INTR13-304 & INTR71/72-304, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

1. Introduction: The Unique Russian Heritage

Russia's heritage primarily reveals a struggle to achieve identity in the face of opposition. Born into a harsh physical environment, on the periphery of great civilisations to the south (Christendom, Constantinople, the Turkish Empire), surrounded by powerful and at times conquering tribes (Magyars, Mongols, Tartars, Finns, Lithuanians, Poles, Swedes, the ancient Khazan state between the Volga River and the Ural Mountains), and the Khanates of Sibir (located east of the Ural Mountains) the Crimean and Caspian regions, the birth of a Russian identity was slow and painful.

Although ethnic Slavs may have existed as early as the middle of the first millennium B.C. (associated with the Scythians of southern Russia in the Don River area), they do not clearly emerge as a separate political grouping until the 9th century A.D. (Riasanovsky 1993, pp19-20). At the first 'the Russ' coalesced around trading cities such as Novgorod, Smolensk and Kiev, and other towns on the great river trade routes joining the Baltic to the Black Seas, then formed principalities at Kiev and later on Moscow. The influence of the Vikings, both as traders and warriors, was also very strong in this early period, especially on Novgorod and Kiev, though the degree of influence remains a politically sensitive issue for some Russian historians.

It was from such humble beginnings that the powerful Russian state, once freed from Mongol-Tartar domination, would expand eastwards across the steppe into the Ural Mountains and Siberia. From the early 17th century it would go on to become a European power in northern Europe, finally defeating Napoleon in his failed invasion of 1812. It took Russia centuries to find her feet as a great European power, especially after the financial and military reforms of Peter the Great, the founder of St. Petersburg (Leningrad). Yet in spite of all these reforms, Russia would turn to the economic and colonial resources of the east to strengthen her hand against other European rivals. The fur trade of Siberia, along with agriculture and minerals extraction, formed a major component of the Russian government treasury in the 17th and 18th centuries (Brobrick 1992; Riasanovsky 1993, p194). Fine furs as a cash economy were so important that a 'Great Sable Road' crossed all the way from Siberia, through Russia to Byzantium and Europe (Brobrick 1992, p68). With these resources, with a 'service' nobility emerging from the mid-16th century, and the imposition of serfdom, Russia emerged as a strong, but not always stable, autocratic state.

It was this sense of struggle against opposition which, in the 20th century, saturated the way the Soviets thought of themselves within the capitalist world system. This was not just a question of ideology, communism against capitalism, especially after the civil war and the European and Japanese interventions of 1919-1922 (Pipes 1994), but of an embattled Russian state surviving in spite of international opposition. Such themes were reinforced by the enormous suffering of World War II, in which Russia made an enormous contribution to defeating Hitler's armies. Indeed, in this sense World War II greatly bolstered Russian patriotism, and for many ordinary Russians of the older generation the 'war was just yesterday', i.e. it verifies a unique role for Russia which even the failures of a centrally planned economy could destroy (Smith 1976, pp369-397; Riasanovsky 1993, p526). The Soviets certainly suffered terribly in World War II: war-death estimates have now been raised to as high as 27 million (Riasanovsky 1993, p528), and the best estimate probably falls in the range of 20-29 million. Patriotism and sense of a special role are not only found in the earlier Russian novelists (Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Gorky, Sholokhov), but even in the recent thought of Russian intellectuals such as Solzhenitsyn. It is in this sense that conservative and nationalist Russians can speak of themselves as 'Great Russians' in comparison to the 'lesser' Slavic branches of Ukraine and Belarus (see the rather dismissive comments on Ukrainian and Belorussian separateness and national identity in Solzhenitsyn 1991, pp14-20).

We can sense such themes running through Russian art and literature, and even in Russian films such as Eisenstein's classics Alexander Nevsky and Ivan the Terrible (Parts I & II). In spite of being made during the height of communist propaganda films, both dwell on themes of Russian 'might and right'. Alexandre Nevsky, dramatising the life of the Grand Prince of Russia who fought the Mongols and repelled European invasions (1219-1263 A.D.). Made just before World War II, it shows the Russians as sandwiched between the powerful Tartar nations and an aggressive Western culture (the order of the Teutonic Knights). This search for a particular role within the great power system of European diplomacy, but faced with a unique involvement with the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Far East, is a central feature of Russian historical experience. It still provides insights for understanding contemporary Russian political behaviour internationally.

In this subject you will not need to know Russian history in great detail. Rather, we will be looking at how Russian reforms have influenced Eurasia as a whole, and had direct impact on Central and Eastern Asia. A time-line with a few dates may help give you some bearings: -

Table I: Background Dates 882-1979 (after Riasanovsky 1993 and Dawisha & Parrot 1994)

Although Russia emerged as a major player in European politics from the end of the 18th century, her expansion eastwards was perhaps her greatest source of power. Large tracts of steppe, forest and tundra were attached to domains controlled by enfeoffed nobles, to officials of the Russian government, and even to the Orthodox Church which established monasteries right on, or in advance of the Russian frontier, e.g. by the early 16th century one monastic order alone, the Disciples of St. Sergius, established 30 monasteries on or beyond the frontier (Riasanovsky 1993, p119). By 1875, Russian expansion into Siberia and the adjacent island of Sakhalin was complete, while all of Central Asia was under effective Russian control by 1895 (Riasanovsky 1993, p427).

A major effect of this Russian expansion, as well as their efforts to develop a strong navy with access to international waters via the Baltic, Black, Okhotsk Seas and the Sea of Japan, was concern sparked among other international powers, especially Britain and Japan. Russian expansion through the 'heartland' of Eurasia led to British fears of interference with her colonial interests in India, Southeast Asia and China. A subtle Great Game of espionage, alliances, and indirect conflicts influenced the fates of Japan (which Britain chose to support in the early 20th century), Afghanistan, Tibet and later on Mongolia (see further Meyer & Brysac 1999). This imperial 'game' was resolved in the following way: -

The search for great power status, of course, in turn prompted Japanese invasions of Korea, and later on parts of Manchuria. This model of a 'great game' is sometimes used as a way to view the conflict in modern Afghanistan (Klass 1987), as well as a new phase of diplomatic and economic initiatives concerning Central Asia which have been launched since 1989 (Ved & Ved 1998; Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p2; Malik 1992). Later on we will critically assess this metaphor of a New Great Game being played out in Eurasia (for one such view, see Dettmer 2000).

We can date the successful end of Tsarist Russian expansion with the defeat she suffered at the hands of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905. Jockeying for influence in northern China, Manchuria and Korea, Japanese and Russian forces engaged in severe land and sea battles. Partly due to extended logistic problems (the single-track trans-Siberian was not yet complete around Lake Baikal), and due to gross over-confidence at sea, the Russians suffered a stunning defeat which enheartened much of Asia (e.g. Indian nationalists against supposed British superiority). Japanese forces captured Port Arthur, pushed Russian forces north in Manchuria, and in the decisive battle of Tsushima Straight (27-29 May, 1905), the modern Japanese fleet wiped out the older Russian fleet which had sailed all the way from the Baltic in Western Europe (Riasanovsky 1993, p403). After this time a period of concordance was reached between Japan and Russia, the former having a zone of influence in Korea, the later dominant control in northern Manchuria (Brobrick 1992, p374). However, after this time, Russia heavily fortified Vladivostok and garrisoned east Siberia with some 200,000 men (Brobrick 1992, p376). In future, Russian and Japanese interests would clash more strongly at the end of the World War II, and in the Cold War, when the Northern Territories (the south Kuril Islands) occupied by the Soviets would become part of the armed frontier between the Soviets and the West (see Rees 1985). In large measure, during the Cold War the entire posture of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and Japan's protection under the US nuclear umbrella were based on the threat posed by the nearness of massive Soviet forces (to be discussed later in the course). It also formed a major pretext and projected defensive role for the modernised Japanese naval and air forces in the 70s and 80s (Keal 1988, p132; Mack & O'Hare 1989; Nishimura 1991; Japan Defense Agency 1993).

During the 1920s and 30s the newly born Soviet State made a redoubled effort to industrialise and modernise the USSR as a showpiece of Marxist-Leninist principles. This involved first a huge effort in several Five Year plans to develop heavy industry, then a generally less successful effort to boost agricultural production through the creation of communes and enforced collectivisation. The scale of production was never just focused on Russia, but created a huge industrial-production complex spanning most of the USSR - major resource centres included Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, the Donbas region, centres around Perm and Transcaucasia, the Ferghana valley, the Kuzbas region and selective areas in eastern Siberia (Riasanovsky 1993, p500). During World War II, when most of Belarus and Ukraine were overrun, with both Leningrad and Moscow almost captured, huge amounts of the Soviet industrial complex was moved east of the Ural Mountains. The result was the creation of a highly interdependent series of semi-autonomous specialised economic zones, with much primary production in the east, and secondary production in the west.

The results of this system have had large-scale effects until today; huge scale industrial projects have left a terrible ecological legacy in the Kola Peninsula, in Central Asia, and in parts of Siberia. For example, in rapidly developing its nuclear industry after 1949, Russia dumped thousands of tons of waste materials in over 500 sites in Kazakhstan alone. Ironic effects also included the fact the Soviet nuclear processing and development plants were spread over more than 10 Republics, with advanced facilities in the Newly Independent States, e.g. the SS-18 missile (an advanced, long range missile, capable of carrying multiple warheads) production plants in Ukraine, and nuclear test facilities in Kazakhstan.

For a Map of Environmental Damage within Russia, go to

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/commonwealth/russian_env96.jpg

It will not be possible to go through the entire history of Russia's development of nuclear weapons, and the various phases of the Cold War confrontation between the Soviets and the Western states. For an overview, read the following section. Three key points need to be emphasized: -

A possible military confrontation within Europe remained very real through 1947-1949, with intense conflicts of interests over Berlin (the Berlin blockade and the Allied Airlift to relieve the city) and in Yugoslavia. Western opinion soon hardened against the Soviets, signified by Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech of 5 March 1946 and President Truman's address to the US Congress on 12 March 1947 (Zeman 1991, p232). Once the fortified frontier was established throughout Europe, the Cold War began in earnest, with the added joy of Soviet nuclear capability in 1949.

The Soviet autocrat Stalin led the Soviets and their allies into the Cold War. During this period two organizations were created. The Soviet Union and their allies created military alliance called the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955, at least partly in reaction to West Germany entering NATO (see Zeman 1991, pp255-6). Another international organisation for these countries was the Council for Mutual Economic Aid, the CMEA or Comecon (see Zeman 1991, p277). The arms race between the Soviets and NATO were sustained on the worldwide scale throughout the 1950's and 1960's. Likewise, the Soviet's viewed the Marshall Plan, aimed to revitalise Europe economically, as a cloaked means to ensure Europe's dependence and friendship towards America. Andrei Zhdanov, writing in November 1947, for example, argued that the 'cornerstone' of the plan was the rebuilding of German capitalism (in Stokes 1991, p41). Soviet Premier Kruschev (also sometimes transliterated as Khrushchev) continued an assertive Soviet policy, which along with a strong American military posture, led to a crisis which could have led to war between the superpowers in 1962 (The Cuban Missile Crisis). In the end, Kruschev agreed to withdraw the missiles from Cuba, and President Kennedy agreed to withdraw nuclear missiles from Turkey.

In the 1970s Leonid Brezhnev continued opening up the Soviet Union to Western trade in an attempt to stabilise the economy (Zeman 1991, p266-7). Although these policies would eventually lead on towards a period of detente rather than Cold War (a change signalled by agreements in the early 1970's but not confirmed till the Helsinki agreements of 1975), the Soviet Union still wished to keep a strong grip on its buffer states to the south and west. Hence when Alexander Dubcek had began to reform Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Soviets felt under threat. Dubcek's reforms included the reduction of censorship and the acceptance of the need to link economic and political reform (Zeman 1991, p280; Desai 1989, p90). The result was once again the intervention of the Red Army. Brezhnev himself, in his "Speech to the Fifth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party" in November 1968 explained: -

However, the pressures of this international arms race could not be sustained forever. Speaking of the problems of the late 70s and 1980s, Gorbachev directly expressed these concerns in his best-selling book Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World: -

The difficulties of the old system, in part, lay in the attempt to close off these countries from the world economic system, which was essentially capitalist, but at the same time to attempt to compete economically, militarily and ideologically. The Iron Curtain had largely removed these countries from trends in the world economy and in technology - such technology as was bought by the USSR was a very expensive overhead to their system. By the 1970's the USSR was in a half way house - it now recognized that the Stalinist aim of complete autarky (self-reliance) had to be abandoned, but at the same time it was not readily able to complete in world consumer markets, even in terms of heavy industry. Furthermore, certain components and technologies did need to imported from overseas - as of 1986 the 'gross hard-currency debt' was in the order of $38.2 billion, although this could be serviced by the 1986 hard-currency export earnings of $25.1 billion for the year (Desai 1989, p24). Soviet oil fields and reserves remained huge, but much of its equipment was highly antiquated and it had to subsidise cheap oil and fuel to Eastern Europe (in 1981-85, 'half of the exportable 800 million tonnes of crude oil was committed to socialist countries', see Zeman 1991, p289). An ongoing energy shortage was a major concern for Russia and Ukraine in the 1990s, and is the main reason for keeping antiquated nuclear reactors on-line (though the Ukraine in May 1995 agreed to phase out some of these reactors in return for European aid and soft-loans). In an announcement in November 1990, Gorbachev announced that from early 1991 the Soviet Union expected hard currency in return for its oil, a move that affected most of East Europe and other allies.

This economic competition between the two systems was a race the Soviet Union could not win. Even a slightly more modernised country such as Czechoslovakia, which had always directed significant amounts of trade to the West, found that it was falling behind. Likewise, the Soviets at first seemed able to compete in the arms race against the West; in 1949 the Soviets developed their first atomic bomb, admittedly with the aid of intelligence derived from the US and Britain, and shortly thereafter thermonuclear weapons and missile delivery systems. The Soviets seemed to be ahead in the race when they launched Sputnik 1 on 4 October 1957, a great surprise to the US and a shock to American educational and research institutions. The Soviets put the first satellite into orbit around the sun, put the first man into orbit, and the first unmanned payload onto the moon (Zeman 1991, p263). All these achievements resulted in a massive re-evaluation of US education and goals, and was the political motivation for the accelerated NASA programs which pulled ahead of Russian manned flights in the late 60's through to the 80's.

In the end, however, the high-tech competition with the US became a crushing burden on Soviet resources (Dallago 1992, p139). Both the Cruise Missile, and more importantly, the 'Star Wars' (SDI) initiative sorely strained Soviet hopes that they could retain parity in this game without even more burdens on their economy (Crozier 1999, pxvii). The SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative, i.e. the U.S. initiative to develop a space-based defence system) project was strongly criticised by Gorbachev as expensive and provocative (Gorbachev 1987, pp590-1; Gorbachev 1986, pp592-606).

Gorbachev's reforms were both economic and social. Glasnost, referring to political and social openness, and Perestroika, economic reform, were related, as emphasized by Gorbachev: -

Although Gorbachev did not intent to introduce capitalism and a multi-party system, this was exactly the effect of lifting the autocratic suppression of dissent from the old 'Party line'. Table II will help set the framework for these changes (NB it is not necessary to remember all these dates).

Although nominally an alliance of independent sovereign states, the USSR had been built up under Tsarist imperial expansion, and maintained by force and central direction under the Bolsheviks. As part of his reforms, Gorbachev had to devolve some real power back to these republican governments and assemblies in order to try to build grass-root's support for his programmes (see Morrison 1991). This resulted in widespread centrifugal forces, with each Republic taking more control of its own affairs. In 1991 the Russian Republic decided to reduce its payments to the USSR budget from 142 billion rubbles down to 23 billion, and claimed control of all oil and gold reserves (Papp & White, 1992, p28, p44), in effect reducing Soviet abilities to run their government. Similar conflicts have occurred (1992-1994) over control of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, and in the Russian east, especially in the area controlled by the Yakuts. One of the most dramatic effects of Gorbachev's reforms has been the modification and then the break-up of the Soviet Union. The USSR had consisted of fifteen Union Republics, with numerous autonomous regions within these republics. Many of these are based on ethnic groups, with a further 16 ethnic groups within Russia itself, e.g. Tatars, Chechens, Yakuts (Papp & White, 1992, p45).

On December 1, 1991 the USSR formally ceased to exist (Papp & White, 1992, p49). This might seem to be a great diminution of Russian power. However, so long as the Russia Federation can hold itself together there are in fact some advantages. By losing all the independent republics, it kept about 75% of the old USSR's resources and only 57% of the population (Jukes 1991, p21). Likewise, many problem areas, such as Armenia, Georgia, the Baltics, and Moldova do not remain its direct responsibility, though Russia has a direct security interest in these regions, e.g. the slow closure of Russian military bases in Georgia through 1999-2001 (Strategic Comments 2001). There has been also some loss of ethnically troubled areas, especially in the Trans-Caucasus region.

Table II: Dates 1985-1996 (updating Riasanovsky 1993 and Dawisha & Parrot 1994)

Russian experience was born out of struggle and a need to assert itself in a competitive immediate regional environment, and in the 20^th century, a changing and troubled international setting. Ironically, today we see some of the same fundamental patterns emerging, with a continued effort to balance the directions of Russian policy towards the West and towards a more Eurasian orientation. A related aspect of Gorbachev's policy was a strong emphasis on the Soviet Union's place in Europe, and an acknowledgment of the close cultural and economic relationship between Russia and Europe (Stokes 1991, p265-267; Pettman 1991, p195). This policy was extremely interesting in that the power of Tsarist Russia had been largely built up by her extension of Empire eastwards, while from the 1930's onwards the USSR tried to increase its wealth through exploitation of Siberia, the Caucasus region and the trans-Urals, with their massive oil and mineral resources. Soviet propaganda 1930-1950 emphasized the heroic 'struggle' by young Marxist Pioneers and elite work cadres to 'tame' nature and develop the resources of the east. However, the conditions for resource extraction are both harsh and expensive, and the transport networks between Siberia and Russia are far too limited even today.

Gorbachev made a key policy speech on this theme in Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, policies which have since come to be known as the 1986 Vladivostok Initiative, in which he tried to project the new Soviet Union as an 'Asian Pacific Power', both economically and politically (see Thakur & Thayer 1987; Polomka 1991). He hoped to develop an improved eastern policy to aid economic performance by linkage into dynamic East Asian economies, and to avoid a possible clash with the U.S. and its allies, Japan and South Korea (Ellison 1991, p14). These goals were only partly met: Soviet forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan, their forces in Mongolia were reduced, and tensions of destabilisation with China over the Xinjiang border were eased, though total force levels along the China Russia border were only slightly affected (Ellison 1991, p19; tensions on the China-Russia border would not be greatly eased until accords made in 1996).

The Soviets then proceeded to make a concerted effort to improve diplomatic relations with Japan: then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited Tokyo in December 1988 and September 1990, followed by a visit by Gorbachev in April 1991. Gorbachev managed to sign 15 agreements on technology, fisheries, coastal trade, cultural exchanges etc., but no treaty or large scale economic agreement was reached (Ellison 1991, p27). Attempts by Gorbachev to insist that the Soviet Union was also part of the Asia-Pacific had faltered on the reluctance of Japan to make large investments in Siberia, on the diplomatic problem of the disputed four islands to the north of Japan (part of the Kuril Islands chain: Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai group), and on the enormous infrastructure costs in developing central and eastern territories. These prospects only slightly improved with Yeltsin's 1993 visit to Japan and his diplomatic apology on Soviet treatment of Japanese prisoners of war (McGregor 1993, p6). A joint timber and a coalmining venture have been agreed, though Yeltsin has not given in to Japan's territorial claims (McGregor 1993, p6). Further, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and current President Putin have had to face stiff resistance by conservative elements in the Russian population and the Russian parliament who are totally opposed to any loss of territorial integrity of Russian territory, and the insistence that ownership of the islands was an 'incontrovertible result of the territorial settlements of World War II' (Ellison 1991, p26). Political groups in the Russian Far East and Vladivostok were also deeply opposed to any territorial deals. This makes even the compromise deal of surrendering the two small eastern islands, and keeping the western defence screen of the two larger ones, very difficult. The Japanese government has since somewhat opened the door to further negotiations, and during November 1997 talks between President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Hashimoto, a pledge was made that a peace treaty between the two nations should be forged by 2000. Japan also backed Russian entry into APEC (the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum), and deals were also struck to improve economic, trade, energy and transport relations between them (Jones 1997).

Thereafter, President Vladimir Putin tried to move forward the treaty process again in 2000-2002, though press reports on this were optimistic (Russia Today 2000). No concrete 'deal' to resolve the problem has yet emerged. Dialogue continued at a symposium for Japanese officials in May 2001 (Japan Policy & Politics 2001a) but by December relations on this topic were once again very 'frosty', when 'Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Khristenko urged Japan . . . to abandon its quest for the return of the entire Russian-held island group off northern Japan, calling Japan's demand an ''extreme'' position that would bring no positive results' (Japan Policy & Politics 2001b). With up to eighty per cent of Russians opposed to returning the islands, as suggested by an April 2001 survey (Japan Policy & Politics 2001c), it is not surprising that Russian leaders found it difficult to compromise on this issue. Japan has also retained a strong line on return of the islands. Through 2002 various economic and political initiatives were raised but made little headway, in part because of the opposition of the Russian Duma to territorial negotiations, and also to turbulence within the Japanese Department of Foreign Affairs, with Prime Minister's Junichiro Koizumi's maverick foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka, soon involved in scandal, and with over 33 officials in the ministry demoted or fired over leaked plans concerning the islands and possible financial aid (see Rutland 2003).

Sensitivity over territorial integrity or vulnerability along borders is part of the structure of the Russian political system (for related threat perceptions, see Podberezkin 2000). After having experienced the disintegration of the Soviet Union, political leaders are sensitive to any threat to the fragmentation of the Russian Federation itself.

Yet Russian itself remains a complex Federal state, with 128 ethnic groups, and some 89 administrative regions granted various levels of autonomy as republics, regions, and national areas (Riasanovsky 1993, p507, pp634-5; Marsh & Bucy 2002, p373). From 1992-2002 there have been numerous trends for more regional autonomy within the Russian Federation itself. The Yeltsin government had been able to restrain these trends by establishing a new Russian Federation Treaty (March 1992), which allowed a three year process before regional governments developed more autonomy and changed official languages away from Russian. Only Tatarstan and Chechnya refused to sign the treaty (see Khakimov 1996; Hanauer 1996; Cornell 1997), but over 40 special bilateral arrangements were made, indicating the range of bargaining over relative power, taxation and control of economic resources (see Nicholson 1999). Likewise, one of the few strong successes of the old Duma (Russian parliament) was the passing of this treaty and related laws (Whitmore 1995a). This debate on the nature of the Russian Federation has continued through to the late 1990s, with one proposal being the creation of larger administrative regions to reduce the problem of managing 89 areas, a move which might increase the likelihood of securing tax revenues and the reduction of local 'political protests' (DeLay 1998). President Putin in particular has tried to promote large administrative units that would also allow more centralised control from Moscow. It was planned to gradually restructure aspects of administration into seven-to-twelve larger blocs, a move that would help secure central taxes (DeLay 1998). Putin also wanted the right to sack regional governors if necessary, a controversial move which would aid the centralisation of power. However, this process has been slow, and through 2001 local governors were allowed to run for further terms in office (Russia Today 2000c; Uzelac 2001). At present, it can still be argued that the Russian Federation is a 'complex system of asymmetrical federalism, under which certain regions enjoy privileged status and greater region autonomy than others' (March & Bucy 2002, p377).

Nonetheless, Russia has chosen to reassert its influence in this 'near abroad' region. Although the term 'near-abroad' has been dropped from official usage, there is now an emphasis on ensuring a band of friendly states on Russian borders. One of the questions we can ask is whether this is results in a 'sphere of influence' policy, and whether it represents a threat to the interests of other countries involved in the 'Eurasian process'. Would Russia be stronger if it concerned itself with domestic reform and relations with the European Union, or are there real and pressing reasons why Russia cannot abandon its 'Great Power' role?. Zvi Gitelman has given one interpretation of these different trends: -

It is against this background that we can evaluate Russian Foreign Policy 1992-2002 before going on to more recent events. Even though Russian sovereign territory has shrunk back to the limits of the Russian Federation (as distinct from the larger limits of the dissolved Soviet Union), Russia under Yeltsin's and then Putin's leadership has attempted to establish a zone of international influence and a security regime reaching out past the old borders of the USSR (see Lynch 2001). This has been achieved by three mechanisms: -

Bearing in mind the extensive borders of Russia, bridging both Europe and Russia, this is still a claim to great power status (Gardiner-Garden 1995a, pi). John Lepingwell has summarised this policy: -

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) came into being (December 1991) as an initiative of the Russian State (under the leadership of Yeltsin), Ukraine and Belarus once it was realised that Gorbachev lacked the influence to push through a new Union Treaty to preserve the USSR. Even though the hardline coup (August 1991 partly sparked by fears of greater decentralisation), against Gorbachev failed, it was now clear that the framework of international relations established by Lenin and Stalin could not persist. Instead, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and most Central Asian states joined the CIS arrangement, which involved annual meetings of heads of states, and attempts to establish shared security arrangements. In a further Alma-Ata agreement, the republics also pledged to respect existing borders between them (Shevtsova 1992, p11). At first, this organisation attempted to use a collective security arrangement to control conflict. One of this organisation's tasks would have been regulating economic agreements and assuring some high level command of nuclear weapons until 1993. It was not fully successful in setting up such a unified approach (see Gardiner-Garden 1995a).

More recently, Russia found itself facing improved Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) and National Missile Defense (NMD) systems being developed by the U.S., in theory against 'rogue states' with missile capability. This system, however, is also of deep concern to both Russia and China (McGuire 1999). Russia in particular has argued that the new system may be in contradiction to the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972), and through 2001 the American leadership declared its firm intention to withdraw from a treaty it now regards as outdated. However, from late 2000 to early 2001, Russia and the U.S. have also talked about joint tests for the prospect of a shared missile shield capability, which would therefore also keep some rough parity of nuclear deterrence between these two countries (Biddle 2001). However, this sharing of sensitive technical data will be difficult so long as Russia is viewed as sharing technical with countries such as Iran. The issue has become less central since the issue of terrorism took centre stage, but may be of future significance of such defence systems are fully deployed into Japan, Taiwan and Europe.

Another of the main planks of this regional policy would be the placing of joint Russian & local Republic border guards on the external frontiers of the old Soviet Union. Such polices remain controversial. Georgia resisted such claims, but eventually accepted such plans under very strong Russian pressure. In fact, the undeclared Russian policy of aiding Abkhasian separatists in Georgia (Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p17, p18), and giving support to both sides of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict may have been a 'softening up' (the 'pendulum policy', Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p15) tactic used to gain Russian objectives in the procuring of base-leases in these republics. Yeltsin had hoped to retain some 30 such bases in the former republics of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States and the Ukraine. As of mid-1995 only 5 sites had been agreed with the three Transcaucasus republics of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Lepingwell 1994, p74; Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p15). Georgia was virtually forced into the CIS after Russians supported regional independence for their Abkhazia province. Likewise, Azerbaijan only joined the CIS in September 1993 (Gardiner-Garden 1995a, pp4-5), and has been suspicious of Russian politics in the region. Armenia, in particular, saw the presence of Russian forces as a safety valve against possible Turkish intervention if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan escalated. On this basis, Armenia in June 1994 offered bases for Russian forces on a rent-free basis (Lepingwell 1994, p77). Through 2001, negotiations have continued, and in early 2002 Azerbaijan signalled that it was willing to allow the Russians to use the main radar base (which can detect ballistic missiles) within Azerbaijan so long as a suitable lease could be agreed upon.

For Maps of Georgia and Environs, go to

http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/georgia_republic.html

The border problem that Russia has been addressing should not be underestimated. This can be seen in the following factors: -

• The Tajikistan-Afghanistan border has been of particular concern even after government and Russian forces (totalling some 18,000 Russian army soldiers) helped overthrow an 'opposition' of Islamic and democratic forces. These forces had to retreat into Afghanistan, but regrouped and made a serious attack on a Russian border post in July 1993, followed by numerous smaller incursions (truce arrangements were made in 1995). In 1993 Afghanistan hosted some 100,000 Tajik refugees (Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p24). Since 1993, Russian border guards, the Russian 201st Motorised Rifle Division, as well as small forces from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have defended the frontier (Lepingwell 1994, p78). Prospects for peace and national reconciliation within Tajikistan have improved with agreements for a ceasefire and amnesty in December 1996 (Pannier 1997; Mesbahi 1997). Events during 1997 allowed the "signing of a peace agreement between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition, the return home of most internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the resumption of the voluntary repatriation of Tajik refugees from Northern Afghanistan." (UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 1997). However, major developmental and democratic reforms remain to be fully implemented. Tajikistan remains on the United Nations 'hot' list of hunger and poverty (Wren 2001). Moreover, the war in Afghanistan has meant that Russia has reinforced its troops to contain Taliban forces that might seek to flee across the border, making the country a front-line area once again.
• In the early 1990s the Azerbaijan-Iran border was 'almost completely' open, allowing smuggling, gun-running and a new drug route to operate from Central Asia through Russia to Europe (Lepingwell 1994, p72). In part, the border has been allowed to open as part of an Iranian policy of allowing family contacts between Azeris across the border. Now, however, it is one of the areas that needs to be monitored in new UN efforts to reduce the impact of transnational criminal organisations. Russia has also been concerned that aid for Chechen rebels has passed from Azerbaijan onwards into the Russian Federation (Nicholson 1999).
• Russia remains concerned with two layers of borders: those into former Soviet space, and those directly into the Russian Federation, and has recently tightened up procedures restricting the use of general CIS visas. Today, the borders of the region seem very porous, leading to deepened concerned about drug, gun and refugee smuggling, and even to the possibility of illegal nuclear technology exports (see Woessner 2000). This is one of the key drivers of cooperation among CIS states, and eastwards to China via the SCO organisation (see lecture 1).
• Russia from January 2000 became deeply concerned about the northern border between Georgia and south Chechnya, arguing that this has been the main area were weapons, people and money have been moved into the rebellious Chechen areas. Tensions resulted in a 20 man OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) team being sent to monitor the border (Russia Today 2000b). Through 2002, even though Russian troops control the main cities and central areas of Chechnya, Russia continues to be about cross border activities of Chechen rebels, who are hiding in remote areas of Georgia such as Pankisi Gorge (Antonenko 2001, p52). Even as military victory was assured for the Russians, terrorist hostage taking occured within Moscow, and surprise attacks continue again Russian forces through late 2002 (to be discussed further in lecture 4).

By asserting power in its immediate region, Russian leaders are also stating that they have no intention of letting the Russian Federation itself dissolve, even if greater local economic autonomy is given. To date Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin has strongly resisted any further break-up of the Russian state. In this they will be backed by the Russian army. Russian policy in the dispute with Chechnya (within the Russian Federation) indicates that they will not tolerate full independence movements, though they were surprised at the difficulties the Russian army has had in suppressing the Chechen rebels. Another reason for the Chechnya intervention may be concerned with insistence on controlling events within the borders of the Russian state, and as a signal sent to the 'near abroad', i.e. the republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Likewise, Russia has shown an interest in protecting the rights of sizeable Russian minorities in Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia and the Ukraine. It must be remembered that serious disturbances in the CIS could result in up to 6 million refugees pouring into Russia ('worst-case' scenario, (Lepingwell 1994, p72). This protection to Russian foreign nationals formed an explicit part of Russian military doctrine drafted in 1992, and remains a watered-down part of their revised 1993 doctrine, and received a mention again in President Putin's 2000 foreign policy statement (Putin 2000; Lepingwell 1994, p73). In tandem with these issues has been the thorny one of citizenship: so far no Central Asian state has followed the dangerous path of Latvia in denying citizenship to non-indigenous speakers. However, must republics except Turkmenistan (1994) have not travelled down the path of a dual citizenship agreements with Russia (Lepingwell 1994, p74). Kazakhstan, one of the most pro-Russian states, and with a sizeable Russian minority, has not accepted the notion of dual citizenship (Lepingwell 1994, p79), perhaps because of the strong anti-government resentment this would cause. The issue of the protection of Russians in the Eurasian region was reiterated in April 1995 by then Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev, once again giving Russia an open pretext for intervention if Russians are oppressed (Gardiner-Garden 1995a, p16). Though this has been soften in the pragmatic diplomacy of the Putin government, this an economic interests in the Eurasian region remain important issues in ensuring the future of Russian security.

Defense and foreign policy are still controversial within Russia, and formed a major part of Parliamentary and public debate through the 1990s (see Pravda 1994). In spite of fear of rapid destabilisation through 1991-1992, Russian foreign policy was quite successful through the mid-1990s: -

Although a rough consensus on a pragmatic approach to Eurasia was achieved in the period (1993-5), there is still considerable uncertainty about what Russia can and will do in the future. In general terms, Russian foreign policy has become highly pragmatic, trying to retain 'great power' status at the very time that the Russian state has become economically weaker and more internally challenged (see Lynch 2001). Through 2001-2003, President Putin has set his stamp on foreign policy and seems to be seeking to retain power within Eurasia while at the same time maintaining strong relations with Europe and the U.S. (see Putin 2000; Antonenko 2001). Several points, however, can be made which will affect the role of Russia in world affairs: -

In conclusion, the prospects for Russia have improved over the last two years but do not guarantee that the country will remain a great power in all senses. If Russia indeed does manage to forge a strong capitalist economy, and resists further disunion within the Russian Federation, then a strong Russia as a world power might emerge within the next 10-30 years. The near collapse of the Russian currency in 1998 suggests that much needs to be done to ensure any kind of economic take off over the next several years. In large measure, however, this timetable will be strongly affected by the actions of other powers (U.S., European Union, China, Japan), and whether they feel they can gain or lose by such a development (see Serfaty 2001). Law and order failures (Bystritsky 1996), productivity problems, a strong and sustainable military without political agendas (Strategic Comments 1998), the issue of maintaining a strong presidential leadership which can work with the Russian Parliament, and the future of the Russian Federation are also major problems that the current leadership need to face. Russia has gained to some degree through its enhanced importance to the EU and the U.S. through 2001-2003 as one of the main conduits into Eurasia affairs. It is now clear, however, that even in Eurasia are no longer just a 'Russian affair'.

If you want to take these themes further, see: -