INTR13-304 & INTR71/72-304, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

Topics: -

We won't have time to look at all of the Central Asian Republics in detail. I will focus today on Kazakhstan, since it is geographically the largest state, and potentially the most powerful in the comprehensive sense of national power (though some would say that Uzbekistan might also emerge as a regional power). This is based in part on a large resource base, on a diverse but comparatively well-educated population of approx. 15 million, and its central geographical position. For Central Asian states, transformation to capitalist economies participating fully in the world economy has been difficult, while progress to a fully democratic system has been markedly slow in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Kyrgyzstan has been the most successful in having relatively open, multi-party elections, though there have been some reverses in the last two years.

2. Troubled Histories

The Kazakh people are one of the largest and most widely spread ethnic groups in 'Greater Central Asia'. As well as Kazakhstan, they have minority populations in Xinjiang province, Mongolia (some 100,000 of these crossed over into Kazakhstan in 1994, Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p38) and Kyrgyzstan. In brief, the Kazakhs 'are a Turkic people, descendants of the nomadic tribes who settled the territory of present day Kazakhstan in the 6th century AD' (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p36). Their culture developed along the northern branch of the Silk Road. Traditionally, they had been a semi-nomad people, living in yurts (felt-lined mobile houses) and minding their herds of animals. Like other Central Asia peoples, the Kazakhs are noted for their tradition of hospitality, which involves offering drink and food to guests, not asking direct questions, but perhaps engaging in dastarkhan, a humorous and polite conversation over a feast. Although many Kazakhs still live in the countryside, many others form components of the city populations of the region. Since the 1930s the nomadic life of the Kazakhs has been largely curtailed.

From the sixteenth century, partly under the impact of the Mongols who controlled the region from the 13-15th centuries, they emerged as three distinct tribal groupings which still have political significance today: the Great Horde (Ulu Zhuz; southeast region), the Middle Horde (Orta Zhuz; central region); the Little Horde (Kishi Zhuz; north) (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p36). During the Soviet period, if the Republic First Secretary was a Kazakh, he was always from the Great Horde, while clan divisions have sometimes been translated into regional interests, e.g. Little Horde members in the northern city of Pavlodar joining with Russians opposed to a Great Horde appointee in charge of regional television (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p38). Although most urban Kazakhs may not know the details of their tribal genealogy, continuing patron-client relationships, whereby different groups help each other, means that tribal affiliations still exist to a limited degree in the cities today (Esenova 1998). Household networks and various forms of informal exchange provided one of the main forms of 'social insurance' during the period of economic transformation in the 1990s (Werner 1998).

Kazakhstan is geographically the largest country in Central Asia (as large as all of Western Europe), but much of this territory is arid desert, open steppes, or mountain terrain. It is for this reason that the region was chosen as one of the main areas for Soviet nuclear testing programs, and for their space launching facility. The northern part of Kazakhstan tended to have a higher Russian population-ratio due to an extensive influx of Russians and Cossacks during the late 19th century, and during periods of Soviet agricultural development, especially the 1960s. During the 19th century perhaps a million Kazakhs died as the region was subjected to Russian, Cossack and Tartar immigration, and due to failed revolts, famine and oppression by the Russian army (Rashid 1994, p111). Some 250,000 thousand also died in a failed revolt in 1916, with perhaps another million perishing during enforced collectivisation of farms (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p36). From 1924, the Soviets also sought to settle the nomadic Kazakh into a more static life-style around villages and later on collective farms, often hunting down those groups which refused to cooperate (Taheri 1989, p102).

The Republic as a whole was used by Stalin as a 'virgin dumping ground for ethnic groups whose loyalties were in doubt' (Rashid 1994, p107). These groups included dozens of minorities, including Germans, Chechens, Mesket Turks, Uzbeks, Tartars, Armenians, Koreans and others. The dominant groups as of 1991 were 40% Kazakhs, 38% Russians, 6% Germans, and 5% Ukrainians (Malik 1992b, p4). By the mid-1990s these figures had changed to 42% Kazakhs and 36% Russians (Puri 1997, p347). By the year 2000 the population was approximately 45% Kazakh and 35% Russian. This population mix, due to Russian out-migration and the slightly higher birth rate of non-Russians, has tended to favour a Kazakh dominance.

Resentment was also felt by many Kazakhs against the Soviet effort to suppress religion, particularly Islam, which was viewed as a direct threat to the security of the southern borders of the USSR. In spite of numerous Soviet attempts to re-educate people away from religion, Islam remained a strong cultural force in Kazakhstan, in part as a form of resistance to Russian domination. We see this in efforts by groups of Muslims to make pilgrimages to religious shrines of 'saints' which had been closed by local authorities. The result was a series of police actions and riots in several Central Asian republics that resulted in some deaths and numerous injuries during 1987 (Taheri 1989, pp160-2). Today, Kazakhstan is more open to religious expression, allowing the building of new mosques, madrassah (Islamic schools and colleges), and allowing people to go on the pilgrimage to Mecca, the haj (Akiner 2000, p99). At the same time, there is an effort to divide religion and state, and limit the role that religious associations can play in politics (see Tazmini 2001).

The Uighur minority also form an interesting cross-border group. Most are found in China's Xinjiang Autonomous region, with a total of some 7,700,000 Uighurs in China in the 1990s. There are also some 300,000 in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. China has been worried about the implications of cross-border nationalism, and in 1996-1998 was involved in a crackdown on rebellious elements in Xinjiang. Ethnic and religious politics, though not reaching the scale of violence found in Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, are a major feature of Kazakh experience (see further below).

3. The Difficult-but-Necessary Relationship with Russia

Tensions between Kazakhs and Russians were further intensified in the mid-1980s when the corrupt Kunayev regime (which seemed to have run government via an extensive network of family and tribally selected appointments) was replaced on Gorbachev's orders not by a Kazakh, but by the ethnic Chuvash from Russia, Gennady Kolbin. In 1986 it seemed that glasnost (reform and political openness) was for Russians only. Riots and demonstrations broke out on 17 December 1986, with some being killed and hundreds injured as police tried to control the situation.

Party elections in March 1989 saw Nursultan Nazarbayev (a member of the Great Horde, born 1940, also transliterated as Nazarbaev) take power, and then in direct elections confirmed as the national leader on 22 February 1990 (Rashid 1994, p117). On 26 October 1990, Kazakhstan became a sovereign state, but Nazarbayev was one of the leaders most keen on retaining some form of Union under Gorbachev's framework, and most suspicious of Yeltsin's drive for Russian autonomy (Akiner 2000, p94; Rashid 1994, p118). The events of the coupe against Gorbachev in late 1991, however, forced Nazarbayev to accept that the USSR was at an end, and that he would have to move to cooperate with the loose CIS arrangement suggested by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. On 21 December 1991 at then capital of Kazakhstan, Alma Ata (also transliterated as Almaty), agreements were signed for the CIS and its joint control of nuclear weapons (Rashid 1994, p119; the capital in 1997-1998 was moved to the city of Akmola).

After that time, tensions with Russia over price controls, monetary policies, and suggestions by Yeltsin of a review of borders, forced Nazarbayev to threaten to break away from CIS and begin developing a Central Asian organisation. In the end, cooperative agreements were signed between Kazakhstan and Russia on regional security and joint use of the Baikonour cosmodrome (Rashid 1994, pp119-120). The border issue, with the desire of some nationalistic Russians, including some Cossack elements, to incorporate parts of northern Kazakhstan remained heated through 1990-1991 (a view implicitly supported even by the writer Solzhenitsyn, 1991), but was defused thereafter. Nonetheless, the ethnic balance remained a very sensitive issue for a number of reasons: -

These tensions have also been slightly exacerbated by an old religious tension between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. In 1988 Soviet leaders allowed the sumptuous celebration of Kiev's conversion to Christianity a thousand years before - a clear sign that Russia once again hopes to bolster support by tapping into Orthodox religiosity (Taheri 1989, p32, p211). Attendance of Church and Mosque have risen throughout the entire region, and although most of these congregations are moderate, there are dangers that religious divisions could be used by extremist politicians.

Furthermore, though Kazakhstan has been relatively successful in drawing in foreign capital (compared to other regional states), the entire economy of the region had been geared as part of the Soviet system. All major rail, road, air and pipeline routes headed north and west into Russia. Even as late as 1991 'inter-Republic' trade still accounted for 84% of total trade, which provided 34.2% of GDP (Dannreuther 1994, p20). Today, trade has increased with regional states, to a small extent with the West, and most especially with China, but Russia still remains the main route for much of this trade, and one of the major inputs and outputs for the Kazakh economy. In fact, Russia through 1995 still provided much of the country's international services, including 'currency, passports, security, embassy functions' (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p38). Russia and Kazakhstan have signed military cooperation agreements (1992, 1994), and in January 1995 signed a 'Declaration on Expanding and Deepening Russian-Kazakh Cooperation' which had strong implications on coordinating the two economies and foreign affairs policies (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p38). There has also been some discussion of forming a joint armed forces structure which would allowed shared training, use of equipment and troops (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p38). Military cooperation deepened through 2000-2001. A Customs Union was created between Russia and Kazakhstan in 1995, boosting regional trade (Melet 1998, p239). However, by early 2000 there were concerns about the joint CIS visa arrangement. The Kazakh government then 'suspended simplified transit rules via Kazakhstan for CIS citizens as a temporary and imperative measure to curb illegal and uncontrollable migration', a policy also followed by Uzbekistan and Russia (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 13 January 2000).

It is against this background that we can see why Kazakhstan has been generally cooperative in the CIS, and had been a strong supporter of a proposed Eurasian Union (EAU), as outlined in lecture 1, which might moderate Russian and Kazakh interests within the wider region. The idea of some kind of Eurasian Union has been resurrected at the economic level as a Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) through 2000-2001 based around intensified cooperation between Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Russia Today 2001).

The future prosperity of Kazakhstan and effectiveness to trade will be directly influenced by the broader regional setting. This need for wider economic integration was already obvious by 1989: -

4. Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Power and International Leverage

An issue which has pushed Kazakhstan into world prominence is the fact that after the break-up of the USSR, it retained some 104 SS-18 Satan ICBMs on its territory, with more around 1,340 strategic nuclear warheads (tactical weapons had been removed, Rashid 1994, p109; Puri 1997, p247), as well as a small number of strategic bombers. Although for a time under joint CIS command, a programme has been put in place for the eventual disarmament and destruction of these weapons. However, President Nazarbayev used the timetable of this arms control project as a means to extract concessions from Russia, and to express his concerns about the continued nuclear armament of Russia, China and the US. As of 1994, Nazarbayev has retained the missiles under (theoretical) CIS control so long as Russia was also a nuclear power (Rashid 1994, p120). Here both Kazakhstan and the Ukraine seem to have linked their policy in relation to nuclear security - they would only guarantee to destroy their weapons if they received US aid to do this, and though both nations joined the START I treaty, the completion of destruction programme moved back to 2001.

However, Kazakhstan had tried to avoid exacerbating other countries by having only a modest national army. At first this was based around a small national guard, and in 1992 by appointing the Russian Lieutenant-General Ryabtsev, commander of the Fortieth Army, to be the first Deputy Defence Minister (Rashid 1994, p120). Other forces in Kazakhstan were at first 'on loan' Russian units, and Kazakhstan has given relatively low priority to the development of its armed forces. There has been some increase of military and internal security spending through 1998, creating a small but reasonably well-equipped army (Chipman 1998, p150). Thus, although the country developed an active armed force of 55,100 men comprising two army corps equipped with thousands of tanks and pieces of artillery pieces, in fact much of this equipment is in store and not in a state of preparedness (see Chipman 1998, p158). Active armed forces as of 1999 totalled 65,800 and a small but relatively modern airforce using MiG 29s and SU-27 fighter aircraft (Chipman 2000, p164). In 2000-2001 Kazakhstan announced a large military equipment purchasing budget, much of this package to be acquired from Russia. Today, a wider range of new security issues (environment, criminal organisations, border control, economic stability) may be more important than traditional military threats.

5. Ecological Disaster and Reconstruction

Soviet ideology and technology favoured the engineering of the environment to suite the demands of a rapidly industrialising state needing to catch up with the power of the west. This left a legacy of ecological and health disasters which represent a major cost component to the future development of the new states of in Central Asia. This is in contrast to indigenous beliefs. Folk traditions in the region always treated rivers as almost sacred, e.g. the Amu Darya river. One Uzbek poet could joke 'When God loved us he gave us the Amu-Darya . . . And when he stopped loving us he sent us Russian engineers' (Taheri 1989, p174).

The most visible of ecological disasters is that of the Aral Sea, which has shrunk by more than two thirds after rivers feeding into it were depleted by massive cotton irrigation schemes over the last thirty years. The result has been a destruction of natural fisheries, the Sea has shrunk to less than one third its original size, there has been massive salination of once fertile soil in the region, and various toxins and pesticides have concentrated in parts of the soil and water-table, leading to associated health problems (Sinnott 1992, p86). The Soviets had considered 'solving' this problem by the planning the Ob-Irtysh projection: the redirection of part of the great Siberian river the Ob through a 2,300 kilometre canal (it would be the longest in the world) into Central Asia. The plan had been to divert this river, and some others, to allow a further increase by 50% of irrigated lands in the Aral region by the year 2000 (Sinnott 1992, p85).

The ecological problem of this and other regions created opposition both within the scientific and intellectual groups of the Soviet Union. Even before Gorbachev's reforms were fully in place, ecological activists began to publicise and study the problem. In 1986 the Uzbekistan Writer's Union created the Committee for Saving the Aral, and reported on and studied the affected area in detail, as well as organising a bank fund for donations to help save the Aral Sea (Sinnott 1992, p91).

During the period of reform under Gorbachev, the Ob River redirection project was put on hold due to the concerns of Russian environmentalists, and due to the enormous cost, at least 30 billion pounds (Taheri 1989, pp175-6). In 1986, the project was shelved, and instead there was a call for a 15-20% reduction of water usage in the region, and plans to modernise the existing irrigation network (Sinnott 1992, p85). The environmental disaster of the Aral is a regional problem of such severity that regional governments have agreed to put 1% of their GDP into a special Intergovernmental Fund (Ecostan News 1995a) to try to help reduce the damage caused. It is difficult to see, however, how any quick solution can be found when all likely ones hinge on the reduction of river-water usage (for the difficult options, see Sinnott 1992, pp91-94).

Kazakhstan has not only suffered from nuclear testing, from damage to the Aral Sea, but in the northwest a huge coal power plant (Ekibastuz) has caused serious pollution, and the large Lake Balkhash has been polluted by copper smelters, resulting in virtual extinction of animal life in that area and in heavily polluted water supplies (Rashid 1994, p123). Nuclear power and related pollution issues have also had an effect on internal politics - a popular opposition movement was the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement ('Nevada' in abbreviation), which was a Green movement which became the basis of the People's Congress Party. Although an opposition group, Nazarbayev has been friendly with the Nevada leadership (Rashid 1994, p122). Nazarbayev himself closed the Semipalatinsk testing site in August 1991, and arranged for compensation to be given to the victims of the Soviet testing programme (Rashid 1994, p124).

It is against this background that we can see that Kazakhs have become very environmentally conscious. During June 1995, a series of seminars, sponsored by the government and the Ministry of Ecology and Bioresources, began to discuss the issue of sustainable development (Ecostan News 1995b). Likewise, President Nazarbayev has questioned the entire issue of nuclear weapons reduction, in favour of a policy of nuclear arms elimination. In this context, many Kazakhs also felt resentment over Chinese nuclear tests, just over the border, during the mid-1990s.

However, the realities of the newly independent state indicate that the country will not be able to afford an entirely green development policy, at least during the next decade. Until 1994 Kazakhstan still ran a small fast-breeder reactor (a BN-350 = a Dmitrovgrad-350), with scientific support from Russia, which supplied around 10% of Kazakhstan's electricity as well as desalinating sea water. The plant was closed due to financial problems, but there have been plans re-open it for a ten year period before replacing it with a newer reactor (Ivanov 1995). As of 1995, Kazakhstan intended to open another reactor possibly at the old weapons-testing site at Semipalatinsk. Likewise, Kazakhstan still mines and refines reactor grade uranium, which it exports (Ivanov 1995). Kazakhstan has also entered into scientific and trade programs with India for the peaceful development of nuclear power (Puri 1997, p247-248).

6. Kazakhstan: Not Yet the New Kuwait

Kazakhstan has an extremely strong resource base, though this was inefficiently managed by the Soviet Union, and there was general underinvestment in the region during the 1980s (Taheri 1989, p175). Natural resources include iron ore, coal, gold, silver, chrome, zinc, cadmium, beryllium, copper, manganese and uranium (Rashid 1994, p125), as well as nickel and bauxite, gas and oil. These resources made Kazakhstan an integral part of the Soviet economy during the 1980s: -

The Caspian Sea region has in the order of 200 billion barrels of oil (proven and possible reserves, Forsythe 1996, p6; for slightly lower estimates, see Jaffe & Maning 1998). This makes access to this oil an international and strategic issue. The 'stakes involved, however, remain unchanged - power, influence, security and wealth' (Forsythe 1996, p6). Oil is likely to become an even more important issue in the near future as gaps between world production and demand narrows (Forsythe 1996, p7, p18) over the next ten years, and as East Asian nations, including China, begin to import more oil. In fact, the issue of the route for gas and oil pipelines, whether through Russia, Armenia, Georgia, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan has resulted in a complex major international game of push and shove. The U.S., in particular, opposes any routes through Iran, and would also like more routes independent of Russian control, though it is otherwise willing to aid investment and technology transfer of this sort to the region (see Forsythe 1996, pp18-20 for American policies). Iran, of course, is eager for join development and is willing to host pipelines through its territory as part of its attempt to revive regional trade (Forsythe 1996, p24). Russia, in turn, has used this issue to gain more leverage on the oil share it can extract from the Caspian Sea, but has been beset by the fact that some oil pipelines have passed through problem areas such as Chechnya. Ironically, instability in neighbouring states such as Azerbaijan can aid Russian leverage on regional oil resources and control of oil routes (Forsythe 1996, pp14-17). Both Iran and Russia have agreed on the idea that the Caspian should be viewed legally as a lake, with resources shared and divided on that basis (Tarock 1997, p194). Tensions over legal control of resources has continued through 2001, with major negotiations planned for 2002 (see Spector 2001). One of the latest moves in this 'oil-diplomacy' has been a Chinese signing of a $4.4 billion memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan 'to build pipelines to China and Iran in exchange for oil and gas concessions and a 51% stake in Kazakhstan's state-controlled oil-production company' (Jaffe & Manning 1998, p124).

At present, however, Kazakhstan still needs to export oil through Russian pipelines, and President Nazarbayev has warned the West of the danger of isolating Russia. In December 1999, Nazarbayev also told reporters 'that his country was supporting construction of the CPC, a major oil pipeline between Tengiz in Kazakhstan and Novorossiysk, Russia's port on the Black Sea.' (Xinhua News Agency, 1999) At this stage, a wealth boom based on oil has not emerged.

The country has the ability to produce grain exports - a bumper crop in 1992 of 32 million tonnes was largely sold to Russia in exchange for needed machinery and spare parts (Rashid 1994, p129). The country also has a range of other agricultural exports, including the production of cotton, wool and meat. It will be necessary, however, to solve the water-usage problem before this agricultural output can be greatly increased.

These factors have led to the projection of Kazakhstan as a new Asian tiger so long as the country remains stable (Rashid 1994, p127), a prospect which seems possible so long as leaders in that country can avoid exacerbating ethnic tensions. International confidence in Kazakhstan has been expressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) arranging a $1.2 billion loan to be spread over 3 years - a very large investment bearing in mind the small population of Kazakhstan (approximately 15 million), and considerably larger than the funds allocated to Uzbekistan by the IMF and World Bank (approximately $300 million as of 1995). By the 1994-1998, the World Bank had arranged some 16 loans for structural readjustment, including road, legal and health care developments, totalling some $1.6 billion (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 22 December 1998). In 1999, the World Bank decided to grant a further loan of approximately $140 million for the modernisation of the national electric power transmission network (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 27 December 1999). Through 1999, Kazakhstan's currency, the tenge, remained relatively stable, and the overall 1999 inflation rate of 18% was not unmanageable in a developing economy (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 14 January, 2000). Some 60 US companies, as well as European and East Asian interests, have opened offices in Alma Ata, including Chevron, Mobile, Citibank, Chase Manhattan, and Price Waterhouse (Laird 1994, p18). As of 1998-1999, government budgeting seemed realistic and the country's economy generally stable (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 22 December 1998). The year 2000 saw a solid 14.6% rise in industrial output and GDP overall grew by 9.6% (Times of Central Asia 2001). In 2001, GDP grew by approx. 13.2% (Nurshayeva 2002).

Yet problems remain, including environmental damage, slow privatisation policies, ethnic tensions, and a tendency towards political authoritarianism that undermines democratic reform (see below). Considerable work also needs to done in improving infrastructure in the country. In 1992, for example, the country only had 6 telephones per hundred persons, with much phone traffic routed via Moscow. As well as earth-satellite receiving stations provided by Telstra Australia, the country plans to entirely upgrade its phone system, with an extra 200,000 lines being provided for the Alma Ata being developed by AT & T. In December 1992 Turkey also helped finance a satellite ground station at Alma Ata. In part, of course, these problems are also exacerbated by the relatively small population in such a large territory. Although the resource-to-person ratio is high, there are limited numbers engaged in creating infrastructure for future development (a problem once shared by countries such as Australia and Canada). The export profile of Kazakhstan has begun to strengthen, with goods and services exports accounting for 33% of GDP in 1996 and 61% in 2001 (see attached Fact Sheets).

Though the political system has liberalised within Kazakhstan, with a much more open press and less overt operation of a police state, political problems remain. President Nazarbayev has been an effective international leader, but he has also attempted to rig the current, formally democratic system in his favour. In the March 1994 elections for the new Parliament, he seems to have effectively nominated many parliamentarians and vetted the rest (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p39). Furthermore, Nazarbayev, through contacts with opposition groups, has sought to lift the position of President to a point where it is in some sense above multiparty politics. The less benign aspect of this has been a tendency to manipulate the electoral system to enhance the power of the presidency. As summarised by John Gardiner-Garden: -

In the worst case scenario, this cloaked authoritarianism could also effectively bring together democrats and Islamic parties into an unstable opposition, as occurred in Tajikistan. Presidential powers at present include the right to rule by decree, to declare a state of emergency, and to dissolve parliament under certain conditions (Akiner 2000, p109). There are also rumours that Nazarbayev's eldest daughter may be being groomed for a future political role (Akiner 2000, p117). To date, however, Kazakhstan has avoided the more intense conflicts of Tajikistan, or the Ferghana valley. In part, Nazarbayev might claim to be following the 'Chinese model', i.e. economic reform before complete political liberalisation. He also holds a unique position as a former member of the Communist elite, now a leading politician and member of the dominant clan group, the 'Golden Horde'. In future, however, he will need to ensure that all groups get some rewards from his country's economic growth. Otherwise, there is no guarantee that Kazakhstan will emerge as a wealthy, independent and stable state.

Internal censorship certainly has been reduced since 1991, with a UNESCO conference in October 1992 issuing the Declaration of Alma Ata on Promoting Independent and Pluralistic Asian Media, suggesting a range of mechanisms to protect journalists and help ensure freedom of the press in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, independent media has come under various pressures, ranging from harassment through to sudden tax inspections and fines, sometimes resulting in a level of self-censorship that limits the expression of opposition ideas (Akiner 2000, p105). Word of mouth through clan networks, called in Kazakh the 'long ear' (uzun qulaq), however, means that critical information still does flow through the country (Akiner 2000, p106).

The question we can now ask is how Kazakhstan will manage its development in the next decade. Are there key priorities which it will need to deal with before it can make use of its potential wealth and strong geostrategic position? Will it find a solution to the oil-access problem? Will it be able to meet both Western and Russian concerns? Will continued economic growth soften political tensions?

7. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan

We will not go into detail on these two republics today - students may wish to develop seminars or essays on them.

The Turkmen entered the region of current Turkmenistan in the 15th century as 'descendants of the Turkic speaking Oghuz tribes who migrated to Central Asia in the 10th century AD' (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p29). Important centres such as Khiva, Bukhara and Merv with dominated by first Persian and then Russian interests by 1881, and was later on incorporated into the Soviet system, though guerilla resistance continued down to 1936.

Turkmenistan is another resource rich country in the region which hopes to benefit from it oil, gas and cotton production. Turkmenistan, furthermore, though retaining a generally friendly line to Russia, has sought to distance itself from Commonwealth of Independence States activities, and did not sign the January 1993 CIS charter on closer economic and political cooperation (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p30). It did not become part of the joint CIS peace-keeping forces in Tajikistan, and it quickly established its own currency. It is likely that it hopes to follow a more independent path of economic development. In this context, Turkmenistan has been 'exploring the possibility of breaking more decisively out of the CIS camp by building export pipelines into Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan and China' (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p31; Bushev 1994). Recent events in Afghanistan have suggested that routes through that country may be possible in the future, depending on the ongoing stability of the Afghan government (see Spector 2001).

However, to defuse ethnic tensions, it has signed agreements on dual citizenship arrangements for Russians living in Turkmenistan (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p30), something which no other Central Asian state has done, though it has been contemplated in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

Perhaps the most significant limitation to future development is the authoritarian style of government maintained by Saparmurad Niyazov, a former associate of Gorbachev. In the 1990 elections the opposition party Agyzbirlik (Unanimity) was not allowed to run, and in a presidential election in June 1992 Niyazov received a suspiciously high endorsement rate of 99.5% of votes (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, pp29-30). In 1994 a referendum extended his term of office till 2002 (Akiner 2000, p107). In fact, Niyazov has gone on to create a personality cult, has had "hundreds of settlements, streets, factories, squares and canals renamed after him, had hundreds of statues and monuments erected in his honour, and is officially known as Turkmenbashi or 'Leader of all Turkmens'" (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p30). This seems to be an attempt to use the mechanics of the old communist personality cult (as used by Stalin and Mao, with the leader representing the will of the proletariat), but now adapted to capture nationalist feeling. People who oppose Niyazov are usually arrested (Collignon 1998). At the same time, he has been able to maintain this by presenting himself as the Turkmenbashi, the 'father of all Turkmen', and by providing regular pensions, salaries, education, health care and relative stability (Dubnov 1998).

Kyrgyzstan is a mountainous state located between Kazakhstan, China and Tajikistan. Once occupied by Iranian nomads, it came under the control of Turkic speaking people from Siberia ahead of the expanding Mongol Empire (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p40). From the mid-18th century it came under Chinese control, but after periods of independence for the territory of Kokand, it came under Russian domination. Serious revolts against the Russian and then Soviet control led to many Kyrgyz moving into Afghanistan and China.

Today Kyrgyzstan controls part of the ethnically Uzbek Ferghana valley, where 1990 disputes over land and housing created wide rioting in which up to one thousand died (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p41). In following elections, Askar Akayev, President of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, became president, and proceeded to reform and streamline government, which has pursued a generally democratic and modestly nationalist form of government, e.g. the capital was renamed from Frunze (a conquering Red Army general) back to Bishkek (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p41). Akayev was most outspoken in opposition to the coupe against Gorbachev, and took strenuous actions against the local communist party to stop it seizing control of affairs in 1991 (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, p41). In 1991 Akayev was confirmed as President in direct elections, while free but rather confused parliamentary elections were held in May 1993. Akayev retained his post in presidential elections in late 1995. President Akayev has had trouble running some of his privatisation measures through Parliament, and in 1996 moved to increase his presidential powers. Akayev won the 2000 elections, but with a deepened opposition. Through early 2001, there were concerns that the President had moved to legally silence opposition leaders critical of him.

Kyrgyzstan, though it has a range of mineral resources and a good supply of hydroelectric power, does not have the oil and gas resources of the other Central Asian states. In this environment, though Akayev would like to see his country as an independent and neutral state (like Switzerland), he in fact has recognised the necessity of cooperating with Russia. In December 1991 Kyrgyzstan joined the CIS, and has continued to seek economic cooperation with Russia. In spite of rapid privatisation of the economy, many of the main industries in the country have undergone partial collapse, and there are reports of rising crime and corruption in the country as economic hardship hits sectors of the population (Gardiner-Garden 1995b, pp42-3). The country seeks further trade from Russia and China, as well as Western aid as it tries to develop industrial and manufacturing skills in its population. It has also entered into close diplomatic and trade agreements with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Through 1994-1996, agreements stabilised its borders with China, opening further opportunities for trade eastwards. It has begun to chart a successful transition to a privatised economy, but still relies to a strong degree on international aid and loans to support the economy (see Abazov 1999 for details). It has a small population of 4.8 million people.

However, Kyrgyzstan has not been without recent political troubles. The taking of foreign hostages by Islamic militants from across the border in Uzbekistan during October 1999 led to a review of the small army and border forces guarding the country. President Akayev said that 'the events in the south of Kirghizia, and in some other states, showed that terrorism had stopped to be a problem of a certain country or region, having acquired a "global character," and was now posing a threat to the whole world community.' (ITAR/TASS News Agency, 23 November, 1999) Through 2000-2001, Kyrgyzstan has also been cooperating with the Shanghai Five (now called the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation) in order to try to clamp down on cross-border terrorism, an issue which is of particular concern to China (see Ferguson 2001). More recently, the country has also begun to cooperate with the U.S. on these issues: -

8. Models of Development and Integration

Kazakhstan seems to be combining a path of privatisation and capital investment with traditional rule by a dominant leader who has a direct connection with the largest indigenous segment, the Great Horde. At the same time, Nazarbayev has some limited concessions to moderate opposition and 'green' parties, while keeping strong control of central government. This model may be stable for the interim, but cannot work without wider cooperation from nearby states, and continued success in stabilizing the economy. This means that Kazakhstan needs to maintain friendly relations with great powers such as Russia and China, as well with regional actors such as Uzbekistan, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. In part, this cooperation has begun with the Shanghai Five (now the Shanghai Cooperative Organisation; see Gleason 2001; Misra 2001), which has improved relations among Kazakhstan, Russia, and China, as well as sought greater stability in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Even if economic reform is maintained, it is possible that demands for a freer political system, and a larger role for Islamic parties in government, may put more pressure on the current government. Kazakhstan has recently expressed interest in closer association with the European Union and in joining APEC, but neither are likely prospects in the short term. Kazakhstan is literally the heart of Greater Central Asia and in many ways the key for future development of Eurasia. Its development remains crucial for the entire region.
 
 

9. Bibliography and Further Resources

Resources

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