Lecture 1:

Eurasia: Super-region or Zone of Conflict?

Topics: -
1) Introduction: Not Yet the ‘New Silk Road’
2) The New Nexus: Contemporary Asian-European Relations
3) A Reborn Eurasian Power? The Russian Legacy
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1. Introduction: Not Yet the ‘New Silk Road’

One of the problems for the study of international relations is how to study and account for change. Looking at one country limits the ability to understand international developments. Furthermore, the way you break up parts of the world will greatly affect your interpretation of history and contemporary events. One ‘super-region’ that is not often studied as a unit is Eurasia, geographically comprising the interaction of Europe, Russia, Central Asia and the Far East. Furthermore, this wider region has gone through dynamic political and economic changes that effect global politics and adjacent regions. If not yet an integrated super-region, it has been suggested that Eurasia is new 'convergence zone' where the interests of a number of great and medium powers are interacting, in part cooperatively, and in part competitively (Cohen 2005; see further below). From this perspective, ‘greater' Central Asia now has begun to cooperate enough to be 'the hub of economic integration of the super-continent of Eurasia, home to the most rapidly growing economies of the globe' (Linn 2007).

We can speak of Eurasia in widest sense of the interaction of this entire zone, ranging from Europe to Japan, and also of two other regions, Central Asia (including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan (the Kyrgyz Republic), and Afghanistan (sometimes Afghanistan is regarded as part of South Asia: in fact is sits astride linkage points to several areas), and the Caucasus region which links the Caspian and Black Sea areas, including Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, as well as influencing parts of Iran, Turkey and South Russia (see map below). A new term has begun to emerge in the literature: Greater Central Asia, suggesting the Central Asian states have a strong interaction with adjacent areas in Mongolia, Tibet, Western China and Pakistan. This term has become more important as Afghanistan struggles to complete economic and democratic reconstruction, with renewed security concerns emerging from early 2006 and leading to a major Taliban offensive running through much of 2007. In general, it can be argued that southern Afghanistan has become more dangerous than 2006, in spite of increased NATO operations in the country, in part due to ongoing turbulence in nearby Pakistan.
These new regional linkages will be fundamental for the 21st century. These include:

A) The spread of European economic, political and strategic concerns eastward, and even via diplomatic institutions such as the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to begin to take in issues affecting the Caucasus and Central Asia, including issues of democratisation, media freedom, migration management, the environment, and comprehensive security. Likewise, from 1997 both the European Union and NATO (North Atlantic treaty Organisation) have expanded to include selected countries in Eastern Europe¹ and have begun deeper economic and diplomatic interaction with the Black Sea, Caucasus and Central Asian Region. NATO has begun to build more cooperative links with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Georgia, and has become involved in peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan through 2003-2008. More generally, the OSCE has also begun to take an interest in Eurasia’s stability as a whole, with recent debates between the US and Russia emerging as to whether the organisation should focus on democratic deficits in the region, on controlling problematic transnational flows (illicit arms, international terrorism) across the region (Weitz 2007). Countries such as Georgia and Ukraine are seen as potential NATO members, or at least might build high levels of cooperation with NATO and the U.S., an issue which remains of concern to Russia and China. The EU in turn has been worried about stabilising energy supplies across the Caspian-Caucasus-Black-Sea and Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus zones, and hopefully stabilising economic and political development in the region. This has emerged as a major problem through 2006-2008 with Gazprom seeking to increase ownership or contractual access to key companies and resources in Belarus and Turkmenistan, as

¹NATO first moved to include Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, followed by invitations to join for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, with accession protocols being ratified and signed for this last group through March 2003-May 2004 (NATO 2002).
well as engaging in limited swap deals into other national supply companies (see Bordonaro 2007). Likewise, the EU remains concerned over major environment problems in Ukraine, Russia, the Black Sea region and Central Asia.

B) With the break-up of the Soviet Union, 15 newly independent states emerged including Russia. Five of these new states comprise Central Asia. Though still partly dependent on Russian trade and transit routes, they are keen to develop new trading partners, including China, South Korea and Japan, as well the EU and the US and potentially South Asia (if Afghanistan remains stable). They have also begun some level of involvement in new regional organisations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation process (part of a process from June 1992 but upgraded to a formal organisation in 1998) and the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO). The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) group has eleven members, (Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece), and are 'seeking to create a market of 350 million people and to develop mutually advantageous co-operation' including the long term goal of 'greater democracy, peace and development' (Nash 2003). Though a slow process, the BSEC summit process has been useful in improving local dialogue, e.g. between Turkey and Armenia through 2002 (Gorvett 2002). The ECO links Central Asia to Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Azerbaijan in a cooperative arrangement which sought to improve trade, investment, travel and communication links, with 2007 discussions on energy infrastructure, regional transport, and a proposed free trade area of 2015 (Linn 2007; Yasmeen 1995). The strength of these regional forums is yet to be fully developed: the ECO in particular does not have strong economic complementarities, and was plagued by competition between Turkey, Iran and Pakistan for influence in Central Asia, and found the turmoil in Tajikistan and Afghanistan particularly disturbing (Yasmeen 1995; for the limits and potential of the ECO, see further Bahace & Saremi 2002). Yet such organisations are beginning to develop common banks, shipping companies, airlines, simplified visa and trade arrangements, and agreements to reduce drug traffic (Yasmeen 1995) and promote controlled tourism along the 'old Silk Road'. Likewise, a more recent dialogue group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has begun to develop diplomatic and security ties among Russia, China and Central Asia states, and is now seen as a key player in Eurasian security and energy agenda (see Runmer 2006). Russia has also sought to build new security and economic organisations (such as the Eurasian Economic Union) to replace the older, loose framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS (to be discussed later in the subject). The Central Asia Cooperation Organization (CACO) in was formed 2002, with Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan as members. Russia joined in October 2004, perhaps to retain leverage on energy resources, though President Putin hoped CACO would aid Russia’s ‘practical ability to counteract such threats as religious extremism and drug trafficking,’ (Xinhua 2004a) Proposals (through 2000-2003) were also made for a Eurasian Economic Community, but have not been fully developed. Loose organisations as GUUAM (formed in 1996 by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova, joined by Uzbekistan in 1997) are more concerned with resisting Russian dominance, but have managed to cooperate in a number of areas (Lieven 2000). However, GUUAM seem to have been in large measure out-maneuverd by Russian economic policies, and Russian efforts rebuilt its influence through new security and economic organisations, e.g. via the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, CSTO (see further next week). Another important activity grouping that has emerged since 2001 is the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program (CAREC), which has become very active in 2007:

. . . November 3, 2007, CAREC held its 6th annual Ministerial Conference in Dushanbe. CAREC’s membership encompasses Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as six multilateral institutions (Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Monetary Fund, Islamic Development Bank, United Nations Development Program and the World Bank). CAREC is focused on economic cooperation among its participants in the areas of transport, trade and energy. At the November meeting ministers approved a transport and trade facilitation strategy which foresees investments to improve transport and trade along six priority corridors linking countries within the region as well as with the rest of Eurasia. The strategy has identified more than 100 investment and technical assistance activities totaling about $20 billion over the next ten years. Ministers further reviewed progress with the preparation of a CAREC energy strategy and approved the setting up of a CAREC Institute to support training, research and outreach activities on regional cooperation and integration. Ministers also supported increased cooperation with other regional organizations (especially EurasEC and SCO) and with other development partners.

(Linn 2007)

C) There is some prospect of some kind of wider Eurasian Cooperative process incorporating Central Asian States, Russia, some European nations, and perhaps in the future, some Asia Nations (thereby reaching out beyond the very loose diplomatic grouping of the Commonwealth of Independent States, CIS). This would potentially be one of the largest international organisations, and also offer a mechanism for reducing numerous regional tensions as well as helping promote cooperative development. The idea had been strongly supported by Kazakhstan and Russia during the early 1990s, but has been critically viewed by other nations. The Eurasian Union’s strongest promoter had been Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, who strongly urged the formation of such a union from 1994 in order to form a common citizenship, and to allow greater freedom of movement and economic development in the region, as well as to provide a forum for security issues (Portnikov 1994; Mursaliyev 1994). In July 1994 Nazarbayev submitted his Eurasian Union plan to the UN (BBC 1994a), while in early 1995, there were even hopes that a Eurasian Summit of leaders could be arranged to begin a process towards the formation of this Union. Strong opposition to the idea of a Eurasian Union also developed. The President Karimov of Uzbekistan had repeatedly rejected the idea of a Eurasian Union (BBC 1995), because it represented too strong an alignment of Russian and Kazakh interests in the region. Some would argue that the OSCE should take a stronger role in ensuring a stable Eurasian region, while Zbigniew Brzezinski has argued that a standing committee of the US and major Eurasian powers could be the core of a new framework for peace (Brzezinski 1997; Weitz 2007). Other have seen either the SCO or NATO networks taking on a wider role that would reach across more of the region, and projecting either Chinese or Western influence (see Rumer 2006). At present, a smaller Eurasian core, based on the Eurasian Economic Community (EurasEC), has begun some of this integrative process through 2007:

On October 6, 2007, the heads of state of EurasEC met in Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan. Encompassing Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, EurasEC aims to create an integrated economic space from Minsk to Dushanbe. The October summit decided on setting up a customs union and signed
documents establishing the relevant legal foundation. As currently envisaged, the customs union will initially encompass Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, to be followed eventually by the other members of the group. The past track record of EurasEC and its precursor organizations justifies skepticism about the prospects for an early implementation of this decision. But the rapid start-up of the Eurasian Development Bank – created by Russia and Kazakhstan in January 2006, with a subscribed capital of $1.5 billion and a mandate to lend for infrastructure and private sector development in Central Asia – adds a new dimension to the instruments which EurasEC has at its disposal to support the development and integration of its member states. (Linn 2007)

D) The potential for economic trade flows to develop a 'Greater Central Asia' zone, linking much of central Asia, as well as Xinjiang (a region of China), Mongolia, Tibet and Siberia into booming economies of north-east Asia. Already, in Eurasia the fastest growth through the late 1990s had been between Russia and China, with China already deeply involved in energy investments and technology development in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In recent years China has made a concerted effort to influence the politics of Central Asia as well as gain future leverage on its energy resources, as well as develop its own Western regions (see Umarov 2005). Greater complementarities are likely to develop among these economies on the basis of trade in oil, gas, 'consumer goods, and agricultural materials' (Spechler 2003; see further Spector 2001). India, likewise, has revitalised some its trade flows with Russia (including major arms deals), has expressed interest in mechanism for the delivery of gas from Turkmenistan, has begun pipelines contracts for major energy deliveries from Iran via Pakistan (in spite of security concerns), and has also begun building cooperative relations with Tajikistan (Cohen 2005). In turn, a new Central Asia South Asia Regional Electricity Market (CASAREM), seeking to route hydro-electric power from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to Afghanistan and Pakistan, with support from a number of international partners including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the U.S. (Linn 2007).

Considerable Japanese investment, aid and trade developed through the 1990s in Mongolia and Central Asia (see Hutchings 1999). As of 1995, Japan had pledged some US$6 billion in 'bilateral assistance' to the Newly Independent States (NIS) of the region, partly linked to promoting regional stability and movement towards market-based democratic political systems. Japan has also pledged aid to help dismantle nuclear weapons, is developing a Japan-centre in Kyrgyzstan, as well as trade-development loans (Yamamoto 1995). By 1999, Japan began to see the prospect of a 'super-continent' emerging in the Eurasia of the future, and promoted 'diplomacy with Russia, China and South Korea and Central Asian and Caucasian countries that compose the Eurasian continent.' (Masahiko 1999; Hickok 2000). Some see this as a 'hedging strategy' in contrast to continued engagement with the U.S. and Asia-Pacific trade flows. Japan has moved forward on major energy deals signed with Russia through 2005-2007 for Siberian energy resources. In the long term, Japan also has interest in greater access to Russia and Central Asia energy resources, either directly, or in cooperation with China. South Korea has been also been involved in selective investment and industrial development within Central Asia and Siberia (as well as Eastern Europe, e.g. in the Czech Republic).

It is this 'greater' Asia integration, as well as the creation of new NETs (Natural Economic Territories) which suggests that in the long term the rapid
development of the coastal economies of Northeast Asia may be paralleled by substantial (but slower) inland development from the east in towards greater Central Asia. Emerging NETS are to be found linking Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and inland Chinese provinces such as Xinjiang. China in particular has made major investments in Kazakhstan's energy sector, preparing for a time in the future when Central Asian gas and oil will be piped into western China, with a pipelines from eastern Kazakh fields already being developed (see Cohen 2005; Melmet 1998; Spector 2001; discussed further in lecture 3). In such a process, Central Asia may become an important hub in the global economy:

. . . Central Asia lies at the core of the Eurasian super-continent, the most dynamic part of today's global economy. Surrounded by rapidly growing China, India and Russia, Central Asia is a potential transit hub for the rapidly expanding transcontinental Eurasian trade and capital flows. Moreover it is the repository of large energy and mineral resources and home to a large and well educated population – 60 million people in the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia, or 123 million, if one adds Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and Xinjian Uyghur Autonomous Region of China to encompass the natural geographic boundaries of today's Central Asia. (Linn 2007)

E) Elsewhere, there has been considerable stabilisation along old frontiers. Talks between Russia, China, and several Central Asian states during 1994-1996 greatly facilitated trade in the region, and resulted in greatly de-militarised borders between Russia and China. Through 1998-2001 China and Russia deepened their strategic partnership, to some degree trying to counterbalance the global power of the U.S. and American-led coalitions such as NATO, but more importantly to stabilize their own relations (see Weitz 2003 for limitations in the China-Russia relationship, which is not a formal alliance). This process of border stabilisation also helped the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization by delimiting and recognising then existing borders across the eastern part of Central Asia. Another important transport project planned is the Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia Transport Corridor project which aims to upgrade highway, rail and maritime transport routes across 13 countries in the Caucasus, Black Sea and Central Asian regions and complements existing east-west links through Russia and Iran (Jones 1999). Through 2005-2006 the EU has also been concerned to improve relations among Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan to allow this project to progress further, having spent about euro 1 billion in grants to the area over past decade and Tacis, its technical assistance programme, has helped to make the Europe-Caucasus-central Asia transport corridor, Traceca, a reality and enable the Caucasians to manage oil and gas transport. (European Report 2005).

UNDP and Asian Development Bank estimates suggest that improved trade and transport infrastructure (beyond pipelines) could double GDP for poorer countries across the region (Linn 2007).

E) These trends also correlate with a desire by the leadership of the China (PRC - People's Republic of China) to begin greater inland and western development and investment in order to slow down the overheated coastal economies (and the associated problems of 'cultural pollution', drugs, 'gangsterism' etc.). China has in fact been playing a master game of diplomacy in Eurasia, drawing closer both to Russia and the states of Central Asia, while retaining an iron grip on Tibet. In the long run, considerable amounts of Central Asian resources might find themselves diverted eastwards, as Japanese, Korean and Chinese economic influence becomes stronger (contra Jaffe & Manning 1998). China has reached considerable accord
with Russia on these issues, and has begun to extend considerable influence on
countries such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as through the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (see Eurasia Insight 2001a & 2001b; Gill & Oresman
2003; Cohen 2005). This trends, however, were somewhat limited by the strategic
move of the U.S. and its allies into Central Asia, particularly with Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan through late 2001 and 2002 in support of operations in Afghanistan
(see below). These factors have been to change again through 2005-2008 with
increased exposure of Uzbekistan's poor human rights record, and some tilting
towards Russia to avoid political pressure on this issue. With renewed European,
U.S. and Russian strategies in the region, it remains to be seen if China can sustain
its strong influence on Central Asia through 2005-2008. It has been suggested that
cooperative rather competitive strategies might be used to reduce the possible
rise of China as a new regional hegemon. Thus Eugene Rumer suggests that the
US engage in cooperative ventures with the SCO to reduce the organization's
impact on U.S. influence (see Rumer 2007; Rumer 2006). Likewise, it is possible
that covert competition between Russia and China may mean that they have
different long-term views of regional development, and different views of how
different organisations should operate.

F) Some writers have suggested that these trends have resulted in the formation of
a 'new Silk Road', in some ways following the ancient trade routes that linked
China with Central Asia and Europe. Thus the different European transport,
Chinese energy and UNESCO cultural projects are sometimes spoken as 'new silk
roads'. Just as in the ancient Silk Road (flourishing in its main phase from the
second century B.C. down to the 10th century), then opening of trade has also
allowed peoples, ideas, religions and cultures to flow across Eurasia (Boulnois
2004; Franck & Brownstone 1986). Any new 'Silk Road', however, is only now
being developed, is greatly deficient in most forms of infrastructure, and also
brings with it real social and security problems (discussed from different
angles in later lectures). The EU, Central Asian states, and China (see Xinhua
2003a) have used this metaphor of a modern 'Silk Road', hoping that resources,
manufactured goods, and services to flow along improved east-west infrastructure.
However, as we shall see, these routes can also be conduits for transnational
threats: organised crime, drug and illegal arms flows, illegal migration,
international terrorism as well renewed forms of national competition. Thus from
the late 1990s the US recognised via the Silk Road Strategy Act that US interests in
the region, including access to energy resources to diversify dependence away from
the Persian Gulf, might be compromised if the region became too unstable, or
subject to too much control from 'regional hegemonic powers' such as Russia or
Iran (Leech 2006, pp55-56; see further Rumer 2007).

G) The U.S.-lead intervention in Afghanistan has changed the geopolitics of
the entire region. It has begun to force new relationships linking the U.S. with
Russian, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while placing new pressures on Pakistan and
China. The prospect of rebuilding Afghanistan as a viable and stable state is one of
the most challenging and promising prospects for all of Eurasia, but this has not be
an easy task. Afghanistan, in spite of some slow moves towards stability, has
suffered from attempted political assassinations, e.g. foiled attempts against the
President and government ministers from 2002, efforts by the Taliban to re-
establish themselves, local warlordism and smuggling, a slow building up of
infrastructure with only small amounts of aid actually having arrived in the ravaged
country, problems of competition for influence by neighbouring countries (Rashid 2003b; Rashid 2003a), the slow progress in building up a truly unified, non-partisan army, and concerns that a true democracy will not readily emerge, in spite of relatively successful elections in late 2004 with Hamid Karzai being confirmed as president in December 2004 (discussed further in lecture 10). Different influences from Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia are beginning to emerge, though in December 2002 'dignitaries from China, Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan signed the Kabul Declaration, pledging to never again meddle in the affairs of the ravaged country' (thereby avoid the 'new great game' syndrome, see Rashid 2003b). Likewise, the changing balance of power in Central Asia, with increased U.S. and European influence in the region, has sparked concerns both within Russia and China about their future place within Eurasia, with Russia in particular concerned to see U.S. military influence excluded (Nicoll 2007; Torbakov 2002). With the U.S. intervention in Iraq, there are also potential spillover effects on Iran, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan and Afghanistan as various groups observe difficulties in moving towards political and security stabilisation.

In this subject we will start from the Russian focus in week 2 (simply because this provides the easiest way educationally), then move east through Central Asia, look at Siberia, energy politics, China-Russian relations, and then focus on regional interactions and on Asia-Europe relationships (see Timetable in Subject Introduction). This 'eastern nexus' will be explored further below and in later lectures. No prior knowledge is expected in the subject, and core information will be provided in handouts. This information will be gone over in lectures, seminars, class exercises, and video-presentations, gradually adding to your familiarity with the region over the length of the subject.

An overview of the lectures as found in the Subject Introduction: -

Week 1: Theme - Europe, Asia and Eurasia
   Lecture: Eurasia - Super-Region or Zone of Conflict?

Week 2: Theme - Russian and Soviet Influence
   Lecture: From Russian Empire to Eurasian Power

Week 3: Theme - Development and Nation-building in Central Asia
   Lecture: Kazakhstan - From Exploitation to Nationhood in Central Asia

Week 4: Theme - Nationalism and Conflict
   Lecture: An Arc of Instability? - Security Dilemmas in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan

Week 5: Theme - Russian-Chinese Relations (Guest lecturer)
   Lecture: Russia-China Relations: The Bear and the Dragon

Week 6: Theme - Democracy and Transition
   Lecture: Democratic Revolutions with Mixed Outcomes: the Ukraine and its Future

Week 7: Theme - Siberia, Japanese-Russian, Korean-Russian Relations
2. The New Nexus: Contemporary Asian-European Relations

In the remote past Europe and the 'Far East' traded and influenced each other for some four thousand years along the long path of the Silk Road (Boulnois 2004; Franck & Brownstone 1986), via a separate route (the ‘Sable Road’) along the steppes of southern Russia (especially during the domination of the Mongol Hoards after the 13th century), and then via extended naval routes. From the 16th century onwards growing European naval power brought Portuguese, Spanish, French, and British colonialism to much of Asia. Here the meeting of East and West was conditioned within the context of imperial competition and global geopolitics (the so-called ‘great game’).

This colonial age had an enormous global impact including:

* The creation of a global industrial age, based on modernization, industrialization and urbanization.
* The creation of an emerging global economic system (replacing earlier major trade systems such as the Indo-Pacific and Silk-Road system which were almost a complete Eurasian network by the 13th century, and well developed between the 15 and 18th centuries, see Lieberman 1993 & Chaudhuri 1990).
* The promotion of the nation-state form of political organisation (verses kingdoms, tribal states, tribute systems, mandala systems etc.), used in modified form in much of Central Asia and with particular patterns of nationalism found in Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkey and China.
* The rapid growth of capitalism, modernism, and new patterns of transport and communication.

Traditional trade and culture routes were further fractured by the superpower contest between the U.S. and the USSR (1946-1987). A restructuring of these relations began when Soviet reforms from 1987-1992, the end of the Cold War, and dissolution of the USSR into 15 ‘newly independent states’. This has led to the opening up of old borders (east-west and north-south across Eurasia) but also to different power
balances emerging among major regional players (Russia, China, U.S., EU. Turkey, Iran etc.). Some see this as a new "Great Game' or power contest in the heart of Eurasia, others a genuine opening up of the region to reform and development. Likewise, new transnational issues such as organized crime, international terrorism, the drug trade, people smuggling, weapons proliferation, and environmental problems that have made management of the Eurasian heartland an important international issue. Transboundary effects have direct impact on adjacent regions including Europe, East Asia, the Middle East and South Asia, and on foreign policies directed towards the region (Ahrari 2003). In the worst caste scenario, these negative flows combined with competition among great powers might result in a fractured zone of conflict with ongoing crises that cannot be stabilised: i.e. a 'shatterbelt' in some way paralleling ongoing tensions across the Middle East (see Cohen 2005).

Likewise, the altered pattern has opened up greater patterns of trade and dialogue between Europe and East Asia. These concerns has been formalised in a series of Conferences between Asia and Europe (the ASEM meetings) from 1996-2008. Through 2002-2006, the ASEM meetings seem most concerned to ensure continued growth in the world economy and promote a stable financial environment, though also hoping to promote improved relations in Northeast Asia. The October 2004 ASEM was able to continue economic cooperation between the two regions, but was unable to reach strong consensus on formally criticizing the human rights situation in Myanmar (Burma), something which has been pressed for by European members, tensions which continued through late 2005 (UPI 2004a; European Report 2005). Through 2006 the EU softened this stance and allowed 'Burma junta's delegates to participate in the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) in September in Helsinki . . . The junta was singled out and severely criticized for its human rights records at the summit' (Thett 2006). From 2006, the ASEM process expanded to include Bulgaria, Romania, India, Mongolia, Pakistan and the ASEAN Secretariat, with the next ASEM Summit to occur in Beijing during 2008 (www.asem6.fi/).

Other regional problems remain outstanding, e.g., the only slow improvement of Japanese-Russian tensions over the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) dispute. From November 1997 leaders of both Japan and Russian had promised to resolve this dispute, with a peace treaty to be signed by the year 2000 (Jones 1997), but this has not yet emerged. Further meetings in 1998 also increased cooperation, but did not really resolve this dispute. Diplomacy between President Putin and Japanese leaders during 2000-2003 failed to chart a practical path forward on this issue (see further Okuyama 2003). A solution of the problem would make it even easier for Japan to invest in Siberia, and for regional economic cooperation among the Siberia, Manchuria and Mongolia areas to continue. In November 2004 another round of diplomacy was opened on this issue by the Russian Federation: -

Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the RF Sergey Lavrov suggested that two South Kurile Islands pass to Japan. In such a way we'll put an end to a half-century of territorial disputes. Mr.Lavrov said that Moscow consents to the Soviet-Japan declaration of 1956 (which supposes the transference of islands Shikotan and Khabomai to Japan) and is ready to fulfill its conditions if Japan signs a peace treaty. (A & G 2004).
Through 2005, however, this failed to form the basis of a new agreement. Instead, Russia and Japan have sought greater economic and energy cooperation through 2005-2007, partly bypassing the sovereignty dispute. However, tensions re-emerged with the Russian patrol boats firing on a Japanese vessel in August 2006, and with Russian claims that over 39 boats had been illegally fishing in Russian waters (Wolfe 2006). With Russia threatening to ban Japanese fishing in the southern Kurile Islands, Japan has sought to re-open negotiations from December 2007, but on the basis of returning smaller islands to Japanese sovereignty, a proposal that seems unlikely to break the deadlock (see Golovnin 2007). Japan, in general terms, has also continued to modernise and gradually normalise its military capabilities, though these concerns are more directed towards short-term problems with North Korea and the longer-term potential of PRC.

In the long run, we may see the emergence of a new balance among three regions, with a wider Europe, East Asia and North America leading major global trends. This can be viewed as a new, regional trilateralism. One key test for this cooperation will be the stability Eurasia and particularly the area of Greater Central Asia (see above), which at present is relatively fragile. Likewise, Russia's role in this system, both the EU and China, will be crucial factor.

3. A Reborn Eurasian Power? The Russian Legacy

Russia gained control of Siberia, Caucasus and Central Asia by the end of the 19th century. After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, for a short time the Russian leader Lenin attempted to reconcile Central Asian nationalities through promoting local leadership and reform. However, by 1928 Stalin enforced a strict control of the economy, crash industrialisation, farm collectivization and economic specialisation in Central Asia which lead to massive destruction of local economies (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p12). Similar policies were followed in Russia, Ukraine and a little more slowly in the Transcaucasian region, including Georgia and Armenia (Suny 1994).

During the Cold War period, the Soviet Union retained tight control of Central Asia, with strategic borders monitored against Turkey (a member of NATO), Iraq, Iran, via Afghanistan against Pakistan, and very long border with China (some of these issues will be explored in lectures 2 & 5). With the collapse of the Soviet Union by the start 1992, and the limited effectiveness of the following loose grouping of states called CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), Russia seemed for a time to have shrunk back to earlier borders which excluded most of her buffer states in the west, south and southeast. Note that Russia today remains a Federal State, but now with a smaller territory than the old USSR and surrounded by a group of new states with varying policies towards Russia (this is followed up in lectures 2 and 3). There have also been efforts to reform and standardise the federal system of Russia, a difficult and challenging task even for President Putin.

By the mid-1990s Russia seemed to be developing a somewhat more assertive strategy to ensure her future. This included the development of a special 'Near Abroad' policy, arguing that Russia needed to maintain stability in the former Soviet States,
and to have joint forces guarding external borders (i.e. the borders of what was the old Soviet Union). The latter was a controversial issue, but in the Caucasus and Central Asia some states bowed to Russian pressure on this point (Lepingwell 1994). Perhaps as a result, Russia was at first deeply suspicious of efforts to expand NATO membership into Eastern Europe (Mikoyan 1998), but this was moderated through a deepened understanding with NATO through 2002, with the NATO group engaging in regular dialogue with Russia in a special NATO-Russia Council, the NRC (Pfaff 2002). Here Russia had to take a gamble in supporting the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan in late 2001 (Antonenko 2001), but still needed to keep strong influence on the politics of the region (in part through moderated support for the 'Northern Alliance' in that country). More recently, Russia has been a major conduit for operations in Afghanistan, has been involved in the arming and training of the new army of Afghanistan (with special influence on Tajik elements). In general, Russia is seeking greater regional influence through 2003-2008, though using economic, energy and institutional engagement to do this (Rumer 2006; Rashid 2003a; Rashid 2003b), with stronger assertions leadership diplomacy through 2007-2008. However, it remains critical of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, especially since one central view of Russian foreign policy has been that the UN Security Council (where Russia has a veto) must not be sidelined. It has also been concerned about US engagement with states in Greater Central Asia, and Washington's strong support for political reform in states such as Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine. Russia has also been critical of US development of missile shield and defence systems, including proposed deployments of parts of this system into Poland and the Czech Republic, leading to Russian suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, threats to withdraw from the INF Treaty, and an emphasis on improved nuclear weapons and new missile within its arsenal (Bordonaro 2007b; Arbatov 2007). In large measure, these are indicators of Russia desire to be considered as a global and regional power.

Russia, in spite of tilting towards the EU in some areas of trade and diplomacy, seems to be partly retaining a Eurasian security policy which has global implications. There have been several phases of Russian policy in relation to Europe and Asia. From the time of Tsar Peter the Great (1682-1725) through the 19th century, there was a tension between those who looked to Europe for the development and future of Russia, i.e. 'Westernisers', verses the 'Slavophiles' who sought a more unique Russian destiny as a religious state almost able to take on the role of as a third Rome (after the collapse of Constantinople), i.e. a moral and religious leadership in Eurasia (Riasanovsky 1993, pp362-363; Figes 2002). In contrast to the Westernisers, other Russians also argued that their 'manifest destiny' lay in the east (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p28), with a conquering Russia creating a huge, Eurasian power linking the best of east and west. So-called 'pan-Slavic' viewpoints also helped justify Tsarist aggression against Turkey (1870s), power politics in the Balkans (which helped set the scene for World War I), as well as forming an aggressive posture in the Far East which led to a 'humiliating military defeat at the hands of Japan in 1904-1905' (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p31). Russia's crushing of the independence of Chechnya may also in part be driven by en effort to keep influence along its southern frontiers and in Central Asia.
During the 1980s and 1990s, one group of foreign policy advisers also promoted a Eurasian policy for Russia, arguing against excessive compliance to the West and dependence on the U.S. This could only be done by balancing interests in the 'European home' with Central Asia and East Asian sources of power (see MacFarlane 1993). James Burke has interpreted this so far as to suggest that the Soviet leader Gorbachev prior to 1992 hoped to develop a 'Eurasian Rimland policy', switching the Soviet Union over to economic and technological power while developing a Russia-India-China alignment of interests that could break the emerging US-China concordat and challenge Western dominance (Burke 1993). This alignment has partially re-emerged, this time on the basis of Russian efforts to improve their relationship with China through their current 'strategic partnership' (established through 1994-1998), and via their influence on Central Asia as a whole through the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation and

Historically, Russia had used the more assertive approach of allowing Russian military units, formally or informally, to fight alongside regional independence movements in order to make other states concerned more pliable: this occurred in the Russian sector of Moldavia (on the northern border of Rumania), in the Abkhazia region of Georgia, and in the crushing of Chechen independence within the Russian Federation. Likewise, the card of protecting Russian minorities in other states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan has sometimes entered negotiations with these countries. Some 25 million ethnic Russians lived in ex-Soviet states outside the Soviet Union, though through the 1990s many began to return (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p15; Shevtsova 1992, p13). In the early 1990s some hundred thousand Russians left Central Asia each year (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p84), stretching the already damaged Russian economy. We can sense their lack of genuine integration into regional Central Asian communities by their language skills: less than 1% of Russians in Kazakhstan learnt the local language, while the highest figure for learning a local language was 4.6% of Russians in Uzbekistan (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p83). In general terms, Russia has tried to rebuild its influence through 2001-2008 via energy access mechanisms, new economic agreements, and a web of new bilateral initiatives (see lecture 2). This has included renewed pressure on countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia, plus efforts to boost influence in Turkmenistan.

This desire for regional power seems to creating a sphere of influence, however, rather than a return to a direct Soviet 'empire' (Goltz 1993). There has been some return to a Eurasian policy, arguing that Russian has special rights in the wider region (Kerr 1995). This policy is also framed in economic and cultural terms include, to create a permissive immediate environment:

* The establishment of conditions favourable to Russia’s economic growth;
* The creation of a belt of friendly states along Russia’s perimeter;
* The comprehensive protection of the rights and interests of Russian citizens and co-nationals abroad;
* The promotion and support of Russian language and culture in foreign countries. (Torbakov 2000)

In a general sense, the 'Eurasian policy' had a certain nationalistic caste and a goal of reinforcing a unique Russian identity, aiming at a strong independent Russia (Bilenkin
1995; Ferdinand 1992). It must be stressed, however, that both the Westernisers and the Eurasianists generally favoured reforms towards a democratic and capitalist system. It is not correct to brand all 'Eurasianists' as 'the champions of anti-Western policies based on nationalism and coercion' (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p31). Likewise, President Putin seems to be facing Russia in both directions. While trying to develop strong trade and diplomatic relations with Europe and the U.S., he has also promoted the image of Russia as a strong state willing to pursue its legitimate interests in Eurasia and Central Asia. This includes a proactive energy policy, and efforts to ensure access to resources and trade flows through Central Asia and eastwards to China and Japan (covered in later sessions). He also has had major concerns about the political path of regional states, e.g. Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus, suggesting Russia does not want to see sweeping reform coming to close to home (see Silitski 2005). Recent tensions (2005-2007) between Ukraine and Russia over increased energy costs, pipeline control, degree of Western 'tilt' and minor clashes over light-house facilities suggest that real differences in orientation are emerging. The 'deadlock was ended when the Party of Regions formed a coalition including the Socialists, formerly the president's Orange Revolution allies, and the Communist Party', but led to former rivals, Yanukovych as prime minister Yushchenko as President, sharing government (BBC 2007a). This began to soften the Ukraine's foreign policy initiative towards EU and even NATO membership, though the U.S. has continued to suggest that NATO membership should be considered for both Ukraine and Georgia.

4. The New States of Central Asia and the Caspian Region

These new states form a crucial linkage zone across in the heartland of Eurasia. In Central Asia we have Kazakhstan (the largest and resource rich), Uzbekistan (the most populous and strategically central), Turkmenistan (with huge gas reserves), Tajikistan (a troubled border state that for a time seemed to forge a democratic stability), and the Kyrgyz Republic (which has not yet fully stabilised after its own 'democratic' revolution through 2005-2007). In the Caucasus (the area between the Black and Caspian Seas) we have the ancient states of Georgia and Armenia, and oil-rich Azerbaijan. These 'Newly Independent States' (NIS) are of great international significance, including the following reasons (this will be covered in more detail in later lectures):

* Source of strategic resources, including coal, gas and oil. The area around the Caspian Sea has 16% of known global oil reserves, and 53% of gas reserves (Tarock 1997, p193; for a different view of accessible reserves see Jaffe & Manning 1998). These will become even more important in the future, e.g. the EU currently imports 50% of its primary energy requirements, but this should rise to approx. 75% by 2020, with most of its gas coming via Russia and Algeria (Bordonaro 2008; Ogutcu 1995). Likewise, even China, which has large energy reserves, will remain a net importer of petroleum and has as it industrialises further. As a result, China entered into a $4.4 billion memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan 'to build pipelines to China and Iran in exchange for oil and gas concessions and a 51% stake in Kazakhstan’s state-controlled oil-production company (Jaffe & Manning 1998, p124). This is an extension of China's intensive development of oil in its far western province of Xinjiang (Melet 1998). China has a concerted
energy policy to use more natural gas, a factor which has already had a strong influence on her western provinces and their development, with major deals also being negotiated with Russia for new gas lines through 2003-2007 (Ferguson 2001; IISS 2003). In the short term, China seems keen on developing pipelines out of Siberia. By late 2006 President Putin had confirmed that supply to both the Chinese and Japan projects would proceed, though there may be delays until 2008 until proven reserves can support enough supply into the Pacific (Moscow Times 2007).

* They form a strategic zone of communication and interaction, i.e. between Russian, China, Turkey, India, Iraq, and Iran. Hence, this region can have a spill-over effects onto adjacent regions in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. For example, the war in Afghanistan from late 2001 led to a refugee crisis along the border with Pakistan, placed increased tensions on the stability of the government of Pakistan, caused initial flows of refugees into Central Asian states until borders and some transport routes were closed, and triggered strong concerns in India about the regional role of Pakistan. In turn, the political stability through 2007-2008 of Pakistan is crucial for undermining support for the Taliban and creating a stable southern-vector of development for Afghanistan and Central Asia (see Behuria 2007).

* This region contains advanced nuclear technology, capable of building nuclear power stations as well as, potentially, developing nuclear weapons. Both Ukraine and Kazakhstan had stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons, though tactical weapons have been withdrawn and other weapons have been dismantled under treaty arrangements made with the US and Russia. It has been feared that these regions could be a disaster for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology and or fissile material, i.e. enriched uranium or plutonium. Ironically the confirmed cases of plutonium smuggling originated in Russia in the mid-1990s. Russia continues to be one of the major arms exporters in the world, especially to India and China, in order to bolster its access to foreign currencies, though through 1996-2007 it has cooperated with the U.S. in trying to reduce plutonium smuggling. This is one area, along with other weapons of mass destruction including biological and chemicals weapons, that needs continued attention (see Cohen 2001). Caution concerning proliferation from Pakistan's nuclear program, plus Iranian and North Korean nuclear capabilities remained of major international concern through 2003-2008, with continued efforts by the EU, the US and Israel to deter Iran from tracking towards greater nuclear capabilities (Saikal 2007; CNN 2005a).

* The region is part of an underdeveloped corridor stretching from Africa through the Middle East into Central Asia and the border regions of East Asia. Unless stabilised, this zone could cause conflicts to spill over into richer adjacent regions in Europe and East Asia (see Cohen 2005; Hanna 1993). Strong poverty in rural regions continues in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and to some degree in less developed rural parts of Russia itself, especially in Siberia and the Far East.

* The region forms a major test case for the interaction of modern society and culturally nuanced forms of Islam (to be studied later lectures). At present, the partial containment of the Taliban and the erosion of Al Quaeda suggests that
there are strong opportunities for more moderate forms of Islam, already present in Central Asia, to take further hold in Afghanistan. However, even through 2002-2008, trends suggest some further polarisation of marginalised groups in Pakistan leading to an ongoing governmental crisis through early 2008, while the Taliban remains operationally active in Afghanistan. This suggests a continued need for dialogue between the West and moderate Islam groups within the Eurasian setting, thereby reducing the tolerance for militant groups. Part of the problem, likewise, is the emergence of authoritarian 'procedural' democracies and ongoing human rights abuses within several Central Asian states.

Furthermore, these different countries, though never unified in a single nation-state (the Turkestan dreamed of by some pan-Turkic thinkers), do form part of a culturally unified region. As explained by Dawisha and Parrott:

Although never unified under a single state with borders coterminous with those of Soviet Central Asia, Central Asia once belonged to a common Islamic civilization that encompassed portions of modern-day Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sinkiang, the Caucasus, and the Volga region, and this distinctive cultural heritage is likely to exert a substantial influence on the external relations of the new Central Asian governments. The Caucasus bears a somewhat different stamp, including as it does peoples with ancient ties to Christendom as well as Turkic and non-Turkic Muslims. The resulting historical and cultural mosaic gives the Caucasus certain features in common both with the new states of Central Asia and with the new states situated to the west of Russia (Dawisha & Parrott 1994, p45)

Put another way, the problems of Greater Central Asia remain central to peace and cooperation in the wider Eurasian landscape. As a pivotal region, it cannot be safely ignored in world politics.

5) The Global Importance of Eurasian Affairs

This region must deal with ongoing transition problems in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, plus moderate competition among external players. Likewise, political instability in the Chinese controlled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, and lack of democratic reform in several of the Eurasian states, are matters of serious concern. The stability of the Russian Federation itself has been called into question with the war in Chechnya and its social aftermath (2001-2008). Gradual Russian economic recovery through 2001-2008 has allowed President Putin to be more active in foreign policy areas, e.g. in relation Afghanistan, China, India, Vietnam, North Korea, Turkey and the Ukraine (to be touched on in later weeks). Debate has continued, however, about how 'deep' democratic culture runs in Russia, in spite of the politics of procedural democracy under President Putin (Borisov 2004; Silitski 2005). Likewise, in forthcoming Russian presidential elections, it has been suggested that if Dmitry Medvedev (or even Sergei Ivanov) wins, then this will leave open a role for substantial influence from Putin, or even a potential role as a future prime minister (Janes 2008). Put simply, economic and political transition has not been completed in this region, nor can be guaranteed without sustained domestic and international effort. This zone is also a source of wide range of transnational challenges, including from environmental disasters, major health threats, drug and arms flows, possible nuclear proliferation, extensive organised crime networks, potential sources of international terrorism, patterns of non-documented migration, stateless persons within poor
economies (such as the Kyrgyz Republic, see Relief Web 2007) and uneven development across rural and regional areas (e.g. poorer areas in Siberia and Uzbekistan).

It is clear that a new international system is emerging within Eurasia. Russia remains important, but is not nearly as dominant as before. China, Japan, Europe and the US are now strong external influences on Eurasia, while internal demands for economic development, greater political freedom, and local nationalism have placed enormous demands on all the governments of the region. As we shall see, though there has been real economic development in Central Asia, the demands for democratic participation have been much harder to meet both there and in the Caucasus region. Thus, for example, perceptions of pervasive corruption had undermined the administration of the former Georgian government, leading to sweeping protests (the "Rose Revolution") and elections giving strong support (approx 90%) through November 2003 for the new President Mikhail Saakashvili, running on strong anti-corruption laws, though 2008 elections were fiercely contested with claims of rigging by opposition groups, though officially 'Saakashvili won 53.4 percent of the vote in the election, while Gachechiladze, his closest rival, got 25.6 percent' (DW 2008; Transitions 2004a). Ukraine, too, managed to push through election outcomes to change government, in spite of strong opposition from the former government and from Russia, but has faced two no-confidence votes that have undermined two administrations through 2004-2007 (Silitski 2005; ABC Online 2006b). Moreover, as we shall see, countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have serious defects in their procedural democracies, leading to enhanced patterns of presidential rule at the expense of fair and open elections (see Gleeson 2006; Bordonaro 2007).

If genuine peace and instability are forged in greater Central Asia, it may be possible for some of some broader regional agenda to develop. At present, we have a number of overlapping, relatively weak institutions that support regional development, economic cooperation, and security dialogue that is partly undermined by competition among major national powers. In spite of partial interventions by UN agencies, the IMF, World Bank, the OSCE, the CIS and other agencies, no comprehensive patterns of regional governance has emerged in Eurasia. From 2007 there has been some limited effort to coordinate some of these different agenda across groups such as EurasEC and SCO (Linn 2007), but this agenda remains limited.

It must be stressed that when we speak of Eurasian affairs we are not concerned just with Central Asia, nor just with 'ex-Soviet space'. On the contrary, Eurasia includes the dynamic relationship between Asia and Europe, as well an international relations among Central Asia, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine, Afghanistan, Iran and China. Key links from this region directly affect both East Asian and South Asia. It is indeed possible that culturally, economically, and even politically, we will see some partial integration and convergence of interests in the Eurasian super-region. However, economic integration and improved communication also bring on rapid change, dislocation, and can sometimes cause conflict as well as aid cooperation. In this course we will explore the dynamics of this change, whether peaceful or conflictual. Bearing in mind the fact that Eurasian issues have an impact on the
economies and strategic interests of Europe, Asia, the Middle East and of the US, the future development of this Eurasian zone will profoundly effect on the global system.

6. Bibliography and Further Resources

Resources

Useful databases with access to a wide range of articles on these topics include Ebsco, Infotrac Expanded Academic, JSTOR, and Ebrary. They will be found via the Bond University Library homepage, (www.bond.edu.au).

Eurasianet has a range of current articles in the Eurasia Insight magazine, plus related pages concerning Eurasia, Russia and Central Asia at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/index.shtml

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has over the last decade on a much wider role of operations in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. It has a wide range of resources available at http://www.osce.org/

A range of useful international relations material can be found at the Brookings Institution, with Internet access at http://www.brook.edu/

The International Relations Portal includes a range of articles, lectures and links concerning international affairs. An education and research site, selected lectures from this subject for 2004 and 2005 will be loaded onto this site. See http://www.international-relations.com

Good coverage on Afghanistan and the 'war on terror' will be found at the Foreign Policy journal at Internet Access at http://www.foreignpolicy.com

Voluntary Further Reading

For those of you who would like to follow up these issues, see one of the following:


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