Week 5:

Ukraine's Democratic Revolution:  
The Western Tilt and Russian Necessities

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1. Ukraine: The Geopolitical and Geo-Economic Linchpin

The Ukraine sits as a crucial linking zone between Russia, the Eurasian step, the Black Sea zone, and Eastern Europe, both historically and in relation to the new expanded borders of the European Union. On this basis, it has been historically central for the formation of the Russian state, has played a complex role with Eastern European states such as Poland, and is now a major test case for democratisation within a charged political environment, with this process remaining troubled through 2005-2007. From being historically subject to Polish and then Russian influences, Ukraine was then integrated as an important part of the Soviet Union. Through the 1990s, after the break-up of the USSR, it moved towards nationalism and neutrality, back towards some political alignment with Russia once key tensions (over resources, over the division of the Black Sea Fleet, and access to bases on the Black Sea, were moderated), while through 2004-2005 there has been a serious tilt towards Europe and westward-oriented policies, but this tilt has slowed through 2006-2007.

Over the last four years, moreover, a virtual revolution has heralded a new wave of democratic activity that has placed the Ukraine once again at the heart of frontier tensions between a wider Europe and Russia. This political revolution itself may have been influenced to some degree by earlier trends in Georgia (the Rose Revolution) and Serbia, where people power was a key part of political transition (see Ackerman & Duval 2005), and in turn may have inspired efforts at political reform in Kyrgyzstan (partly successful) and protest in Uzbekistan (largely failed in terms of outcomes). In turn, it has been suggested the success of the transition in the Ukraine might inspire popular reform in Belarus, and in the long term even begin to change political culture in Russia, but this is far from likely in the short term (see below).

The Ukraine is also a major population centre (47 million), has a range of diversified resources (strong agriculture, iron, coal), was a centre of heavy industry, metallurgical sectors and chemical production though these now need to be
modernised (Gatev 2004), has key import needs (including gas and oil), and is now a key transit route for energy exports from Russia and Central Asia into eastern Europe. On this basis, it remains a major trading partner with Russia and to a limited degree with the EU, but is also part of a complex tussle over energy pricing, over the opening of its economy, and the degree to which it can be 'EU-compliant' as it is offered the prospect of deeper access to European markets as part of a European neighbourhood policy. Any concerted push towards full EU membership, or towards NATO membership, has serious implications both for Russian security policies and for Russia's hope to revive a Common Economic Space (C.E.S.) that would allow it to create a stronger cooperation among the economies of Russian, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Blagov 2005b). Through 2003-2007, as we have seen, the CES remains on a slow track, in part because of a lack of dispute resolution procedures, a lack of a supra-national decision-making body, but in large measure due to Ukrainian concerns about excessive Russian influence (see Smbatian 2005).

In the past, Ukraine was viewed as sitting across fracture lines in cultural and religious senses: Orthodox verses Catholic, Slavic verses Romanian, then Soviet verses Western European (Van Zon 2005, p394; Huntington 1996; Huntington 1993). This simplification has some only some limited truth for the Ukraine, but studies suggested that through there was a dotted line dividing political and civil society networks in Eastern Europe, verses a more repressed system in the Soviet zone, and greater reliance on family-friend networks with strong local bases (see Howard 2002). Indeed, the elections of 2004, as well as events in Georgia and Serbia, suggest that religious and cultural divides do not entirely dictate the limits in political transition (Silitski 2005). Moreover, through the late 1990s this did not stop the strong local feeling that the country needed to emerge from old patterns of corruption and repression, and that the time might be right to emphasise Ukrainian culture and move out from under the shadow of Russia (Gatev 2004). Ukraine is thus once again on the frontier, literally, as it is a major bordering country for the EU, which major concerns about the illegal transit of workers and migrant into the Schengen zone. It also sits on the underbelly of Putin's Russia, which needs Ukraine's cooperation for access to the Black Sea bases, for transit export pipelines...
into Europe (with only some pipelines going across Poland, and planned lines going via northern Europe not yet completed). **Thus a cooperative Ukraine is needed as part of Russia's integrated military and energy posture**, balancing NATO's eastward expansion and ensuring its role as a main energy supplier to Europe. More generally, Ukraine had been key part of Russia's effort to build a **Euro-East zone that could remain a distinct political culture operating forms of managed democracy** and with limited relations with the West (Meyer 2005). Ukraine, then, has become a **linchpin or key state** for emerging Eurasian, European, U.S. and Russian agendas. The government of Ukraine may gain from its geo-strategic location, but only if it carefully manages these different interests.

2. The Origin of National Identity Politics in the Ukraine

The **history and founding myths of the Ukraine have had a strong impact on Russia, the Ukraine, and East European** as a whole. Likewise, current identity politics are based on looking back to these origins. Geographically, the Ukraine has been divided into two regions, the open steppe and forest zones, and the coastal areas of the Black Sea and Sea of Azov (Magocsi 1996, p25) with the Crimean peninsula often playing an important role in terms of diverse political claims. Historically, these divisions were played out from the 7th century B.C. onwards with Black Sea Greek city states trading (or fighting) with Scythian tribes in the hinterland (Magocsi 1996, p30). From 250-650 A.D. other nomadic groups moved through the steppe: Goths, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, and Ostrogoths, to be followed by the Turkic Khazars, who created a state along the shores of the black sea and entered into relations with the Byzantine Empire (Magocsi 1996, pp33-35). Another key group were the 'Slavs', tribes that had lived in a band of northern territory from the upper Oder River to the middle Dnieper River in the east, but who over a thousand years moved southwards into parts of the Ukraine (Magocsi 1996, pp36-39).

The **region was fertile, with pasturage, northern forests, riverine resources, good grain lands, as well as the southern resources of the Black Sea**. From the 12th century onwards the region underwent intensified agricultural production (Magocsi 1996, p94) and later on became a major producer of grain. It was also an area crossed by major **trade routes**, including a northern branch of the Silk Road that passed north of the Caspian Sean and down onto the Volga River. Other trade routes led up the Volga and via other lakes and rivers led to the Baltic Sea. The Khazar state would help stabilise these trade routes under the diplomatic peace they established, sometimes called the Pax Chazarica (Magocsi 1996, p44). The Khazars also were innovators in religion: they chose Judaism and become a focus for Jews fleeing the Byzantine persecutions of the 10th century, but thereafter the Khazars became influenced by Islam (Magocsi 1996, p45).

For our purposes, the key development from the 9th century onwards was a coalition of local groups and Scandinavians (Varangians) were settled and strengthen the fortress city of **Kiev**, laying the foundation for a 'new power' known as the Rus' (Magocsi 1996, p48). At the first 'the Russ' coalesced around trading cities such as Novgorod, Smolensk and Kiev, and other towns on the great river trade routes joining the Baltic to the Black Seas (Riasanovsky 1993; see lecture 2). It was these groups that would lay the foundation of both the Ukrainian and Russian states. The early Kievan state went through expansion from the 870s-972, consolidated
through 972-1132, began to disintegrate through 1132-1240, and went through a political transformation from 1240-1349 (Magocsi 1996, p51).

A serious debate about the early foundation of the Kievan state has emerged, concerning the foundation myths around it, and identity claims, e.g. **to what degree was it a Slav or Scandinavian foundation** (Magocsi 1996, p51)? To what degree can the later Russian state focused on Moscow still claim the culture of Kiev as its own? Indeed, later claims by the Riuryk dynasty Moscow to be the genuine successor would be the basis of territorial expansion southwards to control the Ukraine (Magocsi 1996, p67). It is certain that Scandinavians had a role in the new state at least as a military force, but other sources suggest that they were came in as overlords who united diverse slavic tribes into a 'Rus' state based on the Baltic-Black Sea waterways (Magocsi 1996, p61). Later questions that emerged were the focus on **Orthodox religion as core part of Ukrainian culture** (in opposition to Catholic loyalties and Poland, and the challenge of Islam to the East and Southeast), the role of the Cossacks in this culture, and why Ukrainians of the 20th would resent being viewed as 'little Russians'.

From 911 A.D. the Rus were strong enough to gain trading privileges from the Byzantine Empire, while from 957 onwards Christianity slow emerged as a stronger force among the Kievan elite, and was formally adopted from 987 onwards (Magocsi 1996, pp63-69). By 1100 the great Cathedral of St Sophia in Kiev had been completed, named after Hagia Sophia in Constantinople (Magocsi 1996, p99). From 1037 the heads of the Rus' church (the metropolitan) was officially lodge in Kiev, though in fact invasions and wars meant this was not always the case, and eventually the metropolitan was moved to Moscow from 1326 (Magocsi 1996, pp121-122). Ukraine, like Russia, would soon adopt an Orthodox Christian identity, as opposed to Catholic Poland in the west and Muslim Khanates in the East. Through the late 16th and 17th centuries Ukrainian monasteries and monks would seek aid from the tsar or take refuge in Russia (Magocsi 1996, p211). However, for a time, the Roman Catholic Church from 1375 made serious efforts to convert those in the Ukraine, and as part of a short lived effort at Church unity a Uniate Church was born (Magocsi 1996, p154). The Uniate Church recognised the political leadership of the pope and Catholic doctrine, but kept and rites and ceremonies (Salvonic rite, Julian Calendar, married clergy etc.) as found in the Orthodox Church (Magocsi 1996, pp164-165).

One of the other aspects of the Kievan state was that though it had a huge domain, it also had a **number of important cities**, with urban populations as high as 13% from the 12th century onwards, comparatively high for that period (Magocsi 1996, p84). Urban craftsmen and trading elites would play and important role in the later development of the region as a whole, and from this time public town meetings did create a primitive if limited form of democracy in the Ukraine (Magocsi 1996, pp87-88).

This development was **interrupted by the invasion of the Mongols from 1240**, who razed Kiev, and established control over the Ukraine and Russia - the period of the so-called 'Tatar yoke' (Magocsi 1996, p105; see lecture 2). The unity of the Mongol Empire collapsed after the death of Chingis Khan, and Mongol forces located in the region formed the Golden Horde (= the Mongol-led Kipchak Khanate), and they received tribute from the Rus' until 1480 (Magocsi 1996, p109). The Golden Horde
kept control of trade routes from capitals on the Volga River, Old Sarai and New Sarai, not far from the north-west coast of the Caspian Sea (Magocsi 1996, pp110-112). From 1313 the Golden Horde also officially adopted Islam, leading to further threat perceptions for the Christianising lands to their west (Magocsi 1996, p113). Under such pressures, the Kievan-based kingdom was dispersed and eventually led to three new states that controlled the region - Galacia-Volhynia, Vladimir-Suzdal, and Novgorod (Magocsi 1996, p105). Somewhat later, the Golden Horde itself would break up into three new states (Khanates), one based on Kazan, another in the Crimea, and a third on shores of the Caspian Sea, the Astrakhan Khanate (Magocsi 1996, pp172-173). From the late 15th century onwards, the Crimean khanate would align itself with the Ottomans, thus posing a long term challenge to both to Poland and Muscovy (Magocsi 1996, p175). The Tatars in particular saw the Ukraine as a zone to be raided at will, and as a fertile source of slaves that could be sold into southern and eastern markets (Magocsi 1996, pp176-177).

The Ukraine would also be subject to a Polish and Lithuanian state that expanded to control much of the steppe by 1569. Likewise, Moscow would grow in power and then eventually absorb Novgorod and emerge as a powerful Muscovite state that would become the kernel of modern Russia (Magocsi 1996, p123). These two powers would set key limits and interacting state systems to the west and north.

The next key element to form the basis of Ukrainian identity is the role of the Cossacks, whose character has been viewed as including a desire for 'freedom, independence, and a democratic way of life' (Magocsi 1996, p170). The Cossacks were mixed settler groups that moved beyond the fringes of directed Polish and Russian control, often incorporating native and Tatar groups, relying in part on hunting and fishing, and at times enrolling as military units for nearby states (Magocsi 1996, p178). It fact the name Ukraine probably originates form the general word for an 'undefined borderland' but by the 17th century had come to mean the 'land of the Cossacks' (Magocsi 1996, pp170-171). Of particular important was a region on the southern part of the Dnieper River where Cossacks set up a zone beyond rapids that was known as Zaporozhia - this became a zone of de facto autonomy then a virtual free state (1648-1711) to which numerous groups would flee to avoid to avoid harsh rule (Magocsi 1996, p179). Registered Cossack military units, on the other hand, fought for the Polish king and later on Moscow, though they were also at time in revolt against such powers. The Cossacks also regularly raided the Tatars and the Ottoman empire, as well as forming a key element in Russian expansion into Siberia and Central Asia (see lecture 2). Cossack leaders such as Khmel'nyts'kyi would became major fingers in the international politics of East Europe. Cossack groups in both the countryside and the towns also became firmly attached to the Orthodox faith (Magocsi 1996, p187). In overthrowing both Polish landlords and financial control, the Cossacks were also involved in pogroms against Ukrainian Jews (Magocsi 1996, p195).

Khmel'nyts'kyi was involved in transferring the loyalty of the Cossacks to the Russian tsar, who in turn were granted autonomy, legal and land rights through the 1654 Agreement of Pereiaslav (Magocsi 1996, pp213-215). This agreement has since been viewed in different ways: either as an agreement between equal states or the beginning of Russian dominance of the Ukraine (Magocsi 1996, pp215-216). In any case, by the end of the 18th century most of the Ukrainian lands had become part
of the Russian Empire (Magocsi 1996, p216). It was after the Russian revolution of 1917 that once against the status of the Ukraine would become a crucial part of Soviet politics (see Timeline I).

Timeline I: Ukraine 1917-1988 (after BBC 2006a)

1917 - Central Rada (Council) set up in Kiev following collapse of Russian Empire.  
1941-43: Occupied by German forces  
1918 - Ukraine declares independence: Ukrainian People's Republic set up.  
1921 - Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic established.  
1932 - Approximately 7 million peasants perish in man-made famine during Stalin's collectivisation campaign.  
1937 - Mass executions and deportations as Stalin launches purge against intellectuals.  
1941 - Ukraine suffers terrible wartime devastation as Nazis occupy the country until 1944. More than 5 million Ukrainians die fighting Nazi Germany, including 1.5 million Jews wiped out.  
1944 - Stalin deports 200,000 Crimean Tatars to Siberia and Central Asia following accusations of collaboration with Nazi Germany.  
1945 - Allied victory in World War II leads to Soviet annexation of western Ukrainian lands.  
1954 - Armed resistance to Soviet rule ends with defeat of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).  
1960s - Increase in covert opposition to Soviet rule, leading to repression of dissidents in 1972.  
1986 - A reactor at the Chernobyl nuclear power station explodes, sending a radioactive plume across Europe. Desperate efforts are made to contain the damaged reactor within a huge concrete cover. Many armed forces personnel die of radiation sickness.  
1988 - Prominent writers and intellectuals set up Ukrainian People's Movement for Restructuring (Rukh).

Put simply, even as the Ukraine emerged as a partially independent nation, then a dependent state, then at last as an independent state, Kiev was still viewed by many Russians as the 'cradle of Russia' and a key element of maintaining their control of their security and economic environment (Van Zon 2005, p382). Though technically the Ukraine would be reborn through 1917-1918 as a state within the Soviet Union, it remained largely under the control and dominance of Moscow (see Timeline below). There was an effort particularly in the western part of the Ukraine to resist Soviet annexation, but this pattern of guerrilla resistance was eventually destroyed by 1954, but followed by a dissident movement through the 1960s and 1970s (Service 1997; BBC 2006a). Thus Ukraine was often viewed as subject to external powers:-

Ukrainians have a long history, including a heroic age centering on the Zaporozhian Cossacks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During World War I and World War II, modern Ukrainian nationalists made valiant efforts to attain independence. During both wars, however, unrelenting pressures from Berlin and Moscow destroyed the embryonic Ukrainian states. As a result, the world has perceived Ukraine as an object throughout most of the twentieth century, rather than as a player in international relations. Even from that point of view, however, Ukraine indirectly played major roles in world events; Austria-Hungary, for example, hastened to sign the German-dictated Brest-Litovsk peace treaty to get deliveries of Ukrainian grain that were required to avert mass starvation in Vienna. (Armstrong 2004)
Ukraine also interacted in a complex way with Poland and other Eastern European states, with the issues of borders and transnational enclaves being partly resolved:

Whereas the nature of German regimes during the late nineteenth century and nearly half of the twentieth century led the Germans to take advantage of Ukrainian weakness, the Poles sought, mainly between the World Wars, to dominate and assimilate large numbers of Ukrainians. Indeed, from 1919 to 1939, Poland included a Polish core constituting a slight majority, plus a periphery of other nationalities containing large Polish enclaves. Smaller territories with Ukrainian majorities similarly were dominated by the "state nations" of Romanians, Hungarians, and even Czechs. By the 1990s, these awkward mixtures had been virtually eliminated. The Moscow regime carried out a sweeping exchange of Ukrainian and Polish populations in 1945. As a result, moderate Polish and Ukrainian emigre organizations established harmonious relations that have been prolonged since the Soviet dissolution to accept the existing frontiers. Small Slovak and Hungarian minorities remain in Transcarpathian Ukraine. The breakup of Czechoslovakia in the 1990s left only Slovakia as a weak neighbor on the southwest along with Hungary, which carefully renounced irredentist objectives. A more realistic problem is the increasing discontent of the local populations that Kyiv purists consider Ukrainian but who Transcarpathian natives often term "Ruthenian." (Armstrong 2004).

At the same time, the Ukraine has a crucial ethnic mix with Russians, with a partial concentration of ethnic Russians in the Crimea and the south and east of country, (approximately 22% in total), leading to some fears of separatism as a political card that can be played:

Historically, Ukraine is a geographic collection of provinces of various empires. The eastern and southern parts of the country have a long association with Russia in both its imperial and Soviet manifestations. They are heavily Russified and have for centuries received considerable immigration from Russia. By contrast, the western regions of Ukraine have never been part of the Russian Empire. Incorporated into the Soviet Union only after World War II, they are the least Russified and Russian influence is actually resented there. Once belonging to the Ottoman Empire, Crimea is an autonomous republic that stands out in terms of its legal status and ethnic makeup. Given to Ukraine in 1954 by Khrushchev, the province's mainly Russian residents do not hide their wish to rejoin the Russian Federation. Finally, the capital, Kiev, is essentially bi-lingual and has the cultural and historical heritage of both peoples. (Gatev 2004)

Though this remains true to some degree, and the east and south is perhaps a little stronger in exports (Van Zon 2005, p393), we should not exaggerate ethnic differences: there is not in fact a huge differential in wealth between the two main ethnic groups, they have somewhat similar language and cultural referents, and there is a quite high degree of intermarriage (Gatev 2004; for the complex interaction of Ukrainian, Russian and Crimean Tartars in Crimea, see Korostelina 2005). Differences have emerged in a more focused fashion over issues of nationalism, the future of the country, and political power. Thus through 2004-2005, Putin, Leonard Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych overplayed the political mileage to be gained from these divisions:

What the Kremlin and its cheerleaders still fail to understand is that Ukraine really is not Russia. The differences in political cultures between the two societies made Ukrainians much harder to brainwash with slogans and symbols employed to legitimize the Kremlin’s authority. The country’s east-west cleavage was also
With the exception of a few regions, Ukrainians in all parts of the country had developed a sense of collective identity and togetherness, even though some of them speak Ukrainian and some Russian. (Silitski 2005)

3. Post-Soviet Ukraine: A Not So Neutral Power

As Ukraine emerged as an independent state through 1991-1992 with the breakup of the Soviet Union, there were early efforts to balance its relations with Russia, the U.S. and the NATO alliance. This began in part with the reduction and then elimination of nuclear weapons within the Ukraine. Indeed Russia, Belarus, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan all agreed to the terms of START I. START II was signed at the end of 1992 in order to reduce strategic delivery systems to less than one third pre-START levels and to eliminate all ICBM's (Intercontinental ballistic missiles) with multiple warheads. By 2001 Ukraine had eliminated any active nuclear weapons or nuclear-armed missile launch capabilities. Furthermore, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was established in December 1991 and all former members of the NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and Albania were invited to join. Some 38 nations including the United States and Russia were engaged in this process of dialogue. The NACC has also instituted a Military Cooperation Programme. In 1994-1995, for example, small numbers of Ukrainian and US troops joined in peacekeeping training exercises. Thereafter, it participated 'in the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine. This agreement allows Ukraine to participate in some NATO activities, such as forming volunteer teams in peacekeeping missions' (Ciobanu 1998).

Through the late 1990s, Ukraine maintained 'non-aggression' treaties with Russia and NATO, but only developed indirect patterns of cooperation with Western Europe, e.g. via some joint peace-keeping training with Poland. The Ukraine tried to improve relations with Poland, with whom it signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation in May 1992 (Larrabee 1996, p157). Likewise, a joint Polish-Ukraine peace-keeping battalion was planned in October 1995, with their headquarters in Przemysl (Larrabee 1996, p157). Ukraine has already begun such cooperation through PFP (partnership for peace) joint exercises, mainly in peacekeeping training, through 1994-5 (Larrabee 1996, p148). It must be stressed that the current relationship between the Ukraine and NATO does not include Article 5 of the NATO treaties, i.e. the requirement for mutual and collective defence. Ukraine also entered into 'most-favoured nation status' with the EU (Larrabee 1996, p153), though discussion of full EU membership remains unlikely through 2006 (see below). Part of the problem is that many likely Ukrainian exports are listed as sensitive within the EU schema: e.g. steel, chemicals, textiles and agricultural products (Larrabee 1996, p153). The European states with the most interest in the Ukraine to date has been Poland and Germany, which has pursued a balanced relationship between its relationship with the Ukraine and Russia (Larrabee 1996, p155). In particular, Ukraine would find it dangerous to become a buffer between the West and Russia, but would find membership in the EU productive (Straits Times 1996), and in 2002-2005 has sought a more cooperative relationship with NATO, though its early request to join NATO has not been accepted. However, the idea has made some gradual progress through 2003-2006, but has slowed down under Russian pressure through 2006-2007. Ukraine was part of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program of extended peace-keeping, and also sent troops to Iraq in 2003, while through 2006 the Ukraine
had received PfP funds to destroy excess small arms and conventional weapons (Interfax 2007).

The transition from the Soviet system to an independent Ukraine was not a smooth and open process. As described by one writer: -

Ukraine has known during the 1990s an economic and social implosion as a result of the abolition of its centrally planned economy, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the related grab and run practices of the new elite that emerged out of the old communist Nomenklatura, added with some elements from criminal milieus and the new rich. Rather than a transition towards a market economy and parliamentary democracy, Ukrainians saw a transition towards a neo-patrimonial society that remained to a large extent state dominated. The privatisation of large state owned enterprises only started in the 1990s. (Van Zon 2005, p374).

Likewise, most ordinary household suffered a reduced in real income of an average of 42% during 1992-2000, while many jobs were not effectively paid enough to survive without second jobs or other sources of income, and health care, public services and general education degraded (Van Zon 2005, pp374-375). Through 1998-2004 there was also strong penetration of the Ukrainian economy by Russian businesses, at first viewed negatively by Ukrainian nationalists, but also recognized as a pragmatic source of income and investment (Gatev 2004). For a time it seemed as if Ukraine would remain in the orbit of the Russian economy: -

Debt-stricken, cash-strapped and obsolete, the Ukrainian economy requires urgent inflows of investment if further deterioration is to be averted. In February 1998, Kiev and Moscow signed a ten-year Agreement on Economic Cooperation which officially opened Ukrainian privatisation to Russian investors. Russian companies went on a shopping spree, buying up not only oil refineries, underground storage tanks and port facilities in Odessa, but also aluminium plants, dairies, banks and Ukrainian broadcast media. The agreement marked the onset of a new stage in the relations between the two nations and signalled the opening of the Ukrainian economy to a Russian takeover. (Gatev 2004)

On this basis, through 2000 Russian investors had bought up to half of the Ukraine's energy delivery system and virtually controlled supply to Ukrainian refineries (Gatev 2004).

Border trade was also active, with up to 20 million crossings between Ukraine and Russia recorded annually through the late 1990s (Gatev 2004). In turn this has meant that EU border states in turn have had to strengthen borders control with the Ukraine. Through 2005 Russia still accounted for 21.9% of Ukraine's exports, and 35.6% of her imports, with Germany and Turkey being important secondary trading partners (DFAT 2006). In particular, the country needs large imports of gas and oil, making it highly reliant on Russia and Russian sourced pipelines, with up to $15 billion of fuel needed annually (Gatev 2004; see below). Until around 2002, Ukraine would only export around $12 billion, this means that it has run up debts with Russia that can be used as political leverage (Gatev 2004). In the 1990s, due to the Russo-Ukrainian Partnership Treaty, Russia had decided that it ‘forgive almost the entire Ukrainian energy debt in exchange for control of most of Sevastopol's port for the next 20 years' (Ciobanu 1998).
The economy did begin to pick up after 2000, with growth rates from 5%-12.1% through 2000-2006, with an increase from 2.6% in 2005 up to 5% for 2006 (DFAT 2006). However, by this stage wide-spread corruption had begun to control large sectors of the economy, while Transparency International rated Ukraine with a Corruption Perception Index of 122 in 2004, an extremely high level ranking with Sudan and Niger, (Van Zon 2005, p375), though somewhat lower than Haiti and Bangladesh at 145, though these are of course based on perceptions rather than proven court cases (see http://www.transparency.org/policy_and_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2004). Likewise, there was a trend for increasing control of the media, for harassment and even the murder of some journalism and on the basis of the Press Freedom Index Ukraine was ranked 138, not far from Russia at 140 for 2004 (Von Zon 2005, p375). Through most of 2004 the press remain embattled or stone-walled under former Leonid Kuchma's administration: -

The government used politically motivated libel cases and politically biased licensing mechanisms to harass media outlets that criticized the government. In October, the opposition television station Kanal 5 lost its broadcast license in the Kyiv area and then had its assets frozen by a Kyiv court, after parliamentarian Volodymyr Sivkovitch brought a civil defamation suit against one of Kanal 5’s owners, reformist parliamentarian Petro Poroshenko. The government misused the criminal justice system to punish journalists and stonewalled investigations into the unsolved murder cases of journalists, such as Heorhiy Gongadze, publisher of the online newspaper Ukrainska Pravda. (Freedom House 2005)

In particular, from November 2000 secretly recorded tapes from the office of President Kuchma were leaked (the Kuchma gate scandal), linking him 'to the murder of journalist Gongazde and also to large-scale corruption, illegal weapons deals and other wrongdoing's' (Von Zon 2005, p377). Kuchma also began to lose the support of some Ukrainian nationalists and small and middle-range business groups as he began to favour a smaller circle of oligarchs from eastern and central areas of the Ukraine (Von Zon 2005, p377). From 2000-2004 his popularity and influence began to decline, even as those around benefited form privatisation and control of the energy sector. From 2002 excluded businessmen formed the Razom group (together), that began to support the Our Ukraine ‘electoral bloc' led by Viktor Yushchenko (Von Zon 2005, p378).

Timeline II: 1991-2004 (after BBC 2006a)

1991 - Ukraine declares independence following attempted coup in Moscow: 90% vote for independence in nationwide referendum in December.
Early to mid 1990s - About 250,000 Crimean Tatars and their descendants return to Crimea following collapse of Soviet Union.
1996 - New, democratic constitution adopted. New currency, the hryvna, is introduced.
1997 - Friendship treaty signed with Russia. Ukraine and Russia also reach agreement on the Black Sea fleet.
1999 - Death penalty abolished. President Kuchma re-elected.
2000 - Chernobyl nuclear power plant is shut down, 14 years after the accident. Well over ten thousand people have died as a direct result of the explosion, the health of millions more has been affected.
2000 - Georgiy Gongadze, journalist and strong critic of the authorities, murdered in 2001 February - The European Union calls for an inquiry into the murder of an
investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze. Opposition demonstrations allege that
President Kuchma was involved and call for his impeachment. President Kuchma
denies the allegations.

2001 April - Viktor Yushchenko government dismissed following no-confidence vote
in parliament. Yushchenko was respected in the West for fighting corruption, pushing
ahead with economic reforms and working to attract investment but unpopular with
numerous powerful Ukrainian businessmen.

2001 October - Ukraine's last Soviet-era nuclear missile silo destroyed.

2002 March - General election results in hung parliament. Parties opposed to
President Kuchma allege widespread electoral fraud.

2002 May - Leadership announces decision to launch formal bid to join NATO.

2002 September - Opposition stages mass protests demanding resignation of
President Kuchma whom they accuse of corruption and misrule. Relations with the
West are strained after US officials authenticate recordings in which they say
Kuchma is heard to approve the sale of early-warning radar systems to Iraq. On the
same tapes, recorded over two years previously, Kuchma is also allegedly heard
ordering an official to "deal with" journalist Georgiy Gongadze.

2002 November - President Kuchma sacks Prime Minister Kinakh. Viktor
Yanukovych, governor of Donetsk region, appointed to replace him. He promises to
fight poverty and work for integration into Europe.

2003 March - Tens of thousands of people join Kiev demonstrations demanding that
Kuchma resign.

2003 August - First detachment of Ukrainian troops leaves for Iraq. Kiev promises to
send 1,600 soldiers to help restore order.

2003 October - Border dispute erupts with Moscow after Russia embarks on building
causeway across the Kerch Strait between Russian coast and Ukrainian island of
Tuzla off Crimean shores. The strait also separates the Black Sea from the Azov Sea.

2003 December - Presidents Kuchma and Putin meet in Crimea, sign agreement on
joint use of Kerch Strait and status of Azov Sea in apparent move to defuse border
dispute, although Kremlin denies that Tuzla featured in discussions.

2004 June - Consortium in which President Kuchma's son-in-law Viktor Pinchuk
plays key role buys Krivorizhstal, the country's largest steel mill, for a bargain price.

2004 August - Ukraine ignores protests from EU and Romania by opening canal in
the Danube delta which will link with Black Sea, rejecting claims that it will cause
environmental damage.

At the same time, Russia was concerned that even though it had improved relations
with the EU, NATO, and the US, that Ukraine remain at least in large measure as part of
Russian zone of influence (Silitski 2005). This included a desire to veto any rapid
movement towards full NATO participation, effort to retain access to the Ukrainian
economy, and the need to influence its energy costing and pipeline politics. This in
turn led to major effort to alter the path of the Ukraine through 2004-2007 (see
below).

4. The Orange Revolution and Difficult Transitions

The 'orange' revolution that swept through Ukraine in late 2004 was based on a
number of linked factors. It was 'orange' because Kiev 'residents mixed with swarms
of protesters from across the country, all wearing something orange, the color of
Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party' (Quinn-Judge 2004). The revolution was in large
measure a protest against corrupted elections, but it was also an indigenous
popular revolt combined with a concerted political opposition. The fact that it was
not suppressed violently was largely due to 'defections' within the security forces, combined with support from part of the 'business and political elite' (Van Zon 2005, p374). Though foreign support for the revolution was significant (from Europe, Poland, the U.S., and key proponents of people-power revolution), these external factors should not be exaggerated. Likewise, Russian pressure against reform was probably in the end counter-productive.

One key element of the Ukraine is that it had some diversity of power groups, both in terms of geography (different elites in the Crimea, Kiev, and the western zones of the country). Likewise, the previous Kuchma government had sought to maintain the appearance of democratic structures, allowing (controlled) elections, a parliament with some legislative powers, an electoral commission (partly corrupted and penetrated) and a constitutional court. Likewise, some media managed to remain independent, while many students and protesters managed to resist coercion on how they should vote (see below). This mixture of authoritarianism and limited pluralism meant that some of these institutions could either defect or take on a more autonomous role through 2004-2006 (for the background theory, see Howard 2002; Silitski 2005). Alternatively, this has been seen as competitive authoritarianism (Kuzio 2006; Van Zon 2005, p376), with several figures emerging as the focus for state and business interests. Likewise, privatization, though far from even, did allow a sharing of economic power in the country - i.e. pluralism by default (Van Zon 2005, p396, following Lucan Way). In this setting, ‘oligarchic capitalism had emerged alongside these unconsolidated competitive autocracies’ (Silitski 2005). In this setting, Leonid Kuchma, deeply involved in political scandals and under indirect pressure from European states, obeyed that constitutional limit that would not let him run for office a third time, but tried to manipulate elections to ensure that his candidate, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, would win the Presidential elections of late 2004.

Yanukovych represented key business and regional interests: -

Viktor Yanukovych originates from the eastern industrial province of Donetsk, where 10 per cent of the Ukrainian population lives. He represents a clan that became the most powerful in Ukraine in 2000. Its fortunes were based on coal and steel. The clan operates in a criminalized region where dissent has been made impossible and where competition was replaced by insider deals and corruption. Donetsk represented a model of social and economic development that fitted well in the traditions of Donetsk but was alien to many other parts of the Ukraine. When Yanukovych became Prime Minister (November 2002) Ukraine made a further move towards autocracy. (Van Zon 2005, p376)

Indeed, Yanukovych himself had suffered two earlier jail terms for theft of state property and manslaughter, with the Russians holding his criminal records, giving them some leverage over him (Van Zon 2005, p377). Yanukovych and his supporters tried to manipulate the elections in a number of ways, using pressure on students and government workers as to how they should vote, as well as drawing on conservative members of the Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate to influence voters (Van Zon 2005, p380). Likewise, there were direct attacks on Yushchenko from mid-2004, first by a truck, and then by the poisoning (with high levels of dioxin) in September 2004, while in November 2004 a car bomb operation against his headquarters was stopped, with two Russian citizens being arrested (Van Zon 2005, p381, p383, p387). Ukrainian intelligence has suggested that the highly
toxic form of dioxin was manufactured in a lab near St. Petersburg, and that the Russian intelligence agency FSB might have been involved (Meyer 2005). Likewise, on election day many 'dead voters' appeared to vote, a high number of Yushchenko votes (almost 2.33%) were annulled for technical reasons by the Central Election Committee, and it seems that some 500,000 pre-marked voting papers had been prepared in advance (Van Zon 2005, pp384-385). The Central Election Committee computer was also hacked, with some 1.1 million votes being added to Yanukovych's score - in the end there were more votes recorded and voters registered (Van Zon 2005, p386).

These factors came to a head when the supposed outcome of the first elections were announced, with Yanukovych winning with 39.9% against Yushchenko's 39.3%, when exit polls had suggested that Yushenko should have received 44% of the vote and Yanukovych only 38% (Van Zon 2005, p384). In the second round run-off election, it was announced that Yanukovych had won with 49.4% against Yushchenko's 46.7% though polls suggested that Yushchenko should have won by 11% (Van Zon 2005, p386).

There was widespread protest against what seemed to be an ongoing collusion of 'phoney democracy' with corrupted government and 'oligarchic crony-capitalists' (Meyer 2005). At this stage, the opposition groups moved to a people-power strategy to contest the outcome of the election counts:

Immediately after the second round of elections a crowd of hundreds of thousands gathered on the Maidan, the central square of Kyiv. The crowd stayed in the square for two weeks. Most of them came spontaneously to the Maidan. The dynamics of politics was replaced with the dynamics of revolution. (Van Zon 2005, p386).

This virtual tent city placed enormous pressure on Kuchma and Yanukovych, and the security forces warned that direct military action against the protestors would not be tolerated. A high level of local support, plus internet and mobile phone networks, helped organise food, transport and the logistics need to sustain the protest (Van Zon 2005, p387). Likewise, the discussions of separatism or federalisation by some mayors and governors in the east and south of the Ukraine could not be sustained as a threat (Van Zon 2005, pp387-388). By November 27 2004 some 1 million demonstrators were active on Kiev streets and Yushchenko had mobilised strong security for his supporters in case violence broke out, including 55 former security officers and 4,000 volunteers (Van Zon 2005, p389). Kuchma, meanwhile, was virtually barricaded in his 'recreation facility' in the suburbs and could not get to his office (Van Zon 2005, p389).

Key factors mobilised a successful opposition movement that ensured a re-rerun of the elections. They included:

- The campaign movement Pora (meaning 'it is time') was able to maintain cohesion based on 75 action groups and 10,000 activists from mid-2004 (Van Zon 2005, p376). It also assured that activists were in general law-abiding (Silitski 2005) and did not allow uncontrolled violence to de-rail the public protest.
- Several non-state groups began to act against the closed power circle of government, including Razom (a business group), the Our Ukraine electoral
bloc, and from early 2004 New Choice, based on around 100 NGOs (Van Zon 2005, p378).

- **External groups such as trainers from the Otpor group** who had helped push out Milosevic from Serbia helped maintain a coherent and peaceful organisation (Van Zon 2005, p376). A similar group, Khmara, helped push forward the Georgian transition, and were also influenced by the methods of the Serbian group Otpor (Silitski 2005; Akerman & Duvall 2005).

- **Some media managed to remain independent**, such as Channel 5 and later on the 1 + 1 channel, while other journalists managed to withdraw their support from outlets involved in government propaganda, with some 400 journalists making a public declaration against government misinformation (Van Zon 2005, p376, p379, p388).

- **Fragmentation within the security services**, with some groups turning against Kuchma and later on Yanukovych through the 2000-2004 period. By late November 2005 the Minister of Defence (Kuzmuk) declared that the army would 'defend the interests of the people', while several generals of the SBU (Ukraine's secret service) publicly declared that they would 'not obey illegal orders' (Van Zon 2005, p388). These views were supported by 300 diplomats and the mayor of Kiev (Van Zon 2005, p389).

- **The Supreme Court** stopped the election committee placing 400 polling stations in Russia (Van Zon 2005, p379), where they would have been easily manipulated.

- **There was enough diversity and opposition members in the parliament** to support the Supreme Court and allow elections to be annulled (Silitski 2005).

- **Yushchenko himself had been quite popular** as Prime Minister in 2000-2001 when he had managed to pay 'back wages and pensions', but his reforms had gone too far in threatening the vested oligarch interests in the energy trade (Van Zon 2005, p381) and he was thereafter dismissed, in effect going opposition.

- **Russian efforts to pressure** (or perhaps even remove) Yushchenko backfired with many Ukrainians, e.g. Putin's claim in November 2004 that he would not accept an opposition victory (Hirsh & Brown 2004; Van Zon 2005, pp382-83). There were also reports that Russian special forces had been to Kiev during late 2004, and Russia may have contributed up to $300 million to Yanukovych's political campaigns (Van Zon 2005, p382; Meyer 2005). Putin also made the mistake of congratulating Yanukovych on his victory before the election results had been announced by the Central Election Committee (Van Zon 2005, p388). Combined with Putin’s own control of the Russian media and political system, it was as of he was willing to export autocracy (Silitski 2005).

- **'Western assistance programs'** did help fund NGOs, independent media outlets, and helped fund the Pora campaign movement (Van Zon 2005, p383). This funding was part aiding 'people power' strategies, but also had vested interests in regime change in order to see a more pro-Western Ukrainian government. The impact of this support was real but should not be exaggerated, and both Yushchenko and President Saakashvili of Georgia, when meeting in early 2005, emphasised in the Carpathian Declaration that such peaceful revolutions are largely driven by internal needs and peoples, and not by external manipulation (Ackerman & Duvall 2005).

- **Western governments and their agencies** also supported change in a range of ways, including the September 2004 US House of Representatives declaration that it would engage in low level sanctions if the elections were not fair, and EU demands for fair elections and financing of exit-polls (surveying voting trends...
on the day of the election) to check for miscounting or corruption in the election (see Van Zon 2005, p384). There was also some help from think-tanks and PR managers in helping manage a strong electoral showing in spite of government control of most resources (Silitski 2005). Likewise, elements in the Ukrainian secret service (SBU), working with communication intercepts, MI6 and CIA officers, managed to alert the US with then Secretary of State Colin Powell warning Kuchma and some generals not to mobilise 13,000 troops with live ammunition (Van Zon 2005, p390).

- The presence of some 4,000 foreign election observers (Van Zon 2005, p384), combined with exit-poll surveys and independent media, meant that election irregularities and fraud was quickly revealed. The EU protested the early rounds of elections as fraudulent, and the Bush administration and most European leaders called for a new vote (Hirsh & Brown 2004).

- International Mediation soon arrived to reduce the likelihood of military suppression of the protest. President Kwasniewski of Poland, President Admankus of Lithuania, and Javier Solana, European 'foreign policy chief' arrived in November to moderate tensions. (Van Zon 2005, p388; see further Meyer 2005; Goldman 2006).

The EU delegation persuaded Kuchma to run new a election, the Ukrainian parliament annulling the earlier ones, and the Supreme court announced a re-run of the second round, with the Central Election Committee being prosecuted for an abuse of authority (Van Zon 2005, p392). On 26 December 2004, Yushchenko won the new elections with almost 52% of the vote, Yanukovych with 44% drawn most from the east and south of the country (Van Zon 2005, p393).

5. Pipeline Politics and Beyond

Ukraine, Russia, Europe, Central Asia and Turkey have become enmeshed in a major political debate over energy access, pricing, and control. Through 1999-2007, Russia shifted towards a strategy designed to ensure control and influence over these issues in the Ukraine. By 1999-2002 there had already been major concerns about the way Russia has managed its energy industry, its control of pipelines, and the activities of two major companies, Gazprom and Itera (the International Energy Corporation), which have handled much of the energy exports into Western and Central Europe. Gazprom through 2000 controlled 98% of Russia's energy production, 20% of global gas output, and made annual sale in the order of $17 billion, thereby generating 8% of Russian GDP and 25% of Russian federal tax incomes, with the Russian state owning approx. 38% of Gazprom shares (Adams 2002, p14). Itera and Gazprom have been involved in major disputes with the Ukraine concerning outstanding energy bills, the management of the major pipelines through Ukraine into Europe, and claims that Ukraine was 'siphoning off' more gas than agreed, leading to major court and insurance claims through 2000 (Adams 2002, pp17-18). Gazprom has planned to build new pipelines through Poland to deal with these problems, as well as to meet a projected doubling of gas supplied to Western Europe through 2020 (Adams 2002, p18). Presidents Putin and Kuchma met in October 2000 to agree upon principles that would reduce these problems, and again in May 2003 claimed to be coordinating their approach to energy provision into Europe (Xinhua 2003). Russia provides about 20% of Europe's gas supplies and hopes to increase exports towards the 30% mark, along with Norway and Algeria, as North Sea
resources decrease and Europe comes to import 85% of its energy needs (Adams 2002, pp20-21). However, this is not a risk free process for Russia, since Europe would seek to attach a range of compliance requirements on the Russian energy sector, as outlined in the EU's Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and signed but not ratified by Russia in 1994, and leading to fierce debates within Russia from 1996 (Adams 2002, p20). Compliance would involve opening up the sector to fairer competition, make it more transparent, and allow free transit for gas from Central Asia, potentially greatly reducing Gazprom's profits (Adams 2002, pp20-21). At the same time, signing on would attract new loans and investment into Russia's 'fuel and energy complex', with Russia's Energy Ministry suggesting that Russia needs $480-600 billion of investment into infrastructure this area over a twenty year period (Adams 2002, p20).

In large measure, Eastern Europe and parts of Western Europe have become dependent on Russian oil and gas for energy supplies, with many of these pipelines running across the Ukraine, though some move across Poland or the Baltic States (see www.osw.waw.pl/images/gasMap.jpg). Likewise, it has been hoped that lines such as the Odessa-Brody pipeline will soon ship Caspian oil to Europe, making it less reliant on Russia (Van Zon 2005, p383). From 2004 Ukraine 'decided to use the oil pipeline between the port of Odessa (Black Sea) and Brody (North-West Ukraine, near the Polish border) in a South-North direction, meaning that it will carry oil from the Caspian basin towards Poland and the North-East of Europe' (European Report 2004a). Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and the European Commission remain committed to the project through late 2005 (European Report 2005a). Yet in the end, Ukraine remains a strategic and crucial part of the energy supply network for Europe and Eurasia, including lines running in Turkey (the Blue Stream gas project running part under the Black Sea). At the same time, Russia can largely control pricing and flow of these energy, and does have some partial alternative routes into northern Europe.

6. Ukraine and Sustaining the Westward Tilt?

Relations of Ukraine with the EU and NATO have been one of the agenda items in Eurasia in the 21st century. In part, Ukraine is once again a new borderzone, situated between these western institutions and the Russian sphere of influence. The Ukraine is now one of the largest states now bordering on the expanded EU, and as such has been viewed as a necessary partner is issues ranging from border control through to migration and environmental management. Bearing in mind the slowed momentum of EU integration through 2005, it is unlikely that the Ukraine would become a full member of the EU for the short or medium-term future.

However, 'Ukraine's economic needs can be largely satisfied through participation in EU's "neighbourhood policy," whereby it would be enabled to join the bloc's internal market without access to the Union' (Cohen 2005, p7). In this strategy, states such as Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus would become sustainable through parallel reforms and access to the EU economy, but not become accession members (Gatev 2004). This is also another way of setting some limits on the troubled expansion of the EU, which has had trouble moving towards a more integrated constitutional framework, as well as hesitancy even over the speed of existing candidates such as Turkey. However, it has been argued that: ‘Ukrainians particularly deserve to share in the
benefits of their proximity to the European Union in the form of more trade, a better visa regime, and, yes, the prospect of political integration, even if that does not mean membership for the foreseeable future’ (Silitski 2005). If so, this means that in the future there will still need to a serious reshuffling of relations among the Ukraine, Russia, the EU and NATO, and issue that lead to enhanced cooperation or periods of intense conflict across border zones. Through 2004-2006 it was not clear that the EU's New Neighbourhood Policy was strong enough to ensure that Ukraine will be able to avoid 'slipping back' into the orbit of Russia's sphere of economic and military interests (Gatev 2004).

NATO has also been viewed as another major vehicle whereby Ukraine's independence, directly or indirectly, might be guaranteed. One major change in world affairs has been the retasking since 1991 of NATO from its role as a defensive alliance to a wide security community concerned with the interests and stability of wider Europe. This has included expansion to include Baltic and Eastern European states, a sustained and institutionalised dialogue with Russia (via the x council), a regular dialogue with Mediterranean states, as well as operations in Afghanistan. Perhaps the most radical step in enlargement would be the possible entry of Ukraine into NATO. The US has suggest that it would support Ukraine's membership as part of a round of NATO expansion in 2007 (Cohen 2005), as part of a wider process.

In spite of Russia generally positive relations with the EU and US, and its dialogue process with NATO, such expansion would entail real tensions with Russian leadership circles and Russian public views: -

The Russians view Kievan Rus, a medieval Slavic and Orthodox Christian state that extended from Kiev on the Dnieper to the Lower Volga, as the "nuclear core" or birthplace of modern Russia. Kiev, the "mother of cities," was a Slavic settlement dating to the 5th century on the trade route between Constantinople and Scandinavia. . . . .

Admission of Ukraine to NATO would threaten Russian's strategically vital Black Sea fleet based Sevastopol in the Crimea. In 1997, the Russians and Ukrainians signed an accord that confirmed Ukraine's title for the Crimea. This provided for Russia's lease of Sevastopol naval facilities for the major part of its Black Sea fleet, as well as for the maintenance of its radar anti-missile systems that are centered at Sevastopol and Mukachevo. (Cohen 2005, p7; see further Kryukov 2006)

In fact the division of the Black Sea fleet and access to naval resources their went through a complex process of legal confrontation through 1991-1996, a period of the signing of basic agreements through 1997-1999, and implementation of practical solutions from 2000 onwards (Kryukov 2006). In the end Ukraine would retain about 18% of the 840 vessels in the Black Sea fleet while the Russians would have a 20 year lease agreement to the main naval base in Sevastopol, though control of number of light houses and support facilities in the Crimea have not been fully settled (see Kryukov 2006).

Furthermore, the presence of these foreign, non-NATO troops and assets is in direct contradiction to the criteria for NATO membership (Kryukov 2006), and NATO membership would involve withdrawal of these forces and a change in the status of the naval bases. In the worst case scenario, early NATO membership would not only spark another round of tensions with Russia, but might also re-open tensions between Ukrainians and Russians living in the eastern sector of the
country itself (Cohen 2005, p7). However, from late 2004 Yushchenko made it clear that he had wanted to bring Ukraine into the EU and NATO, following on the lead of Poland and the Baltic States (Hirsh & Brown 2004). Though this might receive support from the Bush administration and Poland, countries such as Belgium, France and Germany might be cautious about alarming Russia and wish to slow down this process (see Meyer 2005). In spite of Russian and domestic opposition, President Yushchenko has remained positive on cooperation with NATO: -

Ukraine will continue playing an active role in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko told the alliance's Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at a meeting in Munich, the Ukrainian leader's press service reported on Saturday.

Late last year Ukraine finalized all legal formalities of its participation in NATO's Active Endeavor anti-terrorist operation, Yushchenko said.

Integration with Euro-Atlantic organizations is Ukraine's strategic objective, the president said. Formulating a consolidated position of all of Ukraine's leading political forces regarding the pace at which relations with NATO should develop in the future is high on the country's agenda, he added.

Yushchenko expressed his gratitude to de Hoop Scheffer for NATO's assistance in disposing of Ukraine's excessive stockpiles of ammunition, light and small weapons, as well as mobile air defense missile systems. The aid has been provided by the NATO/Partnership for Peace Trust Fund. (Interfax 2007)

Sustaining both the Orange Revolution and the westward tilt has been problematic for President Yushchenko. Yulia Tymoshenko had been an active and 'charismatic' leader in late 2004, but she was dismissed last summer as Prime Minister on claims that members of her Cabinet had been corrupt. The ministers and leaders of government also seemed too focused on the west and centre of the country, while in turn 'former cronies of Kuchma have transformed themselves into supporters' of Yushchenko, leaving the President little scope to engage in comprehensive and unifying reform through just over one year in office before the parliamentary elections of March 2006 (Van Zon 2005, p397). Moreover, the following Cabinet was thereafter sacked in turn by Parliament due to claims they had given too much in negotiations with Russia, leading government virtual paralysis through early 2006 as Russia began to increase energy prices to the Ukraine (Van Zon 2005, p397; Feduschak 2006). The deal being negotiated was to ensure local gas supplies at low current prices, but industry would pay higher prices - this led to a no confidence vote against Prime Minister Yuri Yekhanurov's government, a vote support by 250 out of 450 deputies (ABC 2006a).

These events took a twist through March 2006 with a loss of support for Yushchenko leading to the party of Viktor Yanukovych (Party of the Regions) ahead in parliamentary elections, while Yushchenko's Our Ukraine came in third at around 9% (Feduschak 2006; Kuzio 2006). Former supporters of Yushchenko claim that he has not been able 'to end corruption, to prosecute former officials involved in suspected fraud and to bring about economic growth' (Feduschak 2006). The result has been the appointment of Yanukovych as Prime Minister (since he heads the largest party), after the Orange coalition was unable to retain a stable government leading first to an Anti-Crisis government, then a National Unity Coalition through August 2006.
Timeline III: 2004-2007 (after BBC 2007a)

2004 November - Official count indicates presidential election victory for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Western observers report widespread vote rigging. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko launches campaign of street protest and civil disobedience. Supreme Court later annuls result of poll.

2004 December - Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko tops poll in election re-run. Rival candidate Viktor Yanukovych challenges result but resigns as prime minister.

2005 January - Viktor Yushchenko sworn in as president after Supreme Court rejects challenge by losing candidate Mr Yanukovych.

2005 February - President's nominee Yulia Tymoshenko overwhelmingly approved as prime minister by parliament.

2005 February - Court annuls June 2004 sale of Krivorizhstal.

2005 March - President Yushchenko announces that suspected killers of journalist Georgiy Gongadze are in custody. He also accuses the former authorities of a cover-up. Former Interior Minister Kravchenko, who had been due to give evidence in Gongadze investigation, shot dead in apparent suicide.

2005 September - Oleksandr Zinchenko resigns as President Yushchenko's chief of staff and makes corruption allegations against several senior officials. The president dismisses the government of Yulia Tymoshenko. Parliament approves Mr Yushchenko's candidate for the premiership, Yuri Yekhanurov, at the second attempt.

2005 October - Krivorizhstal reauctioned. Mittal Steel pays six times the price paid for it when it was originally put up for sale.

2006 January - Russia briefly cuts supply of gas for Ukrainian use in row over prices. Moscow says its reasons are purely economic but Kiev says they are political. Concerns that the deal ending the gas dispute had yielded too much to Russia lead parliament to pass a vote sacking the government of Yuri Yekhanurov. President Yushchenko says he will consult lawyers over the move. The government carries on for the time being. The trial of three former policemen charged with killing opposition journalist Georgiy Gongadze begins in Kiev. Mr Gongadze's widow says that those who ordered the killing must also face justice. Russia accuses Ukraine of seizing a Crimean peninsula lighthouse which it says the 1997 Black Sea Fleet agreement gave it the right to use. Ukraine insists that the lighthouse is its property.

2006 March - Viktor Yanukovych's party tops polls in parliamentary elections. Yuliya Tymoshenko's takes second place, leaving President Yushchenko's trailing in third.

2006 June-July - After months of bargaining, the backers of the Orange Revolution - the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko blocs and the Socialists - agree on a coalition, but the deal collapses. The Socialists agree instead on a coalition with Viktor Yanukovych's Party of Regions and the Communists. Coalition nominates Mr Yanukovych as prime minister.

2006 August - Faced with a deadline to accept Mr Yanukovych's nomination or call new elections, President Yushchenko agrees that his rival can become prime minister.

2006 September - At least 13 die in gas leak at Donetsk coal mine.

2007 February - Boris Tarasyuk, a close ally of the president and a strong advocate of strengthening ties with Europe and NATO resigns as foreign minister after a protracted row with parliament.

Political life in the Ukraine has begun to change, since the political culture has changed towards a new openness and some greater independence from Moscow. The Orange revolution has brought about ‘media freedom, greater civil activity, free
and fair elections, the breaking of ties between oligarchs and organised crime, and lower levels of corruption . . .' (Kuzio 2006). After constitutional reform, the country is now more of a parliamentary democracy (with a president), rather than procedural democracy masking a 'superpresidential' system (Kuzio 2006).

However, on the basis of the trends, it is too early to speak of a successful ‘democratic contagion’ (Silitski 2005), linking events in Georgia and Ukraine with transition in Kyrgyzstan (still problematic), or in the future for Belarus or even Russia (see Meyer 2005). Belarus, for example, though in theory allowing some independent and opposition organisations, in fact has passed laws allowing the Presidency of Lukashenka to become a lifelong office and he is likely to dominate the March 2006 elections (Silitski 2005; see further East Week 2006). Events in Ukraine still have a long way to go before its revolution is a general success, while events in Uzbekistan, for example, suggest vigorous efforts to avoid such contagion (see lecture 4). Likewise, it is important to be clear about the diverse interests that might be served by such transition, not all of them democratic or based on local democratic interests. At present, Ukraine has to balance its Russian and Western influences, as well as develop a balance between the different segments within its own complex society. This is something that President Yushchenko has failed to do (as of 2007), and at present it seems unlikely that he will win the 2009 presidential elections (Kuzio 2006).

7. Further Reading, Resources and Bibliography

Resources

Transparency International has a useful webpage, including country data, at http://www.transparency.org/

The webpage of the Ukrainian political organisation Razom, in English, can be found via at http://www.razom.org.ua/

The homepage of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, with some interesting political and economic analysis, can be found at http://www.kiis.com.ua/?id=2&sp=1&lng=eng

For one example of an organisation committed to transition to democracy, see the National Endowment for Democracy webpage at http://www.ned.org/

Further Reading: One or more of the following are useful -


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