INTR13-304 & INTR71/72-304, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia 

To understand what is happening today within Central Asia, it is necessary to have an understanding of the troubled history of Afghanistan, and to assess the regional influence of instability in Afghanistan (for more historical detail, see Kaker 1995; Banuazizi & Weiner 1986; Ghaus 1988; Weinbaum 1994). The 'geostrategic location' between the West Asia, Central Asia, and South Asia has forced Afghanistan to be involved in key international and regional contests of power. Afghanistan can be either viewed historically as part of South Asia, or part of an emerging 'Greater Central Asia', but really is a kind of linking-hinge between the two areas (Nojumi 2002, p1). The civil wars in Afghanistan (1978-2001) represent the fragmentation of a state system into zones of control by different warring factions only partly based on ethnic and religious divisions (see Roy 1991, p7). Recent international intervention and efforts at reconstruction (2001-2003) have yet to heal many of the negative legacies of proxy wars, civil wars, and authoritarian regimes (see below).

Afghanistan was also the focus of regional power plays by Pakistan (which sought to strengthen her hand against India by creating a zone of Sunni Islamic influence through the region, see Roy 1991, p4), Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Iran. More significantly, the former superpower rivalry of the USSR and the US helped prolong and intensify the war, without due regard for the impact on the region once both sides withdrew their direct support. The sustained turmoil in Afghanistan can be viewed as the failure to build a modern nation-state, though this effort has been revived with international support through 2002-2003. The notion of a modern state system for Afghanistan was first envisaged by the late 19^th century Amir Abdur Rahman (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont 2000, p419), but foundering under the impact of decades of civil war, and then the theocratic view of the state held by the Taliban. It is only from 2002 that Afghanistan has a change to built a more balanced state widely recognised within the international community.

The traditional Afghan state had been dominated by the Durranis clan-network of the Pushtun (Afghan, also transliterated as Pushton) ethnic group, at first based around a traditional kingship, modified by constitutional restraints, especially from 1964 onwards (Nojumi 2002, p31). However, in 1973 Mohammed Daud seized power in an almost bloodless coup, deposed King Zahir, and declared a republic, but he soon alienated 'left-wing factions' who mobilised against him (BBC 2003). Daud for a time encouraged more aid and trade from the Soviet Union, but through 1976-1977 tried to chart a more independent foreign policy path (Nojumi 2002, p39). Daud in turn was overthrown and killed by the Communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (the PDPA), on 27 April 1978, when an armoured brigade captured the palace in Kabul. Thereafter there was strong infighting between two political factions within the PDPA, the Khalq (based mainly on Pushtun clan-network and rural groups) and Parcham (more based on urban groups and Tajiks), with the leadership of Noor Mohammed Taraki soon being replaced by that of Hafizullah Amin (Nojumi 2002, p25, p31, p65).

The Soviet-backed communist government in turn was almost overthrown by massive rural insurgencies throughout 1979, beginning in March in Herat, based on resentment against the policies of the PDPA, failures in land reform, and repressive security measures, including execution and torture of opponents (Nojumi 2002, p52, p56). It was at this stage that, influenced by the Brezhnev doctrine of intervening to support 'friendly socialist states', the Soviets invaded with a force large enough, they thought, to stabilise what would become a client communist government.

The invasion occurred on 27 December 1979 and shocked Western opinion. This force of 110,000 men (mainly the Soviet fortieth army), though able to hold sectors of control, was not enough to search out and destroy the Mujahedin opposition forces, and in any case was not well trained in counter-insurgency operations. It also had to fight against forces using guerilla tactics, and soon found that the morale of its own troops was very low (see Nawroz & Grau 1996). It was strong enough, however, to support the continued existence of the PDPA government under the leadership of Babrak Karmal, followed by a new Soviet backed leadership Najibullah from 1986. During the late 1980s Najibullah tried to build up a multi-ethnic state based on national republican lines, and from 1991 even sought through a national amnesty to draw Mujahedin opposition forces into a reconciliation process (Nojumi 2002, pp75-76). He failed to achieve this. The result was a long, messy civil war, with the pro-Islamic and anti-Soviet forces gradually increasing their successes, largely due to massive supplies of weapons from Pakistan and the US (via the ISI, Inter-Services Intelligence, of Pakistan and the CIA, who bought many weapons for the insurgents from China for reasons of plausible deniability, see Lohbeck 1993; Roy 1991).

The war in Afghanistan became very significant to the Soviets and Russia for the following reasons: -

In was in the context of Gorbachev's reforms aimed at reducing tension with the West that Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan during 1988-1989. The final defeat of the previously Soviet-backed forces occurred in April 1992, and was due to several Mujahedin factions, especially to the action of the Tajik commander Ahmed Massoud who supported the Tajik-oriented Rabbani government (Saikal 1994, p14. Rabbani had originally led the JIA or Islamic Party, Jamaiat-e-Islami). Other factions included the Hezb-e Islami (Islamic Party or HIH) of 'renegade' Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (backed by Pakistan channelled resources, see Roy 1991, p40; Nojumi 2002, p101), a group of Taliban fighters (sometimes also transliterated as 'Taleban'), originally religious students supported by Pakistan and trained in the conservative Deoband school of Islamic thought (who became the prominent anti-government forces from 1994 through 1996, Pannier 1996), and, controlling much of the northwest 'an Uzbek communist warlord', Abdul Rashid Dostam, who sided with Massoud in 1992, but in 1993 moved to side with Hekmatyar (Saikal 1994, p14; for the best account of groups until 1994, see Khalilzad 1995). Other prominent leaders are Ismail Khan who controlled a zone in the southwest (Nojumi 2002, p17), and the Hazara warlord Karim Khalili, both of whom received some limited support from Iran (Strategic Comments 2001). Aside from these 'internal' front commanders, a number of different groups in Iran and Pakistan tried to influence events (external fronts), as well as the Rome-based group that surrounded the former king, Mohammed Zahir (Nojumi 2002, p20). Through this period, much of Afghan society was mobilised either into left-wing factions, or into splintered Islamic groups (see Emadi 2001), leading to a relatively weak nationalist centre that might have more strongly supported the Rabbani government.

It was this factional fight over power that would make the formation of a stable government almost impossible even after the victory of the Mujahedin against the Najibullah regime in 1992. On April 26, 1992, Massoud's forces, in conjunction with those of Dostam, took control of Kabul with very little opposition (Nojumi 2002, p96). However, an accord for power sharing among the different factions could not be sustained, in spite of efforts to share leadership positions among Rabbani (as President) and Hekmatyar (as Prime Minister). By June 1992, fierce fighting had broken out between different armed groups, leading to a shelling of the city and intense urban warfare in Kabul - 3,000 were killed, 19,000 wounded, and several hundred thousand fled the city during this stage of conflict (Nojumi 2002, p114).

The Rabbani government, though opposed by other factions and not widely recognised, and not in control of all territory, was relatively moderate in Afghan terms, and may have had a broader base of support than the West thought (Saikal 1994, pp14-15). It received arms and support from Iran, Russia, India and Tajikistan, and until late 1996 held the capital Kabul, and through its ally Massoud, the main airport of Bagram (Rashid 1996, p20). At the same time, it was possible that Russia had been giving some backing both to the Massoud and to the Dostam factions, perhaps seeking to gain influence with both, or in order to keep the war going in order to prevent a potentially united Afghanistan threatening its policy in the 'near abroad' (Khalilzad, 1994, p151).

Unfortunately, competition over the control of Kabul lead to another major conflict through the mid-1990s, with proxy interests escalating the war. Pakistan, in particular, has been interested in the option of a strong role in Central Asia, with the need to have strong influence on any government in Kabul in order to do this. An early UN peace initiative to bring together the contenting parties in Afghanistan to form an interim coalition government (UN Chronicle 1995a) was aborted in February 1995 as the balance of power once again was shifted by groups seeking to control the capital Kabul (Strategic Comments 1995). Severe fighting broke out around Kabul again in mid 1995, and much of the city has been destroyed with up to half its population displaced (UN Chronicle 1995b). Likewise, during the mid-1990s regional neighbours including Russia, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia had taken a somewhat stronger stand in supporting particular factions within the country (Rashid 1996; Saikal 1994, p13).

In late 1996 Taliban forces (see below), supported unofficially by Pakistan, engaged in a major northern offensive which gave them control of Kabul. Bearing in mind the radically orthodox form of Islam supported by the Taliban, which favours compulsory use of the veil for women and their seclusion, including no involvement in work or public education (see Goodson 2001), this shocked world opinion. Since there were 30,000 to 50,000 widows in Afghanistan by this time, forbidding them to work was an extremely serious problem (Pannier 1996). Likewise, the Taliban had an unusual interpretation of Islamic law, apparently even forbidding chess as a form of gambling (Pannier 1996), as well as opposing all non-religious audio and video materials. Even Iranian religious leaders have criticised this form of Islam as 'fossilised'. Strategically, the Central Asian states and Russia have also made it clear that a pro-Pakistan, orthodox Taliban would pose a regional security threat if it pushed north to their borders. Through 2000, the Taliban gained control of most of the country, but gained very limited international recognition (mainly from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan). It remained opposed by a Northern Alliance of Afghan factions that remained an intact but relatively weak fighting force until late 2001, in particular controlling valleys north of Mazar-e-Sharif that gave access to international supply routes.

Overall, the problem is part of a Cold War legacy created by the fact that the West in the 1980s only had one aim - to defeat Soviet influence, with no real concern for the lasting peace and stability of the region (Saikal 1994, p13). It allowed a selective arming of factions which promoted other regional powers to back opposing groups. In summary, Iran, Russia, India and Tajikistan were supporting the former Rabanni government, while Pakistan, Uzbekistan and some Arab Gulf states initially aided the Pashtun-based Taliban movement (Rashid 1996, p20). The U.S. channelled aid via Pakistan, spending up to three billion dollars in total. The result was a destructive civil war whose effects continue today (see below). Amin Saikal, in particular, has argued that the West could have helped by putting 'pressure on Pakistan and Uzbekistan to cease their campaign of destabilisation' (Saikal 1994, p15).

Thereafter, the US, Europe and major East Asian nations virtually ignored the humanitarian plight of Afghanistan through the 1990s, giving neither substantial aid, nor using their 'good offices' to reduce regional tensions (Khalilzad 1995, 152). Pakistan had suggested that the success of the Taliban would open a route for Central Asian trade through Afghanistan and Pakistan to the Indian Ocean. The U.S. government, likewise, has been critical of human rights in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but did not seek serious issue until the issue of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist training camps within Afghanistan began to be a major issue (see below). Taliban victories from 1998 gave them control over most of the country, but has also escalated tensions with Iran, which in late 1998 mobilised its forces along the Afghanistan border (on Iran's views on Central Asia, see Tarock 1997). The Taliban were soon implicated in the training of terrorists, especially groups associated with the al-Quaeda network, resulting in heightened tensions with the U.S. and Britain, dooming Taliban's hope that they might eventually be recognised at Afghanistan's legitimate government.

The Afghanistan crisis even down to 2000 had wide regional impacts. President Karimov of Uzbekistan said that he feared 'the spread of radical Islam into Central Asia from Afghanistan' (Saikal 1994, p14). Indeed, since the 1980s, Uzbekistan has been keen to play a role in Afghanistan, training thousands of Afghan students in Tashkent, and sending experts and advisers into Afghanistan (Roy 1991, p48, p62). Without genuine nation building for the entire 1990s, Afghanistan remained a destabilising factor for all of Greater Central Asia..

Even before the last round of international intervention in 2001, the conflict in Afghanistan had been extremely expensive: more than one million dead, some 2.5 million have been injured and disabled, including many children and civilians hurt by indiscriminate bombing and by mines, there were some 6 million refugees, and a further 2 million displaced internally, out of a total population of then 19 million (the higher figure includes nomadic groups, Un Chronicle 1995b; Roy 1991). This excessive rate of injury and dislocation has meant that the state of Afghanistan in any formal sense has been largely destroyed. Furthermore, the fact that some 1 million of these refuges are in Pakistan and some 1.8 million in Iran also made the conflict within Afghanistan one that had direct regional implications (UN Chronicle 1995c). In spite of progress in Tajikistan, Afghanistan demonstrated the geo-political contests for power have continued to involved Central and South Asia. Nor is it certain that Afghanistan can draw on a shared Islamic identity to overcome ethnic and clan divisions (Centlivres & Centlivres-Demont 2000, p425). Afghanistan remains the site of a sustained humanitarian crisis that is was not being effectively met by the international community through 2000-2003 (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 2000). In early 2002, the international community pledged a total of 9 billion dollars to help rebuilt the war-torn nation, but some estimates suggests that a serious recovery might need twice that. It must be stressed, that instability in Afghanistan is a regional issue, whether viewed in terms of drug and arms smuggling, or the movement of militants across borders into neighbouring countries such as Tajikistan and Pakistan, problems in relocating refugees, and continuing instability with the new government in Afghanistan through 2002-2003 (see below). In the worst case scenario, a failure to build a robust government and a viable economy would signal the failure of international reconstruction agenda (as distinct form military intervention politics). If regional and international players, a very wide coalition in the Afghanistan case, fail in this task, this would send a dangerous signal to most of Central Asia.

We should remember that between 1994 and early 2001, the Taliban had a series of surprising successes that gave it effective control of 90% of Afghanistan. The Taliban originated in southern Afghan villages in Qandahar and in the refugee camps of Pakistan, and most had originated from rural areas in the south of Afghanistan (Nojumi 2002, pxi, p122). Many were trained at madresahs or religious schools (talib is an Arab word meaning 'seeker', Nojumi 2002, p119), in the strict Deobandi form of Islam, leading to their indoctrination into notions of militancy that would allow them to be sent to fight in Afghanistan. The Taliban military leadership, however, also had ex-military officers from Afghanistan (Nojumi 2002, pxi), as well as strong support from Pakistan ISI. Leaders such as Mullah Mohammed Omar also controlled strong loyalties in local areas, especially around Qandahar (Nojumi 2002, p23).

We can speak of relative successes for the regime along a number of lines: -

However, these partial successes locally and internationally were soon offset by serious failures in national and regional governance: -

In sum, the Taliban had strong military victories, but in both domestic and international politics were unable to present themselves as a truly legitimate and representative government for all of Afghanistan.

The events leading up to U.S. led intervention in Afghanistan were based on the use of Afghanistan as the country of abode for Osama bin Laden, and his setting up of training bases for groups that would emerge as Al-Qaeda. Repeated calls for the handing over of bin Laden were rejected by the Taliban regime, leading to a rapid turn around of policy in the former Clinton Administration. This resulted in missile strikes against the training bases within Afghanistan in 1998, and a the imposition of U.S. and UN embargoes and sanctions from 1999 onwards. These factors completely closed down the possibility of wider recognition of the Taliban internationally, and also saw the end for prospects of pipeline development, as well as reducing the likelihood of any significant degree of foreign investment into economic projects.

The stage would be for a more serious intervention in late 2001. The terrorist attacks against the U.S. in September 2001 were soon linked to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network, which were being hosted within Afghanistan. It seems that through 1998-2001, the Taliban had begun to rely more strongly on foreign supply of non-Afghan soldiers in its recruitment base, and may also have begun to be more economically reliant on cooperation with the organisation (see Rashid 2002; Nojumi 2002). On this basis, as well as shared feeling on the basis of religion, the Taliban leadership refused to hand over Osama, claiming that no solid proof or grounds of his involvement had been provided. In this context, the U.S. rapidly moved to building an international coalition (including support from Russia, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan), then to air strikes and a rapid deployment of international military forces, with U.S., British and small numbers of Australian forces most active in direct operations against the Taliban. EU countries and France provided supported elements (Blua 2002), as well soldiers that would help in the stabilisation of Kabul. Strong pressure was also brought to bear on Pakistan to allow use of its airspace and some basing of troops and humanitarian programs for refugee flows. This was reluctantly accepted by General Pervez Musharraf (leader of Pakistan), but also resulted in strong protests from militant groups within the country, as well as exposing the government to extra pressure from India over the training of terrorists either within Pakistan or by the Taliban in Afghanistan, including Kashmiri militants, a factor perhaps supported by some elements in the ISI (Saikal 2002, p47, p52; Rashid 2000, p138). The US 'rewarded' Pakistan by lifting sanctions (imposed since the nuclear tests of 1998), and by promising billions in increased aid flows (Saikal 2002, p53).

The main military campaign was over within two months, with the Taliban unable to retain direct control of any part of the country, and the Al-Qaeda network largely dislocated within Afghanistan itself (Jalali 2003, p174), though perhaps still partially functional elsewhere. Once the air campaign began to seriously bite, the North Alliance (based in large measure around Tajik ethnic groups, and with increasing Russian material support), moved in to 'fill the vacuum' in many cities, including an early entry into Kabul (Jalali 2003, p175), even against Western pressure not to take control of the city.

The outlines of the current government of Afghanistan were shaped through international conferences that sought a widening of political representations beyond that of the Northern Alliance, based largely on Tajik groups, with Uzbek and Hazara support (Strategic Comments 2001). As military intervention occured, there was a rapid convening of an UN, US and German organised conference at Bonn, with four main opposition groups represented in bargaining process designed to avoid too much overt power being given to northern groups, but in effect recognising their key role in opposing the Taliban (Jalali 2003, pp175-176). After hard bargaining, an agreement was signed on December 5, 2001, establishing a six-month framework for the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) under Chairman Hamid Karzai, with this becoming a Transitional Authority of Afghanistan (ATA) after an emergency meeting of the Loya Jirga (Jalali 2003, p176). Initially, the 30 strong Cabinet was shared out among different groups, with the Northern Alliance controlling 17 of these, then the Rome group with around 8 seats, with smaller numbers given to a Cyprus Group (backed by Iran), and a Pakistan-backed Peshawar Group (Strategic Comments 2001). Control of Kabul by the Interim government would be supported by the deployment 4,500 troops as an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), as well as by a small UN Mission designed to support planning and reconstruction in the country.

Key steps in the legitimation of the administration included the holding of an emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002, with large numbers of elders, clan leaders, and locally selected leaders attending. This system is on the traditional open meetings for free debate within local Afghan communities, a system which at the national level had been a fundamental institution since 1747. Combined with a strong role for local elders, this system had always moderated the central power of the state by ensuring that there was an organic connection with a network of local leaders and their communities or Qaum networks (Nojumi 2002, p68, p90; Saikal 2002, p52). Although the Loya Jirga at times has been dominated by Pushtun groups (Nojumi 2002, p29), it was the only institution would could give a local mandate to the Interrum Administration. The Loya Jirga voted on a number of candidates, but the former king, Zahir Shah, did not stand for office, perhaps due to pressure from US which feared that he might split the vote, fears of infighting within his family, and recognition that he might be viewed as a modernist by more conservative Islamist groups (Jalali 2003, p178; Saikal 2002, p48, p50). In the end, he would continue to support the representation process, and receive the honorary title of 'Baba', or father of the country, from the Karzai government. The meeting was not perfect, in that local war lords and external groups were able to manipulate support groups, but it did consider a number of leadership candidates in secret ballot (Jalali 2003, p177). Of 1,600 delegates, 1,295 voted for Karzai, with the second strongest vote going to a woman, Massouda Jalal (Saikal 2002, p48).

One of the issues of concern was the future funding of the reconstruction of Afghanistan. There was concern that the division of roles of intervention might work with the US basically running the war, and then the EU, Japan and international agencies picking up the costs of development and reconstruction. In actuality, a wide network of donors and agencies have been mobilised for future development, with Japan, the United States, the European Union and Saudi Arabia being the major national players. However, local and regional insecurity could undermine these efforts (see Eurasia Insight 2002; Ahmad 2002). Moreover, the UN decided to take an approach called the 'light footprint', relying strongly on Afghan staff and building capacity in the Afghan government, with a limited political role for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, UNAMA, in contrast to UN operations in East Timor (Chesterman 2002).

On this basis, President Harmid Karzai headed a government that through 2003 included deputies (vice-presidents) from diverse ethnic backgrounds such as Mohammad Fahim, Karim Khalili, Hedayat Amin Arsala, and Nematollah Shahrani (Saikal 2002, p49; BBC 2003b). The Foreign Minister was Abdullah Abdullah, Interior Minister was Ali Ahmad Jalali, the Defence Minister was Mohammad Qaseem Fahim and the Education Minister was Yunus Qanuni. The last three have been important to the Karzai administration since the Bonn confernce (Chesterman 2002, p40). Although the government is diversified as a whole, it is possible to suggest there is still a slight leaning towards northern groups and Tajiks, with special emphasis on control of key military and intelligence areas by non-Pushtun groups, though the ministry of the interior would in the end go to a Pushtun (Jalali 2003, p175; Chestman 2002, p51). This has caused some resentment, but in fact Karzai has made an effective compromise out of the political challenges that faced him, both in terms of the policies of those who gained military victories in Kabul, and the local political pressures that were expressed in the Loya Jirga in mid-2002. Karzai is himself aligned with Pushtuns in the external 'Rome' group, a leader of the Popolzai tribe, well-educated and relatively modernised, and has sought to keep an ethnically diverse group of deputy leaders in his administration (Strategic Comments 2001).

Through late 2002, the Karzai government in effect relied on the political good will of the international community and local military leaders: -

Current challenges facing Afghanistan include: -