INTR13-305 & INTR71/72-305, The Department of International Relations, SHSS, Bond University, Queensland, Australia

5. Australian Defence Policies: Alliance or Independence?

Topics: -

As we have seen in earlier lectures, a nation's participation in war and the way its conceives of its security have a direct impact on its foreign policy, its international relations, and in many cases upon its identity. Changes in defence policy, in particular, are often responses to, or causes for, major adaptations in the international system, or in regional priorities. In this lecture, we will focus on the 'facts' of Australia's defence posture, capabilities and doctrine from the 1990s until 2001, with a brief mention of how this has emerged over the last century. It must be stressed that security and defence involve much broader issues than just military capability.

During the 1980s Australia had a full time force of some 70,000 personnel, supported by approx. 28,000 reservists. As of 1995, the total active force was 51,100 (23,700 in the army), with 38,250 reserves (Chipman 1995). As of 1998, the active force was 57,400, with general reserves of 33,650 (Chipman 1998). In 1999, the total active force was based on 55,200 persons, with 27,730 reserves (Chipman 2000). This number was trimmed down to 51,500 by 2000, but it is now expected that the number will need to increase again to 54,000 by 2010 (Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, p.xii). This is a small personnel base, in the absence of either conscription or near universal 'national service' (as experienced in Switzerland, Singapore, or South Korea for example). This structure was changed in the early 1990s to reduce the number of personnel in the military forces and civilian members of the Defence Department, and increase the reliance on a special 'ready reserve' and reservists generally. After the 1991 Force Structure Review, there was a reduction of personnel by 16,250 (17.3%), allowing a saving of $116 million a year (Dibb 1996). The current government completed a Defence Efficiency Review in 1997 which creates a more unified command between the Army, Navy and Air Force, and has made considerable cost savings by administrative cuts (Jenkins 1997). Through 1999-2000, the Howard government has begun a new review process which has signalled a partly revised conception of how the military should be used. In part, this has been in response to the crises in Indonesia and East Timor.

At around 1.9% through the mid-1990s (3% in the late 1980s) of GDP, Australia defence spending was also quite moderate (compared with approx. 5% for the US and in real terms, for China), but in regional terms (Southeast Asia) it was by far the largest program in economic terms (Malaysia spent $US2.4 billion and Indonesia $US2.6 billion on defence in 1995, Chipman 1995). Defence expenditure in 1994 for Australia was $10.22 billion (Chipman 1995), with a slight drop in following years. Through 2000-2001, however, the defence budget has increased, in part due to perceived regional instability, but also due to the need to purchase a new generation of high-tech equipment. The defence budget remains more than three times that of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Overall, total defence spending in ASEAN nations as a group is now beginning to outstrip that of Australia, but in national terms Australia's budget remains by far the largest, e.g. in 1994 Australia spent $US7.2 billion on defence, while the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore Malaysia and Thailand in total spend some $US11.9 billion (see comparative tables in Ball & Kerr 1996, p48). Due to the Asian economic crisis, defence spending in many Southeast Asian nations had been curtailed in the late 1990s, while Australia’s was protected from budget cuts, and in the light of operations in East Timor has since been increased in real terms.(1) The Howard government estimates that with growth in economy of above 3%, it is possible for these increases to be contained at around 1.9% of GDP through to the year 2010 (Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force).

The counterbalance to Australia's small force structure has been the reliance on 'force multipliers', i.e. modern technology, aircraft, ships, new weapons systems, surveillance systems etc.(2), to ensure that small numbers of personnel can still be very effective. The head of this force during the 1980s was 75 FA-18 fighter aircraft (then approximately twice ASEAN's advanced fighters), and 21 F-111C long range strike aircraft, now augmented by some 15 extra F-111Gs to ensure the long-life viability of this part of the Australia's air-defence, at the cost of some $150 million (see Wrigley 1994; Stephens 1996. 70 FA-18s are currently operational). These forces combined give Australia a definite advantage in regional fighter and strike forces, a policy overtly reinforced in Australia's 1994 Defence White Paper. Yet as acknowledged in this 1994 report, it will become harder in the long-term to retain this regional strategic advantage. Regional airforces, including those of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore are going through some modernisation, e.g. proposed F-16s for Thailand, MiG-29s and FA-18s for Malaysia, and orders of the British Aerospace Hawk 100 for Indonesia and Malaysia (Stephens 1996, p47). However, this is hardly a real arms race, and in any case there have been some recent down-turns in spending from the late 1980s, e.g. Malaysia's need to spread out weapons purchases, such as the proposed 27 patrol vessels to be developed, in order to cut its government spending deficit.(3) But it must also be noted that most ASEAN nations are concerned more with internal security issues, and that military expenditure 'is not to balance any major power or counter any major regional threat' (Mak 1995, p22). The ASEAN Regional Forum was partly used to ensure that regional spending would not become destabilising (Mak 1995, p22). Furthermore, regular airpower conferences including ASEAN states and Australia and New Zealand have been held in Darwin to clarify potential areas of cooperation and reduce misunderstandings (see Water & Lax, 1994). Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand in particular, will also find that reductions in economic growth in 1997-1998 will make major modernisation programs difficult to sustain..

Australian naval forces are also oriented towards an ability to interdict forces away from the Australian coast, with an emphasis on missile frigates, new ANZAC frigates (6-8 frigates to be deployed), and new, quiet, conventional submarines to take on these roles. The standing army has a northern orientation, with small components ready for relatively rapid deployment, but with the least prepared reserves taking months to be fully battle-ready.

There are three major factors to note about Australia's defence orientation: -

A part of the British Empire and then a Commonwealth, Australia's military and defence orientation was at first largely based on English models and views of warfare. As 'colonials', Australian troops were sent during the 19th century to participate in British conflicts in the Sudan, in the Boxer Rebellion in China, and the war in South Africa in the 1890s.

In 1909, Australia first introduced compulsory military training and founded the Royal Military College at Duntroon (at this time relying on the British Royal Navy to control the seas). At this time, German's forces in the Pacific, including a naval squadron, and their Pacific island colonies were seen as a potential threat. It was only in 1913, however, that the Australian navy (RAN) and a naval college were developed in order to help protect trade routes. We can interpret Australia defence policy at this time in the following way: -

The inter-war period saw mixed trends. In 1921 the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) was created as a separate service, but in the 1920s, defence spending was generally cut, and Australia's defence was considered part and parcel of 'Imperial Defence' (West 1983, p7). Australia found itself one small ally to powerful alliances in Europe. Wars in Europe and operations in the Middle East were one key formative element of Australian military experience.

Yet in 1939 Australia once again found itself not only in wars in Europe, but in 1941 when Japanese forces engaged in a major Asia-Pacific expansion, Australia found itself engaged in a major Asian war. Britain was in fact too stretched by the desperate war in Europe and the Middle East to defend Australia. This was symbolised both by the fall of Singapore, and the inadequacy of British naval forces throughout the region (this has been controversially interpreted as a form of British treachery, see Day 1988, but it is more likely that Britain underestimated the Japanese threat, simply had no further resources to spare). As a result Australia had no choice but to turn to a new 'great and powerful' ally, the United States.

It was on this basis, and at first in fear of a possibly remilitarised Japan, that an Alliance between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) was concluded. From then on, the relationship with the U.S. remained the corner-piece of Australia's defence policy, a trend not even stopped by New Zealand's effective withdrawal from ANZUS in 1985.

In large measure, this was due to the fact that the U.S.-Australia relationship then formed part of combined Western actions against communism in Asia. On this basis, Australian troops fought in the Korean War (1950-53), the Malayan communist insurgencies of the 1950s, the Indonesian confrontation with Malaysia in the early 1960s, and in the Second Indochina War (1965-75, i.e. the 'Vietnam War'). Hence Australia was engaging in a policy of Forward Defence, i.e. defending Australia's perceived interests by sending them to meet threats overseas. This was part of the so-called domino theory, whereby the collapse of South Vietnam could lead to collapses of friendly states to communism/nationalism in Thailand, then Malaysia, then Indonesia, then pose a direct threat to Australia itself.

With the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and the Nixon (or Guam) doctrine (July 1969) calling for U.S. allies to take more responsibility for their own defence ("burden-sharing"), Australia had to reconsider its defence position. It soon abandoned Forward Defence and decided on a more direct defence of Australia and its interests, i.e. a policy sometimes called Continental Defence or Fortress Australia, a policy continued from the mid to late 1970s. This doctrine was not totally isolationist; it did hope for a stable Pacific Ocean. Yet at the same time the Whitlam Labor government in 1973 saw no major direct threat to Australia for the next 15 years.
 

3. Towards Self-Reliance

Yet there were obvious problems with this doctrine of only directly defending Australian territory: 'In a sense, anything beyond the shore-line is forward defence, and any allied bases inside a 'Fortress Australia' may invite attack, unless 'Fortress Australia' also entails isolation and neutrality' (West 1983, p10). It is not surprising, therefore, that a number of reviews of Australia's defence forced a real change in orientation. These included: -

These trends were further developed in the 1994 Australian Defence White paper, which reiterated most of these themes of defence-in-depth, sea and air interdiction, strategic counter-strike, and the use of technological advantage in an age of modernisation. The main aim of the Australian Defence Force remained the defence of Australian territory (a theme first emphasised in the 1903 Defence Act) and its air and sea approaches, though secondary roles included regional engagement, commitments to allies, and participation in UN operations.(6) Therefore, although the Dibb report outlined the aim of a 'strong stable region free from external pressures', and the desire to train and cooperate with Southeast Asian states 'in order to promote a sense of shared strategic interests' (Dibb 1986, p6), these remained secondary to individual national defence.

Defence orientation remains towards self-reliance, though in the context of the treaty relationship with the United States.(7)The mainly military focus of this type of thinking was also found in the 1986 Dibb report, with the central strategy being: 'Australia must have the military capacity to prevent any enemy from attacking us successfully in our sea and air approaches, gaining a foothold on our soil, or extracting political concessions from us through the use of military force.' (Dibb 1986, p6).

Several other trends, however, also emerge from the 1994 paper: -

5. The Critiques of Defence In Depth - An Aggressive Posture?

The 1994 White Paper emphasised that Australia has no direct clash of interest with any nation which conceivably would lead to a major conflict in the near future, and therefore the orientation of the Australian strategic stance must remain defensive.(12) At the same time, the paper also emphasised the need to develop a non-static defence system which can strike at the enemy away from Australian shores, and if necessary, strike at strategic targets on enemy soil.(13) This leads to a certain dual aspect of Australia's strategy - while having no declared enemy, Australia has prepared for power projection in her region, and has wished to retain a technological advantage compared to her neighbours into the early 21st century. This means that the strategic planning of Australia's armed forces relies on the capabilities of opponents, not on their intention or current threat posture.(14)

This has led some commentators to argue that Australia in fact has become more militant and militaristic in its thinking, with an excessive emphasis on military strike aircraft and multi-million dollar exercises which can only be viewed as threats against regional nations.(15) From this point of view, these self-reliance approaches have undermined any hope of developing a common security approach in the region, and in so far as it is pre-emptive, may not be based on a perception of a 'just defence' system. Furthermore, although our area of primary military defence had been defined quite narrowly (see Air Power Studies Centre 1990), it does reach into Indonesia when the 1000 nautical miles of sea north of Darwin is taken into account. Furthermore, the F-111s and the use of the 4 air-tankers (707-320Cs) allow in-flight-refueling to the FA-18s, giving a longer reach if Australia's defence policy changed. The 1997 Strategic Policy envisions an even better armed force able to operate more effectively at a distant from Australian shores. Academics such as Graeme Cheeseman have suggested that we need to change this policy to a definite policy of non-aggressive defence, which more severely curtails Australia's ability to project power into Southeast Asia, thereby reducing regional tensions (Cheeseman 1990; see also Boserup 1986). This issue of an assertive Australia has re-emerged with a renewed assessment of Australia-U.S. defence relationships under the Coalition government in May-June 1996, and with a possibly more assertive role in support of the U.S. alliance. Australia's forceful engagement in East Timor has also heightened threat perceptions within Indonesia, and may to some degree have reduced the cooperation that can be sustained through organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (see lectures 4 and 6).

Other critics such as Alan Wrigley have suggested that the 1994 Report was a 'dinosaur of a White Paper', committing Australia to an expensive (some $10 billion a year) but outmoded military posture with aging weapons platforms (Wrigley 1994). From this point of view we should be reducing military spending and giving more to economic restructuring so that Australia will be really able to participate in the growth and reforms of the Asia-Pacific region. Secondly, the 1994 White Paper seemed to infer a possible threat from China,(16) and a need to keep pace with ASEAN military spending. The irony, here of course, is that China, aside from problems in 1989 and 1995-6, has much more to gain from a stable economic environment. Furthermore, in the late 1980s, Australia's military budget was as great as all of that of ASEAN - the issue is simply that now, with fairly steady spending in some parts of the region, Australia cannot retain such a relative advantage indefinitely (Wrigley 1994). It also seems to be ironic to be touting a need to compete military with these nations (17) when Australia has positive military relations with three of them: Singapore (at present Australia has an extended military agreement with Singapore, focused on the training of the Singaporean airforce, utilising Australian resources, e.g. at Pearce RAAF base, Blair 1995, p179), Malaysia, and now some relations also being developed with Thailand. In this sense, 'completing with the Jones' may be for little more than prestige, a factor which is a major motivation for modern purchases of high technology equipment in ASEAN states as well (see Mak 1995, p12). Through 2000-2001 the Howard government has committed itself to sustaining the purchase of new aircraft, ships and high-tech capabilities.

Interestingly enough, the December 1995 security agreement with Indonesia which ensures mutual consultation on defence issues has lapsed, even though it was partially translated into action through 1996-1998. This agreement had already resulted in some intelligence sharing between Indonesia and Australia, probably largely on naval issues. This, along with joint exercises between Australian and Indonesian special forces troops, had continued a high level of cooperation which developed since 1992. These troop exercises, of course, are controversial in that the East Timor lobby claimed that such special units are involved in counter-terrorists tasks (O'Connor 1996) in suppressing the Timorese opposition. Certainly, regular exercises such as the Kangaroo exercise can no longer be viewed as in any sense as directed against Indonesia: in 1995 Indonesian troops and planners were involved in these exercises (Ball & Kerr 1996, p69). However, the economic and political crises of Indonesia and East Timor during 1997-2000 (see lecture 3) have meant that the limits of the security relationship became very clear. Indeed, the Australian army was so worried that in February 1998 General John Baker, then Chief of the Defence Force, visited Indonesia to assess the situation (Wordford 1998). Since Indonesia is the capping stone of Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia, the prospects of political turmoil, changes in government, down-turns in Indonesia defence spending, the political role of the military, and human rights issues are all of direct concern. This tensions reached fruition with the involvement of Australian forces in peacemaking exercises in East Timor in late 1999 (see lecture 3), a move which many feared could lead to low-level conflict not just with armed militias, but also with some elements of the Indonesian armed forces. It seems that at no time in the East Timor intervention was the security agreement formally invoked, and the understanding has since lapsed.
 

6. A Revised Defence Role: 1996-2001

Since the election of a Coalition government in 1996, there have been signs of some change of foreign and defence policy. As we saw in previous weeks, this included a renewed emphasis on the U.S. alliance, a willingness to allow the U.S. to use forward basing options in Australia, an option not accepted by other regional countries such as Thailand.(18) There has also been some willingness to favour a new security arrangement in the region based on an extension of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

The Australian Howard government was willing in 1996 to take a somewhat tougher line in supporting U.S. and Taiwanese interests against those of the People's Republic of China (apparently two senior Chinese generals were informed of Australia's displeasure, Greenlees 1996d), though the chief of the Australian Defence Force, General John Baker, has emphasised that this role would be largely political - if defence forces were called upon, this would largely be for a 'demonstrative' role (in Greenlees 1996). After 1997, the government became less overt in its critique of China, and it is not certain that it would rush to the aid of the U.S. in the case of conflict over Taiwan, in spite of continued diplomatic support for a peaceful resolution of the issue. By late 1997, Australia seemed to have returned to a strong 'all-the-way with Asia' push, and had not supported U.S. in its resistance to Chinese entry into the WTO through 1997-1999, and in 1997 refused to vote for the UNHRC Commission motion condemning China's human right's record. Along with an important visit by Prime Minister Howard to China, these trends suggest that Australia wishes to play a strong strategy of engagement with the PRC.

In general, these trends are consistent with the type or priority areas the then Defence Minister McLachlan had already identified as important in reform of the Australian Defence Force (ADF): -

These trends resulted in a consultative process leading to a new White Paper on Defence through 2000, published as Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force. The paper explains that defence spending will need to be increased: -

7. The Role of Defence Industries

From World War II onwards, Australia was forced into greater self-reliance in various defence industries. Thus Australia built its own fighter aircraft in World War II as a stop-gap measure until large scale resource reinforcements could arrive from Britain and the U.S. From the 1960s onwards, Australia also tried to build its own aircraft, either on license (e.g. the early Mirages licensed from France), or of its own design. This applied increasingly to Australian ships and other equipment, though due to the high costs of creating a defence industry, many elements were imported, e.g. Leopard tanks and new U.S. Black Hawk helicopters. At the same time, some substantially Australian-built platforms were developed, e.g. the ANZAC frigates and the new Collins class submarines (6 introduced, Roach 1996, p18), as well as the Steyr infantry rifle, which may be sold to the Thai military (Blair 1995, p179). Australia has also developed its own over-the-horizon radar system, the Jindalee network.

There are problems in this policy: -

There are certain areas where Australian science and technology has been able to develop an edge in defence industries, e.g. the Jindalee Operational Radar Network, which can detect targets over the horizon at long range, as far as 3,000 km beyond the Australian cost. The system is advanced, but has cost a start-up cost of $1.1 billion, and was not fully operational before 1999 (Greenlees 1996c; There are also rumours of detection defects during certain periods of the day). Nonetheless, in the long term Australia will need to import advanced weapon systems, especially war planes, from the U.S. at escalating prices. This improves inter-operability with our major ally, but also exposes us to rapidly rising costs in an industry where the sky literally is the limit.
 

8. Points of View: What is a Defence Force For?

It is possible, of course, that the politics of the defence force, its spending and structure are not really tied only to external threats and rationally perceived tasks and roles. Australia's past involvement in war has become part of the ANZAC identity, and in the 1994 White Paper seems correlated with national pride and the ability to maintain international commitments. The same paper states that we gain more respect from others by having a strong military force. This may be true up to a point, but only up to the point where such respect does not become fear due to an increased security dilemma. There are other ways that armies increase prestige: the presence of a strong army and advanced 'weapon platforms' (the sexy language of high tech) indicates to Australia that 'it is somebody', that it can compete on the world stage and be the best (within its modest means) with the handling of modern military equipment. Modern weapons systems have a symbolic dimension as well, and can de linked to patterns of national identity. Each of the services, of course, has its own elite tradition. Australia also has a proud ANZAC tradition, and claims that its soldiers are among the most professional and best in the world. Unit pride is found in all the services, but especially among elite commando and air-borne (SAS) units. Australian infantry units have claimed to be extremely tough (they were highly respected by the Turks and Germans), and some are experts in jungle warfare.

Yet the danger may be that such traditions can blind Australia to its own needs, and to a neglect of alternative ways to conceive of security. It may also blind Australia to some of the harsh realities concerning military spending. To indicate just a few: -

9. Bibliography and Further Resources

Resources

^{1. For an update on these figures, see the DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION Defence Economic Trends in the Asia Pacific 1999, Canberra, Department of Defence (Australia), 1999 [Internet access at http://www.defence.gov.au/dio/index.html].}

^{2. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, pp21-2.}

^{3. Stephens 1996, pp47-8; "KL to Spread Out Weapons Purchases to Help Trim Deficit" Straits Times, 24 April 1996 [Interactive Internet Access].}

^{4. "Regional Shift Frames New Defence Plan", The Australian, 3 December 1997, p12.}

^{5. For an overview, see The Defence Review ’98: A Special Report, Enclosure in The Australian, 19 June 1998}

^{6. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p13, p15.}

^{7. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p16.}

^{8. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p4.}

^{9. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p8.}

^{10. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p24, p29.}

^{11. "Regional Shift Frames New Defence Plan", The Australian, 3 December 1997, p12.}

^{12. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, pp3-4.}

^{13. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p14.}

^{14. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, pp22-3.}

^{15. See The New Australian Militarism: Undermining Our Future Security, Sydney, Pluto Press, 1990.}

^{16. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994 p9.}

^{17. Inferred in Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p11.}

^{18. "Australia May Let US Store Arms During Crisis", Straits Times, 25 May 1996 [Interactive Internet Access].}

^{19. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p3.}

^{20. Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994, p48.}

^{21. For the initial treaty of 1971, see the Internet at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1971/21.html}

References