INTR13-305 & INTR71/72-305, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

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One interesting task is to try and define levels of power, including, of course, economic, diplomatic, and resource factors as well as military power. We have already seen that issues of prestige, of being a 'good international citizen' cannot be excluded from how nations are perceived. The usual ranking of states has been that of micro-states (Pacific islands like Palau), small states (like Fiji), medium powers (like Australia and Indonesia), great powers (a term applied in the past to nations like France and Britain), and superpowers. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the only fully-recognized, broadly-based superpower that remains is the United States. Potential contenders for superpower status include the European Union as an economic and diplomatic power, Japan in the economic sense, and possibly in the future China (see below).

At present, however, only one nation seems to have the requisite military force, economic base, population resources (including education levels), prestige and influence to be called a superpower. The United States remains the only superpower. This has led to several reconceptualisation of the 'state of the world'. From the bipolar world order of conflict between the West and the Soviet Union and its allies (1946-1987), people began to speak of several international orders. Some hoped for a new world order under the leadership of the U.S. With the cooperation of nations in the Security Council, including Russia, it was hoped that a new age of international cooperation could begin solving international problems as well as intervene again immoral regimes or situations (Allison & Treverton 1992), e.g. against Iraq and to stop starvation in Somalia. These hopes proved short-lived, with the international cooperation being still limited by regional problems and by a lack of political will, e.g. reluctance to intervene seriously in the war raging in Bosnia until 1995. Some suspected that an age of regionalism, and competitions between regions, could emerge (Thurow 1992; Acharya 1993; Chubin 1989). Others were even more pessimistic and argued that the end of the age of nuclear deterrence would result in a return to conventional wars, to political chaos, and even to a new international 'tribalism' as states broke up under the impact of ethnic conflicts (Holm 1995; Horseman & Marshall 1994; Camilleri 1992).

Neither the most optimistic nor the most pessimistic of these visions eventuated in the period between 1992 and 2001. Yet there can be now doubt that at present the U.S. remains the major military power in the entire Indo-Pacific region, even if there has been a slight reduction (10-15%) of force levels since 1992, as well as the closing of major U.S. air and naval bases in the Philippines. This has led to a certain argument that the sole power which can police and monitor world peace is really the U.S. (with suitable economic backing from Japan and Germany, and some moral and limited military support from other allies). This view has been most strongly reiterated by the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London, which has argued strongly that the events of 1995-6 have shown that power politics remains with us, and that the tried and true concept of 'balance of power' is the only means to deter aggression. The main groups to be deterred are Iran and Iraq in the Middle East, rump Yugoslavia ('Greater Serbia') in southeast Europe, and North Korea and China (PRC) in Asia. Yet at the same, deterrence is not enough. Involvement of these nations in the international system has also been promoted as a path towards long term peace. This strategy seems to be rather successful in relation to China, and may soon be paving the way for a stable transition in North Korea.

This viewpoint leads to a certain temptation to use a notion called preponderance of power. American leaders might be tempted to use political, economic and military power to assert U.S. interests more forcefully in world affairs. This could lead to an aligning of forces to subtly coerce 'renegade' nations, e.g. those who promote terrorism, or those who threaten the perceived policy interests of the 'West'. The problem of such an approach is that it places a major moral responsibility (see Brilmayer 1994) on the single remaining superpower not to use its strategic power to solve other problems or to hold down other great powers. Through an overt preponderance of power, backed up by suitable regional and Western alliance partners, America could gradually direct a global agenda (on these issues, see Layne & Schwarz 1993). It is possible to interpret U.S. policy in relation to the Gulf War in this way, and it is possible to construct systems of diplomacy whereby the U.S. and its allies can shape 'the regional security environment' in the Persian Gulf to exclude regional or external challengers (see the recommended policies in Khalilzad 1995, p118). It is possible that the 2001 Bush administration may be tempted to pursue somewhat more assertive strategies in relation to China, in part under the advice of national security adviser Condoleezza Rice (Eccleston 2000).

Preponderance of power was also used cautiously in relation to North Korea. Tensions emerged between the U.S. and North Korea over the possible development of nuclear weapons in that country from 1993-1995. The U.S. managed to pull back from punitive actions such as embargos and airstrikes in relation to North Korea, perhaps due to a certain reluctance in Japan and South Korea to rush to sanctions, and due to a cooperative but firm policy by China which was willing to pressure North Korea, but not willing to see it attacked. The Clinton administration did not seem keen on pursuing such risky forms of brinkmanship, and by June 1995 partial agreement had been achieved between North Korea and the U.S. in meeting held in Malaysia. Ironically, this was not a one-way street: the North received greater economic help in replacing old nuclear reactors, and some greater diplomatic recognition from the U.S. Far from a predominance policy serving U.S. interests alone, it also allowed North Korea to play the 'nuclear card' in maintaining a certain level of importance in Northeast Asia long after her relations with Russia and China had seriously declined. Through 1996-8 North Korea suffered from a much more serious problem: destruction of her economic and agricultural base which led to widespread famine in the country. This meant that food and economic aid became a major bargaining point between the North Koreans and South Korea, Japan and the 'West'. The U.S., in particular, is reluctant to support and prolong the regime in the North, but also knows that a rapid collapse could be a humanitarian, refugee, economic and even a military crisis. Nor are the terms or prospects for any sort of unification settled, in spite of intense and troubled negotiations during 1997 (Hewett 1997b). Here we can see that a preponderance of military power is insufficient to automatically solve major crises, or to shape future outcomes. From 2000, North Korea has deepened its diplomatic contacts with the U.S., South Korea and Australia.

Since 1996, the U.S. has taken a more cautious approach in the use of its preponderant power, e.g. in further negotiations with Iraq, and in its intervention in Kosovo (in Yugoslavia). However, in late 1998, and early 1999, there were signs that the U.S. President was willing to run preponderance power strategies again. Renewed missile strikes and Iraq, and plans to increased military spending of up to an extra $100 billion over a six-year period, on high technology weapons indicated some return to this posture (Holland 1997). At the same time, the strategic doctrine for the Asia-Pacific published by the U.S. Department of Defense in 1998 suggested that alongside a strong military presence, the U.S. will also seek address comprehensive issues such as promotion of democracy, terrorism, and the environment (Department of Defense 1998; see lecture 7 for the idea of comprehensive security).

The question we can ask, then, is whether the U.S. is a stabiliser in the Indo-Pacific region, or whether there is a danger that the U.S. could be drawn into new conflicts or competition in the region. In this context, the relationships among the U.S., China and Japan remain crucial for the future peace and prosperity of Southeast Asia, and indeed, for the Indo-Pacific region as a whole. Any emergence of trilateral economic or diplomatic competition among these powers could be extremely destructive (Johnstone 1999; Ayoob 1999).

2. The Role of the Superpower: Stabiliser or Predominant Power?

Most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have viewed the U.S. presence (post-1975) as playing the role of a stabilizing, balancing force in the region. The major exceptions to this trend has been China (PRC), which has at times viewed the U.S. as a hegemon, though this policy softened in the 1980s before being resurrected in the early 1990s and again for a short time in the late 1990s. After 1989, and with repeated tensions over human rights, trade, Tibet, Hong Kong and Taiwan, China has expressed the view of the U.S. as returning to power diplomacy in Asia (see below). Malaysia and India have also been critical of the U.S. overplaying their 'policeman' role in the region. Economic tensions have also resulted in a bout of mutual recrimination between some Asian and U.S. elites (Harding 1998). Likewise, strong tensions between the U.S. and China have emerged after the accidental (and disastrous) bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia (Dellios 1999), and with new tensions emerging over the future of Taiwan. In early 2000, concerned over a vote by the U.S. Congress 'to strengthen military ties with Taiwan, the Chinese armed forces . . . warned Washington not to confuse China with Yugoslavia and Taiwan with Kosovo.'(1)

Likewise, there have been noted differences in attitude between the U.S. and ASEAN states over policies to countries like Vietnam and Burma (Myanmar), both of whom ASEAN was keen to constructively engage long before the U.S. seemed ready to normalise relations. While the U.S. did not return to completely normal relations with Vietnam until early 1995, (due to the fact of losing the war in Vietnam, to Vietnam's incursion into Cambodia, and due to the issue of missing-in-action soldiers, MIAs), most trade and investment restrictions were being gradually lifted through 1993-4 (Chong 1994). Meanwhile, ASEAN had invited Vietnam to become a full member of ASEAN in 1995. Likewise, the U.S. is still keen to maintain sanctions and as little as trade or investment in Burma (Myanmar), due to the poor human rights record of the regime there. In July 1991, the U.S. (supported by Australia, Canada, and the European Community) called for a decrease in trade between ASEAN nations and Burma. Yet through 1995 some Asian nations took a different view. From 1994 Thailand has been keen to 'constructively engage' Burma, and in February 1995 announced a joint Thai-Burmese gas pipeline project to serve both countries (worth some $US 500 million). By mid-1996 Burma was accorded observer status with ASEAN, giving her opportunities for wider dialogue with other countries. Thailand, too, which has a problematic border with Burma, one again reiterated its policy of constructive engagement with that country, suggesting a negotiated western approach of trading improved human rights in return to development and aid resources.(2) Burma in fact joined ASEAN as a full member in 1997, in an accelerated timetable was supported by Thailand and Malaysia, though some other ASEAN countries were more cautious on this issue. At the same time, Japan had taken the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest (1995) as a justification to allow some renewed aid and trade, and some Japanese diplomats have maintained the economic change is the key to transforming Burma's regime. Bearing in mind ASEAN levels of trade with Burma, it is unlikely that a tight sanctions regime (as applied to South Africa and Iraq) could be applied as successfully in the case of Burma. In the meantime Thai, Singaporean, and Japanese investment has increased, including the construction of two large industrial park-complexes.(3) Although Australia still discourages investment in Burma, it has become less vocally critical of ASEAN-Burma relations. The U.S., on the other hand, though understanding the ASEAN constructive engagement approach,(4) through 1996 strengthened its rhetoric against the Burmese regime, and strengthened a range of limited sanctions against Burma in 1997.

Other cases of divergence views between the US and Asian nations include the recent plans of Indonesia to enforce the Law of the Sea to close many of the east-west shipping routes through its islands, and a reluctance by some Southeast Nations, including Thailand, to get entangled with the U.S.-China dispute over the status of Taiwan. The main divergence, as we shall see, concerns how an economically and military empowered China (PRC) should be dealt with. In general, Southeast Asia nations have favoured a multilateral approach. The U.S., however, though willing to enter multilateral forums such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, and new fiscal and finance organisation for Asia-Pacific, the G-6 (Garran 1997), has tended to rely on strong bilateral relations with many Indo-Pacific nations, including one-to-one treaty arrangements (e.g. with Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, Thailand). Recent statements by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell seem to emphasis the relatively low important given to regional groups like ASEAN and APEC (Cossa 2001). The U.S., as the remaining superpower, is thus seen as being at the heart of a wheel of radiating wheel security arrangements. Thus it holds the centre of rim or circle covering most of the Asia-Pacific region. Whether you see the U.S. as the stabilizing or destabilising centre of the wheel depends on your point of view (see below). Even if the U.S. is viewed as a generally benign superpower, we can also ask how reliable it is, even for allies, bearing in mind the complex interests that influence U.S. policy towards Asia (see Simon 1999).

3. Japan: An Economic Superpower Seeking a Normal Role?

Perhaps the most intriguing and complex of these 'great power' relationships is that between the U.S. and Japan. We will not go into this in detail in this course (other courses do that), but it is one of the main relationships in the Indo-Pacific region. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. (and in theory the other allies), have insisted that Japan not be allowed to remailitarize, a view supported by most of the Japanese population. The abjuration of war as a tool of international politics is enshrined both in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, and in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Hence, Japan's economic security in part relies on the global role played by the United States (Olsen 1992, p137). These limitations include constitutional restrictions on Japan's armed forced to the role of a Self-Defence Force, and limitations on the use of their soldiers overseas. Constitutionally, Japan's forces are limited to a purely defensive role, and until recently spending on these forces has been kept low. In 1987, the 1% of GNP budget was lifted, and after 1990 was expected to move towards the region of 1.5% (Hunt 1989, pp201-202). Since then, in comparable terms, defence budgeting has pushed Japan's defence spending into second rank in world terms, with some slight rise over the 1.5% level.

However, problems in defining defensive verses offensive weaponry are extremely difficult in the modern era. This is particularly the case in countries which themselves are of a large scale with extended borders; here weapons with the needed tactical range for defensive operations also often have the range to strategically attack adjacent nations (Cheeseman 1988, p10). This includes Japan when the length of the Japanese island chain is considered in relation to the relatively narrow sea gap to Korea and the Russian territories. However, certain types of equipment can be excluded from a purely defensive role. Long range bombers, in-flight refuelling, amphibious naval equipment and amphibious landing operations all signal capabilities supporting the possible projection of power. In the case in flight-refuelling, this might be justified in an effort to police SLOCs (Sea Lanes of Communication), but their dual use for air-power projection makes this a difficult subject, especially since Korean, Chinese and Russian territory is well within the 1600 kilometre reach of sea lanes which it has been suggested Japan should patrol (Keal 1988, p132). Here, Japan had through the 1980s managed to reduce international tensions by its force structure, emphasizing a defensive orientation based on a strategy of victory denial to an aggressor (Keal 1988, p144), a trend which largely continues down through 1999. Combined with a foreign policy indicating a real quest for peace and a distrust of militaristic solutions, Japan can indicate that it has not the intent, and lacks most of the means, for an aggressive role in Asia. At the same, there has been considerable pressure from U.S. military planners on Japan to allow it to be used as a major base of operations and supply in the event of a crisis in Northeast-Asia, or in relation to Taiwan, a trend which strengthened through 1996-2000.

These constitutional limitations, however, are subject to interpretation and have been slowly broadened. The slow pace of change here is in large measure a response to public opinion in Japan, which is largely pacifist, and is strongly opposed to emergent militarism. Hence, as noted by Takashi Inoguchi (1991; 1992), Japan's changing international role needs to be grounded in a strong domestic consensus. Change will therefore be gradual, and slower than international expectations from more volatile political systems, especially the United States. Several attempts to pass legislation to allow the Self Defense Force to operate abroad indicate the complexity of this issue, and the difficulty of building a needed consensus among the decision making groups in Japan.

Likewise, as Japan begins to slowly take on a more 'normal' international role, and a slightly expanded defence role, it is possible to ask whether the treaty relationship between Japan and the U.S. will begin to change. Some commentators had felt that in the medium term Japan would begin to loosen the closeness of this relationship, perhaps through more direct relationship with other nations (Leaver 1989, p37). In part, this might help a 'break out' from a traditional foreign and economic policy which has resulted in large 'capital and trade surpluses' but which has also resulted in high trade frictions with the U.S., and also resulted in considerable external pressure to change internal domestic arrangements in several sectors of the economy (Leaver 1989, p46). Some commentators predicted that the special U.S.-Japan relationship might be seriously weakened within a decade (Johnson 1994b). Others, such as the senior Japanese diplomat Kazuo Ogura, have hoped at least for Japan to move closer to Asia (in Hitchcock 1994, p3). Conservative Japanese parties and thinkers often insist not only on the preservation of the special relationship, but would seek to expand it (see Ozawa 1994).

Many of these expectations were overturned during the April 1996 visit of former President Clinton to Japan. The U.S.-Japan security arrangement was if anything deepened. This occurred in spite of massive protests on Okinawa Island, whose governor, Masahide Ota, intends to ensure that the US based are closed in the future, hopefully by the year 2015. To date, the U.S. has agreed to return some of the land to the Okinawans (20%), and will redeploy some of its forces to other Japanese bases. Through early 2001, tensions remained on the island, with a U.S. Marine general having to apologise over insulting comments concerning local Japanese leaders (Smith 2001). Yet here we see a real rift between the needs of the Japanese government, and the needs of the people of a region of Japan.

There have also been calls to use the U.S.-Japan Treaty as the basis of a widened security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.(5) This move was not supported by all Japanese,(6) and the Social Democratic Party was critical of this widening to include all of the Asia-Pacific region. In effect, this could be interpreted as directed again China and North Korea. Although the LDP in Japan favours this slight strengthening, there are other alternatives. One of the opposition parties in Japan, the New Frontier Party (NFP, or Shinshinto) led by 'arch-strategist' Ichiro Ozawa, had favoured a return to a more normal role for Japan on the international stage, which would probably indicate the potential for a slight extension of the role of Japan's military forces, and more diplomatic independence in foreign policy. Such moves, of course, could rouse China's opposition, which has always feared a rise of Japanese militarism, and has viewed the main advantage of the U.S. presence in the region as making the rearmament of Japan very unlikely. The older generation in many Southeast Asian nations, and in South Korea, would also watch such moves suspiciously. Likewise, relations with North Korea may be slow to mend, in part because of negative perceptions of the regime through late 1990s (see Okazaki 2000).

This trend of strengthening ties with Japan may be part of a wider U.S. agenda. U.S. strategists and members of the conservative International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) have suggested that the multilateral approach of ASEAN and APEC has economic utility, but cannot really deal effectively with military or security threats. This type of thinking has suggested that great power politics remains alive, and from the West's point of view U.S. military power alone can 'balance' tensions in the Indo-Pacific (see Bearman 1996). They suggest that the 'balance of power' can't be based on economic factors alone, but must rely on the brute force of carrier groups, airpower, and superior military technology. Likewise, the deepening alignment of the U.S. and Japan on defence issues in 1997 seems to part of this same agenda. This has resulted through 1997-1999 in New Defense Guidelines which allow a more active role for Japanese assistance to U.S. forces (see Simon 1999; Johnstone 1999).

China (PRC) has also noted this development, and argued that these trends show that the U.S. may veer towards using gun-boat tactics, and that these various alliances and shifts towards a new security agenda are an attempt to control and contain China. Chinese threat perceptions, in fact, have strongly coloured the entire China-America relationship (see Roy 1996). Though U.S.-China relations have improved from 1998 (see below), these tensions re-emerged in 1999-2000. Other states are nervous about this trend. Lee Kuan Yew, for example, Senior Minister of Singapore, though praising the U.S. role generally, worried that this veer towards containing China is very dangerous. He preferred a policy of firm engagement to draw China into the international system. In turn of course, Western and particularly U.S. analysis often refuses to accept the PRC as a responsible international citizen, and at time veers into excessive and public displays of the 'China threat' (Barme 1997. For the latest example, see Bernstein & Munro 1997). Fortunately, the U.S. also knows that a stable and secure China is a necessity for a peaceful Asia-Pacific region (see below). It is perhaps for this reason that the U.S. has at last signalled in late 1999 that it would support an entry of China into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), while fruitful talks between the European Union and China on this topic occurred in early 2000.

Another key area where Japan has tried to chart a more independent role in the international system has been through her economic and financial diplomacy. Japan tried to play a strong role in returning East Asia to stability after the 1997-1998 financial crises in the region. The Japanese effort to create a proposed Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to operate more quickly and less intrusively than IMF packages, an idea lead by Japan at a G-7 meeting in 1997, was not taken up, nor seriously raised through APEC or the Asian Development Bank, largely because of American opposition (Johnstone 1999b, p125; Wesley 1999, p67; Acharya 1999, p14). Instead, Japan played a major role in bilateral aid and credit packages, as well as substantial support for some of the IMF packages. In October 1998 it announced a US$30 billion reserve of funds to be disbursed over two years under the 'Miyazawa Plan' (Johnstone 1999b, p125). Following this, there was some reform within the IMF to speed up its responsiveness to crises.

4. China: A Great Power Finding Its Place

China is one of the last remaining communist countries in the world, though under the reforms of Deng Xiaoping, especially since 1978 (when limited forms of private property were allowed under the 1982 Constitution), the country has moved to what Deng Xiaoping has called socialism with Chinese Characteristics, allowing a major role for private enterprise and foreign investment in the country. Others have argued that this really is much closer to 'Capitalism with Confucian characteristics'. Indeed, the 'getting rich is good' syndrome now seems to drive a large section of the current Chinese elite.

Dynastic China was once a superpower, both militarily and culturally, in the imperial tribute system which dominated much of East Asia from 221 B.C. down to the end of the 19th century. This sense of a rightful place 'under heaven' was retained even though the throne was captured by invading outsiders such as the Mongolians and later the Manchus (both were rapidly influenced by Chinese culture). By 1895, however, this imperial tribute system had broken down under the impact of Western power, and China found itself at the mercy of foreign and Japanese influences down to 1945. Internally, a civil war raged between the Communist and Nationalist forces, with Mao Zedong only being able to declare the existence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949.

From then on the PRC faced a complex task in international relations. At first, it was allied with the Soviets, with the U.S. seeking to contain Chinese influence by supporting South Korea, Taiwan and building up Japan. However, as relations between the Soviets and China worsened through the 1960s, a curious triangle emerged, whereby China could tilt between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, offering support for one at the expense of the other. This policy allowed a normalising of China-U.S. relations from 1972-1979, with official recognition occurring on January 1, 1979. The closest economic ties developing in the late 1980s. Most of the West was delighted that China should privatise its economy and open her door to trade, and others expected that in due course there would be further reductions in censorship and some move towards a more open political system.

These expectations received a rude shock in 1989, with the killing of hundreds of student protesters in the environs of Tiananmen Square. This was a surprise to many Western commentators. The biographer Harrison Salisbury, for example, was dismayed by this turn of events, and argued that the reformist Deng had lost his nerve and that China was becoming rigid in its thinking and unable to continue in its path of complete modernisation (Salisbury 1992, p461). In reality, it may be wise to avoid swinging between the extremes of optimism and pessimism in analysing the actions of nations.

In this context, the U.S. reverted to a much more cautious policy in relation to China during the early 1990s. This caution was compounded by a recognition of the growth of the Chinese economy, and by the fact that when combined with the wealth of 'Greater China' (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia), that China as a whole could be an economic power-house by the year 2020. There was also alarm at recent increases in the spending of the People's Liberation Army, though many of these claims were exaggerated by different calculations of parity purchasing power (Dellios 1994b, p2; International Monetary Fund 1993; see Gulde & Schulze-Ghattas 1993). There is no doubt that the PLA is modernising, is purchasing Russian aircraft (SU-27s, and possibly MiG 29s and 31s), and has begun to develop her own advanced fighter in conjunction with Pakistan (aimed to have capabilities similar to the American F-16), and developing improved radar systems. China has also been greatly increasing its missile capabilities, including the kind of surface-to-surface missiles useful in naval encounters, as well as new cruise missiles. The latest area of research for China has been the area of anti-missile systems, specifically a proposal to set up a 'Theatre High Altitude Area Defence System' to cover Beijing, Shanghai and the Three Gorges dam area.(7) China has also strongly opposed the development of any missile shield (NMD) system by the U.S.

These problems have also combined with a certain perception of assertiveness in Chinese foreign policy: China remained adamant in keeping tight control of Tibet and has recently upgraded its People's Armed Police quick-reaction force there,(8) been reluctant to negotiate on sovereignty issues concerning the islands of the South China Sea, especially the Spratlys (though economic resource-use is negotiable), remained tough in its negotiations over the political structure of Hong Kong after 1997, and reasserted that Taiwan was an integral part of China. These statements were viewed a segment of Western commentators as showing that China irredentist, unstable, and at least potentially a threat to regional peace (Segal 1994; Shambaugh 1994, Harding 1993). Yet in late 1998, China moved to increase talks with Taiwan (see Baum & Lawrence 1998), and used diplomacy to avoid a deepening of disputed territorial claims with the Philippines. Through 1999-2000, China also moved to deepen relations with Southeast Asian countries through dialogue in the ASEAN-plus-three meetings, but without actually surrendering any of its claims to islands or resources in the South China Sea.

These trends of tension continued over issues such as human rights, the use of prison labour to make export goods, and infringement of copyright, export of Chinese weapons and weapons technology. These tensions were greatly exacerbated by the blunt reminder by the PRC to Taiwan that it would not allow a strong independence line to be taken in Taiwan's external activities, with PLA missile tests and military exercises in the Taiwan Straits making the point through late 1995 and early 1996. These activities may in part have been a test of the will of the U.S. to support Taiwan. The U.S. responded by sending two carrier battle groups into the region, the largest military deployment to South China waters since the Vietnam War. Tensions have continued since that time over copyright issues (especially CDs), and a war of words has continued through 1996-7 concerning the role of the U.S. and China in the region.

Some important positive steps have also been made: in November 1996 US and Chinese officials had talks on arms on arms proliferation and the sale of nuclear technology power technology.(9) Talks between Madeline Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, and the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, in late April 1997, only partly eased these tensions (Hewett 1997). We can sense the sensitivity of these talks by the statement of Chinese spokesman Shen Guofang, who said 'China was prepared to discuss human rights on the basis of equality. This issue should not be used as an excuse to dabble in the internal affairs of another country.' (Lee 1997). The October 1997 meeting between President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton somewhat smoothed relations, but most of the major issues of potential conflict have not been resolved, though some progress has bee made on nuclear-proliferation concerns. The release of the dissident Wei Jingsheng in November 1997,(10) and some discussion of gradual progress towards more democratic reforms within China, seemed to suggest that the PRC was willing to try to seriously improve its relationship with the U.S. in the long term, but should not be read as suggesting that the current leadership in any way envisages China becoming a liberal democratic country. Tensions, has we have seen, have re-emerged over Taiwan and its future after elections in 2000, and whether the U.S. would be obliged to defend the island if the PRC did use force to influence the issue (for alternatives, see Tucker 1998). It is not certain what new policies will emerge from the new George W. Bush administration in the U.S. from 2001 onwards. Although the U.S. engagement strategy will probably continue, it is possible that the U.S. will take a stronger stance on some issues, e.g. human rights and labour standards (Cossa 2001b).

It is quite possible, that with the renewed and strengthened relationship between China and Russia since Yeltsin's visit in April 1996, that a new forms of triangular relationship will emerge in the region (see Voskressenski 1996), with China gaining technological and moral support from Russia. Here the U.S., if following too aggressive an approach, runs the risk of creating a new mini-Cold War in the Asia-Pacific region. China has developed a specific approach of creating a strategic partnership with Russia, a move that she argues is part of the proper quest for a multipolar world.

From the point of view the PRC, of course, China is simply regaining its rightful place as a great power in the region. China had been unusually weak earlier this century for a nation of her size and geographic position, and current growth is simply a return to a more appropriate role. From this perspective, we could expect China's military to further strengthen and modernise (though reduce in numbers of troops), and China's voice in international affairs to become stronger, not weaker. Furthermore, it must be remembered that Chinese military activities and claims to territory have always been adjacent to her own current borders, and usually reflect existing claims of prior territorial control. Although as a nation claiming to lead the Third World, China would sometimes give technical and military aid, China has never placed bases overseas, nor established strong collective alliance systems. The only major current placement of forces into another region is China's control of Tibet, which China claims as part of her territory historically. In this sense, China has always tried to claim the moral high ground in her foreign policy (see Shish 1993). Even her recent penetration into Burma turns out to be largely driven by economic rather than military interests. From these perspectives, China regionally seems to be asserting herself as a great power. Globally, however, China seems unlikely to project herself as a superpower of the American or Soviet kind. Rather, Rosita Dellios has suggested she may reach for a metapower (indirect influence) role in world affairs, linking power, economics, international influence, culture and a certain viewpoint of what is right in world affairs (see Dellios 1994b). This is likely to conflict with Western expectations, since China has always rejected the very idea of 'superpowers' as having a right to dominate global affairs. China viewed both the Soviet Union and U.S. as 'hegemons', and were to be resisted where possible. Here 'struggle and cooperation' can be expected from Chinese foreign policy behaviour (see Ferguson 1995 on these aspects of Chinese political culture). During 1999-2001, China seemed ready to enter cooperative global organizations, but is also preparing for a possible confrontation with the U.S. in the case of a worst-case scenario.

The question we need to ask is what underlies these ongoing tensions between the US and China. Rather than speak generally, we can look at this more closely by asking whether the ongoing tension between the U.S. and China (diplomatically, economically, and militarily) emerges out of a deeper conflict over values. In the Mao era of Communism, the answer could have been a resounding 'yes', with China supporting a socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat (urban workers) and peasants, and the U.S. supporting liberalism, representative democracy and capitalism. Today however, the issue is a little more complex.

David Hitchcock has recently conducted an assessment on Asia-Pacific elites on the idea of a potential 'values clash' with the West. His results suggest that idea of any 'clash of civilisations' (as suggested by Huntington 1993) has been exaggerated: -

5. New Power Relations in the Asia-Pacific Region

Balances of power change, and not always in favour of 'status quo' powers like the U.S. who basically favour the existing international system. US strategy and diplomacy has often been based on the 'balance of power' concept, whereby the military and national strength of nations should always be kept in rough balance, and preferably with the U.S. having a slight advantage against any combination of protagonists. This view argues for the West's control of any likely threat, and not for trusting the stated intention of other nations. Intention and interests can change, but capability and power can be more readily assessed and balanced. To this is often added a second tier of concerns about values, rights, and the emergence of a cooperative international system. This has emerged in the emphasis on engaging China but also pressuring her to meet one vision of international norms (both in terms of human rights and economic policies). We thus see a contest of norms as much military power (Bell 2000).

If there has been return to a balance of power doctrines in the Indo-Pacific region, then this has certain attendant dangers. The good news is that policies to engage China have not been abandoned, either by the U.S., Japan, or the ASEAN nations. The U.S., in particular, has granted China MFN (most-favoured trading nation) status for 1995-1999. Both China and the U.S. were also unwilling to pursue the copyright dispute to the point of a trade war - last minute negotiations have averted this (Tan Tarn How 1996). Likewise, though tensions over CD and software rights remain, the PRC has shown some stronger action in pulling its CD and music manufacturers into line, and in actively policing copyright infringement. Lastly, high level officials from the U.S. have visited China, suggesting that the conflict over Taiwan will not be allowed to be a fuse for warfare, though it still complicates the relations between the two nations. Recent 'tough talk' by the U.S. and China may be part of a wider negotiation process which began in earnest in May 1997. By October 1997, both the 'good will' and complexity of the U.S.-China relationship emerged in the China-US Joint Statement during the conference between Presidents Jiang Zemin and Clinton: -

6. Chinese Reforms Under President Jiang Zemin

Leaders and leadership circles are a crucial component of understanding China's current and future policies. Therefore it is worthwhile to take a brief look at the current President and leader of China.(12) At present he holds three key position in the country: President (and therefore head of state), Communist Party general secretary (giving him the key position in the Party) and chairman of the party's Central Military Commission (giving him a strong grip on military affairs). The career of Jiang Zemin since 1989 seems to present a certain pattern which has begun to set its stamp on China's international role. Jiang Zemin has had to appeal to different audiences within China, including central and regional elites as well as the wider Chinese public. His main task has been to demonstrate that 'he can meet China's domestic and international challenges and bring a bright future to the country' (Zheng 1997, p38). With the death of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin at first seemed part of a collective leadership in which no one man would step out of Deng's shadow.(13) However, in the last few years President Jiang Zemin has managed to set his own stamp on the politics of the new China. Although it seems unlikely that there will be any return to the 'great leader' style of past, Jiang has stepped out of the shadow of Deng Xiaoping and established a claim to be 'first among equals' (Zheng 1997, p56). Jiang still relies on the cooperation of figures such as Zhu Rongji and Li Peng, but as of 1998 it seems no longer true to regard China's leadership as a collective system based mainly on a 'Jiang-Li axis'.(14) This has been done not so much by clear political dominance as by a cooperative style which has managed to retain the support of competent men such as Premier Zhu Rongji, while reducing the prospects of others. In effect, Jiang Zemin has build up a 'core' of power, utilising both formal authority and informal networks.(15)

Several public events help set Jiang's stamp on the Chinese leadership. This included his successful handling of the return of Hong Kong, a strong presence at the funeral of Deng Xiaoping,(16) effective management of the Fifteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party during September 1997,(17) a moderately successful visit to America, and an impressive display of diplomacy on President Clinton's return visit to China. Furthermore, there are signs that although central control is still firmly held by the CCP, some degree of cautious opening to reform and new ideas are a part of Jiang Zemin's program.(18) Issues such as Tibet, the future of Taiwan, human rights, and the open use of the Internet remain problematic (Goldstein 1998, pp34-52) for China, but the current leadership seems to be edging towards the understanding that the strict control of communication and debate can no longer be imposed on these issues. Dialogue with the U.S. even on such disputed areas is a preferred path rather than direct confrontation (Nelan 1998, pp40-42). The careful handling of protest in Hong Kong, the improved diplomatic ties between China and the U.S. during 1997 and 1998, and China's signing of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights indicate an edging towards this dialogue process, though overt political dissent within mainland China itself still seems to be viewed as a direct threat to political stability. Recently, only the Taiwan issue seems strong enough to derail this move towards deeper international cooperation.

Although Jiang Zemin may not have achieved all his goals at the CCP's Fifteenth Congress (September 1997), he nonetheless managed a complex situation quite effectively: -

It was perhaps with these successful performances behind him that President Jiang Zemin felt confident enough to recently launch some powerful displays of serious political intent. This included a clear warming that the PLA must reduce its involvement in business (23) and that officers must distinguish between professional military and commercial career paths. His intention to reduce corruption, even when important persons were involved, was underlined when Chen Xitong, Beijing's former party secretary, was arrested and sentenced to 16 years in prison.(24)

Chinese confidence was also expressed clearly in its first strong role in countering financial instability due to currency fluctuations. However, by June 1998, China had stated that it would need to review its position unless serious efforts were made to strengthen the yen. If the yen and the Chinese currency slipped, it was feared that there would be a renewed cycle of economic crisis in Asia, since many of the smaller Asian states rely on Japan as a trading, investing and aid partner. As a result, the U.S. agreed to help support the Japanese currency, with billions of dollars being committed to strengthen the yen in mid June 1998. This, of course, was at best a temporary measure, and as early as 24-25 June money markets began to let the yen slide, perhaps regarding the Japanese response on banking reform as still to limited (Hopkins 1998), though in fact adequate time had not been allowed for a comprehensive strategy to develop. The Chinese action is interesting, since it was perhaps the first forceful entry of China into international currency diplomacy (Harding 1998). Furthermore, it suggested a strong degree of covert cooperation between China, Japan, and the U.S. to deal with a real problem threatening the Asia-Pacific region. By resisting devaluation of the renminbi throughout 1997 and 1998, China not only avoided internal economic turmoil, but had helped at least reduce some of the problems of instability in Asian markets (Strasser 1998). These policies gained the Chinese leadership a certain recognition for making sound financial judgements in the face of difficulties, though the banking, financial and investment sectors do need further reform (Pei 1998; Hong 1997). China herself is cautiously trying to avoid any serious down-turn in her economy. A stall in growth could aid serious unrest within China, and weaken regime-maintenance for the current leadership and the Communist Party as a whole, which over the last decade has prided itself on economic reform and pragmatic gains.

Nor is President Jiang Zemin's approach without explicit cultural foundations, even though these have only been cautiously launched within limited Chinese circles. In 1996, Jiang Zemin spent some months discussing political, historical and cultural issues with eight professors, which resulted in a book called Nine Manuscripts on the Issues of Chinese and World History, Zhong wai lishi wenti de jiu pian wengao (Shen 1997) Published through the CCP's central secretarial bureau under the names of the academics involved, the book received only a limited circulation within Communist Party cadres, and seemed to be a testing of Jiang's particular political vision for the 21^st century. Jiang seems to be linking back to the tradition of the enlightened ruler, ming jun (Shen 1997, p86), which uses the ideas of intellectuals to help provide a morally just leadership. Xinhua Shen has provided a brief summary of the themes of the book, which positions China's place among the great cultures of the world, arguing that China has a unique civilisation which has allowed it to endure where other ancient civilisations have declined and disappeared. At the same time, reform and renovation are required to sustain this civilisation legacy, to maintain its economic base, and to maintain its cultural inclination towards cooperation (Shen 1997, pp88-89). Several chapters of the book draw on Confucian values and ideals for political and international relations, but also argue that some kind of cultural renaissance may be required alongside any kind of economic take-off (Shen 1997, pp89-90). Themes concerning centralisation of power, the role of an effective civil service, and stabilisation of the boundaries of a unified China are given historical treatment, as is the need for moral education based on 'benevolence and love' ren ai ci shan (Shen 1997, pp91-92). One chapter also notes that with these values as the basis of Chinese society, there will always be serious differences with U.S. policy (Shen 1997, pp94-95). What is fascinating about this work, which seems to have been quite well received among its limited readership, was that it tried to draw on China's cultural and civilisation legacy as a source for legitimation, with only a limited attempt to reconstruct Marxist or socialist ideologies. As noted by Xinhau Shen: -

Hence, Jiang Zemin at the CCP's Fifteenth Congress 'lauded village-level elections and the need for greater public accountability of local government and cadres' and stressed 'the need to build the legal system and streamline bureaucratic organs to make them more responsive and efficient' (Shambaugh 1998, p15). Thus one of Jiang's advisers, Liu Ji, has suggested that some level of political reform is needed to protect economic reform and the future of the Party (Zheng 1997, p53). These changes are not so much an overt change in ideology, as an 'implicit political reform' through the additional of certain institutional elements (Zheng 1997, p54; Jiang 1997). Improving the effectiveness of the legal system, introducing regular methods for electing members to the CCP Central Committee, consolidating grass-roots democracy (at village and local levels), and giving priority the rule of law are all mechanisms that improve the accountability of the Party and enhance stability, but without heading down the path of widespread democratisation.(28)

Jiang seems to be reaching for some kind of regime maintenance beyond the narrow appeal of successful economic performance(29) or adherence to communist credentials. Nor does he fully accept Western criteria of transparency, division of powers, and a multiparty system as the goals of political evolution. Rather, a cultural and social legacy is appealed to in order to gain some credence in trying to reform and revitalise a civilisation which can embrace Chinese in the PRC, Hong Kong, Taiwan and elsewhere in the world. Indeed, in so far as the claims are tied up with cultural and intellectual achievements, they transcend racial and nationality considerations, thereby allowing a move towards civilisation dialogue with all those involved in a constructive way in the Chinese world.

Having said this, it remains to be seen whether these moves towards cultural and social legitimation will find a politically acceptable space in which the leaderships of the PRC, Taiwan, and the 'democratic opposition' can find some shared ground for evolutionary political reform.(30) Nonetheless, through such mechanisms President Jiang Zemin during 1997 and 1998 has managed to present a reasonable, intelligent and participatory face for China to the international community, while at the same time providing an acceptable leadership for many in his diverse Chinese 'audiences'. Evolving from his early appearance as a bland technocrat, he has displayed not only a competent administrative capacity, but now seems to be slowly developing a more complex and satisfying public persona which has prompted a level of cautious confidence in regional stability. Of course, he has not met demands for more radical reform, but nor has he retreated into a mechanical conservatism or slavish repetition of past policies. The future and outcomes of his strategies remain to be developed. Key test cases for the Chinese leadership will include the development of their relationship with the U.S., continued financial and economic management, and relations with Taiwan. As of early 2001, there was no guarantee the China under Jiang's leadership could chart these difficult waters without further conflict. Likewise, there is the prospect that over the next 3-5 years Jiang Zemin may wish to step aside or appoint a new leadership.

7. Balance of Power or International Cooperation

Another way to approach the issue of power-politics in the Indo-Pacific is to ask whether a set of stable, multilateral organisations can moderate power conflicts in the region. Tradition strategic thinkers have suggested that this is not possible, and that ASEAN, the ARF and APEC have all failed in their ability to arbitrate serious political disputes, or strongly enforce agreements on all parties. Of course, this was not the intention of these organisation - they were designed to build consensus, develop confident building measures, engage in preventive diplomacy (though some further arbitration of disputes mechanisms may be developed in the future, see Ball & Kerr 1996). To date, the only other organisations suggested for security issues in the Indo-Pacific are not as comprehensive as the CSCE (Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, now the OSCE). CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) does provide an advisory roll in 'second-track' diplomacy, but these seems too weak to forge a truly cooperative agenda throughout the region.

The problem here, expressed simply, is that the U.S. is powerful enough military, and has sufficiently robust arrangements with allies, to not rely on truly multilateral arrangements (unlike its economic situation). Indeed, U.S. policy at times even does beyond bilateralism, i.e. it is sometimes 'unilateral' in that it sometimes forces a particular agenda on neutral or allied states regardless of their wishes. Perhaps one of the more destructive options for the future, however, would be any return to great power competition, particular if this became a three-way contest among China, Japan and the United States.

9. Bibliography and Further Resources

Footnotes (Title References and Discursive notes)

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