also enter NATO, or indirectly become part of the Western alliance, this would result in a nightmare for Russian military planners. It is possible to speak of a new 'Golden Curtain' that divides Europe between those in the EU/NATO circles, and those excluded from membership in these prestige organisations (see World Affairs 2002a).

NATO through 1996-1999 expanded eastwards, now including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, with more states gradually converging on the standard for NATO entry. As of 2002, ten countries in Eastern and Central Europe lined up for possible membership (including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). In July 2002 this group issued a collective declaration pledging ongoing military and social reform, asking for membership in the short term (People's Daily 2002). The issue received attention at the November 2002 NATO meeting in Prague. As of July 2002, NATO suggested that new members invited for membership in late 2002 should all come in at once, rather than one-by-one (Purdum 2002). By March 2003 the 'Foreign ministers of Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia' signed NATO membership accords and were set to join the organisation in 2004 (BBC 2003).

Russia, though strongly cautious of the expansion of NATO, may in fact have been trying to gain the best bargaining position over these issues, e.g. the absence of NATO nuclear weapons in these new states, and has gained positive treaty relations with NATO, updated in mid-2002 to include a 19+1 Council in which Russia has strong dialogue with NATO and its policies, but cannot veto NATO actions, nor is covered in defensive security arrangements. Behind this process stands special U.S.-Russia and EU-Russia relationships that might affect to some degree the cohesion of NATO decision-making (see Dean 2002). This was made possible, in large measure, through Russian cooperation in the 'war on terror', and through improved U.S.-Russian relation developed from early 2002. As we have seen, earlier tensions were in part defused through 2002-2003 through the creation of the consultative NATO-Russia Council, the NRC. These new arrangements have been hailed as 'the funeral of the cold war' which Jack Straw (the British foreign secretary) claimed is not 'kaput' (Purdum 2002). It gives Russia a stronger but still limited voice in European security arrangements: -

This replaces the earlier consultation process in which Russia had dialogue with NATO, but only after NATO members had reached a unified, coordinated position (Purdum 2002).

Russia was not so deeply concerned about Poland or Czech membership in NATO, but was about a second tier of states entering, especially the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). In the past, events in the Baltic States have had a large impact on Europe. The Baltic states are part of a corridor linking Russia to the Russian military enclave of Kaliningrad, then on to Poland and Germany. The Baltic states also border the strategic region of St. Petersburg and the Russian access to the Baltic Sea. As we saw earlier on, tensions in the Baltic States and their desire for independence were one of the levers which helped result in the breakup of the USSR. This means that as NATO expands eastwards, the issue of Baltic affairs will need to be carefully monitored - hence, NATO's 'pre-accession strategy' will need to deal with the problems that the expansion of NATO might bring to the region (Asmus & Nurick 1996, p121). This would certainly be the case if states strategically located against Russia's borders and naval access routes were to come too close to NATO (see Dannreuther 1999). Baltic States since their independence have looked to the West to help them cope with their security dilemma in relation to Russia, and in 2001 President Bush signalled that the eventual membership of these small states within NATO should be allowed (for Latvia's wish to join NATO, see Vike-Freiberga 2001). Through 2001, Ukraine maintained non-aggression treaties with Russia and NATO, but only developed indirect patterns of cooperation with Western Europe, via some peace-keeping training with Poland. This began to change through mid-2002: following the Russian change in policy through 2001-2003, Ukraine may seek greater cooperation with NATO in future. The fact that Russia now accept the entry of the Baltic states into NATO shows how radically the security landscape has changed, with Russia now in many ways has presented itself a strategic partner rather than competitor with Europe.

Yet there are some ongoing concerns for the Baltic States that should be noted in relation to any future possible tensions with Russia: -

For maps of the Baltic States, go to the PCL Map Library at

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe.html#G

In the last decade, the Baltic states have been cooperating on defence and military issues with European states including Denmark (Asmus & Nurick 1996, p128, p132). The possibility of greater security cooperation with states such as Finland and Sweden is also a possibility.

We can see the complexity in the expansion of NATO in another case: the Ukraine. The Ukraine declared itself an independent state, breaking away from the Soviet Union, in December 1991. Since that time, the Ukraine has had to cope with tendencies to join European institutions, and a need to balance its relations with Russia. It must be remembered that most of Ukraine's energy supplies come from Russia, that Ukraine has a 22% Russian minority (especially in the East and in the Crimea), and that until May 1997 disputes existed with Russia over the control of the Black Sea Fleet and the port of Sevastopol, and that the Ukraine has territorial disputes with Rumania. To add to this, the Ukrainian economy was still not strong, and the country has yet to deal with the disastrous legacy of the Chernobyl reactor melt-down. Ukraine's relations with the West are now only improving, since the Ukraine used its possession of nuclear weapons as a leverage tool to force aid from the West, and to ensure that the West support them in negotiations with Russia. After gaining aid from the U.S., and after some improvements in relations with Russia, Ukraine ratified the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START I) in February 1996, and in November 1994 signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Larrabee 1994, p144). The Ukraine has also tried to improve relations with Poland, with whom it signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in May 1992 (Larrabee 1996, p157). Likewise, a joint Polish-Ukraine peace-keeping battalion was planned in October 1995, with their headquarters in Przemysl (Larrabee 1996, p157). Ukraine has already begun such cooperation through PFP joint exercises, mainly in peacekeeping training, through 1994-5 (Larrabee 1996, p148). It must be stressed that any proposed relationship between the Ukraine and NATO does not include Article 5 of the NATO treaties, i.e. the requirement for mutual and collective defence. Ukraine has also entered into 'most-favoured nation status' with the EU, and by 1998 may enter a free trade zone agreement (Larrabee 1996, p153), though full EU membership seems remote at this stage. Part of the problem is that many likely Ukrainian exports are listed as sensitive within the EU schema: e.g. steel, chemicals, textiles and agricultural products (Larrabee 1996, p153). The European state with the most interest in the Ukraine to date has been Germany, which has pursued a balanced relationship between its relationship with the Ukraine and Russia (Larrabee 1996, p155). In particular, Ukraine would find it dangerous to become a buffer between the West and Russia, but would find membership in the EU productive (Straits Times 1996), and in 2002 has sought a more cooperative relationship with NATO, though its request to join NATO has not been accepted as of 2003. Ukraine generally has argued for a slow evolutionary advance of NATO, and not for a fast expansions which turns Ukraine into a buffer state in a new 'Cold Peace', a term used by former President Yeltsin to describe tensions with NATO in 1994 (Larrabee 1996, p145; Antonenko 1999, p127). This indicates how carefully the expansion of the NATO has to be negotiated, if it is to increase rather than decrease European security as a whole. In particular, any drift back to competitive spheres of interest dividing Central Europe must be avoided (Voigt 1996).

It must also be remembered that certain conditions are required for prospective membership of NATO, including a certain level of democracy, maintenance of human rights, a market economy, and no serious outstanding border or minority problems, and democratic control of the armed forces (Voigt 1996). It also should be a net contributor or resources, rather than a drain on NATO, and needs to move towards military reform and interoperability with alliance forces (World Affairs 2002b). NATO must also cooperate with the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council, comprising NATO plus the former Warsaw Pact countries) to ensure that a wider sense of European security, both in the west and the east, begins to evolve. Within Eastern Europe itself, surveys suggest that popular support for membership in the EU rides at around the 50-70% level, while support for NATO membership runs at around 30-40%, based on concerns over the costs involved, and the more assertive stance of the alliance from 1999 (World Affairs 2002b). However, political elites in most of the region see clear benefits in NATO membership (World Affairs 2002b). In 2002-2003, NATO seems set to expand its membership, at the same time as the European Security and Defence Policy begins to form a process of policy formation.

To date, we have seen that the prevention of nuclear or conventional war remains a major part of the efforts of nations and international organisations in the new Europe. However, there has been a recent trend to broaden defence issues not only to more general security issues, but to argue that any real sense of security must include economic, cultural and environment factors. Security also includes reasonable access to and a level of control over the economic means which are the bases of national and citizen welfare. In general terms, 'comprehensive security' (a term central to the OSCE agenda) should not equate simply with defence policy; nor can it exclude most of the issues associated with foreign policy and economic planning. In many ways, the entire movement towards the European Union has deepened cooperation within Europe and lessened the likely of intense forms of destructive national competition. Likewise, the fact that the states of Western Europe have adopted democratic political systems also lessens the likelihood of war (on the 'democratic peace' principle that democracies don't usually go to war with each other). It is on this basis, of course, that prospective EU and NATO members are expected to have democratic political systems, and not to be engaged in conflict with other states while going through the accession process. In part, this is a redefinition of the nature of national power. Political realists often seek to reduce a wide range of national interests and policies down to the main aim of survival and power augmentation. In recent years, there has been the growing recognition that 'security' is too important an issue to be left at debates on 'defence', and that insufficient attention has been given to developing a body of thought, theory and doctrine at the wider security level (Mack 1986, p31). Here, there has been a shift to considering human security and not just national security as a primary focus. Human security comprises one central component alongside state and regional security in a wider comprehensive framework. The somewhat elusive concept of human security has been given prominence recently through the leadership of Norway, Canada and the UNDP, as well as the participation of a number of other nations (including Thailand), the UNHCR and a number of NGOs at major conferences on this issue (Vollebaek 1999; Axworthy 1999; Suhrke 1999).

We see some of these trends in major concerns within contemporary Europe. They include: -

This list of indicators suggests that military security is not enough to ensure a peaceful and prosperous Europe. To even approximate such goals, economic, political and cultural methods for resolving conflict, reducing great gaps in wealth levels (especially in transition economies), and meeting growing expectations will need to be developed and effectively implemented. Hence Europe's economic and political development remains just as important as its new military arrangements. However, the military dimension and the issue of peace-making cannot be ignored. This is especially important in the recent turbulence in the Balkans, and former Yugoslavia in particular, on the doorstep of Western Europe (as well shall see in lecture 10). Europe needs to ensure the sense of human and community security at a deeper and more sustained level, which is crucial in stabilising Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the adjacent Mediterranean region.

BBC "NATO Timeline", May 2003 [Internet Access via http://news.bbc.co.uk/]

European Report "Inter-Governmental Conference: Presidency Moderates its Ambitions on Qualified Majority Voting", 8 November 2000 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]

GUTMANIS, Armands "The New Europe, Old Frontiers: The Baltic States, Russia and the EU", The Center for Security and International Studies, 24 January 2001 [Internet Access at http://www.csis.org/ruseura/cs010124gutmanis.htm]

PIERRE, Andrew "Europe and Missile Defense: Tactical Considerations, Fundamental Concerns", Arms Control Today, May 2001 [Internet Access at www.armscontrol.org/ACT/May2001/pierre.html]

VOLLEBAEK, Knut "Perspective on Human Security: Chairman's Summary", Human Security Conference, Lysoen, Norway, 20 May 1999 [Internet Access at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignnp/HumanSecurity/lysoen-e.htm]