Lecture 2:

FROM RUSSIAN EMPIRE TO EURASIAN POWER

Topics:

1) Introduction: The Unique Russian Heritage
2) From European Power to Eastern Empire
3) The Challenge for World Power: Cold War and Nuclear Inheritances
4) The Impact of Russian Reform: Russia as the Phoenix?
5) Russia as a Eurasian Power
6) Prospects for the Future: Russia's Reassertion as a Global Actor?
7) Bibliography and Further Resources

1. Introduction: The Unique Russian Heritage

To understand modern Russia and its imperatives we need to have some understanding of its unique history, geopolitics, and the formation of its national identity. Russian foreign policy today still makes active use of its 'history and tradition' as part of a long shaping of the nation's role and goals. Since the creation of the Muscovite Foreign Office (Office of Embassies) in 1549 Russia has sought to pilot and shape its relations with other nations, leading to a long diplomatic tradition that is now global in reach, though with specific Eurasian, European and Central Asian aspects (Ivanov 2002, pp20-30; Rumer 2007; Trenin 2007). A brief overview will set the scene for Russia's current role in Eurasian and world affairs (see below). Russia's heritage primarily reveals a struggle to achieve identity in the face of opposition and establish itself as a powerful nation among great powers. Born into a harsh physical environment, Russia was on the periphery of great civilisations to the south (Christendom, Constantinople, the Turkish Empire), surrounded by powerful and at times conquering tribes (Magyars, Mongols, Tartars, Finns, Lithuanians, Poles, Sweden), and the Khanates of Kazan (between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains), Sibir (located east of the Ural Mountains) the Crimean and Caspian regions. The birth of a Russian identity was slow and painful, and in part built upon negative and positive reflections from these nearby cultures. In the 21st century, Russia still claims a role as a major power within global and Eurasian contexts, though balancing these diverse aspirations may be problematic in the short and medium term (Rumer 2007).

Although ethnic Slavs may have existed as early as the middle of the first millennium B.C. (associated with the Scythians of southern Russia in the Don River area), they did not clearly emerge as a separate political grouping until the 9th century A.D. (Riasanovsky 1993, pp19-20). At the first 'the Russ' coalesced around trading cities such as Novgorod, Smolensk and Kiev, and other towns on the great river trade routes joining the Baltic to the Black Seas, then formed principalities at Kiev and later on Moscow (the Ukraine will be discussed further in lecture 6). The influence of the
Scandinavians, both as traders and warriors, was also very strong in this early period, especially on Novgorod and Kiev, though the degree of influence remained a politically sensitive issue for Russian historians (Figes 2002, p135).

It was from such humble beginnings that the growing Russian state, once freed from Mongol-Tartar domination and able to defeat eastern khanates such as Kazan and Astrakhan from the 1550s onwards, would expand eastwards across the steppe into the Ural Mountains and Siberia (Figes 2002, pp151-152). From the late 15th century Russia would see itself as a unique, Orthodox Christian Empire that had taken over where Rome and Byzantium had left off, with Ivan III assuming the title of tsar in 1483, thereby claiming links going back to the Roman Caesars, though such claims were not at first accepted in Europe (Waliszewski 2006, pp114-119). Through the 16th century Russian military reforms included the use of muskets, cannons and mortars (Waliszewski 2006, p153). From the early 17th century it would go on to become a European power, finally defeating Napoleon in his ambitious invasion of 1812. It took Russia several centuries to find its feet as a great and modernising European power, especially after the financial and military reforms of Peter the Great (for these, see for example Cracraft 2003), the founder of St. Petersburg as a modernising European capital (Figes 2002, p10). Yet in spite of all these reforms, Russia would turn to the economic and colonial resources of the east to strengthen her hand against other European rivals. The fur trade of Siberia, along with agriculture and minerals extraction, formed a major component of the Russian government treasury in the 17th and 18th centuries (Brobrick 1992; Riasanovsky 1993, p194). Fine furs as a cash economy were so important that a 'Great Sable Road' crossed all the way from Siberia, through Russia to Byzantium and Europe (Brobrick 1992, p68). With these resources, with a 'service' nobility emerging from the mid-16th century under Ivan IV and reinforced by the reforms of Peter the Great (Cracraft 2003, pp61-62; Waliszewski 2006, p107)), and with the imposition of serfdom, Russia emerged as a strong, but not always stable, autocratic state.

It was this sense of struggle against opposition which, in the 20th century, saturated the way the Soviets thought of themselves in contrast to the capitalist world system. This was not just a question of ideology, communism against capitalism, especially after the Russian civil war and the European and Japanese interventions of 1919-1922 (Pipes 1994), but of an embattled Russian state surviving in spite of international opposition. Such themes were reinforced by the enormous suffering of World War II, in which Russia made an enormous contribution to defeating German armies. Indeed, in this sense World War II greatly bolstered Russian patriotism, and verified a unique role for Russia which even the failures of a centrally planned economy could not destroy (Smith 1976, pp369-397; Riasanovsky 1993, p526). The Soviets certainly suffered terribly in World War II: war-death estimates have now been raised to as high as 27 million (Riasanovsky 1993, p528), and the best estimate probably falls in the range of 20-29 million. Patriotism and sense of a special role are not only found in the earlier Russian novelists (Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Gorky, Pushkin, Lermontov, Sholokhov), but even in the recent thought of Russian intellectuals such as Solzhenitsyn. It is in this sense that conservative and nationalist Russians could speak of themselves as 'Great Russians' in comparison to the so-called 'lesser' Slavic branches of Ukraine and Belarus (see the rather
dismissive comments on Ukrainian and Belorussian separateness and national identity in Solzhenitsyn 1991, pp14-20), leading to tensions especially with Ukrainian identity politics as well as with ethnic groups such as the Crimean Tartars (see Korostelina 2004).

Such themes run through Russian art and literature, and even in Russian films such as Eisenstein's classics Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible (Parts I & II). In spite of being made during the height of communist propaganda films, both dwell on themes of Russian 'might and right'. This search for a particular role within the great power system of European diplomacy, but faced with a unique involvement with the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East, is a central feature of Russian historical experience (see for example Cracraft 2003; Figes 2002). It still provides insights for understanding contemporary Russian political behaviour internationally, and is also one of the shapers of modern Eurasia. Today, surveys suggest that Russians remains split among different visions of their geopolitical identity, some with a Eurasianist focus willing to draw closer to former parts of the USSR, others with a Slavic or Baltic focus that would see closer relations with different parts of Europe (see O'Loughlin & Talbot 2005; Rumer 2007; Trenin 2007).

In this subject you will not need to know Russian history in great detail. Rather, we will be looking at how Russian reforms have influenced Eurasia today, and had direct impact on Central and Eastern Asia. A time-line with a few dates summarise some of these trends (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Background Dates 882-1979 (after Riasanovsky 1993 and Dawisha & Parrot 1994)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>882-1240</td>
<td>Kievian Russia (centred on Kiev)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1240-1480</td>
<td>Period of Mongol Domination (nominal 1380 onwards)</td>
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<td>1480</td>
<td>Ivan III renounces allegiance to Mongols</td>
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<tr>
<td>1533-84</td>
<td>Reign of Ivan IV, the Terrible, first autocratic 'Tsar'</td>
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<tr>
<td>1550-57</td>
<td>Russian military modernisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1552</td>
<td>Russia conquers khanate of Kazan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1556</td>
<td>Russia conquers khanate of Astrakhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1582-1697</td>
<td>Russian penetration into Siberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1613</td>
<td>Assembly of Russian 'interest groups' elect Michael Romanov Tsar</td>
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<tr>
<td>1613-1917</td>
<td>Romanovs rule Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1613-1917</td>
<td>Cossacks enrolled in Russian military, aid Russian expansion; active in Ukraine, Crimea, along Turkish border</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1682-1725</td>
<td>Modernising &amp; Westernising rule of Peter the Great</td>
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<tr>
<td>1703</td>
<td>Foundation of St. Petersburg (Leningrad) on Baltic Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>Russia conquers Crimea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1792</td>
<td>Port of Odessa on Black Sea won from the Turks</td>
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<td>1803-10</td>
<td>Annexation of Georgia</td>
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<td>1804-13</td>
<td>Russia successful in war with Persia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>Russian strategies defeat Napoleon's invasion</td>
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<td>1815-1817</td>
<td>Wars against Napoleon</td>
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<tr>
<td>1826-28</td>
<td>Russia successful in war with Persia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1828-29</td>
<td>Wars against Turkey - Russian control of mouth of Danube River</td>
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<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1853-54</td>
<td>Hostilities against Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1854-55</td>
<td>Russian defeat in Crimean War by Austria, French, British and Turkish forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>1858-60</td>
<td>Territories treaties with China</td>
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<tr>
<td>1869</td>
<td>Vladivostok founded</td>
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<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Official emancipation of serfs</td>
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<td>1867</td>
<td>Russia sells Alaska to the United States ($7.2 million)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>Russia successful in war against Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>1865-78</td>
<td>Much of Central Asia conquered</td>
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<td>1885</td>
<td>Russian influence reaches Afghan border - clash with British interests</td>
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<td>1904-5</td>
<td>Russia Defeated in War with Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Trans-Siberian Railway completed</td>
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<td>1913-1917</td>
<td>Russian involvement in World War I</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>Russian revolutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>1921-1936</td>
<td>Soviet suppression of nationalist movements in Caucasus and Central Asia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1920-1939</td>
<td>Russian support of Chinese Communism &amp; Chiang Kai-shek</td>
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<td>1939</td>
<td>Russian non-Aggression pact with Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Germany invades Russia</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Russia enters war against Japan</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946-49</td>
<td>Cold War begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Death of Stalin</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Sputnik I goes into orbit</td>
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<td>1962</td>
<td>Cuban missile crisis (height of Cold War)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1973-75</td>
<td>Emergence of detente between Soviets and West</td>
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<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Soviet invasion of Afghanistan</td>
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2. From European Power to Eastern Empire

Although Russia emerged as a major player in European politics from the end of the 18th century, the expansion eastwards was perhaps her greatest source of power. Large tracts of steppe, forest and tundra were attached to domains controlled by enfeoffed nobles, to officials of the Russian government, and even to the Orthodox Church which established monasteries right on, or in advance of the Russian frontier. By the early 16th century one monastic order alone, the Disciples of St. Sergius, established 30 monasteries on or beyond the frontier (Riasanovsky 1993, p119). By 1875, Russian expansion into Siberia and the adjacent island of Sakhalin was complete, while all of Central Asia was under effective Russian control by 1895 (Riasanovsky 1993, p427).

A major effect of this Russian expansion, as well as their efforts to develop a strong navy with access to international waters via the Baltic, Black, White, Caspian Seas (for early military and trade gains, see Cracraft 2003, pp47-48), with later access to the Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, were fears sparked among other international powers, especially Britain and Japan. Russian expansion through the 'heartland' of Eurasia led to British fears of interference with her colonial interests in India, Southeast Asia and China. A subtle Great Game of espionage, alliances, and indirect
conflicts influenced the fates of Japan (which Britain chose to support in the early 20th century), Afghanistan, Tibet and later on Mongolia (see further Meyer & Brysac 1999). This imperial 'game' was resolved in the following way:

The agreement with Great Britain, signed on August 31, 1907, was a landmark in Russian foreign policy, for it transformed a relationship of traditional and often bitter hostility into one of cordiality. That result was achieved through compromise in those areas where the interests of the two countries clashed: in Persia, Russia was assigned a large sphere of influence in the northern part of the country, and Great Britain a small one in the southeastern section, while the central area was declared neutral; Russia agreed to consider Afghanistan outside its sphere of influence and to deal with the Afghan ruler only through Great Britain, Great Britain in turn promising not to change the status of that country or interfere in its domestic affairs; both states recognized the suzerainty of China over Tibet. (Riasanovsky 1993, pp416-7).

The search for great power status, of course, in turn prompted Japanese invasions of Korea, and later on parts of Manchuria. This model of a 'great game' is sometimes used as a way to view the conflicts of modern Afghanistan (Klass 1987), as well as a new phase of diplomatic and economic initiatives concerning Central Asia which have been launched since 1989 (Ved & Ved 1998; Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p2; Malik 1992). Later on we will critically assess this metaphor of a New Great Game being played out in Eurasia (for one such view, see Dettmer 2000), though now it may be a 21st century game over resources, wealth, influence and security as much as over borders and empires (see Kleveman 2003; Tsygankov 2006).

We can date the end of Tsarist Russian expansion with the defeat she suffered at the hands of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Jockeying for influence in northern China, Manchuria and Korea, Japanese and Russian forces engaged in severe land and sea battles. Partly due to extended logistic problems (the single-track trans-Siberian was not yet complete around Lake Baikal), and due to gross over-confidence at sea, the Russians suffered a stunning defeat which enheartened much of Asia (e.g. Indian nationalists against supposed British superiority). Japanese forces captured Port Arthur, pushed Russian forces north in Manchuria, and in the decisive battle of Tsushima Straight (27-29 May, 1905), the modern Japanese fleet wiped out the older Russian fleet which had sailed all the way from the Baltic in Western Europe (Riasanovsky 1993, p403). After this time a period of concordance was reached between Japan and Russia, the former having a zone of influence in Korea, the later dominant control in northern Manchuria (Brobrick 1992, p374). However, after this time, Russia heavily fortified Vladivostok and garrisoned east Siberia with some 200,000 men (Brobrick 1992, p376).

Russian and Japanese interests would clash more strongly at the end of the World War II, and in the Cold War, when the Northern Territories (the south Kurile Islands) occupied by the Soviets would become part of the armed frontier between the Soviets and the West (see Rees 1985). In large measure, during the Cold War the entire posture of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and Japan's protection under the US nuclear umbrella were based on the threat posed by the nearness of massive Soviet forces. It also formed a major pretext and projected defensive role for the modernised Japanese naval and air forces in the 70s and 80s (Keal 1988, p132; Mack & O'Hare 1989; Nishimura 1991; Japan Defense Agency 1993); a policy modified in the
mid-1990s. Through 2002-2007 Japan has continued to expand and partly normalise its defence capacities, taking on a wider role in the Asia-Pacific, as well as addressing threats in relation to North Korea and possible long-term fears in relation to PRC. Japan has sought to bypass these sovereignty disputes through a new energy policy that would make Japan and Russia partners in a wider Asia-Pacific energy supply 2006 (Strategic Comments 2003) network, with pipeline construction in the Russian Far East continuing 2006-2007 to allow major LNG facilities from Sakhalin Island to export into the Pacific from 2008 (RIA Novosti 2007). The sovereignty issue was resurrected again in late 2007, this time in the context over dispute over fisheries, with Russia threatening to ban Japanese fishing in the southern Kurile Islands (Golovnin 2007).

Environmental Damage within Russia
(Map Provided Courtesy of JCL Map Library)

During the 1920s and 30s the newly born Soviet State made a redoubled effort to industrialise and modernise the USSR as a showpiece of Marxist-Leninist principles. This involved first a huge effort in several Five Year plans to develop heavy industry, then a generally less successful effort to boost agricultural production through the creation of communes and enforced collectivisation (creating much human suffering in Central Asia and the Ukraine, see week 3). The system was not just focused on Russia, but created a huge industrial-production complex spanning most of the USSR - major resource centres included Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, the Donbas region, centres around Perm and Transcaucasia, the Ferghana valley, the Kuzbas region and selective areas in eastern Siberia (Riasanovsky 1993, p500).

Lecture 2: 6
During World War II, when most of Belarus and Ukraine were overrun, with both Leningrad and Moscow almost captured, huge amounts of the Soviet industrial complex was moved east of the Ural Mountains. The result was the creation of a highly interdependent series of semi-autonomous specialised economic zones, with much primary production in the east, and secondary production in the west. Russia thus relied on a wider resource base than the current Russian Federation.

The results of this system have had large-scale effects until today; huge scale industrial projects a terrible ecological legacy in the Kola Peninsula, in Central Asia, and in parts of Siberia. For example, in rapidly developing its nuclear industry from 1949 onwards, Russia dumped thousands of tons of waste materials in over 500 sites in Kazakhstan alone. Ironic effects also included the fact the Soviet nuclear processing and development plants were spread over more than 10 Republics, with advanced facilities in the Newly Independent States, e.g. the SS-18 missile (a long range missile, capable of carrying multiple warheads) production plants in Ukraine, and nuclear test facilities in Kazakhstan. Likewise, nuclear know-how technology was also found across the region in states such as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, though these states removed their weapons and declared themselves non-nuclear states through the 1990s.

3. The Challenge for World Power: Cold War and Nuclear Inheritances

It will not be possible to go through the entire history of Russia's development of nuclear weapons, and the various phases of the Cold War confrontation between the Soviets and the Western states. Two keypoints need to be emphasized: -

* The Soviets and the entire 'eastern block' of the Warsaw Pact turned much of their industrial and economic capacity to developing a powerful military force which could confront the West (1946-1986). This confrontation was incredibly tense, was developed on a world-wide scale, and involved the building of a system of nuclear deterrence based on very short reactions times. This nuclear capability, and a relatively advanced weapons export capacity has been retained by Russia today, with military reforms under President Putin reviving Russian forces over the last five years. Russia adopted a first strike policy in the late 1990s, giving it the option of the first use of nuclear weapons under extreme threats, a policy design to bolster conventional weapons limitations. There has been an emphasis during 2000-2007 in rebuilding naval and air-power capacity, including the design for new strategic missile submarines (Borey-class), as well maintaining access to bases in countries such Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Georgia (planned to be wound down through 2008), Ukraine and access to airfields in Uzbekistan (Blank 2007; see further below). Defence spending doubled from 2003 to 2006, and Russian retains a robust nuclear force of 1,500 missiles based on land silos, mobile units, submarines and airborne cruise missiles (Rumer 2007). The importance of these modern forces is that ensure not just deterrence against nuclear and conventional attack, but also provides a guarantee of 'strategic independence and sovereignty' (Rumer 2007, p69). Hence Russia remains sensitive to any perceived erosion of this capability, e.g. via Ballistic Missile Defence systems.
* In spite of considerable progress in the 60s and 70s, as well as some improvement in the basic standard of living of Soviet citizens, the Soviet economy was seen to stagnate in the early 80s. This was also one of the main drivers in reform, with Russia in turn only beginning to stabilise budget and currencies after 1998 (see below). As we shall see, Russia has returned to periods of strong growth through 2001-2007, 5-7% growth in GDP per annum with inflation less than 10% in 2006 and a stabilisation fund of $100 billion containing some $100 billion (DFAT 2007; Rumer 2007). However, debates have continued as to whether this growth is over-reliant on energy resources, and whether this represents a balanced and competitive economy in other areas, in spite of Russia being an emerging energy superpower. Thus energy accounted for 65% of exports, followed by 14% metals, 6% chemicals, and 6% machinery in 2006 (Rumer 2007, p62).

A possible military confrontation within Europe remained very real through 1947-1949, with intense conflicts of interests over Berlin (the Berlin blockade and the Allied Airlift to relieve the city) and in Yugoslavia. Western opinion soon hardened against the Soviets, signified by Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of 5 March 1946 and President Truman's address to the US Congress on 12 March 1947 (Zeman 1991, p232). Once the fortified frontier was established throughout Europe, the Cold War began in earnest, with the added joy of Soviet nuclear capability in 1949.

The Soviet autocrat Stalin led the Soviets and their allies into the Cold War. During this period two organizations were created. The Soviet Union and their allies created military alliance called the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955, at least partly in reaction to West Germany entering NATO (see Zeman 1991, pp255-6). Another international organisation for these countries was the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, the CMEA or Comecon (see Zeman 1991, p277). The arms race between the Soviets and NATO were sustained on the worldwide scale throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Likewise, the Soviet's viewed the Marshall Plan, aimed to revitalise Europe economically, as a cloaked means to ensure Europe's dependence and friendship towards America. Andrei Zhdanov, writing in November 1947, for example, argued that the 'cornerstone' of the plan was the rebuilding of German capitalism (in Stokes 1991, p41). Soviet Premier Kruschev (also sometimes transliterated as Khrushchev) continued an assertive Soviet policy, which along with a strong American military posture, led to a crisis which could have led to war between the superpowers in 1962 (The Cuban Missile Crisis). In the end, Kruschev agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, and President Kennedy agreed to withdraw nuclear missiles from Turkey.

In the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev continued opening up the Soviet Union to Western trade in an attempt to stabilise the economy (Zeman 1991, p266-7). Although these policies would eventually lead on towards a period of detente rather than Cold War (a change signalled by agreements in the early 1970's but not confirmed till the Helsinki agreements of 1975), the Soviet Union still wished to keep a strong grip on its buffer states to the south and west. Hence when Alexander Dubcek had began to reform Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets felt under threat. Dubcek's reforms included the reduction of censorship and the acceptance of the need to link economic and political reform (Zeman 1991, p280; Desai 1989, p90). The result was once again
the intervention of the Red Army under the Brezhnev doctrine of defending the 'sovereignty and autonomy of socialist countries' (see Stokes 1991, p133).

However, the pressures of this international arms race could not be sustained forever. Speaking of the problems of the late 70s and 1980s, Gorbachev directly expressed these concerns in his best-selling book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, arguing for a mixed economic and some gradual political opening (1987, p19). The difficulties of the old system, in part, lay in the attempt to close off these countries from the world economic system, which was essentially capitalist, but at the same time to attempt to compete economically, militarily and ideologically. The Iron Curtain had largely removed these countries from trends in the world economy and in technology - such technology as was bought by the USSR was a very expensive overhead to their system. By the 1970's the USSR was in a half way house - it now recognized that the Stalinist aim of complete autarky (self-reliance) had to be abandoned, but at the same time it was not readily able to compete in world consumer markets, even in terms of heavy industry. Soviet oil fields and reserves remained huge, but much of its equipment was highly antiquated and it had to subsidise cheap oil and fuel to Eastern Europe (in 1981-85, 'half of the exportable 800 million tonnes of crude oil was committed to socialist countries', see Zeman 1991, p289). An ongoing energy shortage was a major concern for Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s, and is the main reason for keeping antiquated nuclear reactors on-line (though the Ukraine in May 1995 began to phase out some of these reactors in return for European aid and soft-loans).

This economic competition between the two systems was a race the Soviet Union could not win. Likewise, the Soviets at first seemed able to compete in the arms race against the West; in 1949 the Soviets developed their first atomic bomb, admittedly with the aid of intelligence derived from the US and Britain, and shortly thereafter thermonuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The Soviets seemed to be ahead in the race when they launched Sputnik 1 on 4 October 1957, a great surprise to the US and a shock to American educational and research institutions. The Soviets put the first satellite into orbit around the sun, put the first man into orbit, and the first unmanned payload onto the moon (Zeman 1991, p263). All these achievements resulted in a massive re-evaluation of US education and goals, and was the political motivation for the accelerated NASA programs which pulled ahead of Russian manned flights in the late 60's through to the 80's.

In the end, however, the high-tech competition with the US became a crushing burden on Soviet resources (Dallago 1992, p139). Both the Cruise Missile, and more importantly, the 'Star Wars' (SDI) initiative sorely strained Soviet hopes that they could retain parity in this game without even more burdens on their economy (Crozier 1999, pxvii). The SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative, i.e. the U.S. initiative to develop a space-based defence system) project was strongly criticised by Gorbachev as expensive and provocative (Gorbachev 1987, pp590-1; Gorbachev 1986, pp592-606).

Although nominally an alliance of independent sovereign states, the USSR had been built up under Tsarist imperial expansion, and maintained by force and central direction under the Bolsheviks. As part of his reforms, Gorbachev had to devolve
some real power back to these governments and assemblies in order to try to build grass-root's support for his programmes (see Morrison 1991). This resulted in widespread centrifugal forces, with each Republic taking more control of its own affairs. In 1991 the Russian Republic decided to reduce its payments to the USSR budget from 142 billion rubbles down to 23 billion, and claimed control of all oil and gold reserves (Papp & White, 1992, p28, p44), in effect reducing Soviet abilities to run their government. Similar conflicts have occurred (1992-1994) over control of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, and in the Russian east, especially in the area controlled by the Yakuts. One of the most dramatic effects of Gorbachev's reforms has been the modification and then the break-up of the Soviet Union. The USSR had consisted of fifteen Union Republics, with numerous autonomous regions within these republics. Many of these are based on ethnic groups, with a further 16 ethnic groups within Russia itself, e.g. Tatars, Chechens, Yakuts (Papp & White, 1992, p45).

On December 1, 1991 the USSR formally ceased to exist (Papp & White, 1992, p49). This might seem to be a great diminution of Russian power. However, so long as the Russia Federation can hold itself together there are in fact some advantages. By losing all the independent republics, it kept about 75% of the old USSR's resources and only 57% of the population (Jukes 1991, p21). Likewise, many problem areas, such as Armenia, Georgia, the Baltic states, and Moldova did not remain under its direct control. However, Russia has sought to rebuilt its influence in these regions, e.g. through new security and economic organisations, e.g. via the Collective Security Treaty Organization, (C.S.T.O.), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (S.C.O.) and the Common Economic Space (C.E.S.), via its diplomacy with Kazakhstan and Belarus, and through its energy policy (see Kaczynski 2006). There has been also some loss of ethnically troubled areas, especially in the Caucasus region, though Russia remains cautious about enhanced patterns of NATO cooperation through 1998-2008. On this basis there are fears that NATO might emerge as a kind of ‘expeditionary force’ with an extremely active role in wider Central Asia. Likewise, Ukraine's tilt toward the EU and NATO, though slowed down through 2007, would pose a serious security problem for Russian military planners. Likewise, high popularity in Georgia for future membership of NATO, with some 77% of voters supporting this idea in January 2008 (RIA Novosti 2008).

4. The Impact of Russian Reform: Russia as the Phoenix?

Russian experience was born out of struggle and a need to assert itself in a competitive immediate regional environment, and in the 20th century, a changing and troubled international setting. Ironically, today we see some of the same fundamental patterns emerging, with a continued effort to balance the directions of Russian policy towards the West and towards a more Eurasian orientation. (Rumer 2007; Trenin 2007) A related was a strong emphasis on the Soviet Union's place in Europe, and an acknowledgment of the close cultural and economic relationship between Russia and Europe (Stokes 1991, p265-267; Pettman 1991, p195). Gorbachev made a key policy speech on this theme in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, policies which have since come to be known as the 1986 Vladivostok Initiative, in which he tried to project the new Soviet Union as an 'Asian Pacific Power', both economically and politically (see Thakur & Thayer 1987; Polomka 1991;
Ellison 1991, p19). Tensions on the China-Russia border would not be greatly eased until accords made through 1996, with the concept of a 'strategic partnership' with China emerging from the late 1990s. However, with the continued rise of the economic power of PRC and its growing economic influence in the Russian Far East and the Central Asia, there are also some competitive elements within this relationship (Rumer 2007).

Likewise, relations with Japan have improved in spite on ongoing tensions over the South Kurile Islands (Northern Territories from Japan's point-of-view). Gorbachev, Yeltsin and President Putin have had to face stiff resistance by conservative elements in the Russian population and the Russian parliament who are totally opposed to any loss of territorial integrity of Russian territory, and the insistence that ownership of the islands was an 'incontrovertible result of the territorial settlements of World War II' (Ellison 1991, p26). Political groups in the Russian Far East and Vladivostok were also deeply opposed to any territorial deals. This made even the compromise deal of surrendering the two small eastern islands, and keeping the western defence screen of the two larger ones, very difficult. The Japanese government then somewhat opened the door to further negotiations, and during November 1997 talks between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto, a pledge was made that a peace treaty between the two nations should be forged by 2000. Japan also backed Russian entry into APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), and deals were also struck to improve economic, trade, energy and transport relations between them (Jones 1997). Thereafter, President Vladimir Putin tried to move forward the treaty process again through 2000-2005, though press reports on this were optimistic (Russia Today 2000). Wider energy politics between Russia and Japan have begun to change this relationship in the medium term (see Okuyama 2003), with successful pipeline and energy deals between Russia and Japan through 2004-2007 (A & G 2004). At the same time, the territorial issue might limit strong global cooperation between Russia and Japan (see Giragosian 2006)

Yet Russian itself remains a complex Federal state, initially with 128 ethnic groups, and some 89 administrative regions granted various levels of autonomy as republics, regions, and national areas (Riasanovsky 1993, p507, pp634-5; Marsh & Bucy 2002, p373). From 1992-2002 there had been numerous trends for more regional autonomy within the Russian Federation itself. The Yeltsin government had been able to restrain these trends by establishing a new Russian Federation Treaty (March 1992), which allowed a three year process before regional governments developed more autonomy and changed official languages away from Russian. Only Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the treaty (see Khakimov 1996; Hanauer 1996; Cornell 1997), but over 40 special bilateral arrangements were made, indicating the range of bargaining over relative power, taxation and control of economic resources (see Nicholson 1999). This debate on the nature of the Russian Federation has continued through to the late 1990s and early 21st century. President Putin in particular has tried to promote large administrative units that would also allow more centralised control from Moscow. It was planned to gradually restructure aspects of administration into larger blocs, a move that would help secure central taxes (Lemaitre 2007' DeLay 1998). Putin has also been able to ensure stronger
oversight of regional governors and has created a strong centralism called the 'vertical of power', but one which also makes performance of the central government more critical (Rumer 2007, p48). However, this process has been slow, and the Russian Federation is a 'complex system of asymmetrical federalism, under which certain regions enjoy privileged status and greater region autonomy than others' (March & Bucy 2002, p377). Sensitivity over territorial integrity or vulnerability along borders is part of the structure of the Russian political system (for related threat perceptions, see Podberezkin 2000). After having experienced the disintegration of the Soviet Union, political leaders are sensitive to any threat to the fragmentation of the Russian Federation itself. Combined with strong anti-terrorism measures passed over the last several years, plus the indirect pressures on media and strong scrutiny of NGOs operating in the country, these trends are a strong re-assertion of state power within the Russian system (see Lemaitre 2007).

Russia has also chosen to reassert its influence in the 'near abroad' region of former 'Soviet space'. Although the term 'near-abroad' has been dropped from official usage, there is now an emphasis on ensuring a band of friendly states on Russian borders. One of the questions we can ask is whether this results in a 'sphere of influence' policy, and whether it represents a threat to the interests of other countries involved in the 'Eurasian process' (see Gitelman 1994). In reality, Russia now has complex tasks in:

a) Maintaining the unity and viability of the Russian Federation.
b) Maintaining access to resources of Central Asia and the Far East
c) Operating as a balancing supporter in relation to operations in Afghanistan, but still being able to keep a critical voice in relation to Iran, Iraq, North Korea and NATO expansion. Here Russia has been willing to see a U.S. and NATO presence so long as it does stabilise Afghanistan, but has been critical of ongoing drug flows out of that country (Rumer 2007).
d) Enhancing its trade and dialogue relations with the EU and NATO. This is done in part via dialogue in the NATO-Russia Council, regular summits with the EU designed to supporting co-ordination in a large number of areas including environmental issues, ‘reinforcing joint efforts and advancing to a common economic, law enforcement and cultural space in Europe’, issues related to EU expansion, cooperation in security and defence areas (Interfax 2003). The EU remains Russia's largest collective trading partner and in turn Russia is of central importance in relation to wider Europe:

The EU maintains its role as the most important trade partner of Russia. Russia on its part is the third biggest trade partner of the EU-27 after the USA and China. It accounts for 6.2 percent of EU-27 exports and 10.4 percent of EU-27 imports in 2006, compared to 2.7 percent and 6.4 percent respectively in 2000. The EU-27 deficit in trade with Russia increased from 41 billion Euro in 2000 to 69 billion Euro in 2006. This increased deficit was due to imports of energy, which rose from 36 billion Euro in 2000 to 94 billion Euro in 2006, while exports of machinery and vehicles increased from eight billion Euro in 2000 to 34 billion Euro in 2006. Within the EU the biggest trading partners of Russia are Germany, Italy, France, UK, Poland and Finland. Significantly Russia is a key EU supplier of energy resources. In 2005, Russia supplied more than 40 percent of EU-27 natural gas imports and more than 30 percent
of crude oil imports, compared to 50 percent and 22 percent respectively in 2000. (Zashev 2008)

e) **Balancing its trade and power relations with China**, in part through the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and via their strategic partnership. At present Russia imports from China in 2007 were 9.4% but may rise as energy exports increase (DFAT 2007).

f) **Projecting the image of Russia as a reforming, capitalist state** that is a worthwhile partner in global politics, e.g. by its support for the Kyoto Protocol (ratified in late 2004), the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and its intensified trade relations with Europe. However, this has been undermined by perceptions of dominance of the political system by Putin, an assertive energy policy, and resistance to NATO policies (Rumer 2007).

g) **Maintaining the ability to export key energy resources** to EU, Japan, China and states such as Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia in a way which enhances the Russian economy and political influence, but avoids excessive international criticism and backlash. Likewise, through 2006 need to produce 705 billion cubic metres of gas, but had an approximate short fall of 55 billion cubic metres (Rumer 2007, p63). More investment in its own fields and control of Central Asian gas is needed to ensure its role as an 'energy superpower'.

These roles, however, can only be achieved if Russia is viewed as a strong and legitimate player in the Eurasian region, as well as a worthwhile partner in global level governance. This has led to an effort to enhance Russia's Eurasian and global role in the last five years.

5. Russia as a Eurasian Power

It is against this background that we can evaluate Russian international and foreign policy through 1992-2008. This is based in part on a Foreign Policy Concept (approved through 2000), and supported by a revised National Security Concept and Military Doctrine (Ivanov 2002, p9), but also Putin’s wider effort to create a ‘permissive’ local environment while building Russia’s prestige on the world stage. Even though Russian sovereign territory has shrunk back to the limits of the Russian Federation (as distinct from the larger limits of the dissolved Soviet Union), Russia under President Putin’s leadership has attempted to establish a zone of international influence and a security regime reaching out past the old borders of the USSR (see Lynch 2001). This has been achieved by several mechanisms:

* the **loose organisation known as the Commonwealth of Independent States** (CIS, with its regular meetings of leaders). Though mainly diplomatic in orientation, is has given Russia a prime seat in regional dialogue, though its influence has declined since the late 1990s (for news of the 2003 meeting, see Isachenkov 2003), with new groupings taking up these roles. However, new agreements have partly rebuilt some of the influence of the CIS on a smaller zone (see below).

* a particular policy of **regional influence** designed to enhance Russian energy politics, control flash points (Tajikistan, Afghanistan), and enhance Russian security
* the planned reduction and revitalisation of the Russian military. This last plan has yet to be fully achieved, though Russian forces have been more effective in their campaign against Chechnya in 1999-2002 than in the earlier 1994-1996 and period. From 2000. The Russian army has been reduced further in size down to a total of 960,000 through 2004, with the aim of creating a smaller, more technologically advanced army, alongside modernisation of navy and air force (Friedman 2000; Chipman 2003). This may eventually become professionally based rather than reliant on conscription, perhaps as early as 2012, but this would require a much smaller troop base, as small as 400,000 (Chipman 2002). The Russian military, however, remains concerned by encircling zones of instability in the 21st century Eurasian region (see further Jackson 2002). It has also tried therefore to develop some areas of military cooperation (see Kubicek 2004), e.g. anti-terrorism measures through the SCO, some rapid reaction exercises under the provisions of the CIS Collective Security Organisation in 2001 and 2002 (involving Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan), plus dialogue with NATO, and new efforts to boost the CSTO through 2004-2008 (the Collective Security Treaty Organization CSTO, including Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). Recently this has included access to airbases not only in Kyrgyzstan, but also improved relations with Uzbekistan and access to an airbase there (at Navoi) through 2006-2007, with peacetime deployment of some Russian fighters there (Blank 2007b). Though Russian forces are pulling out of remaining bases in Georgia through 2006-2008, Russia retains access to the Gyumr in Armenia, and naval bases in the Ukraine down to 2017 (JTW 2006).

* Russia has continued to chart an independent path in foreign policy, both cooperating with the EU and the US, and at time expressing divergent views. Thus Russia supported the intervention in Afghanistan through 2001-2002, but was highly critical of the intervention in Iraq in 2003 without renewed UN sanctions. Russia has also engaged in a round of military and diplomatic links with India, to a lesser extent Vietnam, and has also sought to moderate tensions in North Korea and over Iran. Russia's foreign policy thus looks not just to West and East, but is active and multi-vectored, and with an almost global agenda (Ivanov 2002, p14; Putin 2000). Through 2005-2008 Russia has become more assertive in its foreign policy orientation, with calls for a US withdrawal from Central Asia being made through the SCO, efforts to re-establish itself as the primary Eurasia power 'actor', efforts to sustain a strong Eurasia energy strategy, and a careful balancing of both US and Chinese regional influence (see Rumer 2006).

Bearing in mind the extensive borders of Russia, bridging both Europe and Russia, this is still a claim to great power status, based on strong regional roles and resource access (Rumer 2006; Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p1; Lepingwell 1994). However, Russia found itself facing improved and strengthened capabilities in its environment, e.g. modernisation of PRC forces, deployed of new technologies by the US and its allies, and a NATO which was taken on wider regional roles. These include Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) systems being developed by the U.S., with components possibly deployed in future into Japan, Australia and parts of Eastern Europe in theory against ‘rogue states’ with missile capability. This system, however, is also of deep concern to both Russia and China (McGuire 1999), and was in contradiction to the ABM Treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972), from which the US thereafter withdraw. The issue has become less
central since the issue of terrorism took centre stage through 2001-2005, but has
depended significance in relation to nuclear weapon capabilities in Iran and North
Korea through 2005-2008. Russia has continued to test its own anti-missile systems
including improved versions of the A-135, which have been successfully tested in
2004 (UPI 2004a). Russia retains, of course, a **strong nuclear arsenal** which has only
been slightly reduced in recent years (*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists* 2005). This now
includes some 4,300 strategic nuclear weapons, plus new Topol-M ground based
missile systems that may be able to penetrate missile shield systems (RIAN 2007).

**Russia remains sensitive to shifting alignments and transnational security
challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asian regions.** At the same time, a growing
U.S. (and to a lesser extent Turkish influence) on Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine,
and in Central Asia and has complicated this game of continued Russian influence
(see Katik 2004; see lectures 1, 3, 4). It has also found that although it has managed to
gain military victories in Chechnya (within the Russian Federation), that ongoing
protests, terrorist activities and resistance seems to show that **unrest has spread to
nearby regions within the northern Caucasus area** (also called the Southern
Federal District), suggesting that security in this southern region remains far from
assured (Dunlop & Menon 2006).

External pressures have since been somewhat reduced by multilateral
cooperation through the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO) Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, focusing
on 'international terrorism, illegal turnover of narcotics, illegal migration and
organized crime', though strong levels of cooperation may not be attained till 2010
(Xinhua 2005a). Russia has also sought to retain an integrated air-defence system
facing to the south and south-east, in part through agreements with these states.
The border problem that Russia had been addressing has now transformed itself into the issue of managing transnational and transboundary flows. This can be seen in the following factors:

- The Tajikistan-Afghanistan border has been of particular concern even after government and Russian forces (totalling some 18,000 Russian army soldiers) helped overthrow an 'opposition' of Islamic and democratic forces. Since 1993, Russian border guards, the Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division, as well as small forces from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have defended the frontier (Lepingwell 1994, p78). Prospects for peace and national reconciliation within Tajikistan improved with agreements for a ceasefire and amnesty in December 1996 (Pannier 1997; Mesbahi 1997). Events during 1997 allowed the "signing of a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, the return home of most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the resumption of the voluntary repatriation of Tajik refugees from Northern Afghanistan." (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1997). However, major developmental and democratic reforms have been slowly implemented. Tajikistan remained on the United Nations 'hot' list of hunger and poverty (Wren 2001; for 'energy debts' and related problems, see
Parshin 2003). The problem has become an outflow of Tajik labour flows in nearby regions in the CIS and Russia, and Tajikistan remains a poor and fragile state within the Eurasian system (for ongoing problems see Nourzhanov 2005). There has been gradual replacement of Russian guards by Tajikistan's troops from 2002 and withdrawal of Russian border guards through 2005 (BBC 2006a), but with with claims that drugs were being smuggled easily across parts of the guarded border through 2004-2005.

- Russia remains concerned with two layers of borders: those into former Soviet space, and those directly into the Russian Federation. Today, the borders of the region seem very porous, leading to deepened concerned about drug, gun and refugee smuggling, and even to the possibility of illegal nuclear technology exports (see Woessner 2000). This is one of the key drivers of cooperation among CIS states, and eastwards to China via the SCO organisation (see lecture 1). The reconstruction of Afghanistan (2003-2007) has only partially reduced these flows, with ongoing violence problematic particularly in southern Afghanistan (see lecture 1 & 10). Increasing violence through late 2006 has shown that the Taliban remain as a coherent force and suggests that NATO forces of around 31,000 will need to be reinforced in 2007, and perhaps revise their current strategy.

- Russia January 2000 became deeply concerned about the northern border between Georgia and south Chechnya, arguing that this has been the main area were weapons, people and money have been moved into the rebellious Chechen areas. Tensions resulted in a 20 man OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) team being sent to monitor the border (Russia Today 2000b). Through 2002, even though Russian troops control the main cities and central areas of Chechnya, Russia continues to be concerned about cross border activities of Chechen rebels, who are hiding in remote areas of Georgia such as Pankisi Gorge (Antonenko 2001, p52). Even as military victory was assured for the Russians, terrorist hostage taking occured within Moscow, and surprise attacks continue again Russian forces through late 2002, and again engaged in mass hostage taking in 2004 (to be discussed further in lecture 4). This is one of the ongoing issues for Russia-Georgia relations in 2004-2008, along with concern in Moscow that the new government in Georgia will become too closely aligned with the U.S. which has encouraged NATO membership for that country (see Cohen 2004). In turn, the Georgian government has accused the Russians of interference in the internal political of Georgia, and 'of backing separatist rebels who have set up their own secessionist regime in Abkhazia' (UPI 2004b). Through 2005-2006, some 250,000 Russian troops and security personnel remain deployed across the North Caucasus region, suggesting ongoing regional and border threat perceptions (Dunlop & Menon 206, p110).

- In Ukraine, Russia seems to have had a serious set back with the elections of pro-EU government under the leadership of Victor Yushchenko, with a renewed cycle of tensions through early 2006, in part over gas pricing
but perhaps part of a larger effort by Russia to slow down Ukraine's veer towards the west, EU and NATO. Gas pricing and supply has also become a major issue for Armenia, Belarus and Georgia, which rely heavily on Russian natural gas, with sabotage of gas supply installations in southern Russia leading to mutual recriminations between Russia and Georgia in January 2006 (ABC Online 2006a; for background see Peuch 2005). However, in the long term reform in Ukraine has set a new regional tone that Russia has only partly been able to modify through 2005-2006, e.g. talk of Ukrainian cooperation rather than membership of NATO (see Blank 2005).

By asserting power in its immediate region, Russian leaders are also stating that they have no intention of letting the Russian Federation itself dissolve and have reasserted strong central control from Moscow. Likewise, Russia has shown an interest in protecting the rights of sizeable Russian minorities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia and the Ukraine. This protection to Russian foreign nationals formed an explicit part of Russian military doctrine drafted in 1992, and remains a watered-down part of their revised 1993 doctrine, and received a mention again in President Putin’s 2000 foreign policy statement (Putin 2000; Lepingwell 1994, p73). Though this has been softened in the pragmatic diplomacy of the Putin government, security policy and economic interests in the Eurasian region remain important issues in ensuring the future of Russian interests.

6. Prospects for the Future: Russia’s Reassertion as a Global Actor?

Defence and foreign policy are still controversial within Russia, and formed a major part of intense public debate through the 1990s (see Pravda 1994). In spite of fear of rapid destabilisation through 1991-1992, Russian foreign policy was quite successful through the mid-1990s: -

Rather, a close reading of Russian foreign policy since 1991 indicates instead a diplomacy that has proved relatively successful in maintaining two important policy objectives that are in potential tension with each other: establishing Russian diplomatic and security hegemony throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as Russia's 'great power' status in international councils while at the same time avoiding a rupture with the G-7 states, in the first place the United States, whose cooperation remains essential to Russia's internal as well as external prospects. (Lynch 2001)

Through 2006-2008 we can see some of these successes for Russia: for the first time Russia chaired the G8 organisation of leading industrialised nations; improved agreements with the US may pave the way for WTO entry for Russia, Russian energy policies seem to be giving the country enormous leverage; Russia has managed to regain influence with a core of Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia); and Russia has aired a critical voice over 'western' policies in relation to Iran, Palestine, Iraq, and has extended energy security cooperation with Algeria (Bigg 2006).

Although a rough consensus on a pragmatic approach to Eurasia was achieved, there is still considerable uncertainty about what Russia can and will do in the future. In
In general terms, **Russian foreign policy has become highly pragmatic**, trying to retain 'great power' status at the very time that the Russian state has become more internally challenged and internationally challenged (see Big 2006; Lynch 2001). Through 2001-2007, **President Putin has set his stamp on foreign policy** and seems to be seeking to retain power within Eurasia trying to **revive a global reach** for Russian relations (see Putin 2000; Antonenko 2001). Several points, however, can be made which will affect the role of Russia in world affairs: -

- Russia history has demonstrated a certain **resilience in the face of times of difficulty**. It is uncertain what form this 'resilience' might take in the early 21st century. However, the Russian economy has begun to improve through 2001-2007, and it seems that President Putin's leadership is secure, though there have been concerns about the level of press freedom and the degree to which a real opposition can function.

- It must be stressed that many **elements within the Russian military are opposed to imperialism and interventionist policies**. The harsh negative experiences of failure in Afghanistan, (just as for the Americans in Vietnam), along with a lesser but still negative experience in Tajikistan (the 'Tbilisi syndrome') and Chechnya, have warned many Russians of the frustration of entering ethnic conflicts (Lepingwell 1994, p85). The Afghanistan syndrome helped promote genuine calls for greater joint peace-keeping by CIS states (Lepingwell 1994, p78). At the same time, however, Russia has used its military to maintain unity within its federation, and its comparatively large armed forces are one of its **power-diplomacy** tools in relation to Central Asia as a whole. Likewise, Russia still wants to present itself as a nuclear-power with a credible nuclear deterrent, even if it has been willing to reduce its arsenal. However, it seems now to seek **greater cooperation in regional security (the SCO, and CSTO)**, perhaps due to the real cost of maintaining large profession forces and perhaps as a way to moderate threat perception experienced by countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, and in the long-run the EU and China..<br>

- **International institutional participation in Eurasia to date has been limited**, even as new groupings have emerged. In general, however, the OSCE has not been able to a comprehensive role as the peak security organisation in the Eurasian region (see Blank 1999, though it has been active in monitoring elections and support democratic transition. Indeed, tensions have emerged between Russia and the OSCE over electoral openness across the region, resulting in some decline from Russia for this organisation. Through 2005, **Moscow accused the OSCE of negative interference within the region**: “. . . the OSCE is placing too much emphasis on human rights and election monitoring and not enough on security issues, and is said to be disputing its contribution to the 2005 OSCE budget. Russia, along with a number of other ex-Soviet states, accused the OSCE last July of not respecting the internal affairs of the countries in which it operates.’ (European Report 2005; see further Weitz 2007). In this setting, there may be a **degree of competition among the diverse functions of organisations with different roles** and reach in the region, e.g. among the UNSC, OSCE, NATO, CSTO, SCO, and several smaller organisations. To date **Russia supports the UNSC, CSTO and SCO in their regional roles**, but has been critical of the use of the OSCE in area of internal politics.
• Aside from these advantages, **Russia's projection of power is limited by a wide range of factors as well.** This include the need to maintain economic growth and transition, the cooperation of major markets in the EU, China, Japan and Central Asia, the need to avoid extremes of nationalism and tensions within Russia even as it needs greater non-Russian labour resources, the need to stabilise the northern Caucasus region, the need to cope with a huge 'grey' economy and crime networks, and the need for further political transition (Bigg 2006; Dunlop & Menon 2006)

In conclusion, the prospects for Russia have improved over the last six years but **do not guarantee that the country will remain a great power in all senses.** Russia's foreign policy recognises the danger and costs of retaining inappropriate elements of a 'superpower mentality' (Ivanov 2002, pp13-14). If Russia indeed does manage to forge a strong capitalist economy, and resists further disunion within the Russian Federation, then a strong Russia as a world power might emerge within the next 5-10 years. In large measure, however, this timetable will be strongly affected by the actions of other powers (U.S., European Union, China, Japan), and whether they feel they can gain or lose by such a development (see Serfaty 2001). Russia has gained to some degree through its **enhanced importance** to China, Japan, the EU and the U.S. through 2001-2007 as one of the main conduits into Eurasia affairs. However, Russia is no longer an economic or political model for many countries in the region, thereby moderating its prestige and influence. In fact, trends in Georgia, Ukraine, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan suggest that Eurasia is no longer the preserve of Russian influence. **Eurasia are no longer just a 'Russian affair'. Nor is it certain that Russia can sustain new modalities of power and influence during intense globalisation unless domestic reform is continued within Russia.**

7. Bibliography and Further Resources

**Resources**

For a weekly round-up of news and analysis on and from Russia, see the latest update from the **Center for Defence Information (Washington)** at [http://www.cdi.org/russia/](http://www.cdi.org/russia/)

*The Brookings Institution* has quite good coverage on Russia and Eurasia. Its website can be searched at [http://www.brook.edu/scripts/search99.pl](http://www.brook.edu/scripts/search99.pl)

**Eurasianet** has good updates on Russia and its regional role at [http://www.eurasianet.org/](http://www.eurasianet.org/)

**Mosnews** provides a range of news and editorial coverage on Russia, Eurasia and global affairs at [http://www.mosnews.com/news/](http://www.mosnews.com/news/)

Russian news perspectives on Eurasia and global affairs can be found from the **Russian News and Information Agency** via [http://en.rian.ru/](http://en.rian.ru/)

Lecture 2: 20
Kommersant is a Russian Daily newspaper available on the web at http://www.kommersant.com/

Voluntary Further Reading

If you want to take these themes further, see one of the following:-

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